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ABSTRACT 
 
Litigants in Person [LiPs] have a poor reputation in legal scholarship. Routinely labelled 
‘pests’, ‘nuts’, ‘weirdos’, and worse, LiPs are often posited as a problem for the courts. This 
perception has only been aggravated by the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act in April 2013 which ended legal aid for the majority of 
litigants in non-criminal cases. And yet, despite these pejorative attitudes, we know 
surprisingly little about LiPs. Historically marginalised in scholarship, LiPs are rarely spoken 
about, and almost never spoken to. This thesis sets out in part to redress this by putting their 
experiences at the centre of this research. Drawing on fifteen oral history life stories with 
LiPs, this thesis asks: what is going to law like for them? In addition to adding LiP 
experiences to the record, though, this thesis also sets out to consider what LiP experiences 
can tell us about access to justice. This thesis contends that LiPs face far more challenging 
difficulties than has heretofore been recognised in research. Moreover, this thesis argues that 
these difficulties are, counter to popular perception, not problems inherent to LiPs, but are 
instead indicative of systemic inadequacies in the civil justice system itself, a system which 
theoretically provides access for LiPs but which excludes them in all meaningful ways. 
Ultimately, I argue that until reform addresses the systematic inequality embedded in the civil 
justice system, LiPs are doomed to fail.   
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It is curious that lay litigants have been regarded … as problems, almost as nuisances for 
the court system. This has meant that the focus has generally been upon the difficulties 
that litigants in person pose for the courts rather than the other way around.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
1 John Baldwin, Monitoring the Rise in the Small Claims Limit: Litigants' Experience of Different Forms of 
Adjudication (LCD Research Series 1/97, December 1997). 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis begins with a simple question: why do litigants in person [LiPs] have such a 
terrible reputation? Routinely labelled pests, nuts, weirdos and worse, LiPs are frequently 
spoken about, or written about, in highly pejorative terms.2  These terms are so pejorative, in 
fact, that no other group involved in legal proceedings is talked about in equally negative 
terms, including serial criminal defendants, who attract less vitriol. This is perhaps 
unsurprising: the figure of the criminal defendant as the “poor accused” and the obligation of 
the legal professional to robustly represent this individual is fundamental to our conception of 
justice, and to our notion of a fair trial. LiPs, however, don’t fit into this idealised vision of 
justice. Mostly appearing in proceedings of very little financial or legal consequence, claiming 
or defending comparatively “mundane” issues, LiPs have no place in legal mythologizing. The 
fact that LiPs cut rather unromantic figures may be one reason why they attract comparatively 
little sympathy.3  
 
As this thesis contends, however, the problem isn’t simply that the LiP doesn’t belong in legal 
mythology. The problem is that the LiP doesn’t belong anywhere. Even when we aren’t 
imagining ideal legal proceedings—even when we are simply thinking about any kind of legal 
encounter—we probably aren’t picturing LiPs. This is because normal legal practice means 
being legally represented. Our civil justice system reflects this: it is not a system, as the Civil 
Justice Council noted in 2012, ‘designed with self-represented litigants in mind’.4 LiPs are an 
aberration from what is perceived of as “normal”. The normalisation of representation, and the 
consequent aberrance of not having legal representation, means that there is no clear place for 
LiPs in the civil justice system.5 This thesis therefore seeks to understand how LiPs came to be 
perceived as aberrant from legal proceedings, and what consequences flow for LiPs from this 
positioning. As I will show, this aberrance works as a kind of double marginalisation: LiPs are 
                                                     
2 See, for example, Tania Sourdin and Nerida Wallace, “The Dilemmas Posed by Self-Represented 
Litigants – The Dark Side,” Access to Justice, Paper 32 (2012). More examples are provided in Chapter 
Two.  
3 It is worth pointing out that while LiPs are generally unromantic to the legal profession, there is a 
romanticism on the part of the public more widely, in the idea of the “little guy” going up against a 
larger foe, such as in the ‘McLibel’ case. See McDonald's Corporation v Steel & Morris [1997] EWHC QB 
366. 
4 Civil Justice Council, Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (London: CJC, November 2011), 11.  
5 It is important, of course, to distinguish between different kinds of civil proceedings. However, as I 
will go on to argue, while some proceedings, such as small claims, are more accessible for LiPs than 
others, they still always pose more risks and difficulties for LiPs than they do for represented parties.  
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both structurally marginalised, through their lack of place in the civil justice system, as well as 
marginalised through their positioning as aberrant in their behaviour or character.  
 
In this respect, then, LiPs—although there are more of them than we might think—are 
analogous to a minority. That is, while LiPs may not be knowingly and actively discriminated 
against, the barriers they face are systemic and institutional. In addition, they have been 
largely ignored or overlooked by legal scholarship. In fact, although LiPs are often talked 
about pejoratively, the bigger problem has been that historically, LiPs haven’t been talked 
about, or thought about, much at all. They have also hardly ever been spoken to. LiPs rarely 
feature in legal scholarship about civil justice. Indeed, with some notable, and important, 
exceptions, very little scholarship has focused directly on the LiP at all, leading to their 
effective invisibility in the records.6 This thesis is therefore in part a means of correction, 
joining a small body of scholarship that seeks to understand what it is like to pursue or defend 
a claim without legal representation.7  
 
However, although LiPs have been historically marginalised in legal scholarship, it is 
important to acknowledge that recent changes to legal aid have resulted in a considerable 
increase in interest in LiPs. I began this thesis in April 2013, the month that the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders [LASPO] Act came into force.  This Act effectively 
cut off access to legal aid for the overwhelming majority of litigants in non-criminal cases.8 In 
the wake of the passage of this bill, the LiP came to the fore as a pressing issue for the legal 
profession and for legal scholarship. This was primarily because it was expected that these 
cuts in legal aid would lead to a significant rise in LiPs in civil and family proceedings.9 
Scholars and practitioners were therefore wrestling with the projected impact LiPs would 
have on the courts. In addition, discussions about LiPs occurred in tandem with debates and 
protests about the future of legal aid practitioners after LASPO. There has consequently been 
                                                     
6 This body of scholarship includes the influential work of Hazel Genn, John Baldwin, Richard 
Moorhead and Mark Sefton, Julie McFarlane, Liz Trinder and Rosemary Hunter.  
7 See in particular, Hazel Genn and Yvette Genn, The Effectiveness of Representation at Tribunals, Report 
to the Lord Chancellor (LCD, London 1989); Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton, Litigants in person: 
Unrepresented Litigants in First Instance Proceedings, Department of Constitutional Affairs Research Series 
2/05 (DCA: United Kingdom, 2005); John Baldwin, “Litigants Experience of Adjudication in the Civil 
Courts,” Civil Justice Quarterly 18 (1999): 12-40; Paul Lewis, “Litigants in Person and their Difficulties in 
Adducing Evidence: A Study of a Small Claims in an English County Court,” International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 11, no.1 (2007): 24-48; Robert Lee and Tatiana Tkacukova, A Study of Litigants in 
Person in Birmingham Civil Justice Centre (CEPLER: Birmingham, 2017).  
8 For a summary of these early changes, see Bar Council, “Bar Council response to the Transforming 
Legal Aid: Next Steps Consultation,” Consultation Paper, October 2013. 
9 See Judith Marsh, “A View from the Personal Support Unit,” The Rise of the Litigant in Person: Three 
Perspectives on The Increasing Numbers of People Who Represent Themselves in Court (London: Inner 
Temple, 2013), 48.  
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a marked increase in scholarly interest in LiPs since I began this PhD, and this has only 
continued to grow over the last few years.10 
 
But while the passage of LASPO was important, and while research into LiPs is growing, this 
thesis parts company from recent scholarship in two ways. Firstly, I argue that while the 
passage of LASPO may have aggravated the situation, legal aid changes by no means created 
the difficulties that LiPs face. As I will show, these difficulties have been with us for a very 
long time and they go far deeper than the result of legal aid restrictions. They are, instead, the 
result of an institutional inequality. Secondly, this thesis contends that this inequality has a far 
deeper impact on LiPs than has been hitherto realised. Ultimately, while much post-LASPO 
writing focuses on the impact LiPs will have on the courts, this thesis argues we should spend 
more time considering the very real impact the courts have on the LiP.11  
 
This thesis takes its conceptual framework from the idea of exploring different ‘ways of seeing’ 
when it comes to LiPs.12 Firstly, this thesis seeks to understand how LiPs are seen by the legal 
profession, and secondly through using oral history techniques in the form of life stories 
interviews, this thesis seeks to understand how LiPs see the law, the people who work within 
the law, and themselves.13 As this thesis will demonstrate, what emerges from this analysis is a 
disjuncture between discourses; LiPs have radically different ways of seeing to legal 
professionals, and the result of this is that these groups largely talk across one another. The 
failure of understanding one another’s ways of seeing is central to explaining many of the 
difficulties that arise in practice and communication. Guided by these ideas, then, this thesis 
pursues an original analysis of LiP experience in the civil justice system, seeking to answer 
four key research questions. Firstly, how and why did LiPs come to acquire the negative 
reputation that they have? Secondly, how can we better gain access to LiP experiences, and to 
their ways of seeing? Thirdly, what can these experiences tell us about the institutional 
barriers to access that LiPs face? And finally: what can we do about these barriers? The 
pursuit and elaboration of these four questions is the story of this thesis.  
 
                                                     
10 This includes most recently Lee and Tkacukova, A Study of Litigants in Person; Trinder et al, 
“Litigants in Person in Private Family Law Cases,” Ministry of Justice Analytical Series 2014; the research 
project under Professor Grainne McKever at Ulster University 
(http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/impact-litigants-person-northern-ireland-court-system). 
11 As pointed out by John Baldwin, in the epigraph that opens this thesis, as well as Justice Woolf and 
others.  
12 I have borrowed the term ‘ways of seeing’ from John Berger’s pioneering work of images and visual 
arts, where he explores how the way in which we see is affected by what we know and believe. See John 
Berger, Ways of Seeing (London: Penguin, 1972). 
13 I will explain life stories interviews in more detail later in the chapter as well as in depth in Chapter 
Four which outlines my methodology. 
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WHAT IS A LITIGANT IN PERSON? 
 
The first point of departure is to clarify who exactly is a LiP. This is by no means 
straightforward. In addition to issues with an historical lack of data on LiPs (Hazel Genn 
memorably described it as a “black hole”),14 demographic research that has been done shows a 
considerable diversity in gender, age, ethnicity and education.15 As John Baldwin pointed out, 
therefore, ‘the average litigant or the typical court user does not exist, and any attempt to 
generalise about them is hazardous and probably in most circumstances misleading’.16 In 
addition to this, inconsistencies as to the definition of the term LiP create considerable 
confusion amongst those attempting to discuss legal aid changes, propose reforms or even to 
intervene in any way in the conversation. Peter Gibson, LJ defined a LiP as: 
 
A party to litigation who represents himself by appearing in court himself. If someone 
other than himself represents him, then notwithstanding that that other person is his 
agent, that party is not a litigant in person.17 
 
But while this may seem simple enough, this definition in fact fails to capture a large 
proportion of individuals without representation. Lord Gibson emphasises that being a LiP 
involves attending court, but this excludes individuals who may lack legal representation, be 
involved in legal proceedings, and never set foot inside a courtroom. These people are also 
LiPs.18 In the post-Woolf reforms world, with an emphasis on mediation and on avoidance of 
court, only including those appearing in courtrooms considerably truncates our understanding 
of who acts as a LiP.19 A more comprehensive definition, then, is the one issued by the Equal 
Treatment Bench Book: ‘The term [litigant in person] encompasses those preparing a case for 
trial or hearing, those conducting their own case at a trial or hearing and those wishing to 
enforce a judgment or to appeal’.20 
 
                                                     
14 Hazel Genn, Conference Paper given at Australasian Judicial Institute of Administration, Assisting 
Unrepresented Litigants, Sydney, 15-17 April 2014. Richard Moorhead also describes the lack of 
information on LiPs as a “black hole” in his 3 June 2013 blog at: 
https://lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2013/06/03/response-to-legal-aid-consultation/ (accessed 14 
July 2017). See also Genn, Judging Civil Justice: The 2008 Hamlyn Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 133. 
15 Kim Williams, Litigants in Person: A Literature Review (Ministry of Justice: London, 2011). 
16 Baldwin, “Litigants Experience,” 20. 
17 Gibson, LJ, [1996] 2 All ER 334 at 341, [1996] 1 WLR 518 at 525. 
18 And this conversation leaves aside the question of using the term ‘LiP’ over the arguably more 
comprehensible term ‘self-represented litigant [SRL]’ which is gaining currency in other jurisdictions, 
such as Australia and Canada. This latter term was considered, and rejected, by Lord Dyson in 2013. 
See: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/mor-guidance-terminology-lips/ (accessed 14 July 
2017).  
19 Lord Woolf, The Woolf Report: Access to Justice (London: Ministry of Justice, 1996). 
20 Judicial College, Equal Treatment Bench Book (London: Judicial College, 2013), 1. 
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However, this still leaves the question of McKenzie Friends to consider. McKenzie Friends are 
individuals who assist LiPs but who do not formally represent them.21 Practice guidance 
issued in 2010 emphasises that McKenzie Friends can provide ‘moral support’, ‘take notes’, 
help with ‘case papers’ and ‘quietly give advice’ but may not ‘act as the litigant’s agent,’ 
emphasising that McKenzie Friends have no right of audience and are not formal agents.22 
Gibson suggests that anyone represented by an ‘agent’, whether or not they are a legal 
representative, is not a LiP, which implies that individuals with McKenzie friends are still 
considered LiPs. However, considering that in ‘exceptional circumstances’ McKenzie Friends 
can be granted rights of audience, and considering that McKenzie Friends can provide 
significant assistance for litigants, definitions of LiP that do not consider McKenzie Friends 
also arguably fail to capture another important variety in LiP experience.23  
 
Terminological confusion also arises from the assumption, as Moorhead and Sefton point out, 
that LiPs are claimants who bring proceedings.24 As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, 
the association of LiP with claimant is linked to pejorative assumptions predicated on the 
belief that LiPs are litigious and actively pursue proceedings (usually unnecessarily).25 But 
LiPs act as both claimants and defendants. If anything, as Moorhead and Sefton point out, the 
majority of LiPs are defendants. Indeed, they go on to point out that ‘passive defendants’, 
whom they define as named defendants in litigation who never actively take part in 
proceedings, let alone appear in court, formed 56 per cent of their sample.26  Definitions of 
LiPs, therefore, that are based on appearing in a courtroom or active participation limit, rather 
than assist our understanding. 
 
Finally, the term LiP is linked to the literature that posits LiPs as being individuals who 
deliberately “go it alone”. However, as past research demonstrates, and as this research 
                                                     
21. See Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Reforming the Courts’ Approach to McKenzie Friends: A 
Consultation (Stationery Office: London, November 2016). See also Leanne Smith, Emma Hitchings and 
Mark Sefton, A Study of Fee-Charging McKenzie Friends and Their Work in Private Family Law Cases (Bar 
Council: Bristol and Cardiff University, 2017).  
22 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Practice Guidance: McKenzie Friends (Civil and Family Courts) (Courts 
and Tribunal Judiciary: London, 2010), 1.  
23 McKenzie Friends can be granted ‘rights of audience’ on application by the litigant if the judge feels 
there are exceptional circumstances. Examples of circumstances given in the practice guidance includes 
litigant health problems, a lack of financial resources, or the possibility that a litigant is sufficiently 
inarticulate to require considerable amounts of prompting, which would delay proceedings. See Courts 
and Tribunals Judiciary, McKenzie Friends, 3-4.  
24 Moorhead and Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants, 245.  
25 Of course, calling someone litigious is not in and of itself pejorative; however, in this context the link 
is made between ‘frivolous’ litigation and wasting the courts’ time; two claims frequently made against 
LiPs, as I will outline in the next chapter. 
26 Ibid, 27.  
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supports, this is almost never the case.27 Most LiPs have intermittent, and considerably 
varying, degrees of representation and advice.28 The impact of this kind of advice and 
representation has a meaningful influence on how and why individuals become LiPs and as 
such, it is important to acknowledge this variety. Cumulatively then, many of the assumptions 
we make about LiPs often turn out to be wrong, and many of the ways in which we attempt to 
define LiPs fails to capture the true breadth of individuals who are LiPs. For the purposes of 
this dissertation then, I define LiPs as broadly as possible: individuals who are either claimants 
or defendants, who do not have sustained legal representation throughout the life of their legal 
proceedings.  
 
In addition to the diversity of individuals who may constitute LiPs, this complexity is only 
added to by the fact that LiPs act in multiple kinds of proceedings in the United Kingdom. 
This is reflective of the U.K.’s position of having no restrictions of access in any court or 
tribunal for those without representation.29 This breadth necessitates some limitations on the 
scope of this study. This research focuses on a group of LiPs who have lodged matters in the 
County Courts. The reason I have chosen this specific court is firstly, because County Courts 
are theoretically designed to facilitate access for LiPs.30 Consequently, the experiences LiPs 
have with these proceedings help test whether the current procedures in place to help LiPs are 
represented in the experiences LiPs have or whether (as I will argue) there remain significant 
barriers to access.  
 
Secondly, my focus on the County Court forms a point of difference from much post-LASPO 
research which has focused on LiPs in private family law proceedings.31 As stated earlier, my 
thesis contends that LiP difficulties date back farther than the 2013 legal aid changes and 
consequently such changes are not my focus. When I state that I am looking at County Court 
proceedings, however, I do not mean that my research is limited to this court alone. One of the 
significant findings from this research is that almost all the LiPs interviewed had been 
involved in other court proceedings as well; so, while the County Courts form a baseline of 
                                                     
27 See Julie McFarlane, The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of 
Self-Represented Litigants, Treasurer’s Advisory Group on Access to Justice [TAG] Working Group 
Report, 86.  
28 Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 1999), 83-98.   
29 Rabeea Assy, Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015). 
30 This is comparatively speaking however; as even the Handbook for Litigants in Person, written by six 
judges for LiPs in civil proceedings, prefaces the guide with a warning that no court is designed for a 
LiP. See HHJ Edward Bailey et al., A Handbook for Litigants in Person (London: Courts and Tribunals 
Judiciary, 2012).    
31 See for example, Trinder et al, “LiPs in Private Family Law Cases”; Jess Mant and Julie Wallbank, 
“The Post-LASPO Landscape: Challenges for Family Law,” Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 39, 
no. 2(2017): 149-151; Liz Trinder and Rosemary Hunter, “Access to Justice? Litigants in Person Before 
and After LASPO,” Family Law 45, no.5 (2015): 535-41; Jess Mant, “Neoliberalism, Family Law and 
Access to Justice,” Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 39, no. 2 (2017): 246-258.  
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shared experience, the interviews in this study take us to many different kind of courts, 
including tribunals, higher civil courts and criminal proceedings. 
 
In addition, although I have so far talked about different kinds of courts LiPs are involved in, I 
am not focusing only on what happens in the courtroom.  This would give a misleading weight 
to these kinds of appearances when the reality of legal proceedings is that attending hearings 
is a minor part of the process. Most litigation involves far more time being spent “behind the 
scenes” in negotiations, discussions, settlements and mediation.32 In addition, research into 
LiPs has repeatedly shown the important effect differing kinds of advice and preparation they 
receive can have, if and when they do appear before a court or a tribunal because 
‘representation…is the culmination of a series of preparatory stages in the redress of 
grievances or challenging of decisions which begins with early advice’.33 Consequently this 
thesis pays equal attention to LiP experiences before, during and after appearing in court, and 
includes those LiPs who may never step into a courtroom.  
 
DISCOURSE, SPECIALISM AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
 
A key focus in this thesis is the attempt to elaborate on different discourses, or “ways of 
seeing” communicated by both LiPs and by legal professionals and the gaps between the two 
(loosely definable as “lay” and “law”). In Moorhead and Sefton’s 2005 study into unrepresented 
litigants, for example, they observe that: ‘With unrepresented litigants, judges and court staff 
pointed out there was a much stronger possibility of cases being entirely misconceived, or 
being expressed solely in social, non-legal terms’.34 What Moorhead and Sefton draw attention 
to is a collision between what they term ‘social’ (non-legal) understanding and legal 
understanding. This conflict is one of the primary problems LiPs face when representing 
themselves as what they perceive to mean by “common sense”, “justice”, “relevance” or 
“fairness” may bear little resemblance to legally understood meanings of these terms. What is 
common sense to legal practitioners and what is common sense to a LiP will be fundamentally 
different and is likely to come into conflict.35  This thesis will contend that this kind of 
knowledge gap is a crucial means by which LiPs are excluded from meaningful participation in 
legal process.  
 
                                                     
32 Genn describes this as the ‘centrality of out of court settlement’ to the civil justice system in Paths to 
Justice, 2.  
33 Genn and Genn, Representation at Tribunals, 126. 
34 Moorhead & Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants, 154. 
35 Of course, such conflicts or gaps in perception also exist between all litigants and legal professionals, 
not just LiPs; however, what distinguishes LiPs here is that they do not have a representative to 
translate their experiences for them.  
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In analysing these different ways of seeing, I use the term discourse in the sense that Michel 
Foucault meant; not as a formalistic analysis of language, but rather as an interrogation into 
the specific conditions under which a way of seeing is constructed and deployed, and the effect 
that this has.36 As Foucault points out:  
  
we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its 
conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other 
statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it 
excludes.37  
 
In this respect, to analyse discourses, and in particular to think about the discourse of legal 
practitioners and LiPs is to fundamentally consider the network of power relations within 
which such discourses take place:  
 
To reveal in all its purity the space in which discursive events are deployed is not to 
undertake to re-establish it in an isolation that nothing could overcome; it is not to close it 
upon itself; it is to leave oneself free to describe the interplay of relations within it and 
outside it. 38 
 
Importantly, this kind of discourse is not limited to language, but also encompasses embodied 
behaviours, procedure and habituated practice, all of which play an important role in 
constituting ways of disadvantaging and excluding LiPs.  
 
However, in approaching describing the relationship between “lay” and “law,” specifically in 
terms of inequality of power, I am conscious of not oversimplifying how complex each of these 
subject positions are. So, while I believe that certain themes of practice and certain behaviour 
may be generally apparent in the behaviour of legal practitioners, I want to emphasise that I am 
not claiming that all legal practitioners think or behave in a uniform way, which of course they 
do not. It is at this point that I find the sociological theory of Pierre Bourdieu valuable in 
making this complexity clear. Bourdieu follows Foucault in seeing discourse as constituting 
and defining power relations, but is particularly interested in how individuals absorb and 
reproduce such discourses, or what he terms ‘field specific knowledge’, arguing that this is 
largely through unconscious habits and practice, or what he terms habitus.39 
                                                     
36 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1972), 27. 
37 Ibid, 28. 
38 Ibid, 29. 
39 Bourdieu’s ‘field theory’ emerges from his analysis of different ‘fields’ of cultural production where he 
investigates how field-specific concepts develop and how individuals working within these fields seek to 
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For Bourdieu, habitus is a dynamic, conceptual idea that seeks to describe an individual’s 
predispositions and belief systems, based on what individuals learn to value from early 
childhood onwards. This acquisition of values comes through the drive of all humans to seek 
recognition and validation from others.40 This drive continues into our professional lives, and 
any individual working within a field, such as the legal field, will naturally seek recognition 
within that field: we are all in pursuit of what Bourdieu termed symbolic capital, whether that 
be prestige, advancement, or explicit financial gain.41 To be successful within a field, 
individuals (or what Bourdieu termed ‘agents’) will internalise and naturalise the logics of that 
particular field or, more informally, they will learn the “rules of the game,” in their effort to 
get on. But, importantly, in the process of learning the rules of the game, Bourdieu argues that 
these individuals end up misrecognising the ‘social conditions under which it [the juridical 
field] is manifested’ as being “natural”. This is something apparent in all fields:   
 
The tendency to conceive of the shared vision of a specific historical community as the 
universal experience of a transcendental subject can be observed in every field of cultural 
production. Such fields appear as sites in which universal reason actualises itself, owing 
nothing to the social conditions under which it is manifested.42 
 
So, like Foucault, Bourdieu is arguing that discourses or practices that emerge within 
specialist fields present themselves as timeless or ‘eternal’, but in so doing disguise the specific 
historical conditions, and power relations, under which they are constituted to the point that 
even those working within these fields may not necessarily recognise the inequality on which 
such practices are founded.  
 
For Bourdieu, misrecognition is essential for establishing the relative autonomy of any 
specialist field.  So, the gap between lay and law for Bourdieu is reproduced through agents 
unconsciously learning and playing out the “rules of the game” in that field. But this gap isn’t 
accidental; instead the gap is the border between laypersons and law that emphasises the 
necessary skills possessed by the legal profession alone. As Bourdieu comments:  
 
The institution of a “judicial space” implies the establishment of a borderline between 
actors. It divides those qualified to participate in the game and those who, though they may 
                                                                                                                                                           
establish a specialised identity. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and 
Literature (Columbia University Press: New York, 1993), 162-164.  
40 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 166.  
41 Ibid, 166. 
42 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field,” Hastings Law 
Journal (1987): 819. 
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find themselves in the middle of it, are in fact excluded by their inability to accomplish the 
conversion of mental space—and particularly of linguistic stance—which is presumed by 
entry into this social space.43 
 
Bourdieu’s theory is critical for this research as it helps explain how a LiP’s failure to achieve 
the requisite skills demanded of them in the courtroom (and elsewhere) is a necessary and 
deliberate consequence of entry into juridical space. LiPs cannot accomplish the ‘conversions’ 
required of language and behaviour because they are not meant to. A LiP’s failure is a means of 
maintaining the specialist legal profession: it sustains dependence on legal representation to 
navigate legal process. 
 
Critically, however, legal practitioners will not necessarily be fully cognisant of the difficulties 
for LiPs because they have naturalised what is in fact a very specifically legally produced form 
of understanding and knowledge:  
 
an essential tautology…requires that within the field, conflicts can only be resolved 
juridically—that is, according to the rules and conventions of the field itself. For this 
reason such entry completely redefines ordinary experience and the whole situation at 
stake in any litigation. As is true of any “field,” the constitution of the juridical field is a 
principle of constitution of reality itself. 44 
 
This is evidenced by Moorhead and Sefton, who noted in 2005 that: 
 
There was some evidence of a broader, and understandable, confusion of law with social or 
moral notions of ‘justice’. Unrepresented litigants frequently sought to introduce evidence 
of facts relevant to their own perceptions of fairness but irrelevant to the legal adjudication 
of their dispute.45 
 
I argue, following Bourdieu, that what Moorhead and Sefton term ‘confusion’ is better 
understood as a conflict of concepts produced by the gap between lay and law: this gap is 
productive because it allows the legal field to redefine ‘ordinary’ concepts into a hierarchy of 
meaning that privileges legal understanding and undermines ‘social’ meaning. As Bourdieu 
expresses it: ‘The professionals create the need for their own services by redefining problems 
                                                     
43 Ibid, 828.  
44 Bourdieu, “The Force of Law,” 831.  
45 Moorhead and Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants, 256. 
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expressed in ordinary language as legal problems, translating them into the language of the 
law’.46  
 
As Bourdieu notes, legal language tends to emphasise the neutral and the objective that 
transcends historically contingent and “ordinary” understandings. This leads to a fundamental 
difference between “common sense” as internally defined within the legal field, and what 
people from outside this field might see as common sense.47 By drawing on Bourdieu’s 
terminology, then, I am not arguing that legal professionals necessarily deliberately seek to 
undermine or aggravate LiPs; rather I argue that training and repeated practice leads those 
who work within the legal field to embody and reproduce certain kinds of knowledges that 
disadvantage LiPs. Legal practitioners will frequently (although not always) misrecognise 
their skills as normal and this, as this thesis will demonstrate, leads to all sorts of difficulties. 
 
In addition to Foucault’s work on discourse, and Bourdieu’s field-theory, another important 
theoretical building block for this research is the work of Magali Sarfatt Larson, whose 1977 
work The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis, outlines what Larson terms the 
‘professional project’. For Larson, the professional project is: 
 
the process by which producers of special services sought to constitute and control a 
market for their expertise. Because marketable expertise is a crucial element in the 
structure of modern inequality, professionalization appears also as a collective assertion of 
special social status and a collective process of upward social 
mobility[...]professionalization is thus an attempt to translate one order of scarce 
resources—special knowledge and skills—into another—social and economic rewards. 48 
 
Larson’s work also emphasises the gap between lay and law, arguing that this gap is a 
deliberate consequence of this professional project. Like Bourdieu, Larson too does not claim 
that such a project is necessarily a conscious undertaking. As she notes, when she uses the 
term project:    
 
it does not mean that the goals and strategies pursued by a given group are entirely clear 
or deliberate for all the members, nor even for the most determined and articulate among 
them. Applied to the historical results of a given course of action, the term “project” 
                                                     
46 Bourdieu, “The Force of Law,” 833-834.  
47 Ibid, 820.  
48 Magali Sarfatt Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1977), xvii. 
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emphasises the coherence and consistence that can be discovered ex post facto in a variety 
of apparently unconnected acts.49 
 
However, what distinguishes Larson’s work from Bourdieu, and makes her work of value to 
this thesis. is her attention to how the dual goals of the professional project—consisting of 
both monopolisation of the market and the attainment of social status—develop.  
 
Laying out the historical development of professions, Larson traces the way in which 
professions emerge in the 19th century in a political and economic context marked by the 
emergence of new markets and the movement of rural populations towards urban centres.  As 
she notes, ‘the modern model of profession emerges as a necessary response of professional 
producers to new opportunities for earning an income’.50 Larson argues that critical to the 
development of a profession is attention to standardisation of practice, the development of a 
‘cognitive commonality,’ and the move to eliminating any competition from unregulated 
actors. All of these tendencies, Larson argues, are oriented towards the ultimate goal, which is 
the social distancing of these professionals from non-professionals, and the consequent status 
that arises from this distinction.51  I draw on Larson’s work to argue that much of the 
difficulties that LiPs experience is a by-product of this professional project. Seen through the 
lens of the professional project, LiPs are not simply laypersons. Instead they are also 
individuals who aren’t appropriately educated, regulated, licenced or trained to be taking on 
legal work, but who are arguably taking the place of a professional. This analysis opens up 
another possibility as to why LiPs are talked about pejoratively. This is not only because they 
are deemed insufficiently competent, but because their growing presence constitutes a threat 
towards the monopoly of the legal profession. 
 
In addition to the literature that seeks to understand and approach talking about legal 
practitioners and “the law”, this thesis also draws on socio-legal scholarship to talk about “the 
lay”. For this, the work of Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey in The Common Place of Law is of 
particular value.52 Ewick and Silbey’s work concentrates on what the law means to those 
outside of the legal profession and how ordinary people understand their connection with the 
law. As such, their work focuses on conceptions of law as conceived outside of a legal 
framework and consequently provides insight into lay meanings of terms such as ‘justice’, or 
‘fairness’ that I draw on to consider how LiPs and legal professionals may experience conflicts 
in understanding. In addition, Hazel Genn’s landmark Paths to Justice is an important reference 
                                                     
49 Ibid, 6.  
50 Ibid, 9-10. 
51 Ibid, 77.  
52 Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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point in this research as well. Genn’s work outlines ‘justiciable problems’ and what people do 
about them. Genn’s work seeks to understand what people think about going to law and how 
they experience the process of litigation, including their motives for going to law in the first 
place. Genn’s emphasis on litigant perceptions and experiences, and on the impact of going to 
law, has been of considerable influence in developing my own questions for interview.   
 
However, while such socio-legal scholarship is of great value in exploring the lay, I argue that 
to understand LiPs it is also essential to think about them outside of the frames and categories 
legal research tends to place on them. In this respect, this thesis contends it is useful to draw 
on disciplines outside of law to try and understand these individuals who are outsiders to the 
law. Because of this, this thesis draws on materials and practices from oral history as well as 
anthropological and ethnographic theory; in particular the work of Luisa Passerini, Clifford 
Geertz and Kristen Hastrup. While Passerini is located in the discipline of oral history, and 
Geertz and Hastrup are anthropologists, all three scholars concentrate on how to develop 
research methods orientated towards getting as close as possible to understanding another’s 
way of seeing, as well as play close attention to the ethics involved in such a project.  
 
For Passerini, approaching another person’s way of seeing involves understanding the 
‘subjectivity’ of the research subject: getting at not just what individuals say they did but 
which also gets at ‘the dimensions of memory, ideology and subconscious desires.’53 Geertz, 
too, argues that a researcher needs to approach understanding ‘from the native’s point of view’. 
54  Like Passerini, he argues this is not just about finding out what individuals say they did, but 
also ‘to figure out what the devil they think they are up to’. 55  Both scholars therefore employ 
methods that attempt to understand what research subjects may not articulate directly because 
they may take it for granted about their own world. Geertz and Passerini are therefore 
influential in shaping the kinds of questions I ask interviewees, as I will go on to outline in 
more detail in Chapter Four.  
 
Kirsten Hastrup shares the desire Passerini and Geertz have for approaching a ‘native’ 
understanding of research subjects. However, in addition Hastrup is interested in the ethics of 
ethnography. Hastrup argues that it is essential that sufficient importance is given to how a 
researcher translates or analyses data because this raises critical ethical questions about how a 
person can speak for another.56 This is of pertinence in the context of the power imbalance that 
                                                     
53 Luisa Passerini, “Work, Ideology and Consensus under Italian Fascism,” History Workshop Journal 8 
(1979): 84. 
54 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (London: Basic Books, 
1983), 56-58.  
55 Ibid, 56-58.  
56 Kristin Hastrup and Peter Hervik, eds., Social Experience and Anthropological Experience, (London: 
Routledge, 1994). 
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exists between researcher and research subject. So, while this project does not constitute an 
ethnography, Hastrup’s work on the ethics of writing and translation is invaluable in 
informing how I approach data analysis in this project.57  
 
Finally, however, while this research is predicated on exploring the distinction between lay 
and law, what this thesis ends up doing is disrupting these categories. As I have argued above, 
reducing “the law” to a uniform position, rather than a site of contestation and disagreement, is 
misleading and counterproductive. Similarly, I will go on to argue that calling LiPs laypersons 
can also be unhelpful. Many LiPs in this study have repeat experiences as claimants and 
defendants, with some ending up being engaged in multiple kinds of legal proceedings over 
decades. 58 As such, these LiPs are involved in their own kind of repeat practice, and evolve 
techniques and skills that mirror the acquisition of specialist skills. So, while LiPs do not 
acquire legal skills (and indeed, how they fail to do so is critical to this research), the attempt 
by LiPs to acquire what they perceive to be legal skills and knowledge means they end up being 
not quite laypersons either. I instead argue that LiPs might best be understood as occupying a 
space somewhere in-between layperson and specialist. While their expertise does not 
constitute legal expertise, it is a form of specialism, if a peculiar one, and it is an integral part 
of how LiPs understand themselves. 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
I begin this thesis by exploring how LiPs are understood or, as I argue, misunderstood in legal 
scholarship and what potential issues may flow from these misconceptions. Starting with the 
passage of LASPO, I analyse the literature emerging at this moment of crisis, arguing that 
two distinct discourses become apparent. Firstly, there is an alarmist discourse that 
emphasises the coming “flood” of LiPs and the potentially disastrous impact this will have on 
the courts. As I will demonstrate, this discourse essentially conceptualises LiPs as a problem 
for the courts, and in doing so draws on a rich history of scholarship that depicts LiPs as at 
best, nuisances, and at worst, pathological. The other discourse that emerges is one that 
argues that legal aid changes will lead to disadvantageous outcomes for LiPs, as a concomitant 
result of the loss of the assistance of legal professionals. This way of talking about LiPs does 
not position LiPs as inherently difficult, in fact it is far more well-meaning; however I will 
argue both discourses, through confining themselves to a ‘legal lens’, limit the ways in which 
                                                     
57 I will return to these scholars and outline their theories and how they underpin this project in more 
detail in Chapter Three.  
58 In considering repeat experiences, this work also engages with Marc Galanter’s work on ‘One 
Shotters’ and ‘Repeat Players’ in more detail in Chapters Five and Six. Galanter, “How the Haves Come 
Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change,” Law and Society Review 9.1(1974): 98-99.  
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we see LiPs. I conclude by arguing that our inability to see LiPs outside of the frames we 
impose on them significantly limits our understanding.  
 
Having considered how LiPs are largely viewed in a negative way by legal practitioners and 
scholars, the third chapter of this thesis seeks to understand how we came to acquire these 
attitudes: have we always felt this way about those who represent themselves? And if not, 
when and how did this start to happen? I pursue this inquiry through the critical investigation 
of the term ‘LiP’ itself, studying the moment when the term LiP first appears, and the context 
in which this takes place. I argue, drawing on Larson, that the term ‘LiP’ emerges as a by-
product of the broader development of the Law’s ‘professional project’ over the course of the 
19th century, starting with the founding of the new County Courts and ending when these new 
courts become fused with the higher courts. As I will show, in this period self-represented 
parties become caught up in wider developments occurring within the profession: the ongoing 
conflict between the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ branches of the profession, the emphasis on increasing 
standardisation, and concerted attempts to stamp out unregulated practitioners. As the 
professional project develops, courts become less and less accessible for laypersons. Ultimately 
this chapter argues, then, that being a LiP is not simply self-representation; it is self-
representation that only occurs in a standardised and formalised environment. As I conclude, 
when the term LiP first appears in the literature, then, it does not indicate a greater 
participation of laypersons in the legal system; it instead symbolises their aberrance from what 
has become normal practice: legal representation.    
 
In the fourth chapter, I start from the premise established in the previous three chapters: that 
the term ‘LiP’ is inherently framed as pejorative in legal discourse. In this chapter, then, I 
draw on new ways of approaching and understanding LiP experiences through outlining the 
methodology of this research project. This consists of fifteen life story interviews. These life 
stories are a form of oral history that involves biographical interviewing of long duration.  As 
such the interviews with each LiP range from a minimum of three hours to a maximum of ten 
hours per interview, with an average length of between five and six hours per interviewee. I 
outline here how and why I came to take this unusual approach to studying LiPs and why I 
believe this method offers insights that add to and complement our existing research on LiPs. 
To make this argument, I outline the utility and implications of using oral history and 
qualitative research more broadly, arguing that qualitative analysis can offer a valuable insight 
into the subjective and lived experience of LiPs. Finally, I detail my specific methods; who I 
interviewed, how I found my interviewees and the process of interviewing and translating 
such interviews into data for this project. 
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The second half of the thesis constitutes the findings of this empirical research and uses the 
data gathered to explore how and why LiPs experience difficulties in pursuing and defending 
claims. I start in the fifth chapter by looking broadly at the effect going to law has for LiPs. As 
I outline, the experience is far more damaging than has heretofore been articulated. The 
findings in this chapter refute assumptions that LiPs frivolously or unnecessarily pursue legal 
proceedings, with the interviewees in this study emphasising that they only used the law as a 
last resort. This chapter also emphasises the sheer cost—financial, emotional and physical—
that legal proceedings have on them. While we tend to spend a lot of time considering the 
impact of LiPs on the courts, I argue we do not spend nearly long enough considering the 
significant impact the courts have on LiPs.  
 
The sixth chapter concentrates on the questions of language and embodied behaviour: how do 
LiPs understand their role and how they are meant to behave, particularly in legal 
environments? This chapter draws on sociological theory to tease out the complex and 
inconsistent performative demands being made of LiPs and considers how lack of access to 
internal specialist legal knowledge impedes LiPs’ ability to fully comprehend what is 
happening, or to effectively participate in proceedings. As I ultimately argue, while LiP failure 
is usually attributed to their lack of knowledge or their incompetence, this research reveals 
that the odds are stacked against them. The incoherence and inconsistency of expectations 
placed on LiPs, coupled with the systemic barriers to accessing necessary knowledge and 
assistance, is what causes LiPs to perform badly, rather that it being the result of personal 
failing.  There is simply no way for LiPs to do well.  
 
The final chapter of this thesis then considers the multitude of ways in which LiPs are 
traumatised by going to law, and turns to how these experiences shape LiP beliefs about law. 
In particular, this chapter focuses on the small proportion of individuals in this study who 
express conspiracist theories about legal proceedings and considers how their experiences of 
going to law affects their overall perception of the legitimacy of legal proceedings as well as 
the degree to which they trust legal professionals. Starting out by exploring some of these 
beliefs, I then consider how and why certain conspiracy theories emerge in the context of 
acting as LiPs. Drawing on conspiracy theory literature, I argue that conspiracies are always 
historically and contextually specific. Rather than understanding them as the product of 
individual pathology, these theories are better understood as shaped by the litigation 
environment in which LiPs find themselves. As I outline, this environment is one in which 
their experiences of ‘justice’ do not match their expectations. Drawing on the work of Tom 
Tyler on trust and legitimacy, I consider the impact this dissonance between expectation and 
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experience may have on LiPs.59 I then consider the degree to which ‘procedural justice’, as 
outlined by Tyler and Zimmerman, or rather its absence, may contribute significantly to the 
distrust LiPs experience.60 Ultimately I go on to  argue that while the conspiracy theories held 
by LiPs are eccentric and mistaken and at times, offensive, they are a refracted and warped 
narrative of the multiple exclusions LiPs experience in attempting to go to law. Lord Woolf 
stated:  
 
Only too often the litigant in person is regarded as a problem for judges and for the court 
system rather than the person for whom the system of civil justice exists. The true problem 
is the court system and its procedures, which are still too often inaccessible and 
incomprehensible to ordinary people.61  
 
In the end, I argue that if LiPs are “crazy”, perhaps it’s at least partially because going to law 
has made them so. 
 
I conclude by considering where these findings leave us in terms of reform: what changes are 
being suggested to accommodate LiPs? And what are potential impediments to reform? This 
thesis will argue that most reform does not go nearly far enough in recognizing how 
entrenched the disadvantages are for LiPs and that, consequently, until this is recognised, 
LiPs will continue to fail. Ultimately, however, I end on a more positive note, arguing that 
while systemic changes are needed, there are also potential correctives towards the dominant 
paradigms of thinking and this may, at the very least, allow for more meaningful participation 
for LiPs in the civil justice system. As such, while the future for LiPs seems gloomy, perhaps 
they need not forever be doomed to fail.   
  
                                                     
59 Tom Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale University Press: New Haven, 1990); See also E Allan 
Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Plenum Press: New York and 
London, 1988); for his research on criminal process and trust see: Tom R. Tyler and Yuen Huo, Trust in 
the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (Russell Sage Foundation: New York, 
2002);  
60 Nourit Zimmerman and Tom Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A 
Psychological Perspective,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 37.1(2009): 23. 
61 Lord Woolf, The Woolf Report, Chapter 17, para. 2. 
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2 
 CRISIS! 
THE COMING FLOOD OF LITIGANTS IN PERSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shut the flood-gates: the litigants are coming!62 
       
                                                     
62 Elizabeth Lee, “Shut the Flood-Gates: The Litigants are Coming!,” in Alternative Law Journal 38, no.3 
(2013): 193.    
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INTRODUCTION  
 
‘Shut the Flood-Gates: The Litigants are Coming!’ cries the headline of a 2014 article in the 
Alternative Law Journal. The alarmist tone of the article is generated by the possible changes 
to administrative law in Australia that would lead to more LiPs.63 While this article may be 
Australian, this dramatic tone is only too familiar in the UK since the coming of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act [LASPO] in April 2013 and the resultant 
£350m in cuts to civil legal aid. Throughout this time, LiPs have gone through a strange and 
rapid transition from being occasionally lambasted, but largely ignored, to suddenly becoming 
the harbingers of the potential downfall of the civil justice system. While this may seem an 
overly sensationalist analysis, it does not overstate just how alarmist the tone of much of this 
output has been with an emphasis on LiPs coming in floods, tides, and surges to overwhelm 
the courts.64 This is based on the presumption that LASPO’s effect will be a dramatic rise in 
LiP numbers and a permanent decline in the availability and provision of legal representation 
for civil litigants.65  
 
There is no doubt that the passage of LASPO has engendered a crisis for the legal profession 
and that LiPs are caught up in this. But what this chapter seeks to show is how much this 
outpouring about LASPO demonstrates two things: firstly, how little we know about LiPs and 
secondly, how damaging our misunderstandings about LiPs can be. This chapter, then, 
explores legal misconceptions of LiPs and the potential ramifications of these 
misunderstandings through the lens of the LASPO crisis, arguing that failure to adequately 
understand LiPs and their experiences serves to entrench their inequality.  As I will show, the 
response of the legal profession to LASPO does not constitute a single crisis, but can instead 
                                                     
63 Or Self Represented Litigants [SRLs], as they are known in Australia. Australia has been facing 
similar questions when it comes to coping with unrepresented parties. 
64 See for example John Hyde, “Judges call for urgent overhaul to cope with surge of LIPs,” The Law 
Society Gazette, 5 July 2013; Eduardo Reyes, “Litigants in Person Numbers Soar,” The Law Society 
Gazette, 13 October 2011. These articles will be explored later in the chapter.  
65 See Judiciary of England and Wales, Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person Report (London: 
July 2013), s 2.3. See also Chris Bevan, “Self-Represented Litigants: the Overlooked and Unintended 
Consequence of Legal Aid Reform,” Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law (2012): 43-55; Graham 
Cookson, Unintended Consequences: The Cost of the Government’s Legal Aid Reforms: A Report for the Law 
Society of England & Wales (Department of Management, School of Social Science and Public Policy, 
November 2011); Mavis MacLean and John Eekelaar, “Legal Representation in Family Matters and the 
Reform of Legal Aid: A Research Note on Current Practice,” Child and Family Law Quarterly, 24, no. 2 
(2012): 223-233; Civil Justice Council,  Access to Justice for Litigants in Person. 
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be usefully divided into a tale of three crises—that reveal different ways of seeing the LiP. 
Writ broadly, the first crisis depicts a future of “crazy” LiPs clogging up tribunals and the 
second crisis fears a future where the lack of legal aid leads to an increasing normalisation of 
not having representation, threatening the future of the legal profession as a specialty. For 
those who fear the former, the response has been an outpouring of concern about all the 
inherent problems LiPs bring with them; for the latter, there was, and continues to be, strong 
lobbying on behalf of legal aid practitioners, including highly public marches and strikes, 
drawing attention to the crisis of the loss of legal representation.66 Either way this crisis is 
posited, however, a future of more LiPs poses a threat.  
 
I start this chapter by exploring the first perceived crisis: that a rise in LiPs will flood the 
courts. In this section I look at some recent writing, as well as draw on some historical and 
familiar characterisations of LiPs. This material tends to deride not only LiPs’ performance 
but also questions their behaviour, personality and, at times, their sanity. This leads to the 
first serious misconception to which I wish to draw attention; the underlying tendency to 
conflate all LiPs with high-risk, querulous or vexatious litigants. Writing about LiPs 
frequently posits the difficulties they may encounter as due to personal deficiency or even as 
symptomatic of a behavioural disorder. This reflects a failure of many legal researchers to date 
to sufficiently interrogate the complexity of context and importance of the environment in 
which LiPs act.    
 
The second crisis positions LiPs as pawns in a larger fight for the retention of legal 
representation, with LiPs expected to automatically lose out because of legal aid changes. This 
discourse emphasises that the lack of good quality legal representation results in LiPs 
struggling, due to a lack of substantive legal knowledge and an inability to discern what is 
relevant to a claim or defence. These latter claims are ones that are largely echoed by past 
research into LiPs.67  However, while this discourse is far more well-meaning than the 
previous one, and while I do not dispute the valuable assistance legal representation can afford, 
I argue that this position tends to conflate LiP difficulties with the cause of advocating legal 
representation for civil litigants. This paints a picture where LiPs should always have legal 
representation, rather than considering how individuals may be able to improve outcomes 
without being legally represented.  
 
                                                     
66 This includes groups such as the Judicial Working Group, the Civil Justice Council report, Access to 
Justice and the Nuffield Foundation, Developing the Evidence Base on Family Justice: Mediation and 
Litigants in Person (London: Ministry of Justice, 22 February 2012).  
67  See Paul Lewis, “Litigants in Person and their Difficulties in Adducing Evidence.” In this study 
Lewis notes multiple ‘failures’ such as failure to call witnesses and failure to understand the rules of 
evidence. This is similar to John Baldwin’s findings in Monitoring the Rise of the Small Claims Limit. 
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I conclude by considering the way in which both crises limit how well we can see LiPs. ‘LiP’ is 
a legally constituted subject and, like other legally constituted subjects, a LiP becomes a LiP in 
legal space, much like a barrister becomes a barrister through putting on their wig and gown. 
Yet LiP experiences are inherently more complex than discourses that reduce them to either a 
problem, or an object of pity. Legal discourse in this way constructs and simultaneously limits 
our understanding of LiPs. We are unable to grasp the very subjects we seek to research 
outside of the frames we impose on them. These frames often tell us more about ourselves than 
the subjects we are theoretically seeking to understand.  Ultimately, in the final section of the 
chapter I argue that the ways in which LiPs are talked about not only limit understanding, but 
obscure what I argue to be a much the third, deeper, crisis: the systematic exclusion and 
inequality experienced by LiPs in civil litigation.  
 
CRISIS NO. 1: THE RISING TIDES 
 
In October 2011, The Law Society Gazette published an article entitled: “Litigants in Persons 
numbers soar”. In it, author Eduardo Reyes discloses a ‘dramatic increase’ in LiPs, based on 
data from the Personal Support Unit at the Royal Courts of Justice showing they received a 19 
per cent increase in applications to assist LiPs appearing in the Principal Registry of the 
Family Division in the 8 months running up to August 2011 across the country.68 Reyes’ 
article predates the coming into force in April 2013 of the LASPO Act. The article goes on to 
argue that the increase in LiPs would only be aggravated when the act came into force: ‘Many 
solicitors’, Reyes says, feel this will ‘trigger a huge rise’ and this rise will lead to ‘strain’ and 
‘burden’ on the court system.69  
 
Reyes’ alarmist tone is not anomalous, nor incidental. Numerous articles and letters have 
appeared in the Law Society Gazette and elsewhere since 2011 discussing the expected rise of 
LiPs in the face of legal aid changes, many of whom tend to reproduce to a greater or lesser 
extent this tone. In January 2012 for example, Grania Langton Down wrote of an expected 
‘huge increase’ in LiPs, resulting in ‘dire warnings’ from the judiciary due to the potential risk 
of ‘chaos’.70 In July 2013, John Hyde’s article referred to an oncoming ‘surge of LIPs’.71 A 
                                                     
68 Reyes, “Litigants in Person Numbers Soar.” The Personal Support Unit provides non-legal assistance 
and support for self-represented litigants. PSU members will assist litigants in non-legal tasks, 
including typing up information, providing forms and templates, and signposting them to legal 
assistance. In addition, PSU volunteers will also accompany litigants into the court if the litigant 
chooses this. While the PSU volunteer cannot speak for the litigant, or provide any legal assistance, 
they are there to provide moral support and to take notes, and to ensure the litigant understands what 
transpired during the proceedings and what they may need to do next. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Grania Langton-Down, “Litigants in person could struggle to secure access to justice,” Law Society 
Gazette, 19 January 2012.  
 28 
published letter from an occasional contributor in July 2013 was entitled: “Legal Aid: Children 
Suffer” and claimed that: ‘Litigants in person are the scourge of the courts – ask any judge’.72 
Similarly, Catherine Baksi’s October 2013 article was memorably titled: “Litigant in Person 
Punches Wife During Hearing”.73 This refers to an incident in a Family Court proceeding in 
Essex where the father, a LiP, crossed the floor to the witness box and repeatedly hit his wife. 
A Ministry of Justice spokesperson, when asked about this event, pointed out that regardless 
of legal aid changes, about half the parties in family court proceedings were usually LiPs, and 
went on to observe that lawyers representing a party would not usually ‘play a role in court 
security matters, and we have no evidence to suggest any increase in this type of incident since 
April’.  Nevertheless, the article’s author argues that this incident highlights ‘security 
concerns as more people appear in court without a lawyer’.74  
 
While Baksi’s reference to the direct physical threat of the LiP might seem extreme, Langdon-
Down’s article in fact treads similar ground, citing District Judge Nick Crichton on the 
security threat posed by LiPs:  
 
We are getting more and more people coming to court in private law cases without the 
benefit of sensible, structured legal advice, wanting to spill blood on the court carpet. 
Angry with each other, they shout across the court, they refuse to listen when you try to 
calm them down and it is very difficult to find a solution that they will go away and work 
with.75 
 
These articles demonstrate two linked, overarching beliefs: firstly, because of legal aid 
changes, the numbers of LiPs will rise. Secondly: more LiPs are not a good thing. In these 
articles LiPs are presented as difficult to manage, disruptive and potentially violent. 
 
Alarmist ideas relating to LiPs have a long and rich history both in the UK and abroad. 
Pejorative characterisations of LiPs abound in 20th and 21st century scholarly literature. 
Litigants in person (or their overseas equivalent such as pro se in the U.S. and self-represented 
litigant [SRL] in Australia) have been described, variously, as ‘mavericks’76, obsessive and 
difficult77, ‘cranks’ and ‘pests’78, ignorant79, naïve80, disruptive81, crafty82, time wasters83, 
                                                                                                                                                           
71 John Hyde, “Judges call for urgent overhaul to cope with surge of LIPs,” The Law Society Gazette, 5 
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72 John Greenwood, “Letters: Legal Aid: Children Suffer,” Law Society Gazette, 22 July 2013.  
73 Catherine Baksi, “Litigant in Person Punches Wife During Hearing,” Law Society Gazette, 21 October 
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74 Ibid. 
75 District Judge Nick Crichton quoted in Langton-Down, “Litigants in Person Could Struggle.” 
76 Simon Smith, Maverick Litigants: A History of Vexatious Litigants in Australia 1930-2008 (Maverick 
Publications: Melbourne, 2009). 
77 Tania Sourdin and Nerida Wallace, “The Dark Side.” 
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delusional84, ‘injustice collectors’85 and, importantly, ‘nuts’.86 The New York Law Society 
Journal memorably dubbed them as ‘a society of losers’.87 Negative characterisations of LiPs 
are never just abusive epithets, of course.  They are always revealing in terms of what they tell 
us about how LiPs are understood, or indeed misunderstood, by many people in the legal 
profession and others. There is an historical tendency in the literature to assume all LiPs are 
potentially high-risk, querulous or vexatious litigants. This manifests in using terminology 
that frequently identifies an arguably systemic issue, but then blames the LiP for this.  
 
For example, there is the issue of delay and disruption. At first glance, accusing a LiP of delay 
does not necessarily seem a personal attack. There is indeed some evidence that LiPs take 
longer to pursue claims, although this is not conclusive.88 However, the term ‘time waster’ 
suggests a deliberate decision on the LiP’s part to draw out proceedings. Similarly, there is 
also evidence that LiPs’ presence in courts and tribunals disrupts normal procedures: however, 
while this is factually accurate, calling LiPs ‘disruptive’ implies that they somehow bring chaos 
with them.89 Finally, LiPs are indeed uneducated in legal language, procedure and behaviour 
and in this respect describing them as ‘ignorant’ is hardly incorrect. But the term ‘ignorant’ 
suggests again that this is an inherent or wilful defect of the LiP. My point here is not to 
dispute that LiPs’ presence in legal proceedings can cause problems, but rather that LiPs tend 
to be blamed for any issues as indicative of their own shortcomings. Yet I believe that the 
delay in proceedings caused by LiPs, indeed the trouble they may cause in general, are more 
indicative of a system which on the one hand upholds LiPs’ right to self-litigate and yet on the 
other fails to mould proceedings to their needs and perspectives. As Moorhead and Sefton’s 
2005 study concludes:  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
78 Monica Taylor, “Querulent Behaviour, Vexatious Litigants and the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 
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Vexatious Litigant,” International Journal of Law in Context 8, no. 1 (September 2012): 27-46. 
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The struggles they [LiPs] have comprehending law and procedure; and the importance of 
ensuring that substantive justice is done in our courts suggests that unrepresented litigants 
need help far more than they need approbation.90  
 
Turning to the other negative epithets described above, these are even more immediately 
recognisable as attacks based on a perception that LiPs are high risk or vexatious litigants. 
The terms ‘maverick’ and ‘injustice collector’ for instance, conjures up the archetypal 
vexatious litigant who goes it alone, ignoring legal advice, despite there being little evidence 
of such individuals.91 Similarly, the idea that LiPs are ‘nuisances’ or ‘pests’ emphasises not only 
their disruptive qualities but also the idea that they repeatedly pursue frivolous issues. Finally, 
these negative epithets routinely—and importantly—emphasise a link between behavioural 
disorders, mental health and LiPs.92 These are the LiPs described as ‘delusional’ or ‘nuts’. In 
her article “Hopeless Cases”, Didi Herman notes that vexatious litigants are: 
 
characterised as falling into one of two groups: those with histories of mental health 
problems who launch multiple legal actions against diverse targets; and those whose initial 
legal action, for example (one that recurs often) a complaint of discrimination under the 
Race Relations Act (RRA; now incorporated into the Equality Act 2010), was resolved 
against them, and who then attempt to carry on with aspects of that complaint in various 
ways.93 
 
I argue this tendency to blame LiPs for their shortcomings results from a strong belief on the 
part of the legal profession that LiPs ought to have legal representation. A LiP’s decision to act 
in person (presupposing this decision was voluntary, which as I will outline is usually not the 
case) in itself indicates a potential alarm bell. Tania Sourdin and Nerida Wallace claim, in their 
2014 study into querulous and vexatious litigants, the ‘perception that these litigants [LiPs] 
pose a problem for courts is widespread’.94 I would reconfigure this, however, to argue that the 
perception that LiPs are a problem is widespread. This slippage between the two—from the 
LiP causing problems to being a problem—is primarily attributable to legal distrust of anyone 
who would voluntarily forego representation. 
                                                     
90 Moorhead and Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants, 265. 
91 In Paths to Justice, Genn notes that only 35% of her sample were ‘self-helpers’ who obtained no advice 
in dealing with their problem however even they were likely to have sought advice previously (81%). It 
is also interesting to note the 5% who do not obtain any advice; as Genn notes, such individuals tend to 
have lower educational and income levels. One could speculate that such individuals may also be 
indicative of the ‘passive defendants’ Moorhead and Sefton identify in their 2005 research. See Genn, 
Paths to Justice, 72.  
92 And the conflation of these issues is explored further in the final chapter of this thesis which looks at 
LiPs who hold conspiracist explanations for what happens to them during litigation.  
93 Didi Herman, “Hopeless Cases,” 28. 
94 Sourdin and Wallace, “The Dark Side,” 14. 
 31 
 
In Hazel Genn’s landmark Paths to Justice, she critiques previous studies of legal need for 
focusing too much on ‘the kinds of people who use legal services, rather than on the kinds of 
problems which are taken to lawyers’.95 She goes on to say that this serves to homogenise 
legal problems: if one focuses on the people outside of the specific legal claim, one has no 
means of differentiating success or failure on the basis of legal merit. My argument pursues a 
related tack. Focusing on who a LiP is internalises shortcomings within the LiP him or herself. 
This is seen in the situation above where the difficulties that arise from the presence of LiPs 
are ascribed to behavioural or personality issues. The conflation of LiPs with high risk and 
vexatious litigants leads to a number of serious misconceptions. 
 
In the first instance, vexatious litigants form a tiny minority of LiPs. The Civil Justice Council 
note that ‘although a small minority of self-represented litigants behave in a way that leaves 
an adverse impression, the overwhelming majority of self-represented litigants are legitimate 
users of the system’.96 Yet they continue to occupy a disproportionate amount of attention.97 
This tends to make the problem with vexatious litigants seem much bigger than it is. 
However, associating LiPs with vexatious litigants is also arguably fundamentally flawed. In 
law, definitions of vexatiousness hinge largely on the substance of the claim: they are vexatious 
proceedings. Lord Bingham in Attorney General v Barker elaborates: 
 
The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in 
law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, 
its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all 
proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the 
process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way 
which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process.98 
 
While vexatious litigation ‘involves an abuse of the process of the court’ this can only arise if 
‘the substance of the proceedings themselves can be characterised as vexatious’. In other 
words, a distinction is made in law between a vexatious claim and vexatious conduct. If a claim 
is sound, the manner in which it is pursued may not be characterised as vexatious. Lord Parker 
noted in Re Langton: 
 
                                                     
95 Genn, Paths to Justice, 1. 
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 32 
Despite the fact that it may be said that the manner in which that action was conducted was 
vexatious, it must be remembered that the respondent acted in person, and, not only that, 
but that the action itself could not be said to be a vexatious action; it was one which the 
respondent was fully entitled to litigate and did litigate and accordingly, so far as these 
proceedings are concerned, I ignore that action except as a matter of history.99 
 
It therefore makes a material difference if the respondent is acting in person. Lord Parker 
clearly comments here that although the ‘manner’ in which proceedings were conducted was 
‘vexatious’, the action itself was not vexatious: rather, the LiP was ‘fully entitled to litigate’, 
and consequently cannot be considered to be a vexatious litigant. This distinction can be 
clearly seen where LiPs are most common, places such as the family court. 100 As Lord Gill 
noted in his review of the Scottish civil courts:  
 
Respondents representing those who practice in the field of family law pointed out that 
because of the high level of emotion involved in family law cases, it would be difficult to 
categorise a litigant in a family action as “vexatious”.101  
 
The important point to draw from this distinction is that although LiPs are often conflated 
with vexatious litigants, they may in fact be less likely to pursue ‘frivolous’ claims, a finding 
that is supported by this research.102  
 
Seeing the LiP as “a problem” also leads to another issue: overlooking the importance of the 
context in which the LiP operates. LiPs appear in many different kinds of courts and tribunals, 
which have differing procedures. On top of this, LiPs may face both represented and 
unrepresented respondents. Who are they standing against? Does the fact that there is a LiP 
affect the behaviour of other participants in these circumstances? MacLean and Eeklaar’s 2014 
study into the Family Court found that out of fifty hearings, there were twenty where one 
party was not represented. Of these cases only ten qualified as an ‘active’ litigant in person in 
Moorhead’s terms. In two of the twenty cases where a party was not represented, the legal 
professional who was involved was ‘of such a junior nature’ that ‘the judge commented to the 
researcher on the inequality of arms’. They went on to observe that in a further eight cases of 
the twenty, one party did not attend at all and their failure to do so meant the judge could not 
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proceed. MacLean and Eekelaar consequently argue the need for the term ‘absent LiPs’.103 The 
sheer complexity of the landscape: whether a LiP is active, passive, a claimant or a defendant; 
whether he or she faces a barrister, group, corporation, LiP, whether he or she is in a County 
Court, a social security tribunal, an immigration tribunal, the High Court, and so on, could be 
usefully considered when attempting to understand LiPs’ experiences: this complexity is elided 
when we see the LiP as a problem.  
 
Finally, another key assumption made by those who see LiPs as a problem is that LiPs 
deliberately forego legal representation. This results, firstly, from a misunderstanding on the 
part of some in the legal profession about the accessibility to representation in the first place. 
As many lawyers who work in the area of legal aid already know, Lord Otton’s 1995 report 
found, many years prior to legal aid changes, those who act as LiPs may not do so out of 
choice, but rather through a failure to obtain legal aid or afford representation. LiPs will fail to 
obtain the representation or advice sought or desired due to financial difficulties, problems of 
time or access.104 A simple example is a LiP who tries and fails to access a Citizens Advice 
Bureau due to increasingly limited opening hours and closures of branches of the service.105 
Another is a LiP who becomes a LiP at some point during the life of their claim because of 
withdrawal of legal aid.106 Cookson’s 2011 research stated that:  
 
[a]pproximately 11% of people denied legal aid will not seek alternative advice. Following 
this choice, people will either give up on their social justice problem or attempt to tackle it 
on their own. The proportion of people who, at present, ‘give up’ and ‘tackle their problem 
alone’ after failing to obtain advice can be used as an estimate of the same strategies for 
those who are denied legal aid and do not seek alternative advice. This proportion varies by 
area of law with 65% of people who failed to obtain family law advice tackling their 
problem alone compared to 83% in social welfare law. This difference may reflect the 
greater complexity of family law and the higher proportion of cases which end up in 
court.107  
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There is a danger in perceiving legal aid changes as being responsible for cutting off access to 
representation. Difficulties with obtaining legal representation are longstanding; the passage 
of LASPO may aggravate the situation, but it did not create it.108  
 
Ultimately for those who see LiPs as a problem, the influx of LiPs poses a significant threat. 
But even this fear of an influx is attributable to failures to adequately understand LiPs: in this 
case, the lack of accurate data regarding LiP numbers. One of the most striking features in the 
articles cited above is the repetition of a diluvian analogy. LiPs are going to ‘flood’ tribunals, 
and come in a wave or a surge, or even a ‘tsunami’.  Alternatively, LiPs are going to ‘clog up’ 
the courtrooms suggestive that they are going to cause disruption to an otherwise smooth 
running process. One family law barrister refers in a blog to the ‘hordes of plastic bag wielding 
LiPs’.109 This results in a kind of siege mentality where due to lack of knowledge as to rising 
numbers, alarmist ideas about LiPs are more likely to be aired.  
 
But as I have previously outlined, what we know about LiPs has always been relatively 
limited.110 This is indicative of their marginal status in litigation. As Cameron and Kelly note, 
there has been a lack of ‘any systematic effort’ in common law jurisdictions to understand who 
LiPs are, what their legal problems are, what LiPs can do about these problems, and why LiPs 
might choose to represent themselves.111 While there are a number of important studies done 
on tribunals and small claims courts by researchers such as Hazel and Yvette Genn, Paul 
Lewis and John Baldwin, 112 data on LiPs has only just begun to be collected by the MOJ since 
2014 and even now, it is not collected by the courts in any systematic fashion.113  
Consequently, much of the research attempting to quantify and qualify who the LiP is relies on 
filling in the gaps and assuming that someone is a LiP if there is no obvious evidence of 
representation.114  
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What we do know from the Civil Justice Quarterly Statistics, subject to the limitations outlined 
above, is the percentage of representation in different types of cases in the civil courts. So, for 
example, the latest statistics (June-September 2017) show 97% representation in both sides 
when it comes to unspecified money claims (such as compensation claims), and radically less in 
other areas. Specified money claims, for example, had at least one LiP in 61% of cases. It was 
overwhelmingly the claimant represented in this one-sided scenario, with defendants much 
more likely to be unrepresented, in keeping with Moorhead and Sefton’s 2005 findings of 
‘passive defendants’. Only a quarter of specified money claims were unrepresented on both 
sides. This means the likelihood of a LiP facing represented parties is much higher than them 
facing another LiP. 115  But this is clearly an incomplete picture. 
 
In 2011, a Ministry of Justice literature review in the area concluded that: 
 
Only a minority [of studies]provide robust evidence for our research questions. Few 
controlled for case complexity. As a result, this review should be treated as presenting 
evidence on the potential issues and impacts of litigants in person, rather than conclusive 
evidence of this.116 
 
This is still the case in 2017. This means, in the context of legal aid changes one of the most 
basic questions we need to answer—is there a rise in LiPs?—can best be answered by 
“Probably”. To know definitively would require knowing how many LiPs there were before 
and how many there are now. But we don’t know either. The discourse that constructs LiPs as 
a problem, then, may fear LiPs, but it doesn’t know much about them.  
  
CRISIS NO. 2: THE END OF LAWYERS? 
 
The post-LASPO environment has also resulted in alterations of historical attitudes to the 
LiP. Indeed, it must be pointed out at this stage that it would be disingenuous on my part to 
claim that negative writings are representative of all writing on LiPs. Of course, this is not the 
case. While negative characterisations of LiPs persist, so there is simultaneously a growing 
discussion as to how to include LiPs more meaningfully into legal processes by sympathetic 
legal practitioners and researchers.117 Cameron and Kelly note in their 2002 series of articles 
into LiPs in common law jurisdictions that: 
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The trend in the literature has moved from equating litigants in person with “vexatious 
litigants” to considering litigants in person from the perspective of the problems they 
create for other stakeholders in the system (other parties and their legal advisors, judges 
and court administration officials) to the more recent approach of accepting them as a fact 
of life and identifying strategies to make it easier for them to represent themselves.118 
 
I would argue, however, that the current state of affairs is less of a trajectory from the first 
attitude (all LiPs are potentially high risk or vexatious litigants) past the second (LiPs cause 
problems for other users) to the last (LiPs are a fact of life and we must accommodate them) 
than a messy confluence of all three. The increased acknowledgement of the need for reform to 
assist LiPs exists simultaneously with the tendency to focus on LiPs as a problem. This is why 
the Law Society Gazette articles relating to legal aid changes that opened this chapter are so 
valuable for research: they offer a window into this very confusion. This confusion is arguably 
because, as this second way of seeing so clearly demonstrates, the future of the legal profession 
is indelibly tied to the rise of LiPs. As Zoe Saunder’s article “How Can Lawyers Learn to Love 
LiPs?” notes: 
 
The Government’s evisceration of Legal Aid leaves those of us involved in the court system 
feeling a bit like the inhabitants of an island about to be hit by a tsunami, watching the sea 
recede further and further away, powerless to do anything but wonder how big the wave 
will be and how much damage it will cause. The tsunami will come in the form of litigants 
in person who would previously have had recourse to public funding for advice and 
representation but will no longer have that resource and will have to represent 
themselves.119 
 
The one certain effect legal aid cuts have on the profession is a reduction in legal 
representation in a broader range of civil proceedings.120 Any fear of rising numbers of LiPs 
cannot therefore be separated from this perceived professional threat. This threat is not just 
about displacing legal professionals, but also a threat to procedures in their current form, as 
reform will potentially entail changes in how the courts operate as well. The second LASPO 
“crisis”, therefore, is one where LiPs are remodelled from being problems to being, crudely, 
objects of concern because, in a post-LASPO environment not having representation will 
become the norm. In this particular crisis, the concern about LiPs is that they are likely to do 
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badly, but this is ultimately secondary to a concern about the broad-reaching changes that will 
occur to the legal profession and the effect on the courts of more LiPs.  
 
In 2014, The Bar Council produced a paper, The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 (Laspo): One Year On. In this paper they asserted that: 
 
Although it is too early to determine the longer-term impact of the Government’s 
transforming legal aid agenda (of which LASPO forms a central part), this early research 
suggests that much of what we feared has come to pass, including: A significant increase in 
litigants in person, especially in the family courts; increased delays in court and additional 
burdens on already-stretched court resources; Increased and likely unsustainable pressure 
on frontline providers offering free legal support, advice or representation; A growing 
reluctance of solicitors and barristers to take on complex, low-value litigation, denying 
many access to legal advice and representation, and a growing number of barristers 
actively considering the viability of a long-term career at the 
Bar.121 
 
 
As we can see from the above, although LiPs do get a look in in this report, and although LiPs 
are posited as representing an access to justice issue, their presence is emphasised more in the 
context of the impact they will have on the courts. Of more pressing concern here is the long-
term impact of such changes on the legal profession itself. This is of course unsurprising in a 
document produced by the Bar Council, however, it serves to underline that such a post-
LASPO discourse prioritises the needs of the legal profession over those of the LiP, however 
much access to justice is raised as an issue. In this way of seeing, when LiPs are raised as a 
topic, this is usually to emphasise, as above, that more LiPs will have a detrimental impact on 
the court process. LiPs are not necessarily “problems” in and of themselves, but they will cause 
problems in the court and will fare badly without professional assistance. For example, in 
Unintended Consequences, Cookson notes that:  
 
In certain key respects a rise in litigants in person will have noticeable, material unintended 
consequences to Government: poorer outcomes for litigants, greater burden on HMCTS, 
greater legal costs for legal aid-represented litigants and for government-run organisations 
such as the NHS.122    
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This question of a LiP burden is echoed by other recent LiP studies that note that LiPs are less 
likely to settle123, more likely to have their case thrown out124, more likely to take up more 
court time than represented parties,125 and more likely to cost more money to the courts.126 
Unlike the previous assertions relating LiPs to high risk and vexatious litigants that are, at 
times, highly problematic, the assumption that not having legal representation is a problem is 
in fact better founded. Research, such as Genn & Genn’s tribunal study in 1989 and Moorhead 
and Sefton’s 2005 work have found consistent evidence that someone with good legal 
representation is more likely to succeed than a LiP.127 This is not entirely straightforward, as 
it has also been demonstrated that poor quality legal representation may be significantly worse 
than no representation at all.128  However, there is widespread belief, that is at the very least to 
some extent supported by research, that legal representation improves outcomes. Lord 
Pannick memorably articulated this in a House of Lords debate on the bill: ‘Do-it-yourself 
litigation—because that is what it is—will be as effective as a do-it-yourself medical 
operation’.129 
 
Lord Pannick’s analogy of LiPs as DIY-ers offers an intriguing opening into the question of 
why LiPs are more likely to lose: they are not qualified. Lawyers are able to discern what is 
relevant to a proceeding; they also know the form in which to present information in courts 
and tribunals.130 Crucially, they also know how to behave appropriately in the subtler ways: 
how to address different people in the courtroom, and so on. As study after study notes, it is a 
LiPs ignorance—of substantive law, legal procedure and appropriate behaviour, their inability 
to discern what is relevant to their claim or defence—that means they lose.131 The unavoidable 
implication of this discourse, therefore, is that what a LiP really needs is to either get a lawyer, 
                                                     
123 Rosemary Hunter, “Adversarial mythologies: policy assumptions and research evidence in family 
law,” Journal of Law and Society 30, no 1(2003); J Dewar, BW Smith and C. Banks, Litigants in Person in 
the Family Court of Australia (Research Report No. 20. Family Court) (Family Court: Canberra, 2000).  
124 Advice Services Alliance, Proposal for the Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales: Ministry of Justice, 
Consultation Paper CP12/10 (Advice Services Alliance response: London, 2011). 
125 Williams, LiPs: A Literature Review, 6. As this report acknowledges, when both parties are 
unrepresented, the proceedings may be shorter, but when one side is unrepresented, the case can take 
longer. However, these findings are also subject to the type of court or tribunal and the kind of legal 
claim, so it is difficult to make any generalist statement.  
126 See Cookson, Unintended Consequences, 40.  
127 Genn & Genn, Representation at Tribunals, 108. It is important to note that Genn and Genn refer to 
‘good representation’, so this doesn’t exclude the possibility that bad representation can lead to worse 
outcomes, or at least no material difference. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, 
“Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual 
Use) Make?,” Yale Law Journal 121, no. 8 (2012): 2118-2215. 
128 Ibid; see also Moorhead, Sherr & Paterson, “Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers 
in England and Wales,” Law and Society Review 37, no.4 (2003).  
129  Lord Pannick, House Of Lords Debate 29 January 2014: Column 1271. Available online at: 
http://legalaidchanges.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/lords-debate-pannick-motion-to-regret-prison-
legal-aid-29-jan-2014.pdf (accessed 2 June 2017).  
130 See Genn and Genn, Representation at Tribunals, 244, 246-7.  
131 See Moorhead and Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, The Otton Project. 
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or to be one.132 This is certainly the case being forwarded by critics of legal aid changes. As the 
Bar Council noted in 2016: 
 
The growth in the number of people who are attempting to handle often complex legal 
problems on their own is a particular cause for concern. The rise in court fees and the 
significant cuts to legal aid have put many litigants in the difficult position where they feel 
unable to access justice through the Courts, or through solicitors or barristers with the 
appropriate expertise to help them.133 
 
This argument—that LiPs should have lawyers—is highly persuasive in the context of legal 
aid cuts post-LASPO which undoubtedly disproportionately affect vulnerable litigants. 
Amnesty’s 2016 report notes that the recent cuts are likely to primarily affect litigants in 
family cases, immigration tribunals, housing and other areas where such individuals are likely 
to be disadvantaged already in terms of socioeconomic background, mental health or for a host 
of other complex reasons.134 This is supported by other recent research undertaken by Trinder 
et al in 2014, amongst others.135 However, while I do not dispute or seek to take away from the 
very real effect such changes can have on vulnerable litigants, nor do I wish to minimise the 
inherent difficulties of being a LiP (this whole thesis is an extrapolation of this idea) this 
discourse is limited in terms of how helpful it can be for understanding LiPs. This is because in 
this way of thinking, LiPs become an exemplar of why one needs legal representation. And it 
is very difficult to separate this argument—that LiPs need legal representation—from the 
interest of legal professionals in maintaining dependency on legal representation.136  
 
So how does this position—that holds that LiPs are fundamentally unable to navigate legal 
procedure in any useful way—sit with the right of a LiP to self-represent? This right, 
articulated in Bremer v South India Shipping by Lord Diplock states that: 
 
Every civilised system of government requires that the state should make available to all 
its citizens a means for the just and peaceful settlement of disputes between them as to their 
                                                     
132 It is notable, for example, that Genn and Genn were highly critical of the idea of the tribunals that 
were more “friendly” to LiPs. Genn and Genn, Representation at Tribunals, 248.   
133 Bar Council statement, “Bar Council Responds to Latest LSB Report on Legal Services Market,” 4 
July 2016.  
134 See Amnesty International, Cuts That Hurt: The Impact of Legal Aid Cuts in England on Access to Justice 
(Amnesty: London, 2016). 
135 Trinder et al, Private Family Law Cases; Rosemary Hunter, “Exploring the ‘LASPO Gap,’” Family 
Law 44 (2014); Meyler and Woodhouse, “Changing the Immigration Rules and Withdrawing the 
‘Currency’ of Legal Aid: The Impact of LASPO 2012 on Migrants and their Families,” Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law 35, no.1 (2013): 55-78; Jess Mant, “Neoliberalism.” 
136 This inseparability also poses a problem when it comes to assessing the efficacy of legal 
representation. Does it automatically improve outcomes? See Herbert M, Kritzer, Legal Advocacy: 
Lawyers and Non Lawyers at Work (University of Michigan Press: Michigan, 1998). 
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respective legal rights. The means provided are courts of justice to which every citizen has 
a constitutional right of access in the role of plaintiff to obtain the remedy to which he 
claims to be entitled in consequence of an alleged breach of his legal or equitable rights by 
some other citizen, the defendant.137 
 
LiPs have a constitutional right of access to the courts to pursue claims, what Rabeea Assy 
calls ‘a long-standing common law tradition which treats self-representation as a fundamental 
right’.138  
 
Those that advocate for legal representation, then, do not give much consideration towards 
how to be a LiP in the first place; presumably, given the opportunity, legal practitioners would 
not want LiPs to have unlimited access without representation. In this respect such a ‘right’ 
becomes something like a category error. The most energetic proponent of this position is 
Rabeea Assy who argues in his book Injustice in Person, that the ‘right’ to self-representation 
needs revisiting.  
 
It entails overcoming the intuitive appeal of an entitlement to self-representation and the 
compelling force of tradition. And in the absence of previous theoretical work, possible 
rationales for the right must be expounded and then critically evaluated.139 
 
For Assy, the concept of a ‘right’ to self-representation is misplaced because LiPs are unable to 
do justice for themselves.140 As such, they are better served by having mandatory 
representation. However, while Assy’s position is more extreme, it is symptomatic of this kind 
of discourse. In Assy’s argument, his primary interest is that court proceedings are in keeping 
with the ‘overriding objective’ of civil justice.141 Such an objective is outlined explicitly in Rule 
1.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which states, amongst other points that this is about: 
 
(b) saving expense; 
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – 
(i) to the amount of money involved; 
(ii) to the importance of the case; 
(iii) to the complexity of the issues142 
 
                                                     
137 Lord Diplock in Bremer v South India Shipping [1981] A.C. 909. 
138 Assy, Injustice in Person, 2.  
139 Ibid, 2. 
140 For a good critique of Assy’s work, see Bridgett Toy-Cronin, “A Defence of the Right to Litigate in 
Person,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 37, no.1 (2017): 238-254.  
141 Assy, Injustice in Person, 24.  
142 Civil Procedure Rules 1.1.  
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But this overriding objective is one in which LiPs are, as this thesis will outline, more likely to 
be side-lined. The emphasis on saving money, and on prioritising cases based on their financial 
value or importance (legal, rather than any other interpretation of importance) tells us that 
what LiPs themselves value are of potentially less consequence to the civil justice system. 
While this is not what the objectives in and of themselves dictate, the political context in 
which they operate—one in which there have been successive policy changes in favour of 
greater efficiency of proceedings and reduction in matters coming to court—is one in which 
what LiPs might find worth litigating over becomes increasingly difficult to represent.  
 
It is important to note here that while the general push towards out of court settlements, and 
the greater use of mediation is certainly a way of reducing the caseload in the courts and 
avoiding unnecessary delays, it would be unfair to not also mention that of course, for many 
litigants mediation can be a preferable and less expensive alternative to court-based litigation. 
As such, alternative forms of dispute resolution can play a valuable role in settling 
disagreements and resolving problems. But there remain two key concerns here. Firstly, there 
is a drift towards an increasing use of mediation: for example, a recent recommendation by 
Lord Justice Briggs for a new online court envisions a world in which individuals would only 
be able to litigate as a last resort, having exhausted other alternatives first.143 The concern 
here is that any further push towards mediation risks pushing cases towards mediation that 
are simply not suitable and this nuance may be lost in the drive to keep caseloads down.144  
 
The second concern relates to the public interest in private disputes. By restricting litigants’ 
ability to access courts, and instead pushing them towards out-of-court settlement, such 
disputes and their resolutions will no longer contribute to the development of precedent. 
Linda Mulcahy in her article “The Collective Interest in Private Dispute Resolution” 
emphasises that bargaining out of court is facilitated by, and dependent on precedent.145 The 
move towards narrowing, or entirely closing off, access to the courts for certain cases has, for 
Mulcahy, become: 
 
                                                     
143 Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure Review: Final Report (Judiciary of England and Wales: 
London, 2016).  
144 For example, the online dispute court in British Colombia, the Civil Resolution Tribunal [CRT], is 
based on “forced” mediation, whereby once two parties enter into discussions with a mediator, it is only 
that mediator that will determine whether the matter can be settled, or will require adjudication. In 
other words, parties cannot withdraw. While the Briggs report does not explicitly advocate for this, the 
CRT is an important model for the online court that is proposed. See: https://civilresolutionbc.ca 
145 Linda Mulcahy, “The Collective Interest in Private Dispute Resolution,” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 12, no.33 (2012): 59-80. 
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[so] strong that it is time to turn to consider the equally important question of how we 
identify those cases that must get to trial if both the needs to individuals and the collective 
need of developing doctrine are to be served.146  
 
And so here we face a dilemma; it is obviously in the private interests of some individuals to 
not litigate, but there is also a public interest dimension to consider, and balancing these two 
is extremely challenging. Hazel Genn, noting the centrality of out of court settlement, 
comments that: ‘whether this is a matter for congratulation or concern depends to some extent 
on your perspective and your fundamental beliefs about the social function of civil justice and 
the development of common law’.147 Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this research to be able to 
offer any contribution here, other than to echo Mulcahy’s concern when she notes that one 
doesn’t have to be an ‘adjudication romanticist’ to note that ‘markets are in dire need of 
precedent if they are to function efficiently.’148 In thinking specifically about LiPs, I would also 
argue that there is a clear conflict between the right to self-represent and the policy context 
that interprets and develops these objectives in the civil justice system.149   
 
Natalie Byrom notes that: 
 
The cuts to legal aid have changed the manner in which services are provided to the public 
in a number of important ways. The reforms have reduced the absolute number of 
providers available; they have affected the geographical distribution of legal aid funded civil 
law advice across England and Wales, creating “advice deserts”; and they have altered the 
nature of the service provided by moving the focus away from early intervention and 
complex casework, onto one-off pieces of advice provided once a situation has already 
escalated.150  
 
Byrom goes on to say that legal-aid funded providers, including law firms, have reduced by 
about fifty percent since the introduction of LASPO. For Byrom, these changes engender a 
challenge to traditional concepts of “lawyering”, and she argues that a new vision of lawyering 
‘that encompasses ideals of social justice and public service’ is necessary to gain public support 
for the push towards providing legal aid.151 She argues this is necessary because too often, 
debates about legal aid are framed ‘in terms of its impact on the legal system and abstract legal 
                                                     
146 Mulcahy, “Collective Interest,” 61.  
147 Genn, Judging Civil Justice, 37. 
148 Mulcahy, “Collective Interest,” 79. 
149 This conflict is something I explore in the second chapter when I look at how and why LiPs became 
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150 Natalie Byrom, “Cuts and the Lawyering Identity Crisis” in A Flynn and J Hodgson, eds, Access to 
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concepts and terminology, which fails to resonate outside rarefied circles of lawyers and legal 
academics’.152 I argue that the prioritising of the effect LiPs will have on the legal system over 
ideas of access to justice for litigants is evidenced throughout these writings. As such, this 
post-LASPO discourse can be of only limited value in understanding LiPs and what they want, 
even if advocated by the most sympathetic of practitioners.  
 
This second discourse of crisis, then, inherently reinforces two problematic ideas when it 
comes to LiPs: firstly, it reinforces the idea that LASPO is the crisis point: while it may be so 
for the legal profession, the difficulties LiPs have experienced before these changes show us this 
is by no means the case. As such this second ‘crisis’ of legal aid changes is inseparable from 
what is at stake for the legal profession. Secondly, the underlying implicit necessity of legal 
representation as the solution for all LiPs does not clearly sit with the right of self-
representation.153 On the one hand, there is a right of access to all courts for LiPs. But on the 
other, built into civil justice is an emphasis on the need for representation. So why do we have 
LiPs in the first place? This conflict means that this way of seeing can only get us so far in 
terms of how to improve LiP experiences. The answer seems to be: get a lawyer.154  
 
CRISIS NO. 3:  A SYSTEMIC ISSUE 
 
Both discourses above depict the LiP in certain ways, with the first emphasising how much 
LiPs are a problem and the second emphasising that LiPs would be better off with 
representation. In the first place, what both discourses demonstrate is that the category of 
‘LiP’ is a problem. The term LiP is a legal concept—and yet LiPs exist outside of this. At the 
moment, any understanding by the legal field of what a LiP is and how they behave is being 
observed from a legal perspective. This means we have difficulty understanding LiP 
experiences outside of the frames we impose on them and it also makes it difficult (if not 
impossible) to consider what the law and legal process might mean to those outside of it.155  
 
For example, LASPO changes have led to fears of rising numbers of LiPs in the courts. But 
what if we reconsider this from outside the perspective of the legal profession?  As we have 
                                                     
152 Ibid, 234.  
153 Again, it is important to note that not all practitioners advocate for full representation; some argue 
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seen, from the perspective of many legal practitioners, there is a tendency here to think that 
legal aid changes mean that most individuals who would have had access to representation will 
now go ahead without it. But even if more LiPs do come, they may not look as many in the 
profession imagine. We know from Moorhead and Sefton, and others, that the majority of LiPs 
are not active vexatious claimants, but rather passive defendants. These are people who do not 
participate in their own defence, let alone attend their own hearings. If there is a going to be a 
rapid growth in LiPs, I believe there is a significant risk that these LiPs will be these passive 
defendants: those either unable or unwilling to participate in their own proceedings or, indeed, 
to defend themselves. So what if the real risk isn’t rising numbers? Long before LASPO, access 
to legal aid was problematic, obtaining good quality legal representation was difficult and 
legal proceedings were expensive.156 This is still the case, and LASPO has only magnified it. 
Lia Moses of LawWorks suggests this in her blog for the Law Society Gazette, asking:  
 
How will anyone who is not articulate, well-educated and familiar with the court system 
cope with the procedures in place – will they manage to pay the fees, get the forms in the 
proper order and get past the court office? 157 
 
In this context, the true worry is not that more people will come acting as LiPs; it is that they 
may not come at all.158   
 
Most importantly, though, I argue these two crises serve to both point to, and simultaneously 
obscure, the true crisis: LiPs are perpetually positioned as aliens to legal proceedings. As we 
have seen, LiPs are usually talked about in legal discourses through the perceived threat they 
pose to legal proceedings. But the only way, of course, that LiPs’ entry into legal process can 
be considered a threat is because they are presumed to be fundamentally outside of it. As 
Richard Moorhead noted, LiPs ‘disturb the normal conventions of a courtroom’: it is this 
aberration from normality that can so easily be conflated with the litigant in person him or 
herself being “abnormal”.159 This means that even those who advocate to improve conditions 
for LiPs continue to perpetuate this presumption.  
 
                                                     
156 See Richard Moorhead and Pascoe Pleasence, eds., After Universalism: Re-engineering Acces to Justice 
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157 See Lia Moses, “Helping out Litigants in Person,” Law Society Gazette, 15 July 2013.  
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CONCLUSION:  
LiPs tend to be talked about in highly pejorative terms, and this is longstanding. This 
pejorative attitude arises largely from the impact that such individuals are believed to have on 
others in the court process, due to their lack of specialised knowledge, language or skill. LiPs 
don’t understand their case, they don’t understand how to behave and their disruptive 
behaviour impacts negatively on other court users. In short, LiPs cause problems. But the 
extent of these perceived problems seems to have led to a conflation where LiPs don’t merely 
cause problems, but they themselves are considered to be a problem. As such, criticism of LiPs 
often presents their faults as somehow linked to their character or psychology. While there are 
also sympathetic scholars and practitioners who seek to improve experiences for LiPs, this 
writing still shares certain assumptions about LiPs: that they bring problems with them that 
affect others, and that they disturb the operation of a courtroom. As noted above, this means 
that both groups of writers tend to see LiPs as outsiders to what is ‘normal’.  
 
It is this outsider status that has let to us not knowing much about LiPs, because we have 
tended to neglect them in scholarship until relatively recently.160 When we do talk about them, 
we are often dismissive or pejorative, and even the most sympathetic commentators position 
LiPs as objects of pity.161  And as this thesis will go on to argue, while LiPs possess theoretical 
access to legal proceedings, in practice this right is largely rhetorical. LiPs do not have fair, 
easy, or equal access to the courts, and this is not the result of LASPO. The solution to this 
crisis, however, isn’t about giving people lawyers or working out how to prevent “difficult” 
people from coming to court. Instead, we need to change the way we approach understanding 
those who act as LiPs, finding methods that attempt to, as sociolegal research calls for, ‘reach 
beyond’ the limitations of internal legal discourses.162 While LiPs are positioned as alien to 
legal process they will continue to be afterthoughts, problems, or objects of pity. This cannot 
be sufficient in a civil justice system where, as Bridgette Toy-Cronin notes: ‘the contribution 
that the right of self-representation makes’ is linked to ‘the continuing legitimacy of the legal 
system’.163 
 
It is clear, then, that the term “LiP” poses more problems than it solves. More than just a 
confusing concept, the term is linked to a limited understanding of self-represented parties, 
and exists in a civil justice system that inadequately accommodates such individuals. But how 
                                                     
160 As noted above, there are few examples of LiP research prior to the 1980s, and most scholarship 
comes from the late 1990s, 2000s and later. This is interesting in a situation where self-representation, 
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August 2011.  
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London, 2014), 4.   
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did this situation come to be? Why do we look down on LiPs? Have self-representing parties 
always been looked on as aliens to legal process, or is there another story to be told? Why is 
there a right of self-representation in the courts when the practice of civil justice seem to 
fundamentally preclude LiPs? These are the questions pursued in the next chapter.   
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3 
FROM THE BEAR-GARDENS TO THE COUNTY COURT: 
CREATING THE LIP 
 
 
 
 
 
This [section of the County Court Chronicle] will be dedicated to the Suitor, whether by 
Attorney or in person. Firmly convinced that the ultimate interests of the Attorney and the 
Client are the same; that law may be too cheap as well as too dear; that bad law is worse than 
no law; and that there is substantial truth in the proverbial description of the man who is 
“his own lawyer”.164 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This [case] seems an exemplification of a hackneyed observation that a man who is his 
own lawyer has not a Solomon for his client.165 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
TRIAL LASTS TWELVE DAYS: And Litigant Speaks for Nine of Them.166 
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165 CCC, 1 September 1866, 134. 
166 Western Times, 4 November 1927, 16. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter seeks to understand how we came to acquire the dominant beliefs and attitudes 
we have about LiPs. Why is there such a pejorative attitude towards them? As I outlined in 
the previous chapter, LiPs are considered widely by legal professionals to be vexatious, time 
wasting, disturbed, incompetent or a combination of all of the above.  This has significant 
consequences for LiPs when they try to pursue or defend claims. But how did we get here? 
Were people who represented themselves always considered so negatively? Or is this the 
result of historical changes: if so, when and how? As I will show, pursuing these questions is a 
distinct task to that of undertaking a broader history of self-representation. The term LiP is a 
relatively modern one and taking this term as synonymous with self-representation fails to 
consider how important the moment of historical transformation is from a general idea of self-
representation to the creation of the LiP as a specific role. To understand how LiPs came to be 
understood as they are today demands a critical investigation of the creation of the term itself.  
 
This chapter then, is a study of a particular historical moment: when the term LiP first 
appears, and the context in which this takes place. I argue that this moment is a by-product of 
broader changes taking place in both the legal profession and in legal adjudication, 
culminating in the sweeping Judicature Acts which create the modern superior courts. It begins 
with the founding of the new County Courts in 1847 and ends with the appearance of LiP as a 
term in case law, and in general parlance, by the 1880s. As I will show, in a remarkably short 
period of time from their creation, these new County Courts, theoretically designed to provide 
greater access to justice for poorer litigants, become increasingly dominated by legal 
professionals, who bring in their wake greater and greater formality of procedure and content, 
which makes it harder and harder for individuals to act without lawyers.167  
 
Blaming ‘formality’ and the ‘legal profession’, however, for creating the LiP is an 
oversimplification. Instead I will argue in this chapter that what happens during this period 
can best be understood as emblematic of Larson’s ‘professional project’ in action. Drawing on 
Larson’s framework I will show that the new County Courts become a battleground for 
attorneys to claim their place in a legal profession that up until this point actively 
discriminates between the ‘higher’ calling of the Bar and the ‘lower’ rungs of the rank and file 
                                                     
167 Of course, this was never the only motive for establishing the County Courts, as I will outline later in 
the chapter. 
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practitioners.168  As I will outline, this battle is a battle for distinction that takes place through 
the marking out legal representatives from laypersons, the normalisation of legal expertise 
and the cracking down on unqualified representatives. It is the introduction of these kinds of 
distinction into the County Courts that creates the LiP. What I will show, then, is that the LiP 
role is not simply that of self-representation, it is self-representation that occurs, and only 
occurs, in the context of the latter stages of the professional project. Perversely, this also 
means that the creation of the term LiP does not indicate the facilitation of lay participation in 
legal forums; it instead marks the moment when they are displaced. 
 
 
A NOTE ON SOURCES AND SCOPE 
 
It is important to start this chapter by saying explicitly that this is not a history, either of the 
County Courts, or of 19th century changes in legal adjudication.169 These topics, while 
indirectly implicated in this research, are not only well beyond the scope of this project but 
they are also beyond my capacity as someone who is not an historian and who lacks the 
requisite skill and training to tackle such a task. Instead, what I attempt to do in this chapter is 
narrower: I try to understand what is happening for self-represented parties at the time the 
County Courts are founded and in the following decades, seeking to shed light on how the 
term LiP came about and how such individuals came to be so looked down upon.  
 
However, such a task does necessitate having a general understanding of the pre-existing 
landscape of self-representation prior to the founding of the County Courts, knowledge of the 
County Courts themselves, and understanding of developments in the legal profession at that 
time.  I therefore draw on, and am indebted to, several legal historians whose work is essential 
in constructing my argument: in particular, Patrick Polden’s History of the County Courts of 
                                                     
168 The ‘rank-and-file’ practitioners are the attorneys and solicitors, with attorneys practising in courts 
of common law and solicitors practicing in Chancery. This division ends in 1874 with the Judicature Acts 
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169 The nineteenth century is of course a time of extraordinary and far-reaching changes in the law 
courts: such developments touch on this research but remain tangential enough that dealing with them 
directly would take this research too far from the key questions. However, a contemporary account of 
these changes can be found in Robert William Andrews, The Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, and the 
Appellate Jurisdiction ACT 1876: With Rules of Court and Forms to May, 1880. Annotated So As to Form a 
Manual of Practice. Adapted Chiefly to the Chancery and Common Law Divisions (BiblioBazaar, London 2015 
[1880). For a more contemporary account of some of the changes taking place during this time, see 
Michael Lobban, “Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the 19th Century Court of Chancery, II,” Law and 
History Review 22, no. 3(2004): 565-599.  
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England, H.W. Arthur’s Without the Law and Paul Brand’s The Origins of the English Legal 
Profession.170  It is perhaps an irony that to write about people without lawyers, one must spend 
most of one’s time talking about legal professionals. But as this thesis will continue to revisit, 
self-representation only exists as a concept in relation to legal representation, and so they 
remain indelibly linked.  
 
In addition to the legal historical literature that provides a background to this analysis, this 
chapter draws on two primary sources for information about the County Courts: firstly, the 
House of Commons [HC] and House of Lords [HL] debates that took place around the 
establishment of these courts, and which took place over a nearly thirty-year period from 1821 
until 1849. My research into the HC and HL debates was based on the online searching of the 
database of hansards using “County Courts” as the key search term.171 I read any debate 
explicitly mentioning the County Courts as a means of understanding the grounds on which 
the legislation establishing the new courts was introduced. 
  
Secondly, and most importantly, this chapter draws on the County Court Chronicle, a publication 
that was founded with the introduction of the new County Courts in 1847 and which 
continued until 1920. The County Court Chronicle provides early court reports, editorials, 
discussions of relevant legislative and procedural reforms, and letters to the editor from both 
litigants and lawyers: as such it offers an unmatched insight into debates taking place around 
the time. The alteration in the Chronicle’s style and focus is a useful method of charting the 
shifts in process relating to the LiP that I seek to identify in this chapter. As I will show, 
within a short space of time, the Chronicle goes from being a journalistic, almost gossipy, 
account of cases, many of which have unrepresented parties, to becoming a distinctly different 
publication in keeping with the development of the professional project.  
 
It is important to note here, though, that although the County Court Chronicle is an invaluable 
resource, I am aware that there is a danger in relying too heavily on it for evidence of what 
happened in the County Courts. This is because, of course, the reporting itself is always partial 
and selective. Even in the first year of its publication, where the amount of cases reported was 
significantly more than the amount reported ten or twenty years later, this was only ever a 
fragment of the proceedings actually taking place.  I will argue, instead, that what we can do is 
consider the reporting in the Chronicle as indicative of what was important to the authors 
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(legal professionals) and their audience (largely legal professionals).172 As I will show, the 
diminishment of cases reported involving self-represented parties in later editions of the 
County Court Chronicle does not necessarily indicate that they disappear (and, in fact, we know 
from isolated comments that they do not), but it does tell us that they are marginalised from 
what is perceived to be the “real work” of the Courts: that of legal professionals arguing 
matters of legal interest. 173  
 
My analysis of the County Court Chronicle is based on searching the database 
Newspaperarchive.com which provides access (via a fee) to editions of the Chronicle from the year 
1846 onwards.174  However, while online editions are available until 1904, and the publication 
itself continued for sixteen years after this online database ends, I chose to not continue to 
read further than the 1890s as by this time, the term LiP had been well established and was 
appearing in multiple contemporary newspapers. I began my Chronicle research by reading all 
the 1847 editions page by page to identify where information about self-represented parties 
could be found. Having identified the relevant sections of the publication for self-represented 
parties (this included, for example, ‘The Suitor’, which is dedicated to discussing developments 
for litigants, as well as the weekly County Court Reports and the Letters pages), I then used 
these as reference points when reading through later editions of the Chronicle. Although there 
is a key-word search function in the NewspaperArchive database, the term ‘litigant in person’ 
does not exist until the 1880s (and never appears in the Chronicle). Therefore, this tool was 
limited in its utility which necessitated continuing to read through each edition to ensure no 
new section or term had emerged. So, while I did attempt to make my searching as efficient as 
possible, the material in this chapter from the Chronicle is based on looking through every 
edition of the publication from 1849 to 1890. 
 
 
BEFORE 1847: SELF-REPRESENTATION IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 
 
The presence of self-represented parties in civil proceedings is a longstanding feature of 
English legal history.175 As Paul Brand notes, ‘England before the middle of the twelfth 
century was a country without professional lawyers largely because there was little for them 
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to be expert about’. 176  Prior to the emergence of the legal profession, litigants brought their 
suits in person. The introduction of specialised King’s Justices and tribunals created the initial 
need for specialists. It is the emergence of the legal profession to meet this demand that in 
turn generates greater legal complexity, and then the need for greater expertise to navigate 
this complexity, which results in the development of more formality requiring further 
expertise, and so on in a symbiotic, ever developing relationship that results in a complex legal 
system and a profession that represents it. This accumulation of complexity inevitably 
displaces individuals from being able to self-represent because they lack the expertise with 
which to do so.177 This is of course, in short, a version of Larson’s professional project, 
whereby legal professionals establish a monopoly within an emerging market.178 In England, 
this happens extraordinarily quickly.179 By the time we reach the establishment of Superior 
Courts under Henry II, less than fifty years from the mid-12th century, we have courts where: 
 
[a]lmost all litigants were “outsiders”, both in the sense of having no social or family links 
to the judges and in the sense of their being ignorant of the law and custom followed in and 
constantly being reshaped by the court, which created demand for individuals who could 
act as intermediaries between litigants and the court.180 
 
From the 13th century onwards, the Westminster courts used a writ system that required legal 
experts to draft documents establishing the suit as relevant to one of the recognised causes for 
action.181 There were also professional pleaders who presented the case in court. The superior 
courts were therefore dominated by legal representatives from a very early point, as they 
relied on expertise in substantive issues and pleading.182 Once representatives were involved, 
this significantly raised the costs of appearance, thus excluding individuals who could not 
afford to hire representatives. As Margaret Hastings points out: 
 
the wonder is, considering the obstructions, the many delays, the tedious procedure, even 
where no extraordinary hurdles had to be surmounted, and the considerable expense of 
writs, attorney’s fees, and so forth, that anyone ever had the courage to go to law in a 
mediaeval court except for large debts, extensive lands, or chattels of great value. Either 
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attorneys were persuasive salesmen of the law, or men were willing to pay much to gratify 
litigious proclivities.183 
 
It was simply not a practical option to pursue matters in these courts unless one had a 
considerable amount to spend, and to lose. Hastings’ comment also draws our attention to an 
important point: that it is misleading to suggest that legal representation ends any individual’s 
ability to self-represent. Clearly, even before lawyers, this ability was already largely limited 
to the wealthy and the landed, and thus did not include the vast majority of the population 
who lacked such resources and therefore were unlikely to have any encounters with these 
courts.184  
 
It is apparent, then, that the courts at Westminster were inaccessible to laypersons from an 
early stage. But these were not the only courts in pre-19th century England. Self-
representation continued to flourish in other courts and tribunals such as the Anglo-Saxon 
derived hundred courts and the manorial courts, alongside a host of specialised tribunals that 
existed throughout England and Wales well into the 19th century. 185  Early plea rolls from the 
Eyres (developed from hundred courts but employing itinerant King’s Justices) show us an 
abundance of self-represented individuals.186 Several factors help explain why self-
representation continued in these courts: firstly, many of these courts and tribunals remained 
primarily oral with individuals able to attend and give their complaint on the day. This means 
that disputes were resolved quickly, and also meant that with no elaborate writ system, 
literacy was not necessary.187 Secondly, there was no need for legal expertise as adjudication 
was not necessarily bound by precedent, and there were no superior courts to which these 
courts had to answer.188 There was therefore no obvious need for legal representation because 
there was still nothing to be expert about. Procedures were consequently cheaper and simpler. 
Finally, these courts were held locally, making them not only more physically accessible to 
those who could not travel to London, but also tribunals that could dispense a kind of 
communal justice that the Westminster courts could not.   
 
This is obviously a rather truncated and simplified overview of diverse and complex tribunals. 
But I provide this narrative to draw out two important points for this chapter. Firstly, it is 
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obviously inaccurate to claim that self-representation becomes impossible only in the 19th 
century. Self-representation arguably always required facilitation by certain factors to be 
effective: proceedings that are oral and that therefore do not necessitate literacy, and forms of 
adjudication that don’t rely on knowledge of legal doctrine that would necessitate legal 
expertise. It is when litigants lose access to these kinds of proceedings that self-representation 
becomes more difficult. Secondly, understanding that England is a landscape of multiple 
different courts and tribunals in the mid-19th century also helps to understand the impact of 
the County Court Act 1846. This is because this act does not simply create a new court for 
litigants, it replaces another one: The Courts of Request.     
 
THE COUNTY COURTS AND THE COURTS OF REQUEST 
 
The County Courts Act 1846 came into force in 1847. This bill, which was debated, drafted and 
redrafted over a nearly thirty-year period189, did not create County Courts, which in fact 
already existed, but was rather intended to reform them in order to provide an accessible and 
inexpensive forum for pursuing small debts.190 The superior courts were, as noted above, 
accessible only to the wealthy, required legal representation, and were routinely criticized for 
their ‘dilatory’ proceedings, with suits taking many months. Joseph Parkes, writing about his 
own experience of the Warwick Assizes of 1827, says:  
 
I brought an action for £25. It was defended; six witnesses, besides the respective 
attorneys and parties, attended five days: I obtained a verdict: my costs to the defendant 
were £66, and probably his own costs due to his attorney would be an additional sum of 
£50; thus the original debt in dispute was more than quadrupled, besides the time and 
personal inconvenience lost to all parties.191  
 
In addition, since 1278 the Statute of Gloucester had limited any proceedings in the superior 
courts to actions involving a value of more than 40s. The fact that a suit’s importance was 
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formally determined by how much financially was at stake, barring it from the superior courts, 
was harshly criticised by Jeremy Bentham, among others: 
 
No wrong that I know of can be a trivial one which to him to whom it is done is a serious 
one; serious to such a degree as to make it worth his while to demand redress at the hands 
of justice [….] What to one man may be trivial, to another may be of high importance. In 
pecuniary cases, the smaller the sum in dispute the less reserve is used in branding the 
conduct of parties with the charge of litigation, of which, in such cases, the reproach is apt 
to fall principally, if not exclusively, to the plaintiffs share.192 
 
As Bentham, and other contemporary commentators, including Sir Robert Peel, Viscount 
Althorp and Lord Falconer, argued, the arbitrary corollary between financial value and merit 
misrepresented what the value of the suit may be for the individual bringing it.193 Poorer 
litigants may wager more of their net income or assets than a comparatively wealthy 
individual even if the total sum in question is significantly less.  
 
This statute meant, however, that any suits of lesser value had to be pursued in the lower 
courts. And the existing County Courts were considered by many to be just as bad as the 
superior courts. These courts shared the charges of delay and expense levelled at the superior 
courts, but in addition were also regularly accused of corruption and criticised for their 
infrequency.194  John Smith, in an early House of Commons debate on County Court reform:  
 
[p]resented a petition from the inhabitants of Brighton, complaining of the serious evils 
which arose from the abuses of the practice of the County Courts. The petitioners alleged, 
that these courts frequently granted seizures for sums treble the amount of the original 
debt, and this enormous increase was generally caused by the costs, which swallowed up 
every-thing else. … among others he mentioned the case of a poor woman, who was sued 
for a debt of 14s., and an execution being taken out against her for that sum, and for 15s. 
costs upon it, her goods were seized for a sum considerably exceeding the amount of both 
debt and costs; her bed, her pillows, and several other articles of furniture were taken from 
her, and in this case, as in others of a similar kind, nothing was returned.195 
 
Politicians and jurists, then, proposed the County Court legislation ostensibly as a means of 
extending justice to poorer litigants, and as an explicit reaction to the inaccessibility of the 
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current courts.196 However, although there were certainly altruistic motives involved, the 
legislation was arguably less about giving access to justice for poorer litigants than allowing 
tradesmen to pursue poorer individuals for debts.197 Most importantly, the implication of 
comments made by figures such as Lord Falconer is that the Act was needed to provide courts 
where there were no courts before, or only the bad old County Courts.198 But this assumption 
ignores the Courts of Request. 
 
Courts of Request (sometimes called Courts of Conscience) were courts where cases were 
decided locally according to ‘equity and good conscience.’ As Shaunnagh Dorset points out 
this means that such courts were: 
 
neither a court of common law nor equity and decisions were to be made according to the 
more discretionary norms of “real justice and good conscience”, although such courts could 
apply common law or equitable principles, or a modified version of them […] such courts 
were designed to allow matters to be determined in a manner that was shorn of the need 
for technicalities, difficult pleading or even lawyers, and they were often run by 
laypersons.199  
 
Each Court of Request was a separate entity created by local municipal statute.200 The cases in 
question in these courts were usually very small and as Dorset notes, the procedures were 
relatively simple, and parties could testify in person.201 The Courts of Requests were clearly 
also hugely popular. By 1847, these courts existed in over four hundred locations and dealt 
with several hundred thousand suits annually.202 This was where the majority of small debts 
claims were made, alongside a host of other kinds of minor disputes. As H.W. Arthurs puts it: 
‘It is hardly an overstatement to say that, for most Englishmen of the period, the local Court 
of Request dispensed the only form of civil justice they would ever know’.203 Far from there 
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being no forum for litigants pursuing small claims, then, there were in fact courts already 
operating that were arguably rather successful. 204  
 
So why, then, do the drafters of the County Court Act argue that the new County Court is 
needed? One explanation is that The Courts of Request were no place for those who 
considered themselves members of the legal profession. As a Chronicle correspondent would 
note later: ‘Courts of request were bear gardens in noise and confusion, and their character 
was at the lowest ebb’.205  While there seems to be some evidence of attorneys involved in the 
Courts of Request, such individuals were looked down on as debasing the reputation of the 
profession in general.206 The judges in the Courts of Request themselves required no legal 
training, although by the 1830s they did have to be landowners. Courts of Request do 
occasionally appear in the House of Commons debates about the new County Courts, but they 
are not depicted in a flattering light. Lord Brougham expresses a typical attitude here: 
 
It happens that tradesmen, who know nothing of law, and who may not have much 
occupation in their own business, preside in these Courts of Request, and administer justice 
as well as might be expected. I say it is better to have these courts and these judges than to 
have none. 207 
 
So, while the Courts of Request were considered to serve a purpose while there was no better 
alternative, they were generally considered beneath the dignity of the profession and thus 
replaceable.208 
 
But another, more persuasive explanation for why the Court of Request is replaced can be 
found through examining the criticism in closer detail. Such criticism demonstrates that for 
many in the legal profession, the Courts of Request weren’t just undignified, they weren’t 
courts at all. The language of the criticism evidences this: these courts were, as above, 
described as ‘bear gardens’.209 Other commentators refer to them as ‘but tribunals’.210 Such 
language is more than a character assessment: it is a policing of boundaries, symptomatic of 
what John Griffiths identified as ‘legal centralism’. Griffiths defines legal centralism as the idea 
that: ‘law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other 
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law, and administered by a single set of state institutions’.211 Courts and tribunals operating 
outside of the auspices of this central administration are therefore not real courts. But legal 
centralism is a claim, not a fact. As Marc Galanter comments in his article on indigenous law 
and legal pluralism: 
 
Just as health is not found primarily in hospitals or knowledge in schools, so justice is not 
primarily to be found in official justice-dispensing institutions. People experience justice 
(and injustice) not only (or usually) in forums sponsored by the state but at the primary 
institutional location of their activity--home, neighborhood, workplace, business deal and 
so on (including a variety of specialised remedial settings embedded in these locations).212   
 
Following Griffiths and Galanter, the County Court Act can be read as an ideological claim to a 
specific kind of justice:  a justice that can only be found via the guiding hand of the legal 
profession. The statute’s preamble explicitly states that:  ‘it is expedient that the Provisions of 
such Acts should be amended, and that One Rule and Manner of proceeding for the Recovery 
of Small Debts and Demands should prevail throughout England’. 213  As such the County 
Courts Act is more than simple reform: it is part of a wider thrust of legal centralisation taking 
place throughout the 19th century, dismantling unregulated courts and transforming them into 
new areas of practice for the profession. 214   
 
The County Courts Act, then is drafted to provide proper courts for poorer litigants. These new 
courts will be overseen, and ideally frequented, by legal professionals.215 As Patrick Polden 
states: ‘from the point of view of the profession [. . .] it was imperative that the county courts 
should be established on a basis that would give lawyers access to a lucrative new area of 
practice’. 216 Here we see the mix of altruism and self-interest that largely characterises these 
developments. So while it would be overstating it to say that the new County Court was 
established purely in the pursuit of a professional monopoly, it would be naïve in the extreme 
to believe that this was not also a factor in its development.217 In keeping with Bourdieu’s 
sociological theory, instead, we can see these two motives are entirely blended: it is not the 
case that the legal profession want a monopoly of the new courts purely out of self-interest: 
instead, they genuinely believe that their presence will serve the ends of justice. This attitude 
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is common in the Chronicle, and is exemplified in this County Court Chronicle editorial in the 
year the bill passed: 
 
There is undoubtedly an inclination at present to stand aloof from the County Courts – to 
look upon the practices as low, and to leave it to the lowest grade of practitioners. Because 
the old County Courts and the old Courts of Requests were deemed beneath the notice of 
the most respectable class of the Profession, there is an unwillingness to look upon the new 
Courts as being at all superior to those they have displaced. But this is a grievous mistake, 
and if persisted in will be seriously injurious both to the Courts and to the Profession.218 
 
The implicit argument here is that the presence of legal professionals is necessary in these new 
courts, because their presence will transform the proceedings from ‘bear-gardens’ into real 
courts. 
 
AN OCCUPATIONAL HIERARCHY 
 
It is necessary at this juncture to note that it is far too simplistic to keep referring to the ‘legal 
profession’ as a monolithic group, particularly if we want to understand what happens in the 
County Courts and how it affects self-represented parties. This is because the legal profession, 
like any other profession, has its own occupational hierarchy. More than that, the status of the 
law as one of the ‘older professions’, means that its professional structures were developed far 
earlier than many other professions.219 While it is important not to get lost in these complex 
histories, for the purposes of this research, it is essential to note the gap between the elite 
members of the profession who practiced at the Bar and were admitted to the Inns of Court, 
and those who occupied a lower status in the profession: the rank-and-file attorneys and 
solicitors. While such divisions persist in different forms today, these divisions historically cut 
far deeper. They were, for a start, indicative of a distinct class difference: those admitted to the 
Bar came from loftier backgrounds, compared with attorneys and solicitors who were from 
humbler origins.220 Of course this is often the case today, but in the pre-19th century, this 
division denoted the difference between practitioners at the Bar who were considered 
‘gentleman’, and those who were seen by the Bar as merely working for money. As Daniel 
Duman argues, at the point that the Bar established its autonomy, practitioners worked as 
barristers to attain social privileges that would enable them to pursue leisure; work was not 
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valued in and of itself.221 The fact that barristers were given an ‘honorarium’ rather than 
charging a fee indicated the origins of the Bar’s professionalism in a landscape of aristocratic 
patronage.222  
 
This was of course not the case for attorneys who lacked these social privileges and who were 
dependent on a steady income to survive. But the late 18th and early 19th century was a time of 
radical changes. Industrialisation led to significant population changes, as people moved from 
the countryside to the towns. Such growing town populations led to radical economic and 
class changes too, as new markets opened up in these urban centres, and the class structure of 
the whole country changed with it, from one structured on landowners and peasants, to one 
centred around the market.223 The consequences for the legal profession of these changes are 
significant. As Daniel Duman notes: ‘The aristocratic concept of the gentleman was no longer 
appropriate to the professions in an industrial age’.224 While up until this point, the Bar had 
thrived on a pre-nineteenth century guild-like exclusivity, by this time, as T.H. Marshall 
notes:   
 
Leisure is no longer in the same sense the mark of the aristocracy, and commerce is no 
longer a disreputable occupation . . . The professional had to change his ground. He had to 
admit that his occupation was laborious, like the tradesman's---and even to glory in the 
fact—but to assert that it was labour of a superior kind. The idea of service became more 
important than the idea of freedom.225  
 
In the legal profession, this changing of ground happened at both the higher and the lower 
ends: the Bar re-oriented itself from aristocratic patronage to subscribing to a model of 
service.226 But in the meantime, large sections of the ‘lower-rungs’, increasingly made up of the 
new, socially-mobile middle class, were also eager to improve their own prospects by 
emphasising their professionalism.  
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Larson argues that the distinction insisted on by professions is:  
 
a means of conferring status by establishing social distance between the professionals and 
the other groups: the as-yet socially unacceptable self-made men of the industrial 
bourgeoisie, in societies which maintained pre-industrial criteria of stratification.227 
 
I would argue that what is significant in this history of the legal profession is that the Bar 
maintained its ‘pre-industrial criteria of stratification’ well into the 19th century, and with this 
the anxiety to disassociate the Bar from attorneys.228 This means that the division between 
upper and lower rungs of the legal profession was not simply a social one, but was actively 
policed. Attorneys were strongly discouraged from joining the Inns of Court and could only 
join the Bar if they ‘abandoned their practice in the lower branch for at least two years before 
being called’. 229 In short, this means that at the time of the founding of the County Courts 
many areas of practice in the superior courts were simply inaccessible to the lower rungs of 
the profession because they did not have rights of audience, with the Bar enjoying a total 
monopoly on superior court advocacy. The fact that the entire judiciary was drawn from the 
Bar only ensured that the legal profession as a whole was largely dictated to by the interests of 
this elite group.  
 
In this context, then, the new County Court becomes critically important because it offers a 
new site of practice to attorneys and through them, a means of establishing themselves and 
becoming recognised advocates.230 Such a move could potentially both distinguish them from 
lay practitioners as well as allow them to access areas of practice previously the exclusive 
reserve of barristers, thus improving their prospects and strengthening their position in the 
legal profession. This echoes Larson’s argument of the ‘double’ nature of the professional 
project:  
 
the double nature of the professional project intertwines market and status orientations, 
and both tend towards monopoly—monopoly of opportunities for income in a market of 
service, on the one hand, and monopoly of status in an emerging occupational hierarchy, on 
the other.231 
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The new County Courts were therefore not only a new forum for poorer litigants to pursue 
debt claims. They were also not only a new area for legal professionals to expand into. They 
were in addition to both, an opportunity for attorneys to stake a claim to be taken seriously in 
the courts. And as I will argue in the next section of the chapter, it is when attorneys begin 
staking their claim that the LiP begins to emerge.   
 
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE COUNTY COURT  
 
In June 1847, the first edition of the County Court Chronicle was published, advertising itself on 
its masthead as a monthly publication by the editor and contributors of the Law Times. At this 
point, the courts themselves had been in operation for less than two months. The front cover 
is dedicated to notices of the next County Court sessions on each circuit, followed by seven 
pages of law reports from across the country. The bulk of the rest of the publication is devoted 
to specific subsections on particular roles. The mission statement the Chronicle outlines for 
itself is: ‘to provide for all who are engaged in the County Courts, whether as Judges, Clerks, 
Bailiffs, Practitioners or Suitors, a medium for mutual information and intercommunication on 
the matters relating to the administration of justice by a tribunal which is of incalculable 
importance’.232 
 
The tone of the first edition is journalistic and experimental. The Chronicle itself acknowledges 
the provisionality of its current layout and arrangements, and the court reports themselves 
frequently give descriptive accounts of the circumstances of the courts in addition to specific 
cases. For example: ‘Narbeth, May 20. There were thirty-six cases entered. The courtroom, 
which is much too small, was crowded to excess with upwards of 100 persons being obliged to 
wait in the street outside’.233 In the reports themselves, self-representation is clearly common, 
with up to half the cases in the first half a dozen issues involving at least one individual 
appearing in person, if not on both sides. It is difficult to make any estimates of the proportion 
of self-representation in general because the reports are only a fraction of the cases that were 
heard. But it is reasonable to assume that an even higher proportion than that which appears 
in the law reports self-represented in actuality. This is because there is an explicit agenda on 
the part of the Chronicle to report cases of legal interest. For example, in Berwick, on May 29: 
‘At the first Court there were twenty-five cases entered, while at the last there were upwards 
of sixty. The only case interesting to that of the Profession was:’ followed by an account of a 
dispute between an agent and a represented defendant.234  
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For a case to be of legal interest the concept must be understood in legal terminology: this is 
more likely to arise in cases with represented parties.  Consequently, matters of unrepresented 
parties are more likely to go unreported.  However, although the Chronicle is staffed by 
members of the profession, with their concomitant clear interest in drawing out relevant legal 
issues, the publication commits itself to the interests of self-represented parties as well as that 
of the profession. The County Court Chronicle dedicates a section to the “Suitor”: in other words, 
to the litigant, who was more likely than not to be self-representing. This section is filled with 
information that is intended to assist such individuals. As the editor explicitly states in the 
epigraph opening this chapter, a Suitor in person, and an attorney representing a client, are of 
equal dignity and status.235 At this point, then, we may safely observe that self-representation 
is seen by the authors of the publication as relatively normal. 
 
So, although I have made much of the radical transformation resulting from the County Courts 
Act, it really began as an attempt to combine the introduction of more professional practices—
and with it an opportunity for attorneys to become recognised advocates—without completely 
dismantling what came before, thus retaining enough of the old Courts of Request to ensure 
the new court’s popularity. This hybridity can be seen in several ways. Firstly, and crucially, 
the County Courts Act clearly outlines the right of trained attorneys to represent litigants, and 
restricts the ability of other third parties to act as representatives.236 The Chronicle notes in 
1847 the measures taken towards this: 
 
[o]ne of the most serious evils to which the suitors resorting to inferior tribunals have 
been exposed – that of being duped into the employment of sham practitioners – has 
already received a very decided check from the Judges presiding at Southwark and in 
Bloomsbury.237 
 
This crackdown on unregulated individuals is one Larson argues is characteristic of the 
professional project, and it receives regular coverage in the Chronicle over the years.238 At the 
same time, however, a fees cap is in place stopping legal representatives from claiming costs 
from the court in any proceedings less than 5l.239 This means, in practical terms, that the 
County Courts both worked towards greater regulation of the profession by weeding out third 
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parties, but also restricted access to legal representation in practice as the majority of disputes 
fell below this threshold. This is in keeping with the intention stated by the initial proposers of 
the new County Courts that they would be as accessible and simple as possible.240  
 
Secondly, there is a clear attempt to link the County Courts to the superior courts in an effort 
to legitimate them and attract more legal professionals: the Chronicle, for example, advises that 
the judges keep an eye to the ‘dignity’, ‘decorum’ and ‘tone’ of the superior courts. The 
following extract is typical of these kinds of editorials:  
 
The new courts, for all practical purpose, dispense very nearly the same law as the superior 
courts, and have jurisdiction over almost as many subjects. True, the amount is limited; but 
that does not affect the real importance of the Courts; for the same legal questions, the 
same philosophy of evidence, the same care in the judgment, the same skill in the advocacy 
are required, whether the sum in dispute be 20l or 50l. It is the nature of the action and not 
the amount of demand that determines its legal importance.241 
 
This is reflective of the concerted desire to get these County Courts more in line with the 
‘dignity’ of superior proceedings, thus making them an appropriate forum for respectable 
professionals. But on the other hand, there was still no appeal avenue to the superior courts for 
the vast majority of cases, as the Newcastle County Court judge points out:  
 
I am not bound by the specific rules of practice of the superior courts, nor by those of the 
County Court, part of whose jurisdiction has been turned over to this court….by the 78th 
section, I am to do justice between the parties by applying in such cases the general 
principles of practice in the superior courts, according to my discretion. It is very difficult 
to apply the practice of the superior courts to this court, because we have no pleadings here: 
but the principles of their practice I may apply.242  
 
The attempt to achieve this new hybrid court, where professional standards could be 
introduced, while informality and simplicity could be retained, runs into difficulties very 
quickly. We can see this in the cases reported in the Chronicle in the 1840s. For example, in 
Philip v Edwards, the plaintiff in person fails to make out his case and applies for an 
adjournment: this is granted but only on condition he pays the defendant’s costs for attendance 
that day. But in Newcastle, an illiterate man who fails to bring his daughter to assist him in his 
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plaint is also allowed to adjourn without paying defendant costs.243 In Warwickshire, the judge 
states that he will not allow anyone to speak for the plaintiff except a member of the plaintiff’s 
family, but in Philips v Edwards, the brother of the party asking for adjournment is not allowed 
as the judge refuses to recognise him.244 Similarly, in Lloyd v Jones the judge will not recognise 
the plaintiff’s wife.245  
 
Contradictions are also apparent in the question of legal representation. Many judges 
expressly argue that they want to encourage the presence of attorneys in the new County 
Courts: 
 
My great desire is to encourage the attendance of professional men in the courts on this 
circuit, for I am convinced that their assistance greatly conduces to the proper 
administration of justice in any court, whatever its rank, in which that assistance is 
rendered.246 
 
This is in keeping with the argument that a greater presence of professionals will legitimate 
these new courts. But other judges argue that legal representation is unnecessary stressing 
that lawyers are a ‘luxury, not a necessity’.247 In Jennings v Shepherd, ‘His Honour said he 
should be glad to allow costs where there was any necessity for an attorney’s attendance; but 
in ordinary cases he should not, nor would he lay down any rule, but judge each case per se’.248  
 
This lack of consistency is apparent in the court environment itself, which greatly exercises 
the Chronicle and its readers from the beginning. Consider, for example, this memorable 
account of Brentford County Court in 1847, which, while an extreme example, echoes other 
contributions around this issue: 
 
The Court is held at a public-house, in a room capable of accommodating a hundred or a 
hundred and fifty persons; the judge, clerk, high bailiff, &c being all seated together at a 
common tavern table, none of them being distinguished by any badge of office […] there 
must have been not less than five hundred people present, at the lowest calculation. These 
were distributed in the court (as many as it would most inconveniently hold), and the rest 
all over the house nearly, the greater part being on the staircase, and a great many, both 
there and in the court, intoxicated and withall noisy. The disgraceful confusion which these 
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state of things produced is perfectly indescribable; not to be witnessed, I hope and believe, 
in any other court of law in the kingdom.249  
 
The choice of venue, a public house, draws attention to the lack of dedicated court buildings at 
this point in time.250 There are clearly also no dress regulations: not only are the judges and 
professionals holding no ‘badge’ of office, but it later transpires that they are not dressed in 
any way distinguishable from anyone else. They sit at a large table that is again 
indistinguishable from other facilities in the public house.  In the opinion of the writer: 
 
It was the whole work, and hard work, too, of the poor wicket keeper or sub bailiff to 
prevent regular pitched battles, to say nothing of “words of violence” to check which his 
continued entreaty was- “Silence, ladies! silence! You really must be quiet, ladies; and go 
out if you want to talk”. But little the “ladies” reckoned, or the gentlemen either, for they 
still cut their jokes and vented their wrath, as the humour was upon them, in the most 
boisterous manner.251  
The gloriously mixed metaphors employed by the distressed attorney above (taking in 
sporting events and warfare and, later, theatres and bear gardens) emphasises that what he 
sees taking place in the tavern is not what he recognises as proper court practice. This is 
clearly due to the absence of uniformity and distinction which leads to a lack of respect by the 
audience and other participants (who, outrageously, feel that they had the right to speak: even 
women!). The writer largely attributes this failure to the judge: it is the judge’s responsibility 
to create an appropriate atmosphere through preserving distinction of rank in dress and 
seating arrangements and upholding stricter control of the court.  
This concern about the judge’s role in setting the tone is shared by other commentators of the 
time.252 Polden notes:  
 
 Even in country towns, however, the extent to which dignity and decorum prevailed 
depended largely on the personality of the judge. Some judges felt it would be enhanced by 
adopting the trappings of the superior courts, put on robes themselves and encouraged 
advocates to do likewise. James Espinasse went further than most, dressing up in silk gown 
and wig and being preceded into court by his officers bearing wands; this was felt to be 
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affecting the majesty of the law a little too much, but when Amos held court muffled up in 
his greatcoat he was considered to be lowering the dignity of the court.253 
Polden goes on to tell the story of Justice Edward Parry who, as a young lawyer, found 
himself before a County Court Judge. As Parry relates in his memoirs, while he had been told 
about this judge’s dislike of lawyers who wore robes, he hadn’t been told about the other 
“rules”, ‘such as not standing between the judge and the fire.’254 
But while these accounts are an entertaining demonstration of the lack of standardisation of 
practice in these new courts, what they also reveal is how much social anxiety is felt by these 
attorneys and how much they want to have their dignity and status upheld through operating 
in appropriate environments. Larson notes that:  
 
beyond the local sphere in which reputations were established there were few recognized 
guarantees of competence and probity. Without these visible signs, respectable common 
practitioners found themselves helpless against the competition of the unscrupulous and 
the inept, who proliferated in unregulated markets.255  
 
I argue, following Larson, that it is the ‘common practitioners’ battle for ‘visible signs’ that the 
Chronicle wages in the early years of the County Court. Attorneys fight to ensure that greater 
regulation, distinction and guarantees of competency are established in these new courts so 
that they can both shore up their role as advocates, as well as secure their status within the 
legal profession. As Polden notes:  
 
[…] all the judges, whether modest or flamboyant, had to make decisions about procedure 
and evidence which were of importance to suitors and to the lawyers of the district, and 
such decisions were more significant for the administration of justice than any points of law 
that came before them.256 
 
And this, arguably, explains why attorneys are so upset by proceedings such as that taking 
place at Brentford. It also explains why an unusual amount of time is spent in the Chronicle 
discussing things such as the regulation of dress. One upset writer complains in August 1847 
of a professional wearing a ‘ginger-beer blouse’ commenting that it was ‘wholly out of place 
and, under the circumstances, disgraceful.’ 257 While this might come across at first glance as 
rather snobbish, in in fact emphasises the importance of distinction in legitimating courts and 
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the practitioners operating within them. Attorneys are trying to work out what a proper court is 
in the shadow of the 19th century superior courts. It is the growth of these markers of 
distinction that starts to undermine self-representation, as we begin to see from the 1850s 
onwards.  
 
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE SELF REPRESENTED PARTY 
 
To the Editor of the CCC 
Sir – I have before now expressed my opinion at some length on the CCs. Perhaps you will 
allow me however to summarise my reasons for thinking any further extension of 
jurisdiction in these courts most undesirable. 1. The fact of the many small yet defended and 
virulently contested cases between an uneducated plaintiff and an obstinate defendant. 
Everyone who has practised in the rural districts knows the result: Dreadful waste of time, 
impeded business, and ruffling of judicial equanimity.258 
 
The 1850s, 1860s and 1870s in the County Courts was a time of increasing standardisation of 
practice and creeping formality that manifests in several different areas. By this period, there 
are codes of rules, judges are only appointed from candidates with seven years of experience at 
the Bar and there are qualified registrars.259 Successive alterations to the statute also raises the 
ceiling on the amount that can be disputed.260 The fees cap for attorneys is also continuously 
raised (although lawyers’ fees being included in the awarding of costs always remained subject 
to the discretion of the judge).261 This latter move was undoubtedly partially in response to the 
Chronicle’s repeated advocacy of this. Both changes mean that by the 1860s and 1870s financial 
recompense was reasonable enough not to exclude attorneys from wanting to participate in 
the County Courts and therefore more and more begin appearing. At the same time, 
regulations are tightened to ensure that only appropriately credentialed individuals can act as 
representatives, with an emphasis placed on weeding out the ‘sham attorneys’ as part of a 
broader standardisation of procedure.262  
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On top of these developments, the calls for a greater connection to superior courts resulted in 
the eventual fusing of the County Courts to the appeal circuit in the 1870s. 263  This was part 
of wider, sweeping changes to the courts through the Judicature Acts of the 1870s.264 This 
fusion certainly does not result in universal acclaim, with many writers in the Chronicle noting 
their concern. As one correspondent expresses it, such fusion would be ‘subjecting a sphere to 
the rule of the square’.265 As he goes on: ‘we have often to protest against the public’s allowing 
itself to be guided upon questions of law reform by the profession, whose habits or interests 
are bound up with the abuses’.266 However, this development also reflects the County Court’s 
success. By the 1870s it is adjudicating on almost all civil matters, having been granted 
jurisdiction on bankruptcy, admiralty matters and other areas previously only dealt with by 
the higher courts. This means that ‘common practitioners’ now have access to areas of practice 
that had once been completely out of their reach.  
 
These changes are reflected in the Chronicle, which even by the mid-1850s is a noticeably 
different publication. By late 1849 the Chronicle is reporting relevant superior court 
decisions.267 While it is only logical that superior court decisions are reported on once there is 
a system of horizontal precedent, the decision to include Superior Court decisions before there 
are official appeal courts underlines the Chronicle’s strong desire to emphasise that the County 
Courts are of equal respectability and scrupulousness to the superior courts. These changes 
also mean that the County Court reports are given much less prominence than originally, with 
the bulk of reporting now being superior court decisions. This remains the case throughout 
the rest of the Chronicle’s publication history. Already by June of 1849, there are eighteen 
pages of superior court decisions before reaching the County Court decisions (covering less 
than six pages).   
 
Ten years later, in June 1859, the Chronicle contains only three pages of County Court reports 
out of sixteen pages in total of court reports. By June 1869, County Courts accounts are no 
longer listed under the reports: the report section is dedicated to superior courts only and they 
are grouped together by subject matter (contract, equity and so on).268 There are four County 
Court reports, each of which reports a single case, represented on both sides, with extended 
discussion on a point of law for between half a page to two pages. This format continues 
throughout the 1880s, with it being difficult to find any County Court reports in the 
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publication let alone a self-represented party.  By 1889 the Chronicle is described as: ‘a report of 
cases required in the County Court and argued and determined in the Superior Courts’.269  
 
Throughout this period, we also see repeated advocacy by the Chronicle to formalise court 
procedure even further. The following extract comes from the Chronicle in 1870 and is 
representative of many such calls at the time:   
 
[a]s to pleadings in the CC, a plaintiff is permitted to state his case in the form of a 
statement which to all intents and purposes is as much like a declaration with the head and 
tail off as can be. I ask why should not a defendant be obliged to set out in writing a 
statement of his defence, and deliver it to the plaintiff or his attorney within a limited time 
before the hearing, and that in default the plaintiff be at liberty to sign judgement if the 
cause exceed a certain criteria?270  
 
The idea that litigants should submit written outlines of their defence is not new, in fact the 
initial proposal came in 1849, two years into the new County Courts.271 But what they do point 
to is the degree to which the presence of legal professionals in the court is normalizing the 
need for legal skills. The argument outlined above is an argument recognisable today: that it is 
a simple matter to submit a written statement in Plain English. But as we already know, such 
a requirement is far from a simple task for a self-represented litigant who may not be literate 
or who, even if they are literate, may lack the legal expertise with which to identify the specific 
issue at stake. And here we see the slippery slope: as more attorneys frequent the County 
Court, legal skills become seen as increasingly essential. This shift happens without 
necessarily recognizing how much this will exclude self-represented parties from being able to 
act effectively.272  
 
A CHANGE IN ATTITUDE  
 
The changes taking place in the County Courts result in a sea-change in attitude towards self-
representation in the Chronicle over this time. In 1852, the Chronicle emphasises that ‘every 
man has a common law right to appear and conduct his own case in any Court in the 
kingdom’.273 But The Suitor section has disappeared by August 1849, indicating a presumption 
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of the normality of legal representation even at this early point. From 1852-1862 the section 
reporting County Court decisions is renamed “County Court Curiosities”. This section covers 
‘amusing’ incidents, frequently ones that occur at the expense of self-represented litigants. 
These are given titles such as ‘a funny bargain’ and ‘undergraduate extravagance at 
Cambridge’.274 A good example of the tone of this section is reported in the memorable case of: 
‘Who “robbed” the dead pig? Damage to a pig, 6s’.275 In this case, the parties are both self-
represented and the dispute is over whether or not the defendant disembowelled (‘robbed’) a 
pig to the value of 6s of innards against the instructions of the plaintiff. Citing the exchanges 
verbatim, the report becomes a kind of mini-play complete with laughter from the court, and 
dramatic escalation, culminating in the plaintiff flopping the pig corpse out onto the 
courtroom table: ‘(continued laughter, while plaintiff tumbled the two lumps of pork about the 
court-table with extraordinary agility, to the great amusement of the spectators)’.276   
 
Most significantly, in September 1866 the Chronicle, reporting an incident involving a self-
represented party, comments: ‘This seems an exemplification of a hackneyed observation that 
a man who is his own lawyer has not a Solomon for his client’.277 By this time, then, we have a 
complete reversal of the original 1849 stance of the Chronicle seen in the opening epigraph of 
this chapter. As we saw then, there was a commitment to the role of self-representation in the 
County Courts and an implicit presumption of its normality. But less than twenty years later, 
the idea that an individual would go to the County Court without a lawyer is already seen as 
indicative of a lack of judgment.  
 
This belief in self-represented parties’ lack of judgment is made explicit by one writer in the 
Chronicle in 1859 advocating the abolition of trial by jury. He begins by arguing that the 
adoption of ‘fixed and refined’ rules of law to determine dispute resolution renders lay juries 
outmoded.278 The author then outlines what exactly legal training gives: 
 
The faculty of hearing without being deluded by sophistry and eloquence, of catching and 
connecting as it flies the broken and disjointed evidence of numerous and contradictory 
witnesses; of selecting what is material and rejecting what is irrelevant, of sifting the wheat 
from the chaff, the substantial from the seeming, and extracting the kernel of truth from 
the misshapen husk of errors in which it is enveloped. The Greeks fabled that the Goddess 
of Wisdom sprang fully armed and grown from the head of Zeus. The English seriously 
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believe that judicial wisdom springs forth mature from every tradesman’s head. This is a fit 
article of faith for a nation of shopkeepers. 279 
 
This argument—that those without lawyers lacked the ability to effectively pursue or defend a 
claim—is common in the Chronicle from the 1850s onwards.280 The irony here is that while the 
argument for the necessity of legal skills is initially targeted at weeding out ‘sham’ attorneys, 
it eventually undermines self-represented parties too. Once the proposition that only properly 
educated, credentialed and regulated professionals can provide representation, the discourse 
quickly widens to suggest that only such qualified individuals have any business at all being in 
court.  
 
It is important to emphasise here that these changes do not stop individuals from self-
representing, and in fact we have ample evidence that they continue to do so. As Paul Johnson 
points out: ‘There was no obvious sign of this growing legal formalism crowding out the 
layman's direct access to the due process of law’.281 But the self-represented party is either 
rendered invisible, or looked on with amusement, by the 1870s.282 At this point, self-
represented parties cease to be valued informants. Because they lack the specialism to 
understand the nature of their dispute in legal terms, the information they contribute becomes 
largely irrelevant and counterproductive.  In addition, the emphasis on regulation and 
standardisation has resulted in a transformation of the courts to emphasise the distinction of 
the legal profession, evidenced through dress, spatial division, language and expertise. Thus, 
two factors exist by this time that persist even now: a derogatory attitude towards self-
represented parties, and a tendency to render self-represented parties invisible in official legal 
accounts.   
 
WHOOPS! WE LET THE LITIGANTS IN  
 
AMUSING INCIDENT AT THE LAW COURTS 
In a Divisional Court of Queen’s Bench on Wednesday, Miss Carroll, a lady well known in 
the courts as a litigant, appeared in person before Mr Justice Denman and Mr Justice 
Vaughan Williams. She said she had an “ex parte” application to make  
– Mr Justice Denman: What is your name?  
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– The Applicant: Octavia Carroll; otherwise, “the lady without a name” (Laughter.). My 
application is this: - I have obtained two orders to enable me to call witnesses, but the 
committee of the Incorporated Law Society keep the orders and will not give them up to 
me.  
–Mr Justice Denman: But we can’t do anything unless we have the order before us. We have 
nothing to go upon.  
–The Applicant: My Lord, give unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s. (Laughter.)  
– Mr Justice Denman: There is nothing before us. 
- The Applicant: My Lord, England expects that every man this day will do his duty 
(laughter).  
- Mr Justice Denman: I can’t help that (Laughter). We have no duty to do now. Sit down.  
– Miss Carroll then made a profound bow and left the court.283   
 
The above sketching out of the development of the County Court seeks to demonstrate the 
degree to which self-representation becomes derided in tandem with broader developments in 
the 19th century professional project, specifically as a result of attorneys staking a claim in the 
new courts in pursuit of advancing their own respectability.  But what does this mean for the 
creation of the term litigant in person? The term itself never appears in the County Court 
Chronicles.284 But it does begin to appear in other publications in the 1880s. By the time it 
appears, it almost invariably refers to the pathological or vexatious litigant: 
 
Mrs Thompson, the well-known litigant in person at the London Law Courts, was charged 
at Marlborough Street Police Court with being drunk in Piccadilly. The defendant 
emphatically denied the offence, but the constable’s view as to her condition was confirmed 
by medical evidence and a small fine was imposed by Mr Hannay. 285 
 
In 1884, the London Evening Standard is talking of woman who is ‘well-known’ as a ‘lady 
litigant in person’.286 In 1890, The Morpeth Herald too refers to a lady ‘litigant in person’.287 
While the proceedings relating to Mrs Thompson, referred to above are, obviously, criminal, 
it suggests the kind of individual that was indicative of those who self-represented. Mrs 
Thompson, serially litigious, incompetent, and untrustworthy, is already recognisable as the 
                                                     
283 Grantham Journal, Saturday 15 August 1891, 7. 
284 CCC, 1 September 1866, 194. 
285 Falkirk Herald, Wednesday 20 October 1897. 
286The Standard (London Evening), Wednesday 5 November 1884, 3. 
287 In this article, the editorial is sympathetic towards her relative competence, but still notes the great 
difficulty the judge faces understanding her, her struggle to ‘comprehend’ the circumstances, and the 
unequal battle between her and her represented opponent. They also note the challenges faced by her 
‘extremely poor English’. Morpeth Herald, 21 June 1890. 
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standard LiP we see today.288  By the time the term appears, it is also clear that successful LiPs 
are exceptional.289  
 
But what exactly does the term mean? The term’s first appearance in case law, in 1896, simply 
notes that: ‘in case law, every litigant in person has an absolute right of audience’.290 But what 
this chapter has sought to demonstrate is that a “litigant in person” is much more than this. It 
is a concept that only makes sense where legal representation is the norm. More than this, the 
term only exists in the context where self-represented parties have lost their less formal 
forums to resolve disputes. The term LiP references the context of a formalised legal process 
indicative of the latter stages of the professional project: where unregulated practitioners have 
been largely stamped out, and where there is strict attention placed on distinction of legal 
practitioners from the lay: through dress, language and expertise. The appearance of the term, 
then, does not signify the LiP’s incorporation into legal process; instead it marks their distance 
from what is legally appropriate. LiPs are created in the moment where they are no longer 
competent: they are established as a phenomenon by virtue of their failure to mimic legal 
professionals. The LiP’s incompetence, then, is not a failure of their role, it is their role. Their 
inability to perform successfully (although there are exceptions, these are only considered as 
exceptions) reinforces the need for legal professionals.291 
 
Tellingly, while self-represented parties are frequently mocked in the Chronicle, criticism of 
LiPs is overwhelmingly found in the higher courts (perhaps telling us why the term never 
appears in the Chronicles).292 For example, in 1892 the Gloucester Herald runs an interview with 
a County Court Judge. The judge notes the difficulties caused by litigants in person in the 
superior courts, compared with the relatively trouble-free experience of them in the lower 
courts. And this leads to the most compelling reason why LiPs are talked about the way they 
are: because the fusing of the County Courts to the appeal circuit gave self-representing 
parties access to the Superior Courts. This means that parts of the legal profession that had no 
association with the County Courts—specifically the Bar and the superior court judiciary—
met self-represented litigants for what is likely to be the first time in their professional lives. 
The decision to integrate the County Courts with the superior courts seems to have been 
taken without realising that not only would standardised practice filter downwards but that 
                                                     
288 Yorkshire Evening Post, 27 September 1922, 5. 
289 See: Pall Mall Gazette, Thursday 18 January 1894; The Star, Guernsey, 06 May 1890; Dundee Evening 
Telegraph, 30 July 1913. 
290 The Queen v Justices of London [1896] 1 Q.B. 659, 662. This case is significant in underlining LiPs’ 
rights of access into the higher courts; earlier newspapers reported cases where LiPs were denied a 
hearing. See, for example, the Edinburgh Evening News, 10 August 1892. While this is a Scottish case it 
is notable that the LiP prevented from being heard protests that there is no evidence of such a rule 
banning self-represented litigants.  
291 See Letter from “Parochial Critics” in CCC, 1 November 1870, 262. 
292 Aberdeen Evening Express, Tuesday 9 August 1892.   
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self-represented parties would also filter upwards: and by the time they got there, they were 
LiPs.    
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that the LiP—and attitudes towards the LiP—are inseparable: 
the LiP is a role of failure, created as a by-product of the professional project in action, seen 
through developments in the new County Courts, which include increasing standardisation 
and distinction.  But while this explains why there is such a negative attitude towards LiPs: 
they are productively anomalous—their presence emphasises the competence of the 
profession—this has never prevented individuals from self-representing. LiPs are still there, 
even if they aren’t written about.  The very irritation in which they are held by legal 
professionals tells us of their continued presence. The problem, of course, is that when legal 
records only record matters of ‘legal interest’, most actions involving LiPs fly beneath the 
radar, which is why we do not find it easy to find material about them and it is why we have so 
much trouble understanding their perspectives; because we have no real means of capturing 
them.  
 
It is clear then, that the term ‘LiP’ in many ways limits our ability to understand what it is like 
for such individuals pursuing or defending a claim.  To get at this missing experience, we need 
to take a different approach, and find ways of obtaining information about things that happen 
in the margins: things that aren’t usually written down. In the next chapter, then, I turn to 
explaining how I have attempted to do this, through explaining the empirical arm of this 
project, starting from the premise that to understand what it is like to be a LiP, we have to go, 
in H.W. Arthurs’ words, ‘without the law’.   
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4  
METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
 
 
 
 
It isn’t an inquisition; it’s an exploration, usually an exploration into the past […] So I 
think the gentlest question is the best one, and the gentlest is, ‘And what happened 
then?’ 293  
 
 
[t]he unique and precious element which oral sources force upon the historian and which 
no other sources possess in equal measure is the speaker’s subjectivity. If the approach to 
research is broad and articulated enough, a cross section of the subjectivity of a group or 
class may emerge. Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they wanted to 
do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did. 294 
 
  
Amongst the gravest of the inadequacies of oral history, I would suggest, is the tendency to 
transform the writing of history into a form of populism — that is, to replace certain of the 
essential tenets of scholarship with facile democratisation, and an open mind with 
demagogy. Such an approach runs the risk of constructing oral history as merely an 
alternative ghetto.295 
 
                                                     
293 Studs Terkel quoted in William Grimes, “Studs Terkel, Listener to Americans, Dies at 96,” New York 
Times, 31 October 2008.  
294 Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different?”, The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other 
Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991): 35. 
295 Luisa Passerini, “Work, Ideology and Consensus under Italian Fascism,” History Workshop Journal 8, 
no.1(1979): 84. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is easy enough, as the first three chapters have demonstrated, to make a case for why 
drawing on legal scholarship can cause difficulties when it comes to understanding how LiPs 
experience going to law. This does not mean, however, it is easy to know how to go “without 
the law” in order to understand them better. Nevertheless, this is what this chapter seeks to 
do, by outlining the methodological decisions I made when putting together this study. This 
involves considering how disciplinary methods from outside of law can be put to use in the 
pursuit of understanding LiPs and their experiences in the civil justice system. Ultimately, the 
backbone of this dissertation is fifteen oral history life-story interviews with litigants in 
person. This chapter is consequently an account of how I came to use this approach and why I 
argue this is a valid, and valuable contribution to our understanding of LiPs. The chapter 
might then perhaps be more simply titled: why oral history? Or, to be more accurate, why use 
oral history when examining the LiP? For while there are many general answers as to what 
makes oral history, in Alessandro Portelli’s words, ‘precious’, this chapter must necessarily be 
concerned with what makes oral history a better choice than any other scholarly methodology 
for this research. This involves critically examining oral history as a discipline, as well as 
considering oral history’s potential shortcomings and how these pitfalls have been managed in 
the context of this research project.  
 
More than just an elaboration of oral history, however, or an explanation of my methods, what 
this chapter seeks to do is account for how and why I have chosen to focus exclusively on LiP 
experiences. For while I canvas practitioner and scholarly arguments from the literature, I do 
not talk to anyone but LiPs, asking: what is the experience of going to law like for them? I 
begin by outlining my research questions, before explaining why these questions lead to my 
choice of a qualitative piece of research. I contextualise this decision within the field of 
previous LiP research undertaken before turning to outlining specifically my disciplinary 
choices, arguing why oral history can open up a way of seeing that may enable us to 
understand more about what it is like to be a LiP. Finally, I turn to my specific methods, 
discussing my interviewing process, use of data and approach to analysis. This latter section 
includes an account of how and why many of my hypotheses, questions, and interviewing 
techniques were frequently upset, undermined, contested, and fraught in ways that were 
largely unanticipated, but which turned out to be crucial in mapping out what I sought to 
understand: how LiPs see the law, how LiPs see the people who work in the law and, most 
importantly, how they see themselves.  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
As this thesis has already outlined, understanding what going to law is like for LiPs is of 
critical importance, particularly in the wake of the passage of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act.  However, at a time when it is more important than 
ever that we know as much as possible about LiPs, we find ourselves instead in a situation 
where we do not know enough. But know enough about what exactly? As previously outlined 
in this thesis, while a number of important studies have been done into LiPs, it remains an 
under-researched area. Those studies that do directly look at LiP experiences tend to do so as 
part of a wider project that involves multiple informants, including legal professionals.296 This 
limits the amount of time spent talking to LiPs, with the majority of studies involving some 
use of face-to-face interviews, but far more frequently, telephone interviews or, most common 
of all, questionnaires.297  
 
In addition, when I argued previously that LiPs were in some ways analogous to a minority, I 
did not just mean that they are historically overlooked as objects of legal study. I also meant 
that when they are studied, these studies tend to reproduce the institutional and systemic 
assumptions the legal profession already have regarding LiPs. For example, what much 
previous legal research into LiPs tends to share is a greater concern about the impact LiPs 
have on legal process than the impact that legal proceedings have on LiPs.298  While this is 
perhaps hardly surprising as much of this research is intended to be used to shape policy and 
practice guidance, it is a significant limitation in studying LiPs. Despite the considerable 
growth in interest into LiPs since the passage of LASPO, current studies have continued this 
mixed-method trend of talking to LiPs in concert with legal professionals.299 
 
I argue that these approaches risk a repetition of the privileging of legal over lay knowledge 
that marginalises LiPs in the first place. Ultimately, this means that although we have 
acquired more information about LiPs than we previously had, LiPs continue to not be seen 
outside of the frames imposed on them, even by well-meaning legal scholars and practitioners 
                                                     
296 See, for example, Trinder et al, “LiPs in Private Family Law Cases”; Moorhead and Sefton, 
Unrepresented Litigants.  
297 Moorhead and Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants, Genn & Genn, Representation in Tribunals; Lee and 
Tkakucova, A Study of LiPs.    
298 An important exception to this is the work into private family law, particularly the work of 
Rosemary Hunter and Elizabeth Trinder, both of whom concentrate in some detail on the effect of 
going to law without representation on LiPs.    
299 See for example, McKeever et al, “The Impact of LiPs on the Northern Ireland Court Service”, 
currently underway at Ulster University; Bridgette Toy-Cronin, “Keeping up Appearances: Accessing 
New Zealand's Civil Courts as a Litigant in Person,” PhD Diss., Otago University, 2015. 
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who are genuinely trying to improve LiPs’ lot. It is these kinds of limitations that this thesis 
attempts to go beyond. This project therefore takes as its guiding principle that to better 
understand LiPs one must, in Richard Moorhead’s words, ‘engage directly with the litigant’s 
social world’.300  
 
There are therefore two important research gaps I have identified that directly generate this 
study: firstly, there is a lack of in-depth interviewing with individuals who have acted as LiPs 
to get at what going to law is like for them in more detail, including understanding their 
experiences before and after encountering legal professionals or going to court, with research 
to date primarily being about how LiPs’ behaviour in court can be interpreted within existing 
legal frameworks. Secondly, almost all of the LiP studies conducted to this point are ultimately 
interested in the impact LiPs have on the courts and only secondarily, if at all, interested in the 
impact the courts might have on the LiP. This project therefore seeks to address both these 
gaps by understanding what going to law is like for LiPs, through attempting to gain an in-
depth first-hand account of individual LiP experiences; such accounts covering not only when 
these individuals come to court, but also before, during and after. In addition, through these 
experiences, this project focuses on the impact going to law has on LiPs, and what this 
unilateral, and situated perspective can tell us about how LiPs themselves account for and 
describe the difficulties they face.  
 
A QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
 
This thesis aims to understand the situated experiences of LiPs, and to gain access to their 
stories of going to law. As such, this emphasis on subjective experience clearly lends itself to a 
qualitative methodology. While quantitative analysis can, and has, provided vital information 
about LiPs, what I am trying to do is understand individual LiP experiences, which is 
something quantitative analysis cannot achieve. My research is not intended to ‘reveal how 
things are’, nor is it purporting to be a representative study of the area: indeed, I am also 
somewhat sceptical of any such project simply because any form of categorisation tends to 
sacrifice nuance. Quantitative methods are also not appropriate, I would argue, to go beyond 
internal legal discourse. As I have argued earlier, categorisation of LiPs is problematic in itself 
because the categories they tend to be put into are, again, legal categories, e.g. what kind of 
claim is it? Once again we face the same problem of legal research tending to reinforce 
previously assumed categories.   
 
                                                     
300 Moorhead, “The Passive Arbiter,” 417.   
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While qualitative methodology is by no means uniformly agreed on, a broad explanation of a 
qualitative approach could be that such an approach prioritises the importance of 
understanding lived experience.301  In addition, qualitative approaches are interested in the 
subjective, placing value on perspectival narratives given by individuals that can provide 
greater depth and contextual information, and through this, reveal insights not available to 
quantitative or statistical methods.302 This approach tends to focus on smaller sample 
numbers, and to make greater use of in-depth methods—such as long-form interviewing, as is 
employed in this study.  
 
In addition, qualitative research is often argued to be more suitable for approaching groups 
traditionally marginalised in scholarship, which again suggests a certain suitability for 
research into LiPs. It is important to emphasise at the outset however, that firstly, the 
distinction between qualitative and quantitative approaches is by no means clear-cut.303 
Secondly, and importantly for this piece of work, I do not wish to suggest that qualitative 
approaches escape the criticisms directed at qualitative research methods and how they are 
imbricated by discourses of power. As Denzin and Lincoln note, qualitative research, like any 
other form of scientific method, is bound up in conflicting and power-laden discourses and 
history of colonialism and imperialism and carries its own history in traditional anthropology 
and ethnography, of reinforcing the privileged researcher studying the ‘Other’. Nonetheless, 
Denzin and Lincoln suggest one can explain qualitative research generically in the following 
way: 
 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists 
of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices 
transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field 
notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this 
level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.304  
 
As such, while qualitative research by no means escapes the difficulties inherent to any kind of 
scientific method, the emphasis placed on attempting to understand phenomena on its own 
terms and in its ‘natural settings’ make it conducive as a methodology for approaching LiPs 
‘without the law’.  
                                                     
301 Norman K Denzin and Yvonna S Lincoln, “Introduction” in Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(London: SAGE Publications, 1999). 
302 Ute Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (London: SAGE Publications, 2000).  
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304 Denzin and Lincoln, “Introduction,” 6.  
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WHY ORAL HISTORY? 
 
This study uses ‘life-stories’ interviews, a form of oral history interviewing, of fifteen LiPs to 
account for their experiences. Oral history describes the process of interviewing people about 
their past, and ‘life stories’ are a long form of oral history that is in the form of a biographical 
narrative.305 The purpose of this narrative varies, but narratives generated through the 
practice of oral history are often used to evoke accounts by informants marginalised by more 
traditional historical scholarship which tends to privilege written sources over oral ones. This 
is of course not exclusively the case, however those whose narratives are more effectively told 
by oral transmission may be those who have less access to the kind of privilege that facilitates 
literacy or record-making and the link between the marginalised and oral history as a 
methodology remains strong within the discipline.  
 
Oral history is also distinct as a form of historiographic practice in the primacy of the 
interview as the method of gathering data. This is where oral history can be distinguished 
from autobiography because, as Michael Frisch points out, oral history depends on the 
interrelationship of interviewer and interviewee: it constitutes a ‘shared authority’.306 The level 
of control of the interviewer in producing the interview, and the dialogic nature of the 
exchange is of importance to oral history. Oral history interviewing, then, relies on the 
importance of what interviewees say, and is also predicated on the relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee.  
 
However, the term oral history also refers to the data produced by oral history interviewing 
and there is thus a blurring between process and product. As Lynn Abrams points out, oral 
history is ‘both a research methodology (a means of conducting an investigation) and the 
result of the research process’.307 This kind of terminological conflation can lead to a number of 
difficulties in clearly distinguishing between the methodology of the specific project (how the 
investigation was conducted), and the process by which the data is analysed by the researcher. 
This is because the term ‘oral history’ describes two radically different methods in terms of 
ethics and approach. For example, whereas the process of making oral history interviews is a 
‘shared authority’, the subsequent analysis belongs entirely to the researcher. I try and make 
this distinction clear in emphasising that while the interviews are a form of oral history, the 
                                                     
305 Charlotte Linde, “What is a Life Story?” in Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 20-50. 
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use I make of the data is a form of transcription that needs to be separately accounted for, as I 
outline later in this chapter.  
 
There are three key reasons why I believe oral history is particularly suited to accessing LiP 
experiences. The most obvious starting point is the oral historian’s ability to reach those 
largely disregarded by traditional historiography. As scholars such as Luisa Passerini, Ronald 
Grere, and Alessandro Portelli have claimed, oral history can give voice to the 
marginalised,308 and oral history can unsettle traditional power relationships in the authorship 
of history.309 Due to its perceived distinction from traditional forms of scholarly history, oral 
history is arguably also not subject to hierarchical prejudices that may exclude particular 
people or groups of people from scrutiny, due to factors such as gender, race, sexual 
orientation or socio-economic background.310 In this respect, oral history is a natural fit when 
considering the experiences of the LiP, a marginalised figure in legal scholarship. They are, in 
Michael Frisch’s words, ‘a significant, much neglected, and previously unknowable corner of 
the attic’.311 
 
The second powerful argument in favour of oral history as a methodology for examining LiPs 
is that it allows interviewees to tell their own story. When pioneering American oral historian 
Studs Terkel died in 2008, The New York Times obituary drew specific attention to the “rich 
detail” of his oral history work. Terkel, they said, had revealed ‘great historic moments 
sounded by an American chorus in the native vernacular’.312 The ability to access the 
vernacular—the common language—is one of the most frequently advanced arguments for 
oral history as a scholarly practice.313 As noted earlier in this thesis, LiPs’ experience in going 
to law often involves the collision of their vernaculars with legal language, resulting in them 
being unable to tell their own story. Using oral history as a methodology is a means, therefore, 
of engaging with LiPs’ experiences on their own terms, and provides a way in to study the 
significance of the gaps between legal discourse and LiP understanding—a major aim of this 
thesis.  
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In addition, in law, key to the adjudication of any form of dispute is the need to establish what 
happened. Narrative is consequently central to legal proceedings. In a court setting, a 
narrative is usually elicited through questioning by legal professionals in the form of 
examination in chief and cross examination.314 In our adversarial system, two competing 
narratives will emerge and one will be chosen by the fact-finder as the most persuasive.315 As 
has been observed by many legal scholars, a legal narrative involves the translation of a 
witness’s experience into a particular discursive form.316 To be persuasive, legal narratives 
must be coherent, chronological and usually interpret events in legal language.317 However, as 
scholars such as forensic linguist John Gibbons have noted, the construction of this narrative 
involves the translation of someone’s (usually a layperson’s) experience into this form.  This 
can significantly alter the story as it might have been told in other environments. As he 
explains:  
 
The packaging of complex and multifaceted reality into a linear narrative carries obvious 
dangers of distorting the secondary reality. However, the need to make the secondary 
reality “graspable” for a varied audience usually outweighs these concerns.318  
 
The emphasis on communicating a narrative in a legally recognised form is of the greatest 
importance in legal proceedings. However, this can lead to the distortion of someone’s 
experience where the story that emerges no longer resembles the reality a witness might 
recognise. While this imposition of control is most obvious in situations such as cross-
examination, it persists in all aspects of legal narrative construction both in and outside the 
courtroom and is part of the broader social process of translating external events into field-
specific knowledge.319  This necessarily involves privileging legal interpretation, something 
Clifford Geertz refers to as the ‘skeletonization of fact’.320 Accepting that this process is legally 
necessary, Geertz argues that ‘it grows increasingly tenuous as empirical complexity […] 
grows’. As he points out: 
 
The realization that legal facts are made not born, are socially constructed, as an 
anthropologist would put it, by everything from evidence rules, courtroom etiquette, and 
law reporting traditions, to advocacy techniques, the rhetoric of judges, and the 
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scholasticisms of law school education raises serious questions for a theory of 
administration of justice that views it as consisting, to quote a representative example, ‘of a 
series of matchings of fact-configurations and norms’ in which either a ‘fact-situation can be 
matched with one of several norms’ or ‘a particular norm can be . . . invoked by a choice of 
competing versions of what happened.’ If the ‘fact-configuration’ are not merely things 
found lying about in the world and carried bodily into court, show-and-tell style, but close-
edited diagrams of reality the matching process itself produces, the whole thing looks a bit 
like sleight--of-hand.321 
 
While this translatory experience is commonplace, it is far from benign. Rather it is a good 
example of what Bourdieu termed symbolic violence. LiPs—like other laypersons—are not 
‘qualified to participate in the game’ and their experiences are largely excluded, distorted, 
truncated and altered.322 This practice has become so habituated as to be frequently 
misrecognised as normal. This is most apparent in legal advocacy materials through the use of 
terms such as ‘persuasion’ and ‘storytelling’.323  
 
Geertz famously commented: ‘[W]hatever it is the law is after it is not the whole story’.324 
We might also follow this statement to say that in any legal proceedings, some stories are 
told, but many stories are not.325 In other words, the legal narrative that emerges privileges 
some versions of the truth and silences others. This can be from the shaping of a layperson’s 
narrative into something alien to that teller, or due to the lack of opportunity at all for a 
layperson to tell their story.  In addition, the legal conception of a single narrative contradicts 
the lived experience of most individuals who experience overlapping, complex and multi-
faceted problems. As Pascoe Pleasence, Nigel Balmer and others have pointed out: people do 
not only have one problem and, as Hazel Genn, observed, if a person does have a problem, 
‘they [are] likely to experience it on more than one occasion’.326 Oral history interviewing, 
then, can be a means of correcting these normatised presumptions. This project gives LiPs the 
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opportunity to give their own account of events.327 Put simply, LiPs can relate what happened 
then, something they are usually unable to do freely in legal proceedings.    
 
I do not wish to imply that this narration is unfettered. 328 The shape of the narrative that 
emerged was of course influenced by my line of questioning and research interests and the 
framing of the interview in terms of my project also had an effect. There is always a degree of 
power and control involved in such a process, and this project was no exception.329 But the 
narratives I have co-produced in this research disrupt what we understand as legal narrative, 
by providing an alternative framework, and environment, for stories to emerge. As Studs 
Terkel noted, unlike legal proceedings, oral history interviews are not an inquisition: ‘it’s an 
exploration, usually an exploration into the past […] So I think the gentlest question is the 
best one, and the gentlest is, ‘And what happened then?’330  
 
The third and final reason for choosing oral history for this research is the deliberate emphasis 
oral history places on the virtues of subjectivity and reflexivity. In her ground-breaking article 
on oral history and Italian fascism, Luisa Passerini argues that it is insufficient for oral history 
to merely shine a light into neglected areas. Instead, she argues a more radical approach is 
needed to outline the specific merits of oral history. As she observes: ‘We cannot afford to lose 
sight of the peculiar specificity of oral material, and we have to develop conceptual 
approaches—and indeed insist upon that type of analysis—which can succeed in drawing out 
their full implications’.331 Whereas in the past, scholars aimed to provide a neutral account of a 
separate object of study, oral history scholarship, in concert with other disciplines using 
qualitative research methods, broadly argues that the traditional division between subjectivity 
and objectivity is limiting and that subjectivity can allow for powerful scholarly insight.332   
 
For Passerini, what can emerge from oral history accounts is more than adding to the record, 
or hearing from the marginalised—something more than oral history’s ‘reconstructive 
agenda’. 333 Instead, oral history is about subjectivity in its fullest sense—as a manifestation of 
culture and belief. This turn in oral history scholarship is an explicit rejection of pejorative and 
limited understandings of subjectivity that rely on a dichotomy of objective and subjective. 
The kind of subjectivity Passerini envisages presupposes that neutrality and objectivity are 
not only unrealistic goals but also unwanted ones. This is not only a means of answering back 
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critics of oral history that allege inherent bias, it is also a broader epistemological claim to a 
different kind of knowledge that qualitative research methods such as oral history are 
positioned to accrue.334   
 
Looking across disciplines, subjectivity arguably shares much in common with the 
anthropologically derived term sensibility. Clifford Geertz, in his seminal essay “Art as a 
Cultural System” argues the inseparability of what we might consider ‘aesthetic production’ 
from the rest of everyday understanding and existence.335 Geertz claims that ‘to study an art 
form is to explore a sensibility, that such a sensibility is essentially a collective formation, and 
that the foundations of such a formation are as wide as social existence and as deep’.336 In 
other words, sensibility is something ‘the whole of life participates in forming, one in which 
the meanings of things are scars that men leave on them’.337  Fields of cultural production 
such as the arts or law are therefore emanations of this, but inseparable from it: they are an 
‘expression of culture’, as Passerini termed it. Accounts of LiPs through their very specificity 
and subjectivity may be a way in to understand their sensibility. But how might we practically 
go about this?  
 
Social historian Robert Darnton argues in The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French 
Cultural History that key to understanding accounts of the past is to focus on moments of 
cognitive dissonance for the scholar in the historical account.338 His famous example of a cat 
massacre—where an 18th century French population delighted in the telling of an event that 
would (arguably) horrify Darnton’s contemporaries—serves to illustrate his point that it is the 
moments of greatest lack of understanding on the part of the researcher that can potentially 
provide the most powerful insight into the past as they are a means by which he or she can 
gain entry into an alien sensibility. While Darnton was talking specifically about studying the 
past, this method can still usefully be applied when undertaking a ‘history of the present’.339 In 
this project, this means not attempting to reconstruct information supplied by LiPs into 
something recognisable within pre-existing legal frames, but rather in deliberately focusing on 
the strangeness itself as an entry point into how LiPs construct their own understanding of 
law and legal proceedings. To reiterate Portelli’s points; ‘Oral sources tell us not just what 
people did, but what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they 
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now think they did’.340 To reconfigure it into discourse previously referred to in this thesis, 
what can emerge from LiP interviewing in this project is a means, as Richard Moorhead 
advocated, of ‘engaging directly with the litigant’s social world’.341 Oral history, as a form of 
qualitative research, facilitates this engagement. 342  
 
However, while this chapter argues for the virtues of oral history for this project, there are a 
number of critical issues that need to be managed. Firstly, there is as much a danger in 
valorising oral history as there is in valorising the written word only. Studs Terkel himself 
considered his work “guerrilla journalism” and this again frames oral history as an alternative 
methodology: a way to sidestep the inequities of dominant historiography. But this kind of 
positioning carries its own scholarly risks, not least of which is creating a ‘straw man’ out of 
other forms of historiography. As Luisa Passerini observes in the epigraph opening this 
chapter, this kind of ‘facile democratisation’ can lead to an ‘alternate ghetto’.343I am not 
claiming that oral history is essentially alternative, nor am I resorting to vague ideas about 
equality and empowerment for the interviewee.  Claims about empowerment risk 
underestimating the degree of control that still exists on the part of the researcher that needs 
to be accounted for, specifically relating to how that record is used in further research, 
something I address later in the chapter.  
 
More broadly, though, there is a tendency to valorise oral sources as inherently ‘alternative’ 
that simply does not stand up to scrutiny.   Oral history methods are perfectly serviceable to 
reproduce and construct conservative frameworks for understanding history, just as one could 
with any form of historical method. This is evidenced by its popularity in eliciting accounts of 
areas of cultural production from elite players. Also, as Portelli points out, the “down-up” 
method may be common in oral history practice but it is not unique to it.344 Nor is oral 
history’s embrace of the quotidian aspects of life anything original.345 Emphasis on oral 
history’s status as alternative in and of itself is relatively meaningless:  a way to the alternative 
ghetto outlined by Passerini in the epigraph opening this chapter. 346   
 
Secondly, a noticeable component of oral history scholarship is an emphasis on how unique 
oral history is as a method, with repeated references to its.347 While I do not wish to 
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undermine the value of oral history in accessing subjective experience, I would question its 
insistence on its own uniqueness. Rather, I would argue that oral history shares with other 
forms of qualitative research methods certain advantages in terms of mining 
phenomenological experience and being interested in approaching subjective and lived 
experience, but not necessarily a better account than methods rooted in anthropological and 
ethnographic theory.  
 
Thirdly, a recurring critique of oral history methods concerns the argument that memory is an 
inherently fallible source. As memory is subjective and fragmented it cannot be independently 
verified.  Therefore, any account of what happened will not only be partial but can be confused, 
factually inaccurate, and misleading. There is no disputing that memory can be fallible. 
Scholars from across a range of disciplines from law348 to neuroscience349 to trauma studies350 
will tell us that memory does not simply store accounts of events that are then retrievable 
whole and intact at some period later. But this claim does not actually interrogate how 
memory is used in oral history projects. As Ronald Grele points out, memory is not 
necessarily supposing that we are drawing on a repository of facts.351 Instead, it is used to 
illustrate an abundance of other things: a manifestation of culture, or belief, evidence of habitus, 
a way in to an alien sensibility.352 This is because oral historians are asking different kinds of 
questions. Michael Frisch, in his essay review of Studs Terkels’ Hard Times, asks: 
 
What happens to experience on the way to becoming memory? What happens to 
experience on the way to becoming history? As an era of intense collective experience 
recedes into the past, what is the relationship of memory to historical generalization? 
These questions, so basic to thinking about how culture and individuality interact over 
time, are the sort of questions which oral history is peculiarly, perhaps uniquely, able to 
penetrate.353 
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For Frisch, it is how oral history accounts differ from the record that is of value, as will be the 
case in this project.  This is not despite their subjectivity, but because of it. As Passerini 
observes, ‘subjective reality also has its own history, and a multi-faceted relationship with 
institutional power’.354   
 
Ultimately, in responding to these critiques I argue that generalist criticisms of oral history 
are largely misplaced. Methodology relates to the specific practices of gathering knowledge 
and these are always necessarily contextual and particular. We need to start by asking what is 
the material being used for?  I will therefore conclude my chapter with a detailed account of my 
methods. This section will address explicitly who I talked to, what questions I asked and how 
I went about asking them. Ultimately, my aim in the concluding section is to explain how I 
avoided the ghetto while still making an argument for the ‘gentlest question’. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The first step in approaching conducting this empirical study was to consider what kinds of 
questions to ask potential interviewees. To a large extent, the basic structure of these 
questions is shaped by my choice of a ‘life stories’ approach and use of oral history as a 
methodology.355  In addition, the interviews are also intended to be housed as a permanent 
archive at the British Library; as such, this lent weight to the need to make the interviews both 
roughly chronological as well as comprehensible.356 The format of these interviews was 
therefore essentially biographical, where interviewees’ experiences as LiPs only formed one 
part of the account they gave. This was a deliberate strategy that in the first place encouraged 
interviewees to account for their experiences in law in a new and separate context that does 
not presuppose that this is the sole focus of the conversation. This is a quite straightforward, 
though effective, way of getting “outside of the law” where interviewees are more than ‘LiPs’. 
This lack of legalising of context also allows interviewees to give lesser or greater weight to 
their experiences as LiPs as is in accordance with “what they thought they were doing”.  
 
This means that while the questionnaire I developed for interviews encompassed multiple 
detailed questions about LiPs’ litigation experience, it also spent equal, or more time, 
concentrating on interviewees’ childhood, background, professional experience, personal lives, 
and beliefs. Interviewees were asked questions such as ‘What is your happiest memory of 
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school?’ and ‘What was your personality like as a child?’ Such questions serve multiple 
purposes: in the first place, it allows a development of a biographical narrative led by the 
interviewee. But secondarily, such questioning helps develop an intimacy between interviewee 
and interviewer. By asking questions about memories, desires, and emotions, these questions 
sought to encourage interviewees to be franker in later questioning that was more directly 
pertinent to my research questions and that covered topics that were potentially emotional or 
stressful for participants.357  
 
However, while the establishment of closeness was a key aim of such questions, they did also 
serve a more direct purpose. Other questions that occur early in the script involved topics such 
as bullying, encounters with authority figures, and beliefs and attitudes towards the law, the 
police, politics and justice. Interviewees were asked to reflect on earlier experiences long 
before they acted as LiPs. This allowed the interviewees to attempt to chart the origins or 
development of beliefs about law, what the law can or should do, and what expectations an 
individual might have about his or her relationship to the law and the legal world. These 
questions were a means to begin to trace out interviewees’ ‘horizon of expectations’ about law 
prior to their encounter with it as a LiP.358   
 
In this respect, life stories are a means of attempting to account for what Bourdieu terms 
habitus, and the questionnaire aimed to facilitate this.359 Such questions, while sometimes 
entirely anodyne in the reflections they evinced, were revealing in allowing LiPs to account 
for their personalities and how they came to be LiPs. For example, some interviewees 
emphasised their early obsession from childhood of “justice” or “fighting for what was right”. 
Others emphasised their distrust of authority figures, and many commented on the lack of 
access to the legal profession. While some interviewees had no desire to be legally trained, 
other interviewees commented that access to the legal profession was something beyond their 
social and financial means, and that such a profession was reserved for those of different 
backgrounds to them. While such findings may not definitively demonstrate anything 
conclusive about LiPs in general, they can be suggestive of a sensibility in which LiPs may 
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already feel resentful towards or excluded by legal professionals when it comes to the time 
when they are involved in litigation.360     
 
Ultimately, the script I developed (attached in Appendix A) contained 134 questions, ranging 
over the entire extent of an individual’s biography. Beyond the breadth of questions asked, the 
other emphasis in the questions posed was that of asking deliberately open, and open-ended 
questions, again in keeping with an oral history methodology. These questions were shaped by 
the notion of the ‘gentlest question’, as Studs Terkel put it: with an emphasis being placed on 
questions being a tool to facilitate an interviewee to speak freely, not to merely respond with a 
‘Yes’ or a ‘No’. As such, when asking such questions, I frequently adapted their form to make 
them more open if necessary, and encouraged the interviewee to conclude their train of 
thought. So, while the questionnaire served as a template, it was not a rigorously read-out 
script, but instead was part of a semi-structured interviewing process. Galetta describes semi-
structured interviews as a method to ‘address specific dimensions of your research question 
while also leaving space for study participants to offer new meanings to the topic of study’.361 
In the interviews, while I returned to the script for guidance and to keep a coherent and 
largely chronological structure to the interviews, I let interviewees continue to speak until 
they had finished their train of thought, and also moved topics with them if they wanted to 
discuss something else, free to, as Bernard expresses it, ‘follow new leads’.362  
 
This flexibility of questioning was also informed by ‘grounded theory’, which emphasises the 
dynamic nature of empirical research and lays importance on developing theory from data as 
well as data from theory.363 Strauss and Corbin describe grounded theory as ‘a general 
methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and 
analyzed’.364 They go on to note that grounded theory is essentially ‘constantly comparative’ 
whereby a researcher refines and develops new hypothesis throughout the collection and 
analysis of data. As Savenye and Robinson put it: 
 
A grounded theory perspective leads the researcher to begin a study without completely 
preconceived notions about what the research questions should be, assuming that the 
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theory on which the study is based will be tested and refined as the research is 
conducted.365 
 
 
As such, grounded theory is about keeping an open mind and this reaches across the whole 
course of methodological decision making. In this way, how I constructed the project, how I 
found interviewees, how I questioned interviewees and how I conducted analysis were 
informed by this ‘grounded’ approach. So, while I began with certain key research ideas, and 
shaped the questionnaire based on this framework, the attempt to find interviewees resulted in 
an alteration in how I structured my project. In addition, and throughout interviewing, as 
themes emerged from my questioning, these became emphasised in subsequent interviews. 
After interviewing I would reflect on the gathered data and as patterns emerged, this enabled 
me to shift direction in questioning. This approach also echoes Darnton’s earlier argument 
about alien sensibility; while I asked certain questions with some ideas in my mind of what the 
key findings may turn out to be, in many ways the interviewees upset these assumptions; by 
concentrating on the strangeness that emerged, I was able to access a situated and unusual 
perspective on LiPs which changed the nature of my approach.366  
 
A particularly good example of the influence of grounded theory is the final chapter in this 
thesis, which details conspiracist theories and which was entirely unanticipated when 
sketching out what I thought my findings chapters would look like at the beginning of the 
empirical project. I undertook this study with the clear belief that LiPs were largely 
pejoratively treated and misrepresented as “weirdos” by many in the legal field. My contention 
was that this was largely predicated on misunderstanding and prejudice. However, I found the 
situation was much messier than this, with a number of my interviewees expressing clear 
conspiracist attitudes. As such, this finding made me want to understand these ideas better, 
and I therefore allocated more time to asking questions about these kinds of ideas in my later 
interviews, and this section of the thesis has become extremely important in developing my 
analysis.  
 
 
FINDING INTERVIEWEES 
 
Having developed a rough questionnaire which, as outlined above, was a template that was 
freely adapted and significantly altered throughout the interviewing project, the next task was 
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to find individuals to interview. This turned out to be significantly more challenging than I 
anticipated. An initial idea was to approach the County Courts individually to discuss 
accessing LiPs this way. While I knew there would be issues of confidentiality to potentially 
overcome, it seemed a sensible way to get started. I therefore began by emailing the County 
Courts in London one by one, trying to find a manager, or dedicated LiP liaison to speak to. Of 
the ten courts in London I emailed, I heard back from two, with the other eight never 
returning my emails. Of the two who did contact me, both stated that they had no individual 
who was nominated to assist with LiPs or specially trained to do so, and that there was no one 
for me to talk to.367  
 
I then thought that while I may not be able to meet interviewees through LiP contacts at the 
County Courts, I may be able to develop materials to advertise the project and place them in 
the County Courts. I therefore developed a poster and information leaflet (see Appendix A) for 
which I consulted with, and received guidance from, Lizzie Iron, Head of Service at the 
Personal Support Unit. I contacted the County Courts to see if placing posters in the court 
buildings would be possible. I was then contacted by a member of HMCTS Performance, 
Analysis and Reporting Team who told me that to put posters up anywhere in a County Court 
building required making an application under the Data Access Panel. This turned out to be a 
complex process which would take a minimum of 7-8 weeks.368 In the first instance, such an 
application required a long application form, my CV, the questionnaire and all other project 
information, and a separate letter of ethical approval from the London School of Economics to 
accompany the submission. While these requirements were not difficult to supply, I also 
needed to demonstrate that I had a sponsor within HMCTS which would involve a separate, 
lengthy negotiation with no guarantee I would be successful. I did ask whether such a process 
was necessary as I was not requesting permission to access any data, or to talk to court staff. 
However, the HMCTS staffer confirmed that this process would still be required to put up 
posters in the court buildings. In addition, the staffer noted that he felt there would be likely 
minimal to zero uptake in response anyway. I consequently decided against applying for this 
as my project did not have scholarship that met the criteria of the Panel, and because such a 
course of action would be very time consuming and difficult in return for what would quite 
likely be a not particularly successful outcome.369       
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I therefore abandoned this idea and thought that perhaps I would advertise via the PSU and 
requested to put up posters in the PSU branches around the country. However, the PSU at the 
RCJ decided against letting me put up posters in their branch feeling it would be 
inappropriate; other PSU branches either did not respond, or were unwilling to put up posters, 
with only one PSU being willing to place leaflets in their room, but not posters. I similarly 
tried to gain access to CABs for placement but was again told that this would not be possible. 
Finally, I considered placing the posters on Community Information Boards locally, but 
decided against this, firstly because I considered it very unlikely that anyone would make 
contact and secondly, because it would limit the geographical scope very radically as I would 
only be able to place them nearby in London. In the end, I printed over 200 posters, and I 
never used any of them, abandoning this method of finding interviewees.370   
 
I next thought that perhaps I would contact potential interviewees directly, either through 
meeting them while training as a volunteer at the PSU, or through attending hearings at the 
County Courts themselves, approaching LiPs afterwards. However, while these seemed the 
most direct means of accessing LiPs I ultimately decided against both approaches for primarily 
ethical reasons. I could not reconcile volunteering at the PSU where my role was to assist 
LiPs with their needs, with attempting to co-opt such individuals for my own usage.371 It 
seemed an ethical conflict of interest to approach individuals this way and it seemed to 
expressly go against what the PSU itself would expect as appropriate behaviour on the part of 
volunteers. I also decided against contacting LiPs at the courts directly because it seemed 
unethical to confront individuals, however gently, when they were under such considerable 
stress and preoccupation.372 I felt such an approach would be intrusive and clumsy and risk 
alienating such LiPs. In addition, both such means of approaches would also only capture 
interviewees who had managed to access the PSU, and interviewees who actually went to 
court. Both would therefore narrow the potential pool of LiPs that this study deliberately 
seeks to try and keep broad. On top of this, such a direct approach would also narrow 
geographically the pool of interviewees, with me only being able to contact those in London, 
and therefore not making contact with LiPs outside of this; this was again expressly against 
my desire in this project to not limit my interviewees to Londoners, and so I abandoned these 
ideas too. 
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Ultimately, my experiences of failure in reaching interviewees directly and locally made me 
realise that in fact the most effective, and appropriate, method of finding interviewees was 
going to be online through the internet and social media. Using purposive sampling, this 
approach would allow me access to LiPs all over the country, it would also ensure that I could 
contact such individuals in a less confrontational manner, and that their participation would be 
explicitly voluntary.373 As such it seemed like a far preferable option to the ones previously 
canvassed. I therefore set up a website, a Facebook account and a Twitter feed called Litigant 
Stories, calling for interviews for the study and explaining the project.374 The website 
contained information about the study, about me, and about the kinds of questions to expect, 
and interviewees were able to inform themselves of project details before deciding whether or 
not to participate. I also exchanged multiple emails with potential interviewees frankly 
explaining what the interviewing process would be like.  
 
Through these online methods, I managed, over the course of the project to speak to fifteen 
LiPs. Four interviewees were sourced through Twitter where they contacted me after seeing 
my call for interviewees (kindly retweeted by LiP organisations, such as the Bar Pro Bono 
Unit, and relevant academics, such as Richard Moorhead). Three others I found through 
Facebook. This was done by visiting the Facebook sites of the County Courts and noting who 
had ‘checked in’ to these places. I then contacted these individuals one by one to find out 
whether they had been LiPs. In total I messaged fourteen individuals through this means, with 
only five responding. Of those five, three became interviewees, but the other two withdrew. 
Through Facebook I also contacted the Citizens Advice Bureau pages for areas that had local 
County Courts, which included Birmingham, Bolton and Croydon. While these sites shared 
my Facebook page, this did not generate any additional interviewees. In addition, I joined a 
number of private Facebook groups after explaining my project to the group moderator. 
Through this, I became a member of several groups including ‘McKenzie Friends of Children’, 
‘McKenzie Friends & Self Representing in Court’ and ‘Self-Representation in Court.’ However, 
I was unable to find interviewees in any of these forums.  
 
Two interviewees were sourced via their webpages: one I found directly as it was explicitly 
about LiPs and I made contact with him. Another came to my attention in a newspaper article 
and I then found his website and contacted him and he agreed to be interviewed. Another 
interviewee was recommended to me by a colleague. Finally, the remaining five interviewees 
were obtained through ‘snowballing’ whereby interviewees passed on the details of other 
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potential interviewees after gaining their trust in my project.375 While I was able to source 
several interviewees this way, my success rate was not very high, as I approached fifteen 
individuals, with less than half being willing to participate. I am, however, very grateful to 
those interviewees who enthusiastically assisted me in finding participants, which was 
extremely helpful.376   
 
Because of this mixed method of sampling, and the emphasis on online sourcing, the 
interviewees in this study come from a variety of places, from Southampton to Yorkshire to 
Bristol to Grantham and beyond, with only four out of fifteen being based in London. In 
addition, I was able to capture a wide variety of legal categories, with the interviewees going 
to the County Courts in relation to issues including housing and possession proceedings, 
family matters (prior to 2014), small claims, non-money claims, negligence claims, bankruptcy 
claims and more. The interviewees also consisted of both claimants and defendants, and they 
had a mixed background in terms of obtaining advice and representation, with some using the 
PSU and the CAB, and others not, and some being legally represented for parts, and others 
not. Some also faced represented opposition and others faced other LiPs. In addition, some 
were still in the midst of litigation, others had completed litigation and others still were 
contemplating further litigation. As such, this method of sampling enabled me to gain access 
to the breadth of those acting as LiPs, including those who went to court regularly and some 
who had spent very little, if any, time in a courtroom.  
 
However, there are a number of limitations to address within this sample. Firstly, there is its 
small size. Logistically, of course, there were challenges to doing more than this. Firstly, these 
are very long interviews involving multiple sessions for most participants and as such 
involved considerable amounts of travel and accommodation that was self-funded and very 
expensive. The shortest interview was just under three hours in length in one session, and the 
longest interview was between nine and ten hours over two sessions, with the average length 
of the interviews being around five to six hours in duration, over two to three sessions, 
although up to four in some cases.377 Travel time was at times up to eight hours in each 
direction to reach further-flung interviewees, and involved overnight stays in half of all 
                                                     
375 As Rowland Atkinson and John Flint point out, ‘snowballing’, whereby one research subject will 
provide access to another research subject, is of value when trying to access hard-to-reach populations, 
making it particularly effectively in reaching LiPs. See Rowland and Flint, “Accessing Hidden and Hard 
to Reach Populations: Snowballing Sampling Techniques,” Social Research Update 33 (2001).   
376 Lee and Tkakucova also spend some time in their most recent report discussing the difficulties of 
accessing LiPs to interview. They were assisted by the Birmingham PSU who allowed them access to 
their offices and distributed their questionnaires. Even with this facilitation, they note that of 193 
questionnaires completed, only 60 were initially willing to be interviewed. This dropped to a total of 25, 
with many refusing, or hanging up, having initially agreed. These interviews were done over the phone, 
not face-to-face. See Lee and Tkakucova, A Study of LiPs, 5-6.  
377 It is important to note of course, that this only denotes recording times. This does not include the 
time spent before the interview recording began, any breaks and the time afterwards.  
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interviews. All of these factors set a constraint on how much interviewing I could do, in 
addition of course to the restrictive timeline of a PhD. This number of interviews, then, has 
been reached by firstly considering the scope of the project. Due to the intensive nature of the 
interviews and their length, more than this would be unfeasible within time constraints.  
 
Beyond logistical considerations, though, the small sample is also in keeping with an oral 
history methodology. As this chapter has elaborated, oral history interviewing is about depth, 
sensibility and a situated perspective. The rich detail evinced through these interviews 
evidences the validity of such a method and of a small sample. A criticism frequently levelled 
at qualitative research is the generalisability of the findings. However, as Jennifer Mason 
notes: ‘qualitative research should …produce explanations which are generalisable in some 
way, or which have a wider resonance’.378 And this is also the claim of this thesis: that this 
research not only shines a light into the specific nature of individual experiences but also 
considers how these insights can assist our understanding of LiPs more generally.  
 
The difficulty arises, then, as to how one can do so in the context of a small group of 
interviewees. For Pertti Alasuutari, the term generalisable carries overtones of quantitative 
research. As he states:  
 
generalization is…a word…that should be reserved for surveys only. What can be analyzed 
instead is how the researcher demonstrates that the analysis relates to things beyond the 
material at hand…. extrapolation better captures the typical procedure in qualitative 
research.379  
 
Therefore, this thesis can be seen as keeping both Alasuutari and Mason’s guidance in mind. I 
am not claiming to capture a representative sample, but instead arguing throughout that the 
findings in this thesis can be ‘extrapolated’ to consider wider resonances.380 In taking this 
approach, I argue that although the sample number is small, this is sufficient to demonstrate 
the unexpected variety and complexity of the LiP experience compared to what has previously 
been discussed. Moorhead and Sefton’s 2005 study notes the variety of LiP experiences 
including the phenomenon of passive defendants as well as active claimants, the differences for 
LiPs in facing represented and unrepresented opponents and so on. 381 My sample of 
interviewees reflects this variety in greater detail than previously analysed. It also goes 
further in providing new information as to the degree to which LiPs have had previous contact 
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with the courts, or who then go on to pursue further claims: a complexity heretofore 
unexplored. Finally, my analysis considers the impact of legal proceedings in greater detail 
than previously undertaken. Consequently, although the sample number is small, as Howard 
Becker puts it:  
 
[i]t may not take many interviews to show that something people have not thought about 
as taking a variety of forms in fact does take such a variety of forms. I can interview three 
physicians and demonstrate that there are three kinds of medical careers in a given 
community. I won’t be able to say what proportion of the town’s doctors have each kind of 
career and shouldn’t try to hint at that. But my analysis may not require that kind of 
conclusion.382  
 
And this is the note I want to emphasise: my analysis does not require the kind of conclusion 
that speaks definitively of what LiPs are like. The claim I am making in this thesis is that the 
in-depth nature of these interviews means that the findings therein can be extrapolated to 
consider some theoretical issues pertinent to the experience of LiPs in a wider sense. Through 
adopting a qualitative methodology, this research aims to complement, and add to, the existing 
picture of LiPs. By sitting alongside previous quantitative and mixed-methods research, this 
work can help bring out the individual voices behind the larger statistical picture. 
 
Another limitation of this study is the lack of women participants; only five of the fifteen 
interviewees are female. Ultimately, the reason why I did not conduct more than fifteen 
interviews (I had initially aimed at a maximum of twenty) is because I wanted to interview five 
more women, and I was unable to persuade any more to participate. While a number of men 
were available for interview I decided not to do this, as it would skew the sample even further 
away from being sufficiently representative of women. As to why it was difficult to find women 
participants, this merits further examination. There is some suggestion in the literature that 
many defendant LiPs, at least, are male, but there is no real evidence of a clear gender gap.383 
However, to begin with, it is notable that ultimately my success rate in obtaining interviewees 
was overall quite low; of the approaches made online, the majority of individuals either did not 
respond, or eventually decided against undertaking being interviewed. This is because firstly, 
it demanded a considerable amount of unpaid time on the interviewees’ part, and secondly, it 
involved identifying with the role of LiP and being willing to have an interview recorded and 
archived in a publicly accessible manner. This was undoubtedly a constraint set on who could 
participate. It was certainly the case that far more women withdrew from participating after 
                                                     
382 Howard Becker quoted in Sarah Elsie Baker and Rosalind Edwards, “How Many Qualitative 
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being initially willing to communicate, suggestive that perhaps the nature of this project was 
more likely to attract males than females, or that the constraints inherent to the project were 
more likely to be a problem to the particular women I contacted. 
 
Similarly, only two participants were from a BAME background, both being Black British men 
from London. Once again, this interview did attempt to gain interviews with several other 
BAME LiPs, but they declined to participate or did not get in touch leaving this small sample 
undoubtedly predominantly white and male. The whiteness and maleness of this sample, while 
regrettable in some ways, is of interest, however, in certain other ways. There has been some 
suggestion that these are the groups most likely to be LiPs; certainly, they seemed to be the 
most ready individuals to self-identify as LiPs and the ones most keen to tell their story and 
have it publicised.384 This perhaps reflects the normative position they operate in society in 
general; when things do not go their way, they are perhaps more likely to ascribe it to injustice 
that merits public attention. As mentioned before, while I do not want to go beyond the claims 
that these experiences merit, I certainly think that these experiences are suggestive of the 
kinds of people who may consider the courts ‘theirs’.  
 
It is notable, for example, that one BAME interviewee, Charles, commented that he was 
reluctant to attend court when he was pursuing a claim against a builder; in this case, the only 
way to get recompense was for the court to decide that the builder’s house was one of his 
assets (the house was in the name of his wife), however, as he expressed it:  
 
To be honest, I don’t even want the judge to see me because I, I, I’m actually conscious of 
the fact that if he thinks it’s a black man trying to take somebody’s house away he might, he 
might rule against me. I might be completely wrong but I just don’t want him to see me at 
all so I never go to court once, unless it is necessary. 
  
There is of course ample evidence of the lack of diversity amongst the judiciary, particularly in 
regards to BAME individuals, as well as women.385 This is also the case, although less so, for 
the lay magistracy as well as at the Bar, although less markedly amongst solicitors.386 Senior 
legal professionals, particularly barristers and judges, remain predominantly white and male 
and while this study can hardly draw conclusions in the context of such a small sample, it is 
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important to be aware of how important this lack of diversity may indeed be when it comes to 
how accessible the courts might be to those who are not white, or male, or who may not speak 
English as a first language.387 
 
The final limitation I think it is important to acknowledge to this sample is the degree to 
which such a long interview, where individuals self-identify as LiPs, means that it is far more 
likely that those who have repeated experiences as LiPs are likely to participate. As I outlined 
in the beginning of this thesis, while LiPs include ‘one-shotters’ and ‘repeat players’, this 
sample is dominated by individuals who have had repeated experience as LiPs, in some cases 
over the course of more than fifteen or twenty years. This means that the sample is less able to 
capture the experiences of one-time LiPs (although two of the sample are examples of this) and 
instead disproportionately focuses on the repeat players. However, as oral history interviewing 
tells us, and as Darnton’s theory proposes, what this skewing has done is provide unparalleled 
insight into the complex experiences of repeat LiPs. So much research emphasises LiPs as 
being involved in a single claim, but the experience is utterly different for those who find 
themselves being involved in multiple claims. This means that this thesis can examine in detail 
how and why individuals may become serial litigants, and what this experience can tell us 
about the LiP landscape.388  
 
ETHICS AND INFORMED CONSENT 
 
This project was developed in line with the Oral History Society’s ethical guidelines as well as 
the LSE Research Ethics Policy, and it obtained ethical approval from the LSE Research 
Ethics Committee.389 The project outline was submitted for analysis and I then responded to 
Committee feedback, before receiving approval to continue. As outlined above, in considering 
how to approach interviewees, I was concerned not to do so in a confrontational or unethical 
way and so I chose to source them online, explaining the project, and signposting the potential 
interviewees to the website for the project. I then provided all potential interviewees with a 
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Project Information Sheet in clear, accessible English (also downloadable from the webpage) 
that explicitly outlined the intention to lodge interviews in an archive at the British Library as 
well as explained how the interviews would be analysed in my subsequent research and used in 
publication.  
 
I then made it clear to those potential participants who were interested at this stage that when 
I met with them I would provide them with further details as to the interviews, issues 
regarding consent, privacy and how the material is to be used. If the individual agreed to 
participate, we organised a time and date for me to come to them to conduct the interview. 
Once I had met the interviewee, I provided them with a secondary information sheet that 
outlined further information regarding consent and privacy and the use of the material. This 
two-step process prior to interviewing meant that before the interview took place, the 
interviewee orally agreed that I could use their (anonymised) interview in my research and 
publications. They also provisionally agreed to the archiving of their interview at the British 
Library. Once the interview was over, I again explained that I would use the findings 
anonymously in my research and only then did the interviewee sign the Recording Agreement 
for archiving their interview at the British Library. At this juncture, interviewees were given 
the opportunity to choose to ‘embargo’ for a period of up to thirty years any portion of the 
interview they did not wish to be made public.390   
 
Participant privacy is protected in this thesis through the anonymisation of participants. 
While the participants agreed to be identified in the public archive, I chose to keep them 
anonymised here as this seemed the more ethical and appropriate way of presenting the 
research data, particularly as publications would see these findings circulated within the 
academic and, potentially, professional community which, although it is unlikely, could affect 
LiPs still pursuing or defending claims. This also means that where interviewees were 
involved in published proceedings, I have chosen not to reference these materials so as not to 
compromise their anonymity. While this is regrettable, because of the potentially valuable 
insight such a comparison could offer, it would compromise the anonymity this study is 
predicated on.  
 
THE INTERVIEWING PROCESS 
 
The interviewing process took place between January and June 2016. Each interview lasted 
roughly between three and ten hours in length and usually took place at the interviewee’s 
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home. This method of interviewing was done with the intention of eliciting greater depth of 
information and fostering trust between researcher and interviewee. Most obviously, this 
encounter enables the interview to happen away from places with explicitly legal connotations. 
Whereas much of a LiP’s experiences with law may take place in official, semi-formal, and 
neutral environments, these interviews happened in places chosen by the interviewee to put 
them at their ease. Twelve interviews were done at the interviewees’ home, and I travelled to 
them to do the recording. Three took place elsewhere; one in my hotel room, and two at the 
PhD Academy at the LSE which provided a small, private side-room. While the hotel room 
interview seems to have been conducted there because the interviewee did not feel comfortable 
inviting me into her home, it is interesting that the latter two interviews not done at home 
were directly related to the interviewees’ experiences as LiPs: one was in the midst of resisting 
possession proceedings and feared bailiffs (as well as having all parts of her flat filled with 
legal papers) and the second had been rendered homeless through litigation and did not have a 
place to go.391  
 
While participant details are anonymised here, for safety reasons my supervisors were privy to 
the details of my interviewees and I contacted them with details of who I was meeting and 
where I was going prior to meeting an interviewee, and contacted them again to let them 
know that I had left safely. While I never experienced any sense of danger, there were several 
moments that were of some concern. One participant had no fixed address and wanted me to 
meet him at a train station in rural Somerset, at which point he would drive me to another 
undisclosed location. I turned down this offer explaining in a way that sought not to offend 
him by telling him that I needed to follow university guidance which forbade not being able to 
say where I was going (which is not entirely true), and he accepted this explanation. 
Eventually, he attended the LSE where I conducted his interview over three sessions in the 
Law Department and the PhD Academy. As mentioned above, another interviewee I went to 
meet would not allow me access to her home, and so we had to conduct the interview in my 
hotel room. This was unexpected, and of some concern, but this was assuaged by the 
interviewee being female, and her being accompanied by another individual, her McKenzie 
Friend, who stayed throughout the interview. While the circumstances remained far from 
ideal, I wanted very much to talk to this LiP and considered this not to be a sufficient reason 
to not conduct the interview. Unfortunately, because of the personal nature of the interview, as 
well as the demands of sound recording, conducting an interview in a public space was not 
feasible.  
 
It is important to emphasise, however, that the majority of these encounters were welcoming. 
Interviewees made me lunch, we had many tea breaks, I would learn about their lives and 
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families, sometimes meet some of these family members and would be welcomed into their 
homes. This approach to interviewing means that I have become emotionally involved in, and 
affected by, participant experiences. This was a direct result of the intensity of this kind of 
research process. A good example of this is the interview I conducted with Neil. While most 
interviews were conducted over multiple sessions, Neil had less availability and lived further 
away, and so we conducted the interview over the course of an entire day. The intensity of that 
experience made Neil quite emotional, and by the end of the day he described the experience as 
akin to ‘therapy’. I do not make this point to somehow suggest how useful my interviews were 
to the interviewees. But I introduce this to say how much the experience of conducting these 
interviews affected me, and the difference this makes in how I approach analysing this data. 
Through this experience, I became heavily invested in the LiPs’ stories and experiences. I 
argue that this investment, however, has not compromised this research, but rather facilitated 
it. The intimacy the nature of this project evoked has developed in me a strong desire to fairly 
and accurately do justice to LiPs’ experiences. In addition, my own personal responses to these 
interviewees, and the unexpected degree to which I have felt in this project, has underlined the 
importance of being reflexive in how I approach this data rather than pretending to an 
unattainable objectivity: I have consequently hopefully trod a careful path between 
acknowledging my own discomfort, prejudices or concerns as they arose, without falling into 
the self-important trap of making myself the ‘hero’ of the story.   
 
In this project, therefore, I do not pretend that I am not in the room, or that my presence had 
no effect, but instead I consider, as above, the difficulties this may pose for interviewees as well 
as the ways in which it may be advantageous. While the intrusion and dominance of a 
researcher can be problematic, the visibility of the researcher can, as oral history scholars 
assert, also be an asset. Alessandro Portelli comments that:  
 
Communications always work both ways. The interviewees are always, though perhaps 
unobtrusively, studying the interviewers who ‘study’ them. Historians might as well 
recognize this fact and make the best of its advantages, rather than try to eliminate it for 
the sake of an impossible (and perhaps undesirable) neutrality.392  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that I am not simply a ‘researcher’ but carry my own 
markers of identity, being both white and female. While I do not feel that this posed any 
explicit problems in this interviewing, I have no doubt that it changed the nature of the 
interviewing. One interviewee, for example, who was an older male, treated me in quite a 
‘daughterly’ way, taking an interest in my life outside of research and wanting to know about 
my family. There is also, for example, some evidence that perhaps women find it easier to be 
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interviewed by other women in certain circumstances and so it is possible that when talking to 
one interviewee about traumatic issues to do with the adoption of her daughter, it was 
facilitated by our shared gender.393 In terms of my whiteness, interviewing those of a BAME 
background undoubtedly means I have no shared understanding or appreciation of the 
discrimination faced by those who are not white, nor of the lived experience of being black, 
and this is an undoubted limitation in the research.  
 
In addition, an obvious and important example of the implications of my presence, as well as 
the need for reflexivity as a researcher, is the anti-Semitism expressed by three or four 
interviewees, such as Anna: 
 
because of the Jewish influence that um I needed a decent Jewish judge to stand up for what 
is right because you know, because I’m aware there’s, that there is some thoroughly decent 
Jewish people who have got great family values but I’m also aware from personal 
experience and what my mother has told me that there are others who will do anything for 
money, um, and so I thought, this is an opportunity for him to stand up for the decent ones, 
yeah?394 
 
Being not only white and female, but also from a Jewish background, this put me in an 
immediately awkward position. The purpose of these interviews is to get LiP perspectives, and 
not to challenge their narratives. As such, it seemed wrong to interrupt them. I also felt that 
doing so would immediately break any purported intimacy that was enabling the interview to 
work. I had not identified myself as Jewish, and clearly these interviewees did not think that I 
was; undoubtedly, they would not have spoken as they did if they had known.395 However, I 
think there is no doubt that these comments of theirs affected me; on listening back to the 
transcripts I think it made me less sympathetic (if not consciously), more likely to be sceptical 
of their accounts, and more likely to move the interview on more rapidly as I felt 
uncomfortable in their home. I was also more likely to ask these interviewees questions to 
elicit them being more explicit about this prejudice although this happened on a subconscious 
level as I only noticed this behaviour on listening back to the interviews. As such, it changed 
the interview in subtle ways. This is a more explicit example that simply draws attention to 
what must always be acknowledged; that an interviewer’s presence affects the interview. 
                                                     
393 J. Finch, “’It’s Great to Have Someone to Talk to’: Ethics and Politics of Interviewing Women”, in 
Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice (London: SAGE Publications, 1993). For a contrasting 
perspective, see: C.K. Riessman, “When Gender is Not Enough: Women Interviewing Women,” Gender 
and Society 1, no. 2 (1987): 172-207. 
394 This is by no means as bad as it got, but I do not want to give further airing to the nastier comments, 
such as allegations of ‘what the Jews did in World War Two’.  
395 Two of my interviewees were Jewish themselves. While I did not identify myself as Jewish to one of 
these interviewees, the other interviewee continually asked me personal questions throughout the 
interviewing (and outside of it) so I had told him that I was Jewish.  
 105 
However, I want to emphasise that while such reactions on my part weren’t controllable 
consciously at the time of interview, I have tried to be open-minded, sympathetic and careful 
with all interviewee accounts and this partly involves acknowledging, as above, my own 
limitations as a novice interviewer.   
 
APPROACHING ANALYSIS  
 
While the challenges of interviewing were considerable, there is a final, difficult problem to 
consider: that of translation. Debates between written and oral sources overlook one 
important fact about oral history: it comprises both. No oral history research stays oral: at 
some point it has to be written down. As Lynn Abrams points out, oral history is ‘both a 
research methodology and the result of the research process; in other words, it is both the act 
of recording and the record that is produced’.396  How this process takes place is the most 
central question in oral history scholarship. This is unsurprising when we consider that the 
act of translation means oral history’s defining disciplinary feature, its essential orality, is lost. 
Portelli comments: 
 
Traits, which cannot be contained within segments are the site (not exclusive, but very 
important) of essential narrative functions: they reveal the narrators’ emotions, their 
participation in the story, and the way the story affected them. This often involves attitudes 
which speakers may not be able (or willing) to express otherwise, or elements, which are 
not fully within their control. By abolishing these traits, we flatten the emotional content of 
speech down to the supposed equanimity-and objectivity of the written document. 397 
 
Any movement from an oral record to a written transcription means performative dimensions 
of live speech are ‘flattened’. Interestingly, as Passerini notes, this is a parallel to legal 
processes where court proceedings are audio recorded but the records we tend to rely on are 
the written transcripts alone. As Lynn Abrams puts it, there is a ‘verisimilitude’ at best 
between recording and transcription.398 Much of the scholarship in oral history is therefore 
concerned with dealing with this loss. Oral history scholarship concentrates on minimizing the 
inherent impoverishment of translation. This manifests in practical steps to be taken to 
improve the verisimilitude between the interview and the subsequent transcription. This can 
be done, for example, through including written references to speech styles, additional notes, 
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and attempts to render some of the mood or emotion into the written document.  This is 
valuable in the context of this project whereby the audio recordings will be a richer document 
than written transcript. Attending to means by which emotion or context can be incorporated 
into the written transcript can significantly ‘thicken’ the description that can emerge from an 
interview. As such, in documenting comments made by interviewees I have tried to reproduce 
as exactly as possible ellipses, pronunciation and wording to retain a degree of this richness.  
 
However, the tendency in oral history scholarship to see translation primarily as a practical 
step in a journey of producing a record elides the crucial distinction between the record of an 
interview and the other written record that is the subsequent production of knowledge by an 
academic based on this record. While both are in written form, they are two distinct 
phenomena. The failure to see this is I think in some ways attributable to language slippage. 
Having an umbrella term—oral history— that covers only the interview and the record (as 
Abrams has it) elides the emerging written research. The emphasis on the interview record 
also reinforces the origins of oral history as a practical method, rather than as a developed 
coherent theory.  However, I believe another significant issue is oral history’s disciplinary 
isolation: scholars within oral history rarely looks to other fields to consider if there are 
comparable methods or understandings that could usefully be drawn on.  In this case, I believe 
that oral history scholarship would be significantly enriched by drawing on anthropological 
and ethnographic theory to fully elucidate the ethics and challenges of translation from 
interview into analysis. I will outline this in the following section by drawing on the 
anthropological process from fieldwork to ethnography. Just to be clear: this interviewing 
project does not constitute ethnography, even if the empirical act of interviewing is a form of 
fieldwork. But the framework of this fieldwork-ethnography process pays better attention to 
the complexity of the project of translation as well as to the production of academic 
knowledge, something under-addressed in oral history scholarship. It is to this framework I 
will now turn. 
 
In Clifford Geertz’s article “Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture” he 
argues that in order to understand a science, ‘you should look in the first instance not at its 
theories and findings, and certainly not at what its apologists say about it, you should look at 
what the practitioners of it do’.399 In anthropology, or anyway social anthropology, what 
practitioners do is ethnography. And it is in understanding what ethnography is, or rather 
what doing ethnography is, that a start can be made towards grasping what anthropological 
analysis amounts to as a form of knowledge. This, it must be immediately said, is not a matter 
of methods. From one point of view, that of the textbook, doing ethnography is establishing 
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rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking genealogies, mapping fields, keeping a 
diary, and so on. But it is not these things, techniques, and received procedures, that define the 
enterprise. What defines it is the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in, to 
borrow a notion of Gilbert Ryle, ‘thick description’. 400 
 
In other words, although fieldwork and ethnography encompass practical methods, these do 
not define the work: it is the intellectual and conceptual framework: how you see it and what 
you make of it. The thick description that a scholar aims to evoke in research, then, is not just 
about the verisimilitude of the audio interview to the record even though this is a significant 
part of it. In other words, oral history’s emphasis on finding ways to include emotion, 
emphases, pauses and so on into transcription is an essential part of building up a thick 
description, but it is not the thick description in and of itself. For the purposes of this project, 
then, while it is essential to pay attention to how the interviews are conducted, my aim as a 
researcher is not to produce the best possible interview, but to produce an analysis based on 
this. This involves moving beyond practical methods and into interrogating how I use the 
record that has been created. As Peter Hervik adds: ‘anthropological knowledge is not about 
representing native voices or about evoking lived experience by narrative constructions but 
about generalizing the particular in a separate discourse’.401  
 
The first thing that shifting my orientation towards this separate discourse does in this project 
is undermine the claims oral history scholarship makes about shared authorship. LiPs are co-
authors of my interviews, but not of my research findings, when they become 
informants.402This is not an equal partnership, and this goes under-acknowledged in oral 
history scholarship, arguably demonstrable of the ‘facile democratisation’ of which Passerini 
warned us. One of the first things to consider is how much this situation potentially parallels 
legal narrative: except, instead of legal professionals telling LiPs stories, I am now doing it. Of 
course, paying reflexive attention throughout to allow a freer narrative to emerge from LiPs 
as well as the emphasis on being as accurate as possible will assist in addressing this. But the 
ethics of speaking for others remains complex and fraught. 403  
 
There are further challenges in the ethics of speaking for others. Pierre Bourdieu remarks that 
‘it is because subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that what they do 
                                                     
400 Ibid, 2-3. 
401 Hervik in Hastrup and Hervik, Social Experience and Anthropological Experience, 97.  
402 Clifford Geertz, “’From the Native’s Point of View’: On the Nature of Anthropological Sciences,” 
Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 28, no. 1 (1974): 26-45.  
403 Gilles Deleuze and Michele Foucault, “Intellectuals and power: A conversation between Michel 
Foucault and Gilles Deleuze” in Donald Bouchard, ed., Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault (Cornell: Cornell Paperbacks, 1980).   
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has more meaning than they know’.404  This statement captures the unconscious performance 
of habitus that is of such value when seeking to understand other people’s experiences. But 
this is not just applicable to research informants but to the researcher herself. Knowledge 
production, its methods and discourse, is a form of scholarly habitus and it is something 
Bourdieu argues is overlooked in critical anthropological writing, including the work of 
Geertz. Bourdieu critiques thick description by arguing that it is insufficiently reflexive.  His 
somewhat cumbersome term, ‘scholastic epistemocentrism’, refers to the fact that academic 
discourse is a form of knowledge production we too readily overlook as researchers:  
 
it is customarily ignored that the description of descriptions or of spontaneous theories 
itself presupposes a scholastic break with the recorded activity that has to be put into the 
theory; and that apparently humble and submissive forms of scientific work, such as ‘thick 
description’, imply and impose on reality a pre-constructed mode of construction which is 
none other than the scholastic view of the world.[…] imputing to its object what belongs 
in fact to the way of looking at it, it projects into practice an unexamined social relation 
which is none other than the scholastic relation to the world.405 
 
This critique speaks powerfully to the degree to which our ways of seeing limit and influence 
the project we create, the record we create and the research that we write. The emergent 
writing is defined and limited at every stage by being performed by someone (me) who has 
habituated the ‘scholastic relation to the world’.  
 
This critique can seem dispiriting in that it appears to close down the possibilities of any 
research undertaking. However, I think it can be seen better as a gauntlet thrown: a challenge 
to be as robustly reflexive in decision-makings as is possible, while acknowledging all the 
necessary caveats. It is hardly reasonable to spend a thesis arguing for the damage done by 
habituation of legal discourse if I fail to acknowledge my own habituation of academic 
discourse. As Bourdieu notes, one must ‘return to the world of everyday existence, but armed 
with a scientific thought that is sufficiently aware of itself and its limits to be capable of 
thinking practice without destroying its object’. 406 While speaking for others cannot ever be 
‘solved’, where the focus of the research lies can also help us move beyond being bogged down 
in scholastic epistemocentrism. Kirstin Hastrup, pointing out that ‘anthropology and 
autobiography merge in the process of knowledge production’, goes on to note that: 
 
                                                     
404 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Social and Cultural 
Anthropology, 1977), 79. 
405  Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 53. 
406 Ibid, 50.  
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While acknowledging the indubitable significance of autobiography and the situatedness of 
the anthropologist, the starting-point is not the self, but the field into which the 
ethnographer invests her powers of imagination. Through this investment, the 
ethnographer arrives at an understanding not only of “culture” and “society”, but more 
importantly of the processes by which cultures and societies are reproduced and 
transformed 407 
 
Hastrup reminds us that the focus of the researcher needs to remain on the purpose of the 
project itself.  While ethnographers must acknowledge their situated and partial perspective, 
their responsibility lies in being able to ethically and faithfully produce an account based on the 
interview records that sufficiently allows for complexity. In this project, I must be reflexive 
about my own academic discourse but not lose sight of the fact that the purpose of this project 
is to understand another sensibility, even if that understanding will always be limited. Kirstin 
Hastrup beautifully articulates this in her call for an ‘ethics of inarticulacy’.  Hastrup notes that 
‘experience is always emergent, never performed, while anthropological models often display a 
degree of finality’.408 It is therefore important to avoid conclusions or finality. It is my 
responsibility as a researcher to draw attention to what isn’t said, what cannot be said, and 
what should not be inferred. It is about striking a balance. As Clifford Geertz pointed out: ‘it is 
not necessary to know everything in order to understand something’. 409  
 
However, in developing my ‘coding framework’, it is important to note that this process was 
messier than the term ‘coding framework’ suggests. As Herbert Kritzer notes: 
 
Experienced social scientists know that textbook descriptions of the research process are at 
best a sanitized description of the messy reality of what happens when researcher meets 
data.410 
 
As someone who is not an experienced social scientist, when this researcher met my data, I 
found it very difficult to know how best to go about my analysis. I had strong theoretical 
frameworks to guide me, knowing, as I have outlined above, that I wanted to foreground LiP 
experiences, to faithfully and sensitively reproduce what happened in the way they understood 
it, but also knowing the limitations of such goals, as well as the need to be reflexive. However, 
these frameworks are not the same thing as knowing exactly what to do with the material in a 
practical sense. As Kritzer notes: ‘research is not a simple journey to the shopping mall of 
                                                     
407 Hastrup in Hervik and Hastrup, Social Experience and Anthropological Experience, 2. 
408 Ibid, 9. 
409 Geertz, “The Interpretation of Cultures,” 20.  
410 Herbert M. Kritzer, “‘Data, Data, Data, Drowning in Data’: Crafting the Hollow Core,” Law and 
Social Enquiry 21, no. 3 (July 1996): 761. 
 110 
research results’.411 As such, the actual process of coding and analysing data was done largely 
intuitively. While in retrospect I can see clearly how a coding framework emerged from this 
process, the experience of doing this felt far less systematic. I found it enormously helpful to 
find the scholarly work of Halliday and Schmidt who outline the ‘Methodological Anxiety 
Syndrome’ or ‘MAS’ experienced by many novice socio-legal scholars conducting empirical 
research.  
 
Halliday and Schmidt note that: 
 
Law and Society research typically proceeds on a similar basis: beginning with a naive 
design, but informed and evolving through experiences in the field and engagement with 
the data. However, we have not done so well at naming and accepting the importance of 
“naive fieldwork” in the research process. In this understanding, then, being 
methodologically thoughtful – possessing the capacity to move from the naive 
understanding of one’s project to the more sophisticated, and to discover the questions, 
theoretical potential, and epistemological problems latent in one’s engagement with the 
world as one sees it – is ultimately much more important than being methodologically 
trained.412 
 
In outlining how I conducted my analysis, then, I do not try and claim a smooth and natural 
process. But I hope I can demonstrate that how I analysed this data was methodologically 
thoughtful, if at all times underpinned by MAS.   
 
DOING ANALYSIS 
Coding describes the process of interacting with data and developing a framework for analysis. 
Denzin and Lincoln note that in grounded theory, coding is essentially an interactive process, 
where the researcher goes back and forth continually between data and the developing 
analysis.413 They describe the process as follows: 
 
First, we compare data with data as we develop codes; next, we compare data with codes; 
after that, we compare codes and raise significant codes to tentative categories: then, we 
compare data and codes with these categories: subsequently, we treat our major 
category(ies) as a concept (s), and last, we compare concept with concept.414 
                                                     
411 Ibid, 764.  
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and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. 
413 Denzin and Lincoln, “Codes and Coding,” 361. 
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Strauss and Corbin’s framework supports this interpretation. They break down the coding 
process into three phases: open, axial and selective, with open codes being the first stage of 
analysis of data, and axial coding being the moment when codes become categories. Finally, 
selective coding is analogous to the raising of categories to concepts.415 Such a framework is a 
helpful method to separate out the stages of my analysis which, if more intuitive and messier 
than these categories suggest, echoes these stages.  
 
My analysis began during the interviews themselves. While I was careful not to do too much 
note-taking so as to be distracting to the interviewee, I made notes of the time-stamps when 
there was any moment that was particularly relevant to my research questions. I also recorded 
timestamps of the different sections of the interview to help me remember the structure of the 
interviews, given that the interviews themselves were of considerable duration. I made my 
first set of post-interview notes immediately after completing an interview (usually in my car, 
or as soon as I returned to my home or my hotel). These notes captured any themes, ideas, 
experiences or language that seemed important to that interviewee or which struck me as 
strange in Darnton’s sense, as well as anything that explicitly and obviously addressed the 
overall research questions of this study. At this time, I would sometimes replay certain 
sections of these interviews drawing on the time-stamps I had made to catch something I had 
half-remembered afterwards that I wasn’t sure about. I then typed up these (usually) 
handwritten notes, resulting in a few pages of rough notes for each interview. These notes 
became the earliest kind of ‘open codes’ that started to organise what I thought may turn out 
to be key ideas emerging from the research. These encompassed such ideas as conspiracy, 
language difficulties, distrust of lawyers, vulnerability, complexity, and ‘justice obsession’.416  
 
The next step of data translation occurred when I had completed all of the interviews. At this 
point, from June to December 2016, I listened through to each interview from start to finish 
systematically, accompanied by a blank word document, transcription software and a foot-
pedal that enabled me to both make notes as I went along as well as, where I wanted to, 
transcribe sections of the interview. My main goals in this systematic review of interviews 
were firstly to make notes of timestamps where particular topics or subjects were covered, i.e. 
noting when the section on ‘childhood’, ‘schooling’, ‘first LiP experience’ occurred to assist me 
with finding this section of the interview in the future. While I had done some of this work in 
the interviews themselves, my handwritten notes were usually incomplete. Secondly, I again 
went through the process of making notes on important themes, experiences or ideas that 
                                                     
415 Strauss and Corbin, “Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons and Evaluative Criteria,” 
Qualitative Sociology 13, no.1 (1990): 3-19. 
416 Strauss and Corbin, “Grounded Theory Research,” 13-14. 
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came out of the interview. This systematic interview was done without referring to my rough 
notes, to avoid overly influencing what I was looking for and to enable me to listen out for 
different ideas or new themes I may not have noted at the time but which, having done other 
interviews, might have become more important.  In addition, I began to delve deeper into each 
of these emerging ‘open codes’, searching to understand the contexts, ‘conditions’ and 
‘consequences’ of these moments.417 I then compared these notes with my original notes to see 
if there were clear themes emerging.  
 
The process of reviewing each interview obviously also changed from the first to the last 
interview as the second time I reviewed an interview, I had an earlier set of themes and ideas 
to compare it to. This meant that as I continued to review the data, I began to note trends and 
ideas that cut across multiple interviews, that connected with the initial notes I had made of 
key emergent themes in each interview. This enabled me to develop the major narratives that 
span this thesis that seemed to present something that was quite central to the LiP experience. 
I therefore then used this emerging narrative framework as a guide to return to parts of each 
interview.  
 
Denzin and Lincoln note:  
 
[a]s coding progresses, particular categories and themes emerge as more salient, as central 
to integrating a number of key concepts, and/or as being of interest to particular topic 
under study. The data are then more thoroughly and systematically reviewed with fewer 
specific concepts or categories in mind to determine where and how these are illustrated in 
the data.418 
 
This was the experience I had in the systematic review of the interviews, as it enabled me to 
start to get a strong, largely intuitive, sense of the stories that were coalescing around 
common themes or experiences. I then used this to mine the interviews further trying to 
capture how and why these themes differed from interviewee to interviewee. Part of this 
‘going deeper’ process was about understanding each interviewee’s specific story of a common 
theme, and part of it was also about accessing the specific sensibility of the individual. While 
this, of course, is a near impossible task, one way I attempted this was to use their voices as 
much as possible. It was at this point that I transcribed sections or quotations from 
interviewees, concentrating on reproducing as exactly as possible the way in which the 
interviewees expressed themselves. This process, retrospectively reviewed, is in line with the 
‘axial coding’ stage that Strauss and Corbin identify. 
                                                     
417 Ibid, 13-14. 
418 Denzin and Lincoln, “Codes and Coding,” The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, 87.  
 113 
 
At this point, with detailed notes and ideas on a series of concepts, I was largely writing up 
small sections, returning to my notes on the data, and making choices as to the key themes 
that best communicated the narratives emerging across interviews. It is through this process 
that I decided on the major themes and sub-themes, akin to Strauss and Corbin’s ‘selective 
coding’.419 However, it was of importance to me to ensure that I was not simply picking out 
data that supported the narratives I identified or those that supported my initial research 
hypotheses. As such, I tried to avoid this by continually reviewing the interview notes I had 
made throughout the writing process, to ensure I sufficiently paid attention to those findings, 
experiences and thoughts that did not support some of the themes emerging, or which 
complicated any pat findings of consensus amongst LiPs. The themes I did not cover in this 
thesis were sometimes ones I had less ‘robust’ evidence for but for others, such as the question 
of advice, it was a case of having to be realistic about how much I could talk about in one 
thesis, and I put these aside with the intention of referring to them in further writing.420 This 
process led me to four key categories, or themes, that I wanted to focus on: conspiracy, impact, 
complexity, as well as ‘acting as a LiP.’ These themes do not describe all that came out of these 
interviews, and I have attempted to include stories of difference in this thesis, and to avoid 
making any claims of representativeness that would gloss over the reality of the individual, 
lived experiences of the interviewees. This has hopefully enabled me to be ‘methodologically 
thoughtful’ and careful about the claims I make from this data about LiP experiences.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I cannot in the end, of course, claim that I am doing full justice to the interviews or 
interviewees. Such an enormous and rich amount of data forestalls that claim. However, these 
interviews have been framed to allow LiPs to speak for themselves as much as is practicable; to 
narrate their experiences, and draw attention to what they believe is important. I have tried to 
be respectful in drawing attention to these emphases made by LiPs and led to where they wish 
to go, while still obviously fulfilling the academic demands of this thesis. This means the 
layout of the second half of his thesis echoes LiP preoccupations, not legal categories, and not 
necessarily my own preoccupations either.  
 
While I may have had some sense of what findings I expected, and while to some degree these 
findings have been echoed in this data, so much of this process has thrown up unexpected, 
confusing and complicated ideas and themes that I frankly did not remotely anticipate. The 
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second half of this thesis therefore reflects this, with a mix of the anticipated (going to law is 
difficult) and the totally unexpected (conspiracies). I begin these stories with Chapter Five, 
which looks explicitly at impact: what does it feel like to be a LiP and what impact does going 
to court have? As I will show, if instead of focusing on the LiP’s impact on the courts, we focus 
on the courts’ impact on the LiP, a far more troubling and difficult landscape begins to emerge. 
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5 
BEING A LIP:  
VULNERABILITY, COMPLEXITY AND HIGH STAKES  
 
 
 
 
Kate:  What impact do you think this has had, going to court has had, on your life? Financially, 
personally? 
 
Neil:  […..] You can’t really put a cost on it monetary wise, well you can, I suppose, it can be a 
quantum worked out with all the Ogden tables and all the loss of earnings and interest and 
what have you. Uh, it has cost, from loss of earnings, say, I’d say £20000 a year. It’s uh, 
not nearly, twenty, twenty-eight years now, so earnings, it’s cost me lots of money.  
 
You can add, you probably, it’s not a great deal because, uh, there’s probably, probably 
£10,000 worth of paper and ink and printer ink and what have you. And the, the models 
[medical models Neil has had made] there’s a couple of grands’ worth of models, postage. 
Telephones. But that’s, that’s not, the important thing, the one thing that they’ve taken 
from me, and I’m looking up there, that’s J---’s grandson, you know that photo, little one, 
not my son, not my grandson…I’ll never have that. There’s a grandma, there’s a great 
grandma there, there’s a grandma and there’s a little grandson and there’s all sorts…  
 
Where would you, where would you, you know like, how long have you been, I’m not 
trying to find out how old you are but what’s your…what’s your destination in life? 
Where would you like to be in thirty years’ time? Successful, safe, secure? Healthy? Family 
around you? You know, being able to help your family…well think about, in thirty years’ 
time, that’s where you are, right, and then rewind yourself thirty years to now, and think 
something happens now that prevented you from getting where you wanna be, that wasn’t 
your fault, that was somebody else’s mistake and then that person, with the aid of a, with 
the aid of solicitors just lied through their back teeth to stop you from…you might never 
have gotten to where you were, but you shouldn’t, you shouldn’t be out of pocket…  
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Basically we’re talking money aren’t we, the ability to earn money, your economic loss, 
you know, yeah, I’m going to be paying for the rest of my life.  But I’m dealing with that. 
The one thing that I hate is, [beginning to cry] little things. Social life has gone. And 
that’s, that’s all to do with money, you know. Being abro-, in my life I’ve been abroad, well, 
three times. Three times in fifty-four years. I’ve never been abroad with mates, I’ve never 
been able to afford… [crying]. God. I’ve never been able to afford to take me mum out 
for… a decent meal…you know, oh, sorry [crying]. God. It’s weird…. [long pause].  I 
haven’t been the brother I would have liked to have been, the son, the uncle, the grandson. 
Father. The grandfather, great grandfather. Because. Not because I was discharged from 
hospital by mistake, but because a group of supposedly ethical, intelligent, powerful people 
decided that they could get away with not dealing with their mistakes and responsibility 
and…just being unaccountable.421 
  
                                                     
421 Neil lives in Northern England and has been in chronic pain and unable to work since he was 
severely beaten by a group of organised football hooligans. He was sent home from hospital having been 
told his collarbone had not been fractured and, according to Neil, having not had it x-rayed. He suffered 
significant pain, was unable to work and his doctor subsequently told him on examination that he had 
broken his collarbone (although this has been subject to ongoing debate amongst medical professionals). 
For Neil, the hospital’s failure meant that he did not receive the treatment he needed to be able to heal 
sufficiently to return to his livelihood as a floorer. This was the basis for the medical negligence claim 
he brought in the County Courts which lasted, in one form or another, for nearly thirty years. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important findings of this thesis is that LiP’s lives—and cases—are 
significantly more complex and challenging than expected. With this finding comes the 
related one that the impact of being a LiP goes far deeper than I anticipated. The individuals 
who talked to me in this study, like Neil cited in the above extract, told me of long, 
multifaceted cases involving multiple courts that left them financially exhausted and 
emotionally drained. Some said the experience of pursuing a claim led to them losing their 
families and some lost their homes. Many felt the experience had a negative impact on their 
mental health, with the spectrum covering minor anxiety, depression, severe depression and 
those who had been, at times, suicidal. So, while LiPs are not the “nuts” they are often made 
out to be, their stories demonstrate significant, genuine vulnerability.  
 
So, what to make of this finding? I am not a psychologist and am not qualified to make any 
judgments on any potential pathologies of interviewees, nor would such speculation be within 
the ethical boundaries of this thesis. But most importantly, I argue that we are too quick to 
pathologise LiPs—whether diagnosing them as litigious, or obsessive, or deluded. The result 
of this labelling is that we internalise problems within an individual, at the expense of 
considering the context in which these individuals are acting. The emotional and 
psychological stress LiPs experience is at least partly, and perhaps even largely, related to the 
sheer cost of pursuing or defending a claim. In other words, a LiP’s vulnerability—the 
vulnerability I am talking about, anyway—is not one embedded in an individual’s psychology 
but is fundamentally connected to the legal proceedings in which he or she is acting.  
 
This chapter argues, then, that deeper engagement with LiPs telling their own stories reveals 
that what we might call the “outside” narrative of LiPs involved in multiple proceedings—that 
LiPs pursue a hopeless claim, come to court, lose their case and this makes them angry and 
drives them to more and more fruitless litigation—is reductive, for two important reasons. 
Firstly, this outside narrative seems to imply that LiPs understand what is happening. And 
mostly, they don’t. Secondly, the outside narrative also implies that the legal system works 
efficiently and fairly and quite often, it doesn’t. This means that LiPs may bring a worthy 
claim but still lose. They may defend an action well, and still lose. There may be a defence 
available to the LiP they don’t know about. What is certain about these situations, however, is 
that these individuals will feel that something fundamentally unjust has occurred in a context 
of considerable importance to them.  
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What emerges from this research, then, and what I explore in this chapter and the following 
two chapters, is not what I expected it to be. To employ a double negative: my research does 
not demonstrate that LiPs do not behave in the ways ascribed to them.  In other words, my 
research findings demonstrate what could be called “Yes, but’. Some LiPs are involved in 
multiple proceedings, some do suffer from mental health problems, all are confused and unsure 
of legal proceedings. But from their perspective, the situation looks very different. It is this 
perspective that is lacking from much research into LiPs and that I want to try and 
communicate.  
 
I begin by demonstrating the sheer diversity of experience that can be seen between just three 
interviewees in this study, and the problems this raises for generalising about LiPs and their 
experiences. I then go on to explore how each interviewee’s story demonstrates significant 
complexity, across cases, courts and time, and the challenges this poses about narratives of 
LiPs that are oriented around ‘single issues’. Finally, I consider the issue of litigiousness by 
considering the stakes, arguing that far from voluntarily or enthusiastically pursuing 
litigation, each LiP in this study felt they had ‘no choice’.  As I will argue, seeing things from a 
LiP’s perspective, partial and emotive as it can be, can tell us something of the relationship 
between high stakes, impact and multiple proceedings for LiPs. And through this, we can learn 
something of considerable importance: how we treat vulnerable people in the courts and how 
we show respect for their stories.  
 
DIVERSITY 
 
Charles’ first contact with the County Courts was sometime in the early 1980s.422 Charles 
went to collect his son for the day from his estranged partner and she wouldn’t let him in. 
Instead she called the police. Charles became extremely fearful and upset as he was working at 
that time in communications for the police and, as he put it, ‘I thought I could lose my job if I 
got in trouble with the police so for her to do that sort of thing, you know, it was really 
beyond belief’. When the policeman arrived, Charles was in tears, trying to explain to the 
policeman what had happened and also telling him how he could not understand how she 
could have called the police. Charles decided then, he says, to walk away, to ‘walk out of his 
[son’s] life’ and he got in his car. But then the policeman knocked on his window, and talked 
to him. The policeman said to him ‘don’t do that, don’t just walk away’ before telling Charles 
of how he had regretted losing a relationship with his own child. At that point, Charles says, ‘I 
decided that I had to fight to make sure that I could get access to him’. This led to his first 
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appearance as a LiP in the County Court and being awarded joint custody of his son. Although 
his former partner had representation, through legal aid, and he did not, he described himself 
as ‘very confident’ going in:  
 
…[l]ike I said, all I’m asking, all I was asking for is, um the opportunity to see my son on a 
regular basis so I couldn’t see, the, the judge had no reason why he would deny me that. He 
had no reason to deny me that access.  
 
Eleanor’s first experience in County Court, on the other hand, was as a defendant in 2008. 
Owning her own business, Eleanor was sued by a subcontractor who claimed they had not 
been paid for work done for Eleanor’s business. Eleanor attended a £30 fixed-fee interview at 
a solicitor’s firm she had found online in her local area, who ‘walked me through what I needed 
to put into the defence to send back to the court so that’s what I did’. Following this, and some 
further communication from the claimant, she attended the County Court. She describes 
attending the hearing:  
 
Well I mean I remember sort of sitting outside S---- County Court, the, you know the court 
offices, hearing rooms or whatever they’re called, um, feeling, you know, my stomach sort 
of turning somersaults and stuff like that because…no matter how well prepared you are 
it’s still fairly scary, ‘cause you, the trouble is with court is you have a, you can go in there 
with the strongest case in the world and still lose…over a technicality. 
 
Both Eleanor’s and Charles’s experiences differ again from the experience of Talia who first 
attended County Court in 2007 when she took her freeholder to court for failing to properly 
insure her property according to the terms of her lease. The freeholder did not turn up, and 
Talia was successful in evidencing her case. Talia then took the order the same day to the 
freeholder’s place of work but he did not comply with the order, or acknowledge it in any way, 
sending her back to court less than six months later. By the time of her initial County Court 
appearance, Talia had already gone through legal processes before, having attended the then 
Leasehold Valuation Tribunal [LVT].423 Having had solicitors at the first hearing of this 
tribunal, she dispensed with them for the appeal, and was thereafter a LiP in almost all of her 
subsequent legal actions, including the ones at the County Court: 
 
Um…it was, it was after the[LVT] decision being appealed [that Talia dispensed with the 
solicitor], I think, well it must have been. Um….without referring to my files, I wanted our 
solicitor to write a witness statement, I thought that would help, and he said okay, I’ll do it 
for £200 and then like a week before he was supposed to give it to us, he said Oh, I haven’t 
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quite finished, I’d like another £200 and I really, uh [laughter], I don’t think, think he just 
expected me to just…and I said ‘that’s it, okay we won’t use it, forget it’ [laughter]. 
 
These are just three examples of first experiences of LiPs in the County Court, but I use them 
here to signify upfront the considerable diversity of experience inherent even at the most 
surface level examination of LiPs. Charles’s first experience relates to family matters, 
Eleanor’s to small claims and Talia’s to housing possession. Both Charles and Talia are 
claimants, while Eleanor is a defendant. In addition, Charles does his own research and seeks 
no external advice and is confident acting as a LiP. Eleanor on the other hand, seeks solicitor 
advice prior to attending the hearing and is extremely anxious about the outcome. Talia also 
does her own research, but unlike Charles, who doesn’t think he needs a lawyer, and Eleanor 
who can’t afford a lawyer, Talia actively doesn’t want a solicitor, considering them individuals 
who drag out proceedings for their own financial gain.424  
 
What these three examples suggest is that there are far more points of divergence in LiP 
experience than there are convergences. At first glance, this disparity is hardly a surprising 
finding given the inherent complexity of civil justice. As Hazel Genn notes: 
 
[O]ne of the problems in understanding civil justice is its complexity in terms of range of 
subject matter and configurations of parties and that this diversity inhibits 
conceptualization and theoretical development – so many different types of parties, so many 
different types of dispute.425 
 
 Other researchers, such as Moorhead and Sefton, as well as John Baldwin, have also argued 
that the category of LiP captures a wide range of individuals.426 However, accounts of LiP 
failures often do not consider the variety of circumstances in which LiPs act, as perhaps they 
would when thinking about represented actors in civil disputes. In addition, what is also of 
importance is how substantial these differences are, and the concomitant difficulties this 
inherent diversity poses, both in terms of practical reform as well as in raising questions about 
the term LiP itself.  
 
Firstly, an obvious example of how this diversity is a practical problem arises when 
considering how to provide useful guidance for LiPs. In a context where reliable free legal 
                                                     
424 This is a view shared by many interviewees, including Charles later in his legal proceedings 
experience. The lack of trust LiPs have towards legal representatives is explored in detail in Chapter 
Six where I draw on the work of Tom Tyler on trust and legitimacy, in particular Why People Obey the 
Law. .  
425 Genn, Judging Civil Justice, 11.  
426 Moorhead and Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants; Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice; John Baldwin, “Litigants 
Experience of Adjudication,” 20. 
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advice has been drastically reduced, how can one, for example, provide written assistance or 
online information for LiPs when the category itself, even in the County Courts alone, is so 
broad? While they may attend the same kind of court, LiPs will differ regarding any advice 
they sought or received, any research they undertook, whether they had representation at any 
point, how much legal or courtroom experience they may have had, the nature of the dispute 
itself, and whether their opponent is represented or unrepresented. 427 The LiP may also face 
an individual, or a corporation, or a local authority (all of whom are represented in this 
sample). Alongside this difference in types of proceedings and legal claim, there are of course 
differences in age, sex, ethnicity, education, and language to contend with.428 These differences 
clearly raise immense difficulties in being able to provide applicable, sufficiently tailored or 
specific advice. This is also occurring in a context where the limited sources of face-to-face 
advice, such as the Citizens Advice Bureaux [CAB], are increasingly inaccessible. As Neil 
comments: 
 
I found the Citizens Advice Bureau was basically impossible to get in to…uh…and to find 
one in the locality or to get an appointment to see somebody …well I can’t say they’re 
useless because I never actually got there to use them. Um, there are various people like 
litigants in person help thing on the, uh, like on Twitter and they’ve got their own website, 
ah I’m sure you’ve seen those haven’t you, litigant in person help. They may, they may be 
effective, uh, but I’ve never seen any evidence of it. 
 
Secondly, this diversity of individuals and circumstances also draws attention to problems 
with the term ‘LiP’ itself. The term includes those such as Eleanor who seek legal advice, but 
are not formally represented, people like Charles who conduct research through legal forums 
online, but don’t instruct a solicitor, and those like Talia who intermittently employ solicitors 
before dispensing with them.429 It also includes anyone of any background and experience 
including, potentially, solicitors and barristers who may choose to act for themselves. In this 
research sample, it includes both Tim who has qualified as a solicitor but does not practice as 
one, and Marie who is raised in care and leaves school at 16. As the broad spread of 
interviewees demonstrate, these individuals have little in common other than a label.  
 
                                                     
427 Or they may not: many LiPs will resolve the dispute (or give up) before it reaches the court at all.   
428 In this group of individuals, as outlined in the previous chapter, thirteen interviewees were white, 
and two were black British, ten were men and five were women and they ranged in age from 28 to mid-
80s. All spoke English as a first language.   
429 The category of LiP also includes those who are accompanied by McKenzie friends, paid or unpaid. 
In this sample, Marie has been using a McKenzie friend for several years and they have become so 
jointly committed to her case, and used to working together, that they undertake work on her case 
together, including, notably, this interview. When I went to interview Marie, her McKenzie friend 
accompanied her at her request. So, while Marie was the one answering questions, her McKenzie friend 
sat beside her throughout the proceedings, clearly functioning as a source of support and assisting her 
with her recollections and the timeline of the proceedings.  
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This use of labelling is problematic, though. It is unclear where the role of LiP starts and 
stops. Is being a LiP a role that is adopted temporarily and then doffed? Or is it more than 
that? When does one start, and stop, to be a LiP? This was something of interest in this study 
because it raises the question of whether these individuals recognise themselves in such a label. 
For many interviewees, this was a label they did not feel any affinity for. For example, as Tim 
put it:  
 
Not, I don’t, I wouldn’t necessarily say that I saw myself…obviously I was, but it didn’t 
sort of occur to me that I was a litigant in person. Um, again part of that is probably for 
me, that when I was studying [law] that was kind of a, a wild fantasy that someone had 
that they would actually, you know you could represent yourself absolutely, I think we 
probably covered it in about five minutes in a lecture once, you know people do, depending 
on the case, they’re either idiots or they’re geniuses and that was it basically, but it’s a 
rarity. 
 
Tim went on to note that LiPs are ‘kind of looked down on slightly. More than slightly, um 
but that’s largely by the lawyers who would rather be getting paid a lot of money to uh, to to, 
to do the case themselves’.430 This was echoed by Charles:  
 
I think they look down at us sort of, I think they wa-, they think of us as people wasting 
their time, wasting the courts time…it’s not something that they want. They’d prefer if it 
didn’t exist because, because I mean if you look at the documentation from my barrister for 
instance and compare it to my documentation, there, there’s no comparison [in quality]. 
 
As both interviewees point out, the label itself has become cluttered with largely negative 
associations do not treat the term LiP as a temporary role, instead they tend to talk of LiPs as 
a specific type of person.431 So although the term ‘litigant in person’ technically describes a 
specific and discrete temporal moment in an individual’s life, it is spoken about by many in the 
legal profession, and felt by those who act as LiPs, as something approaching an all-
encompassing identity: but this is an identity that for many interviewees is troubling because of 
all the negative connotations it brings.  
 
Alongside these problematic issues of terminology and identity, however, the current working 
definition of LiP also implies that individuals’ experiences prior to entry into judicial space are 
not relevant. By denoting individuals as LiPs only during a discrete period of time, we fracture 
                                                     
430 For Tim, ‘idiots and geniuses’ is the most apt way to describe how LiPs are perceived by the legal 
profession. 
431 For example, see Swank, “The Pro Se Phenomenon,” 373-386. 
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the longer narrative that for any individual is relevant to how they come to act as a LiP and 
that will shape how they inhabit and perform that role.432 This context of course includes 
background, education, family, income and so on. It also, crucially, involves any prior 
experience with legal proceedings. Returning to our three cases, for example, at the time of 
Talia attending the County Court, she had previously appeared at the Lease Valuation 
Tribunal and its subsequent appeal, as a LiP in the latter. Talia then went on to further 
disputes with her freeholder as well as her mortgage lender that spanned a period of ten years 
and were still ongoing at the time of writing this. She has acted as a LiP throughout this 
entire period.  
 
Charles, on the other hand, when he first attended these County Courts, had never been in 
court before. However, this was not to be his only court experience. Charles went on to appear 
on two subsequent occasions relating to custody in the County Courts over the next ten years. 
He also, in the mid-1990s, started civil litigation against his conveyancing solicitor that took 
him to the High Court. Throughout this period, and the subsequent appeals, he was 
intermittently represented, and at one point, he sued the solicitor he employed to bring the 
case for negligence. Charles also became involved in a dispute with a contractor. This action 
started in 2010 and was ongoing at the time of his interview, by which time Charles was 
employing a direct access barrister. Finally, Eleanor was also a first-timer in the County 
Courts when she was sued in 2008. But after this experience in the County Court, Eleanor 
went on to act as a claimant in two further civil proceedings, one she won and one she lost.  
She conducted the majority of these proceedings as a LiP, and did so from prison, where she 
served a seven-year sentence, spending three and a half years in prison before being released in 
2014.  
 
Looking at the above then, beyond all the diversity inherent in being a LiP, one area of 
convergence in this study was that almost all of the LiPs who spoke to me had had multiple 
encounters with legal proceedings and legal professionals. The question that arises from these 
unexpected findings are therefore how and why: how do these individuals come to be multiple 
litigants? And why do they keep returning to law? Is it simply that these are ‘litigious’ people? 
Or are there other reasons? And how can these findings of complexity tell us something about 
the wider experience of LiPs in the civil courts? That is what I explore in the next section of 
the chapter.  
 
                                                     
432 Indeed, as I go on to note in this chapter, the inability of a LiP to restrict their arguments to one area 
leads to difficulty.   
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COMPLEXITY  
 
Kate:  Do you have any other memories of making a complaint? 
 
Charles:  I’m sure there are lots but I can’t actually remember at the moment 
[laughter]. I’m always trying to, always complaining about something to be 
honest [laughter]. 
 
Kate:  Why do you think that is? 
 
Charles:  No, I, ‘cause over the years, once you get, um, once you start complaining, 
because when you see people have deliberately taken the pee, you can’t just, 
just let it go, you can’t just turn your back on it so you tend to try and fight 
for your rights.  
 
Kate: So in your experience you usually have to be persistent? 
 
Charles:  I think you have, because people just deliberately take the mickey because they 
know that a lot of people won’t bother and a lot of people don’t know their 
rights so they just take the mickey.  
 
 
A striking finding of this study was how many individuals were involved in multiple 
proceedings. In this sample, thirteen out of fifteen interviewees had been involved in more 
than one case. Of the two who had not been involved in multiple cases, one, Trevor, was in the 
process of preparing to start a second case that arose directly from the circumstances of the 
first case. This means only one interviewee, Tim, had a single, discrete experience of attending 
County Court, receiving a judgment (against him) and then ceasing proceedings.433 Of the 
thirteen who had gone to court multiple times, their litigation spanned from between two to 
three years (Eleanor) to over thirty years (Oliver). Neil, for example, as outlined in the 
opening epigraph of this chapter, has been pursuing some kind of remedy since the early 
1990s. This has taken him to the County Courts as well as the Appeal Courts and directly to 
the High Court. Peter has been to the County Courts, the Family Courts, and the Queen’s 
Bench on multiple occasions over the last five years. Paul has been in proceedings in the 
                                                     
433 As already noted, this finding raises questions about the assumptions made by the County Court that 
each LiP will be attending court for the first time, and that this will be their only experience with this 
kind of legal proceedings. I will explore this in the following chapter when I will consider the degree to 
which ‘practice’ aids LiPs in performing effectively. 
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County Court, the High Court, multiple Employment Tribunals and, most recently, the 
Immigration Tribunal. Marie, now 29, has been involved in legal proceedings almost non-stop 
since the age of 21. At one point, in 2012, she was involved in five different proceedings 
occurring simultaneously: ‘Basically we had cases in the County Court, we had cases in the 
Family District of the High Court, we had cases in erm, European Court of Human Rights, we 
basically had cases in every level of court going’.  
 
This complexity cannot, of course, be separated from the methodology of this project. 
Ultimately, advertising for this project involved interviewees identifying themselves as LiPs, 
as well as having the available, unpaid time to complete what was a very long interview. There 
is little doubt that both factors mean my sample is more likely to contain individuals who have 
been involved in more complex situations, as perhaps the average ‘one-shotter’ LiP doesn’t 
consider their story to be sufficiently of interest to a researcher, or does not identify with the 
label of LiP.434 However, while this may certainly be a factor in these findings, and we cannot 
make any assumptions as to how representative this complexity is across all LiPs, this finding 
reminds us that the assumption that County Court cases are simple and discrete belies the 
potential complexity of any individual’s legal history.   
 
So how do LiPs come to be involved in multiple actions? In Chapter One, I argued that there 
was a tendency on the part of the legal profession to conflate all LiPs with high-risk and 
vexatious litigants. This was at least partially because of the perception that LiPs are more 
likely to be involved in more than one case. By performing this conflation, the legal profession 
provides its own explanation as to why individuals pursue multiple cases. As Didi Herman 
notes, vexatious litigants are: 
 
characterized as falling into one of two groups: those with histories of mental health 
problems who launch multiple legal actions against diverse targets; and those whose initial 
legal action, for example (one that recurs often) a complaint of discrimination under the 
Race Relations Act (RRA; now incorporated into the Equality Act 2010), was resolved 
against them, and who then attempt to carry on with aspects of that complaint in various 
ways.435 
 
A minority of interviewees in this sample clearly met the latter definition: that is, their 
multiple actions seemed to spring from obsessively continuing a complaint they felt was 
wrongly decided to the point that they had become actively conspiracist in their attitudes 
                                                     
434 Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead.” 
435 Didi Herman, “Hopeless Cases,” 28. 
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towards the legal profession.436 But the majority of the interviewees didn’t seem to fit the 
description. And yet they pursued multiple complaints. So how had this come about? For some 
interviewees, their multiple different actions were unrelated.437 But for others, the picture is 
more complicated: in the stories the interviewees narrated, it often was about pursuing other 
actions relating to an initial injury or wrong. And yet, to characterise these individuals as on 
the spectrum of vexatious is arguably to insufficiently consider the circumstances under which 
this took place. For example, for one interviewee, the impetus towards starting another 
complaint was due to bureaucratic errors, where to not continue a ‘related’ complaint would be 
to not be able to seek restitution for something that was clearly unfair. This is the case of 
Trevor.438  
 
Trevor was sued by a contractor for withholding some of the money promised to complete a 
job.439 Sending away his forms to the central Northampton Claims Processing, Trevor then 
heard nothing for several weeks before receiving a letter from the court telling him they had 
lost some of his paperwork, and asking him to re-send it. He then did so. A further few weeks 
passed before the court again contacted him, claiming it had not received his resubmitted 
paperwork. He then re-sent it a second time, this time (‘luckily for me’ as he puts it) using 
recorded delivery. He was then sent a letter explaining that the case had been allocated to the 
County Court.440 He heard nothing after this until he received a letter telling him that because 
he failed to submit his defence, the judge had found against him (‘thrown my case out’). 
Luckily for Trevor, he had a sister who was a qualified lawyer who helped him to have the 
judgment set aside.441 Unfortunately, in the meantime the initial judgment resulted in bailiffs 
being sent to Trevor’s door. He had to pay them to leave and the loss of money from this, as 
                                                     
436 This includes interviewees Anna, Frederick, Russell and Georgina. However even these stories do 
not necessarily imply that their original complaint had no merit, or that any of their subsequent legal 
actions were baseless.     
437 Eleanor is relevant here. There is no relation between her first case a defendant and her subsequent 
two civil actions. When Eleanor went to prison, her mother was elderly and unwell but still at home. A 
decline in her mother’s health led to her being moved into care. This meant that Eleanor’s property, 
including her two cats, no longer had a place. Both of Eleanor’s subsequent actions relate to trying to 
recover her lost property when she was in prison. Similarly, Charles’s family proceedings in the old 
County Courts, are totally separate proceedings from his civil claims. Paul, too, is currently involved 
with the Immigration Tribunal which relates to his wife’s right to remain in the UK, and is unconnected 
with his previous multiple experiences at the Employment Tribunal. 
438 This also again chimes with the reality of the multiple interlocking problems individuals experience. 
See Pleasence, Causes of Action; Balmer et al., “Worried Sick.” 
439 Trevor never disputed this, but had deliberately withheld some of the money because the contractor 
had done a substandard job, some of which he had to then employ another contractor to redo. When he 
received a summons from the small claim court relating to this, he felt confident that he was justified in 
his actions.    
440 Trevor had also ticked the box signalling his willingness to mediate, but he never heard further 
about this. 
441 Eventually Trevor and the contractor came before a judge and decided amongst themselves an 
amount they both agreed on. 
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well as what he called the blatant overcharging of the bailiffs (even though they were also not 
meant to be there) has led to him preparing to go back to court.  
 
Trevor’s case demonstrates that simple administrative errors can potentially lead to a LiP 
losing a case. While his case is the only example in this study of poor bureaucratic practice 
that, in Trevor’s version at least, leads directly to a negative outcome, numerous other 
individuals in this study talked of similar problems including not receiving materials from the 
courts, the courts failing to send them judgments, missing or incomplete casefiles and other 
errata that posed serious problems for them, resulting in delays, and additional time and 
anxiety.442 Marie, for example, relates the experience of a missing casefile in this extract: 
 
I mean it’s like um, we nearly ended up with a boycotted he-, first hearing on the contact 
case because they put the j-, they put the application in front of uh, the judge that had 
actually been the QC in the previous court contact case, you know what I mean? It’s simple 
mistakes made by the court like that can cause so much, like messing around and 
everything. The court, the courts are so lacksidaisical about things at times. Then you, then 
you ring up and try and speak to um, a clerk about something and they’re like, they don’t 
even know what’s going on and then it’s like you turn up in court and there’s uh, no court 
bundles, we actually ah, turn up in court and there’s actually erm, bundles missing. We had 
to lend, lend the judge our bundle until erm, the missing bundle which is found at another, 
was actually found at, um, at the criminal cour-, the criminal court, it was actually found at 
the criminal court and they had to send a taxi to go [laugh], go and get the files. You 
know what I mean? It’s simple stuff like that make it so much hard work.  
 
Trevor’s case, as well as the similar experiences of Paul, Talia, and others, illustrate that 
administrative issues can quite easily lead to mistakes and, potentially, unfair outcomes. This 
is clearly a relevant concern for LiPs, in a context of increased “efficiency” measures such as 
central processing in Northampton, and increasingly limited telephonic and face-to-face 
contact in the courtrooms themselves due to a diminution of court staff. 443  Interviewees in 
this study noted the difficulty they had simply trying to speak to somebody at the courtrooms: 
the central telephone line wouldn’t pick up, or would transfer to voicemail. Similarly, emails 
received an automated response and there was no way of being able to reach someone who 
could assist them in what to do next.444 Most enquiries led to them being redirected to the 
                                                     
442 Both Paul and Talia also had considerable problems with the courts not providing information to 
them on their respective cases.  
443 The repetition of the same complaints of poor administration indicate this is a key issue for LiPs, and 
not one generally dwelt on in LiP studies that usually focus on LiPs’ inability to successfully navigate 
advice or follow instructions.  See Williams, LiPs – A Literature Review, 1.    
444 The issue of IT services hovers over this thesis and is regrettably beyond the scope of what is 
coverable. However, it is important to note here that The Woolf Report spent some time arguing that 
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HMCTS website only which contains very limited information to assist LiPs.445 However, 
what is also important to consider is the impact this may have for the majority of LiPs who 
may be unaware of what “normal” proceedings are like.  
 
Trevor repeatedly stressed during his interview that it was only because he had privileged 
access to someone legally qualified that he was able to know what to do to redress the 
situation (although he still ended up £1000 out of pocket). Most people who act as LiPs will 
not have such privileged access and were, he stressed, at considerable risk, particularly those 
who were more vulnerable:  
 
It’s [central processing], it’s like half-arsed, to use that, it’s not, there, there should be 
loads of, there should be loads of places that you can go and access information and 
someone within the court system that you can speak to that’s there to help you because you 
are not legally trained. But there isn’t anything like that, you have to find it for yourself 
and that to me is silly ‘cause it’s law you’re talking, it’s, it’s, it’s still a legal thing, it’s still 
something that can be, can, you know, can have ramifications, you know, and yet it’s just 
left for you to do. And I, you know, that might be alright for some people who are, you 
know, quite intelligent and fairly, you know, together, but if you’re a drug addict or, or 
somebody not that, you know, academically bright, or can’t read very well, or, or all those 
sorts of things then it’s not going to be that easy for you is it?  
 
For those individuals, it would be exceedingly difficult to firstly, be able to identify what had 
gone wrong and secondly, be able to rectify the situation.446 This returns us again to a feeling 
of lack of accessibility to courtroom staff who could help.447 As Marie puts it, LiPs are 
considerably disadvantaged compared with legal professionals: 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
improved IT systems would be essential in increasing access to justice but this never really took place 
with the courts still paper-bound. I will return to the question of IT systems in the following chapters, 
as well as in the Conclusion of this thesis where I will consider the prospect of an online court, 
something suggested by the Briggs Report in 2016.  See Lord Justice Briggs, Civil Courts Structure 
Review: Final Report (London: Judiciary of England and Wales, 2016). 
445 It is worth reflecting here on Pat Carlen’s characterisation of courts as ‘theatres of the absurd’ . See 
Pat Carlen, “The Staging of Magistrate’s Justice,” British Journal of Criminology 16, no. 1 (1976): 48-55. 
Jacobson, Hunter and Kirby, and Paul Rock also call attention to the ‘chaotic’ nature of legal 
proceedings, with Jacobson describing them as ‘structured mayhem’. See Structured Mayhem: Personal 
Experiences of the Crown Court (Criminal Justice Alliance: London, 2015); Rock, The Social World of an 
English Crown Court (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993). 
446 The concern that such individuals might ‘give up’ is noted by Genn and Genn in Representation in 
Tribunals, as well as Cookson in Unintended Consequences.  
447 This belief is supported by findings from the HMCTS survey into court staff done by the Trade 
Union Congress, cited more extensively in the next chapter, which demonstrates a reduced, deskilled 
and demoralised court staff. See TUC, Speak Up For Justice, available online at: 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/Justice_Denied_Report.pdf (accessed 3 November 2016). 
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I’ve had a hell of a lot of issues filing applications and erm, applications going missing and 
it seems to happen more if you’re a litigant in person than it does for solicitors, like 
solicitors have internal emails and you’re given a lot more information if you’re a solicitor, 
you’re given you know, more precedence whereas if you’re a litigant in person you’ve got to 
go through the direct channels, you can’t have communications through the court a-, 
except via a generic email, uh, generic phone, phone number, erm, and uh, solicitors have 
direct access to the judges you know what I mean? They can email a judge, they can send 
paperwork directly to the judge, litigant, again litigants in person don’t have that power, 
they don’t have, are not, are never, very rarely given that opportunity. I mean, I have once 
or twice which was pretty lucky to be honest with you but a gen-, as a general rule litigant 
in person have to go round the houses to get where they’re going whereas solicitors are 
given all the shortcuts. 
 
As Trevor sees it: 
 
It seems to me that the, the court system is full of error, ’cause, you know, you hear of it all 
the time, stuff going missing, and getting lost and not having it, people turning up and this 
not happening and also, it seems from the outside, super inefficient. It seems. Now there’s 
probably loads of reason why it is like that, you know, but on, on bigger cases I can 
imagine, you know, there is a lot of bits and they need to come together on a particular day 
and you only need one of those bits not to be there that you can’t proceed with. 
 
For Trevor, court processes are by ‘nature’ inefficient, and efficiency measures can only 
undermine any fairness. This situation of administrative error then is clearly either far more 
likely to happen to litigants in person in the first place, or far more likely to be more difficult 
to rectify than it would be for legal professionals. This is assuming, of course, that the LiP is 
even able to recognise what has gone wrong. If the LiP does attempt to rectify these problems, 
however, these administrative failures certainly present a persuasive reason for an individual 
to pursue a further complaint related to their initial proceedings without it being symptomatic 
of inherent litigiousness. Here, for Trevor, the transformation from ‘one-shotter’ to ‘repeat 
player’ has little to do with psychology and far more to do with the inefficiency of the legal 
context in which he was operating, as well as relating to the considerable disadvantage LiPs 
operate under compared with legal professionals.  
 
Summarising the above, then, it is clear that multiple proceedings can be unrelated, or can be 
due to court system failures. Any on-the-surface assumption that conflates LiPs involved in 
multiple proceedings with vexatious litigants purely on this basis can therefore be 
problematic. If, for example, an assumption is made that because LiPs have been involved in 
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multiple proceedings, they are more likely to be vexatious this becomes a kind of circularity of 
logic and can detract from the serious hearing of a LiPs claim. However, it would be 
disingenuous to represent the majority of LiPs’ multiple proceedings as down to bureaucratic 
failure. Although it is a frequent occurrence along the way, such failure does not explain the 
bulk of the interviewees’ complex legal proceedings in this sample. Here the picture is much 
murkier. For the majority of interviewees involved in complex proceedings who spoke to me, 
these people were pursuing, at times obsessively, claims that proliferated around an initial 
‘wrong’. This clearly echoes the outline of a typical ‘vexatious litigant’ that Hermann 
summarises in her article. But even for these individuals, as I will argue in the next section of 
the chapter, to conflate complexity and vexatiousness is to mistake the gravity of the injury 
that prompted their initial contact with law. It is also, importantly, to potentially 
misunderstand what these individuals are trying to achieve by going to law in the first place. 
 
 
HIGH STAKES 
 
 
So um, I go to court.448 I leave Sarah [Peter’s wife] at home with James [Peter’s son]. In court they’re 
[the local authority] getting thrashed, they’re getting thrashed in court. The judge is doing it in his nut 
with them, he’s gone ballistic with them because they’re saying: ‘The judge before, she’s corrupt!’. I just 
can’t, I was just totally in turmoil, I couldn’t believe, I was just, ha, couldn’t believe what was going on, 
they were like absolutely desperate. ‘Yeah the judge’s corrupt’ and I always remember it, the judge he 
turned around and he said, ‘so you’re telling me that the judge, the previous judge, is corrupt and they’ve 
made the wrong decision?’. ‘Yeah, yeah that’s right!’. He said ‘right, I’ve never heard nothing like this 
in my whole career’. He said ‘I’m going to adjourn now’ and he said ‘I want you to seriously consider 
what you’ve just been saying’ and this is to the local authority. So we adjourn. This is about 11 o’clock 
in the morning…then five, maybe five minutes later, I stayed in the courtroom, and um, five minutes 
later, um, my wife’s solicitor comes in. Guy. Nice bloke. He, he said, ‘uh, I just, I just phoned up Sarah to 
give her an update’. He said, ‘you’d better go home’. I said, ‘well why?’ ‘Oh she don’t’ sound well’. 
‘Oh…what do you mean?’ ‘Well she don’t sound well, you’d better go home. Wait until the judge comes 
in, ask him to leave’ and so I did, and I go off home, going, uh, what’s going on? 
 
So gets to my, drives home, gets to two streets away down that way, E----. There’s a great big police 
van across the road, I think, what the, what’s this? So, they’ve stopped, ‘who are you?’ so I told them, so 
                                                     
448 This is Peter talking and the case he attends court for is trying to stop the local authority from 
taking his son into care.  
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pull up over there and he said ‘just wait’, and he radioed through and all I could see all the way down 
the road and our house is at the bottom, is police vehicles. I think what the hell is happening? So, I uh, 
wait, and this car comes out, green car, with two police officers in it. And they, they say ‘oh can you sit, 
sit in the uh, sit in the back and have a chat’. They said, ‘uh, there’s been a incident’. I said, ‘what, well 
what incident?’ And they said ‘oh your wife, uh, she’s took a overdose’. Oh my -, …I said, ‘well wh-, 
wh-, what about James, where, where’s my son? Where’s our son?’ ‘Oh, um, well there’s been an 
incident’, and they wouldn’t, and I said ‘well, wh-, what is it? Oh. I said ‘well where are they?’ ‘Well, 
your wife’s gone to S0000 Hospital’. I said, ‘but where’s my son? ‘Oh well, he’s gone to Frenchay 
[hospital].’ I said, ‘well why?’ and then they said, ‘oh there’s been an incident. He’s been stabbed’.  
 
And that was it I just [exhaling noise], I just like burst into tear- oh my god. And um, off we go. They 
race me in the car over to F---- hospital A&E and um, I’m sat in the, they said ‘wait here’, so I’m sat in 
the car waiting, they rush into A&E. They come out and they say ‘right come on in, we’re going to the 
family room’. So go in the family room, I’m just in like, uh, total, state and um, I get in there and I, I 
just, a [exhalation], terrible. And um, they say ‘social services are outside, we told them to get’, oh he 
said ‘we’ve told them to leave’ and they wanted to come in to see me! Like, and I said, ‘well what’s 
going on?’ Then the surgeon comes in, and uh he says ‘oh we’re operating on, on your son’. They’ve had 
operating, lifesaving, touch and go. I, I find out she, she, what happened, she, she tried to kill herself and 
our son. She stabbed him eight times. She, she tried to kill him. And uh, yeah they had three surgeons 
working on him, and obviously, thankfully they saved his life.  
           
 
Peter has been in and out of court since 2010, trying to regain custody of his son.449 At the 
time of the events outlined above, the local authority was already trying to remove Peter’s son 
from his and his wife’s care because of concerns about Peter’s wife’s mental health and 
stability. After the stabbing, Peter lost custody despite, as he has always argued, there not 
being any evidence against him being an inadequate parent.450 For him, going to court is, and 
has always been, a means of trying to be reunited with his son. At the time of writing this, his 
son has been in foster care for over seven years and he had had no success in the courts. 
Peter’s case is clearly an extreme and unusual situation, yet it illustrates the point that the 
clear majority of the LiPs I spoke to only pursued claims that were of considerable 
significance: indeed, for some, like Peter, the stakes could not be higher. This is also the case 
                                                     
449 This has mostly been, prior to 2014, the family section of the County Court and, post 2014, the 
Family Court, although also at times the higher courts as well. 
450 Peter’s wife was convicted of attempted manslaughter and is currently detained indefinitely under 
the Mental Health Act. He has not had contact with her since 2010. Peter’s son’s foster home is less than 
two blocks from where Peter currently lives and they have regular supervised contact that will soon 
shift to unsupervised contact. As Peter puts it, what is most likely to happen is that as his son grows 
older, he will then have his own say about where he wants to live and Peter is optimistic this will result 
in him coming home. 
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for Neil, cited in the opening epigraph of this chapter. For him the alleged failure of the 
hospital staff, and the subsequent inability to obtain some form of restitution, led to him losing 
his livelihood, and through this, his means of being able to afford to have his own family. 
Marie’s story, too, fits this narrative. At the age of 20, Marie had her baby taken from her care.  
After assessment in a Mother and Baby Unit, the child was fostered and then, ultimately, 
adopted. Marie has been fighting in the courts since then, in one way or another, to get her 
child back.451    
 
The above cases might perhaps seem a more extreme example compared with a more ‘typical’ 
LiP experience. Yet of course, there is no typical LiP experience. And this study suggests any 
idea we may have of discrete and straightforward dispute resolution may itself be less normal 
than the experience of the contrary which, as above, is messy, confusing and complicated. 
Many other LiP experiences in this study also indicate, if not quite as extreme an example, a 
similar proportional level of personal significance to the individual in question. This is well 
illustrated by the case of Eleanor. When Eleanor was in prison, her mother’s health 
deteriorated leading to her mother ultimately going into a care home, and eventually passing 
away. When Eleanor’s mother went into care, Eleanor’s possessions and her cats, which had 
all been at her mother’s house, went into storage and her cats went into a cattery.  Somehow, 
throughout the course of her imprisonment, the cattery bills went unpaid and an employee at 
the cattery took it upon herself to take the cats home. Eleanor then went to the County Courts 
as a LiP to reclaim possession of her cats. On the surface, this may not seem as significant as 
fighting for the custody of a child but, from Eleanor’s perspective, fighting for return of her 
cats was as important as any fight in her life could be. As she expressed it:  
 
It was fairly antagonistic because it’s basically sort of “how dare you walk off with my 
property and my family”, because basically those two are my family and it’s like, it’s the 
same as me turning up, you know, deciding I like, I’ve taken a fancy to your kids and taking 
them home with me. You wouldn’t like that so, you know, it’s the same thing. 
 
For Eleanor, her two cats were her family, and the case in County Court was essentially, 
therefore, a custody dispute. As she said:  
 
It had become a point of honour by that point, just because I’d been in prison doesn’t mean 
you get to help yourself to whatever you fancy of mine with no consequences which was 
basically the attitude she’d [the employee who had taken Eleanor’s cats home from the 
cattery] had taken. 
                                                     
451 Similarly, Talia is fighting possession proceedings on her home. As of September 2017, she had been 
evicted and was continuing to fight to regain access to her property which was being sold.  
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As well as being about keeping together the only family Eleanor had at this point, for Eleanor 
it was also about retaining a sense of identity. Alongside the case to get her cats back, Eleanor 
also fought as a LiP in the County Court, to get access to her possessions which had been 
stored in a place she could not access.452 Essentially, the loss of her possessions and of her cats 
would mean that Eleanor had no connection whatsoever to her previous existence when 
released from prison. As it turned out, she managed to win back her cats, but not her 
possessions, and so when she returned to the community her cats were all she had.453  
 
These stories remind us that for many LiPs, they are in court, and only in court, to address 
issues of great importance to them.454 This is because they would not be there if they did not 
have to be. As Eleanor says: ‘people don’t go to court on a whim, they usually go to court as a 
last resort in a civil matter and, in criminal court, they get no choice and the implications of 
judgement can have huge consequences for people’.455 Eleanor emphasises what was expressed 
uniformly in this study: that is, that going to law is a last resort. The LiPs in this sample 
routinely expressed that they felt that they only went down a legal path when they felt they 
had no other choice. As Tim said ‘I tend not to, as I saw, I tend not to complain unless there is 
something fairly significant to, to complain about’. Charles similarly remarked, when 
discussing going to court over what he argued was misappropriation of the funds from his 
property sale: ‘I tried to avoid litigation because, um, he’s [his opposition] um, he’s a barrister, 
and um I don’t know, I don’t want to, I didn’t want to get involved in that because of the cost, 
so, um, eventually I had no choice’. This belief that they largely had no choice was echoed by 
Marie, Talia, Peter, Oliver, Russell, Frederick and others. As Talia put it, it was to be done 
only in the context of something of utmost significance: ‘It’s, it’s something that, if you have to 
do it you have to do it, you, you, um, sometimes the choice is between, between being a litigant 
in person and losing your, your home or your rights to, um, well any of your rights’.  
 
                                                     
452 As Eleanor tells it, the solicitors [for her mother’s estate] involved in this storage refused to move it 
to a nearer facility that Eleanor could access on day release from prison. Because of this Eleanor was not 
physically able to go there to retrieve her things and organise to have them moved. However, she was 
also not allowed to send a proxy. This meant eventually her possessions were disposed of. 
453 The sheer significance of the cats to Eleanor’s sense of personhood is evident not just in this 
narrative but in the interviewing process itself which took place at Eleanor’s home. Eleanor’s cats were 
present, interview breaks were made around the cats’ feeding times and fittingly, the cats can be heard 
throughout on the interview tape.  
454 This of course demonstrates the huge amount of emotion involved in these cases versus a civil justice 
system that does its best, as Paul Rock notes, to keep emotions at bay. See Rock, “Witnesses and Spaces 
in a Crown Court,” The British Journal of Criminology, 31, no. 3(1991): 266-279. 
455 Eleanor Extract, 20.02.16, 04:03:16 – 04:03:31. 
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From the above, therefore, it is clear that many LiPs will only go to law when the stakes are 
sufficiently high and they feel there is no other choice.456 There are, however, two things 
important to note here. Firstly, of course, LiPs feeling that they had no choice is not the same 
thing as them actually having no choice, and I would not want to mistake one for the other. 
Secondly, of course, what is of utmost significance to these LiPs may not be accorded the same 
significance in a wider context. While Peter and Marie fighting for their children might be 
recognisably significant, for example, Eleanor’s case would seem less so. But what is important 
is that it tells us about the significant investment and belief each LiP has in the case they are 
pursuing or defending, and the seriousness with which they take the decision to pursue or 
defend a legal matter.  
 
This serves as a reminder of a point frequently returned to in this thesis: that LiP perceptions 
of significance frequently differ from legal perceptions of significance. Underestimating the 
importance of an issue to a LiP can lead to failure to see why a LiP might pursue what someone 
else might consider ‘Pretty Boring Stuff’.457 The gap between these different ways of seeing 
can lead to a situation where the courts risk trivialising or undermining a LiP’s cause 
especially where this might result from failure to recognise the relative weight or value a LiP 
may accord to it.458 LiPs therefore  run the risk of being dismissed as vexatious or time-
wasting, and can even be financially punished for carrying on, even if the case is of the utmost 
significance (to them).459 This situation, to me, echoes what Jeremy Bentham was criticizing 
two hundred years ago: 
 
No wrong that I know of can be a trivial one which to him to whom it is done is a serious 
one; serious to such a degree as to make it worth his while to demand redress at the hands 
of justice [….] What to one man may be trivial, to another may be of high importance.460 
 
Returning, then, to Herman’s definition of the vexatious litigant, we now run into some 
problems. Clearly, as I stated above, some LiPs may consider their case to be significant, but 
that will not prevent the proceedings from being vexatious. This is seen in those who verge on 
the conspiracist and who have pursued multiple, increasingly less plausible, claims and who 
blame their failure on corruption.461 Others, like Eleanor, are obviously not on the vexatious 
spectrum at all, despite attending court on multiple occasions, but they risk being perceived as 
                                                     
456 This is surely at least partially related to the cost of pursuing proceedings, both financial and 
emotional, both of which I will consider at the end of this chapter.  
457 Dave Cowan and Emma Hitchings, “Pretty Boring Stuff.”  
458 This is of course not the case for the Family Court or Court of Protection.  
459 In the next chapter I look at examples where a LiP continuing a dispute can be financially penalised 
for this.  
460 Bentham, A Protest Against Law Taxes. 
461 And I will consider some of these cases in Chapter Seven.  
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potentially vexatious because the ‘merit’ of their case is untranslatable in the civil justice 
system.462  And for people like Peter, Talia, Neil, Marie and others, the situation is even more 
confusing. As far as Peter is concerned, for example, anything he can do to attempt to win 
back his son, or extend contact with him, is worth the cost and time. This can mean trying in 
any way he can to have another hearing with a judge. This will always relate to the ultimate 
issue of the loss of custody of his son, but the case itself may be clearly of less merit.  
 
For example, once Peter had a care order made against him, he immediately appealed the 
decision as a LiP. This was despite not understanding how the appeal process worked. This 
resulted in the grounds that he put forward being insufficient. As he says, when he got to the 
appeal, the judge explained what the problem was:  
 
[h]e explained the appeal is about, did the judge, the lower court do something wrong. 
And this is the thing, see. And um, so I ended up going back to court again there. Uh, 
March the 28th. Um. And then again…what have I got, yeah April 2012, yeah, I must have 
went three times then….yeah, went three times, yeah, but it ended up he couldn’t do 
nothing. So the care order stayed in place obviously, um, and I couldn’t do nothing.  
 
At this point, Peter’s appeal was technically without merit. And yet this is clearly because he 
didn’t understand how an appeal worked and how narrow the terms of a successful appeal had 
to be. He himself says ‘I must have went three times then’ and is unable to clearly articulate on 
what legal grounds he felt justified in doing so. From Peter’s perspective, then, it seems that 
an appeal is another chance to explain that he should have custody of his son, and to argue that 
the previous case was decided incorrectly. This is something that may be characteristic of 
vexatious proceedings, but is far more understandable if we consider it in the context of the 
“longer narrative”.463 And therefore, the more chances Peter has of doing this, then the more 
chances he has of overturning the initial decision against him.  
 
Peter’s story, and similar versions of it, is what I heard repeatedly throughout these 
interviews: individuals who have a central injustice or wrong for which they are trying to seek 
some kind of remedy. While this fits into what Herman described: the individuals initiate or 
defend a complaint that ‘was resolved against them, and who then attempt to carry on with 
aspects of that complaint in various ways’, this description does not sufficiently come to grips 
with why they might be doing so. This why seems to be both about seeking a sense of justice 
                                                     
462 While Eleanor has gone to court twice, she has been successful once, with the judge clearly finding 
merit in her argument and in returning her cats to her. Her previous experiences with court 
proceedings do not interfere with this assessment; none of them bear any relation to obsessive pursuit of 
any particular target, nor do they evidence any desire to compulsively pursue legal proceedings.   
463 The legal problem here of course is on re-raising issues of fact that have already been adjudicated by 
the court.    
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and ‘rightness’ but underlying it, there seems to be a hope amongst LiPs that going before a 
judge one more time might finally lead to that judge overturning the original wrong. This is an 
impossible wish, but one that arguably drives many. So, while Marie might now be pursuing a 
case against the local authority for their failures to her while she grew up in care, underlying it 
is the belief that these systemic failures materially contributed to the circumstances in which 
she lost her child. As such, if she were to succeed in this action, then greater scrutiny might be 
paid to all situations where those raised in care lost custody of their own child. And there is 
then a perceivable window of possibility that this could result in something changing; perhaps 
an inquiry, perhaps a scandal, something else that could undo what has been done.464 
 
Similarly, for Peter, once he had exhausted the appeal process, he kept returning to court 
looking for other things to help him somehow subvert the care order decision. For example, he 
discovered that before the permanent care order was made, the interim care orders [ICO] 
were incomplete: that is, there was a 17-day gap that was not accounted for in the ICOs issued. 
For Peter this was a chance to prove that his son had been detained “illegally”. It is not 
difficult to see how this is a ‘hopeless case’. However, it is also easy to see that from Peter’s 
perspective it is about dismantling the initial wrong decision somehow, anyhow, and a 
technicality will do. Peter was hopeful that if this had been found to be so, then retrospectively 
the ICO would have been voided and that therefore the permanent care order could not have 
taken place.465 That this is a hopeless belief is apparent to individuals with more knowledge of 
the legal system, but from his perspective, any action to gain access to his son was, and is, 
worth a try.  
 
I argued earlier that the definition of a LiP as an individual involved in a discrete proceeding 
essentially fractures the longer individual narratives that are essential and relevant to a LiP’s 
understanding of how they came to be acting for themselves in any situation. This can create 
the appearance of vexatiousness in individuals who are pursuing something that, from their 
perspective, is both significant and quite straightforward. For LiPs, their case is about the 
longer story: restitution for a wrong, the return of their child, the security of their home. In 
this respect, it would seem that those who are most likely to pursue what could be considered 
vexatious proceedings are those who are pursuing claims of the greatest significance; as far 
from ‘time-wasters’, from their perspective at least, as is humanly possible.   
 
                                                     
464 Didi Herman, “Hopeless Cases,” 28. This belief also has echoes of Nobles and Schiff’s construction of 
perceptions of ‘miscarriages of justice’ where lay and law conceptions of ‘justice’ fundamentally talked 
across one another; here we literally have individuals talking across one another in the court. See 
Richard Nobles and David Schiff, Understanding Miscarriages of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001).  
465 It is interesting to reflect here that this echoes Ewick and Silbey’s claim about ‘narrative’ in how 
everyday laypersons understand law. See The Common Place of Law, 29.  
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This fracturing of LiP narrative leads to the potential proliferation of ‘hopeless cases’. 
However, it can also arguably lead to another, related problem which is the diminishment of 
the ability of a LiP to effectively represent him or herself in court, regardless of the inherent 
merit of any proceeding. This issue became apparent in this study. It was notable how many 
interviewees struggled to be able to tell their story coherently during their interview. This 
was often because, as above, the complaint or “big issue” took the form of multiple different 
levels of proceedings. For example, Charles went from talking about the case where he took 
his conveyancing solicitor to court over misappropriated funds put into an investment 
property (the court termed this a partnership dispute although Charles vehemently rejected 
this label), to talking about his negligence claim against his solicitor heard in the High Court. 
The sheer difficulty of holding all of this information in one’s head was evidenced in the 
confusing language deployed: ‘I think this…..this one was actually after my experiences with 
the, um, with, it sort of goes back now to this case and then that one came up after that’. This 
was repeated again and again by others when tasking them with outlining what each case was 
about and what happened during.466 The process of asking each interviewee to describe cases 
one by one causes considerable difficulty; I would argue that this is because from a LiP’s 
perspective it is the wrong, or the harm, that is the central organizing feature, and the cases 
feature secondarily in amongst this. As Ewick and Silbey note, ‘one is never only the law 
because any legal matter is also a matter about something else…everyday life occurs as 
interactions among friends, among colleagues, among family members, between consumers 
and merchants. These relationships are the raw materials out of which disputes and legal cases 
emerge’. 467 This means the experience of interviewing was frequently about catching 
individuals in the middle of an experience that for them made no sense without a wider 
context.  
 
If these LiPs are struggling to explain their stories to me in the context of an interview, this 
probably reflects a similar struggle that occurs when they are in the court. It seems likely that 
LiPs will similarly be unable to separate out incidents, nor to be able to stick only to the 
relevant matter of a hearing because the complex nature of their claims means that it is not 
necessarily clear to them how they can be separable in the first place. This must be a 
disadvantage to a LiP and add fuel to the perception that they are unable to stick to the 
point.468 It also adds fuel to the perception of LiPs as obsessional, returning again and again to 
what for them is the most important factors, and for the court is frequently irrelevant. 
 
                                                     
466 This includes Georgina, Talia, Anna and others. Of course, memory and time elapsed since then are 
factors in this, but even taking this into consideration, the marked confusion between one case and 
another is suggestive of a real problem for LiPs involved in multiple cases.  
467 Ewick and Silbey, The Common Place of Law, 284.  
468 The introduction of irrelevant material is highlighted by Moorhead in “The Passive Arbiter.” See 
409-419; see also Jones v Longley and Others [2016] EWHC 1309 (Ch)  
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Yet what this section has demonstrated is that from the perspective of the LiP, multiple cases 
are not pursued on a whim, and are only undertaken out of sheer necessity. This problematises 
the assumption that LiPs pursuing multiple proceedings are necessarily vexatious. While some 
of the proceedings themselves may be spurious, they do not stem from a frivolous impetus. 
Until we better understand this gap between perception and reality, and until we recognise the 
disjuncture between, on the one hand, LiPs having right of access to the civil courts for 
dispute resolution and on the other hand, the significant barriers they face, the complexity of 
LiP experience is likely to be dismissed as anomalous or, at worst, indicative of LiP mischief.  
The reality for these LiPs, though, is that going to court is far from fun; instead it has a real, 
detrimental impact on their lives in a variety of ways.   
 
VULNERABILITY  
 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the LiPs most involved in multiple legal proceedings were 
impacted by them the most deeply, but what is notable is that even those only involved in 
relatively minor or short proceedings spent some time in these interviews emphasising how 
difficult they found the experience.469 While it is of course important to emphasise that much 
of the impact and strain of legal proceedings is clearly inseparable from the actual hurt or 
wrong that prompts said proceedings in the first place (to blame all of Peter’s negative 
experience on legal proceedings, for example, would of course be to overlook the extremely 
painful and difficult situation he found himself in) even taking this into consideration, clearly 
being a LiP is extremely hard and stressful work.  
 
I stated in the opening of this chapter that I did not want to talk about vulnerabilities in terms 
of pre-existing mental health issues. As I said before, I am not in a position to make any kind 
of evaluation on that front. Instead, I want to concentrate in this section on how the LiPs 
themselves felt their encounters with law affected them. We can begin this with returning to 
the beginning, the case of Neil. In his interview, Neil described the proceedings costing him a 
considerable amount of money, both the loss of earnings he would have had, as well as 
considerable costs towards representing himself. But in addition to these material costs, he 
talks about the formidable personal costs that have come in the wake of these proceedings. 
Neil’s quest for some kind of restitution has led to his social isolation and his inability to have 
a family.  
                                                     
469 Trevor, for example, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, was involved in only one case, but 
bureaucratic errors led to bailiffs arriving on his doorstep and him losing over £1000. 
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For Talia the sheer anxiety she feels on an ongoing basis, and the sheer work involved in 
staying on top of the paperwork has led to her rarely leaving her house except to attend court 
and walk her dog. As Talia put it:  
 
It’s been very difficult. It’s been by turns terrifying, I, sometimes, you know, I mean when 
you’re in court, you’re, you’re being held up by adrenalin but at other times when an order 
or a letter arrives from them with some new insanity, it feels as if you’ve been hit, been hit 
by a baseball bat and sometimes its felt, literally felt as if my heart would stop, I was so 
anxious. 
 
Talia states quite clearly that she doesn’t have the time, or the energy, to pursue anything else 
outside of this claim:  
 
It has completely shot up my social life, um, partly because being too tired but it’s also the 
emotional thing as well. There was a, were a few months where I didn’t, I, I became 
conscious that I had no conversation but, but this litigation, this litigation and the 
litigation against my freeholder. I, I, I don’t know how long this is going to go on, and I’m 
going to have to try to revive my social life because I can’t do without my social life.  
 
This is echoed in Oliver’s case. For Oliver, pursuing proceedings against the police led to his 
sectioning under the Mental Health Act as well as the loss of his wife and family and, 
eventually, his home: 
 
Me being sectioned under the mental health act, that took away two-three years of my life, 
lost my wife and family, my health, wealth and professional qualifications, all in the middle 
of these proceedings.  So I’m working all summer to put that as mitigation circumstances 
that, that the £1 million or £1.5 million claim [against him] which is currently resting on 
the table should be struck out. 
 
Currently Oliver travels to stay at friends’ houses but frequently sleeps in his car and is 
homeless.470 Anna, too, has been rendered homeless on a number of occasions throughout 
pursuing legal proceedings. At the point of writing this in September 2017, Talia has been 
evicted and is homeless. Both Oliver and Anna are also unable to work as a direct consequence 
of legal proceedings. In Oliver’s case, his professional licences in the two areas in which he 
could earn money were taken away as a result of his ongoing litigation and issues with the 
                                                     
470 Charles too, had a partner leave him because of the ongoing litigation.    
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police. In Anna’s case, she simply has no time to run her own business when she is also 
conducting complex litigation on her own.   
 
Peter, too, lost his job, as a direct consequence of legal proceedings. As he explains it:  
 
And um, tha-, the important part of that is actually through this pro-, these proceedings, 
um, I lost my job. My company was extremely supportive of me, they never wanted me to 
leave, they, they, really really, was impressed with my ability to work as a training 
manager. Um. And it came to the stage where I needed to go back to work but the only 
way I could do that was, um, to make a proposal, which I did, I made a proposal, not in this 
hearing but the one going back in the early stages. I put a proposal in, um, to change 
contact which would allow me to see my son on a weekend or the evenings, even at a 
contact centre if needs be. Um, but it would have freed me up to go back to work and I 
would have to go back, my, my, I, my work involved Monday to Friday and they even 
agreed about if I could ease my way back in just a few days at a time and then get back into 
the rhythm of things because of all the trauma. The local authority, um, in a court session, 
my barrister was on the phone to my boss, and her words actually to the judge was, and 
I’m in the witness box…. Um ‘this man is going to lose his job if the local authority don’t 
agree with this proposal’ and it was a reasonable proposal. It weren’t nothing, you know, 
Uh, they turned around and said no. That was in March 2012. In August 2012 I lost my 
job. And they made,  basically put, it’s either you see your son or you have your job [ironic 
laugh]. I mean, sorry but, just crazy.  
 
This has resulted in Peter being unemployed and becoming, at times, significantly depressed.  
 
The emotional impact of conducting multiple proceedings is echoed by Marie, who elaborates 
on the cost of both losing her baby and attempting to get her back:  
 
Well at the moment, um, I’m under Mental Health Services, I’ve been in and out of hospital 
on the mental health side, erm, for the last 18 month, I’ve been in and out, in and out, in 
and out, ‘cause different things trigger different feelings and erm, and like I suffered severe 
depression, I’ve been suicidal, I’ve been, you know what I mean, I’ve been through the 
works really over the last 18 month, um, I mean if you asked me like two, two and a half, 
three years ago if I’d be under Mental Health Services, been suicidal, not been able to cope 
with everyday things, I would have laughed in your face, I was a strong person, or so I 
thought I was, erm and now I’m just like I say, I’m a shell. I’m a shell of what I used to be. I 
can’t cope with normal everyday things. I struggle daily to, to actually find the will to 
move forward with things and try and find a way forward with things. Erm, I’ve had to 
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completely change my coping strategies, I’ve had to completely change, my whole life’s 
changed, but mentally and physically I’m still stuck at the day I lost my daughter because I 
can’t, I can’t, I can’t bring myself forward, I can’t […] my whole life, on that side of things, 
relationship side of things is non-existent and has been since the, the day I lost my 
daughter. Erm, and like I said, my mental health has deteriorated. I used to be, you know 
what I mean, I used to be upbeat, I used to be able to cope with things, I used to try and 
look on the positive side of things but now everything is just black. Everything is just dark. 
It’s always negative and it’s very hard to try and pull yourself through each day. And it’s 
hard to convince yourself that it’s better off that you are, you are are alive, it’s better off 
that you are here for your child when you’ve got the feeling that they’ve not been told 
they’re adopted. 
 
Clearly, the emotional and material costs of going to court are extensive. What is also evident 
from these examples of cost, above, is that they do not purely represent the cost of the 
traumatic event that led them to court. For Marie, the emotional impact of the loss of her child 
and the stress and cost of the proceedings are inseparable, as is the case for most of the LiPs I 
spoke to. And this cost is significant for all LiPs, before even considering the financial cost 
which, when roughly estimated by the LiPs themselves runs into at least a thousand pounds, 
minimum, to upwards of hundreds of thousands of pounds.471 There is no doubt, for some LiPs 
that mental health issues pre-existed, or were triggered or exacerbated by the sheer emotional 
turmoil of the situation they found themselves in. But even if this was the case, this 
vulnerability is at least exacerbated by the experience of going through legal proceedings.  
 
For others, loss of income, jobs and relationships were a direct result of going to law. This is 
clearly a result of repeated proceedings, something that may be characterised as ‘obsessional’. 
As discussed earlier, this is due to the emotional significance of the event that may trigger the 
need to pursue restitution at all costs. But it is crucial not to forget that this obsessive pursuit 
also occurs in a context where LiPs are not fully able to comprehend the proceedings and, 
crucially, are unable to articulate or have their longer narrative heard: a narrative that for 
them is central to the reason they are there in the first place.  
 
Going to court has a dramatically disproportionate impact on a LiP compared with a legal 
professional. The sheer costs of paperwork, the collision between regular working hours and 
court opening times, the delays and lack of notice, the poor communication by the courts and 
other technical aspects aggravate a situation that is already of considerable emotional stress 
and this can lead to situations where simply being involved in important proceedings can lead 
to an individual such as Peter losing a job. This can only exacerbate the likelihood of the case 
                                                     
471 Marie estimates about £15,000.  
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becoming obsessional: because ultimately, the sheer impact of going to law can lead to the 
point where pursuing his or her case is all the LiP has left. As Peter expresses it: 
 
He [the judge] said ‘you’ve been bamboozled by the court system’. I thought yeah, that 
speaks volumes.  Because at no time did they ever, and I’ve said it before, in no time did 
they ever consider me, as a person, like what I’ve gone through or…shocking really. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has argued that the experience of being a LiP is a harder, more complex and 
more confusing experience than previously considered. The LiPs in this study are often 
involved in multiple proceedings and for some these proceedings have been going on for many 
years. Their experiences are consequently complicated by the sheer complexity of the cases 
involved as well as the emotional significance of the central issue at stake for each individual 
LiP. Far from pursuing litigation frivolously, then, the LiPs in this study are very clear that 
they did not take the decision to pursue or defend a claim lightly: for some LiPs, doing so was 
the only way to try and save their home, to keep their child or to preserve their sense of 
identity. And the impact of going to law has been dramatic, with people losing family, losing 
jobs and losing their homes.    
 
But what I have also sought to demonstrate is that the difficulties LiPs experience are not 
simply because of wilful, vexatious obsessions on the part of delusional individuals. Instead, it 
is also about the considerable constraints of continuing to fight for something the LiP believes 
is right in a context where doing so is made disproportionately difficult. In this respect, this 
chapter has suggested that the civil justice system, while theoretically existing to adjudicate 
disputes, may in fact exacerbate grievances for LiPs, rather than redressing them. But while I 
have discussed the impact of these difficulties, what exactly are these difficulties themselves? 
How are LiPs being bamboozled? What are the challenges LiPs face when going to law 
themselves? How and why is being a LiP a disproportionately more difficult situation to being 
represented? These are the questions I pursue in the following chapter.   
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6 
HOW TO BE GOOD 
 
 
 
 
You get people turning up and looking like idiots, when in actual fact they’re not, they just 
haven’t been given the, there’s no guidance for them to find anywhere. 
Tim 
 
 
 
 
And I said…they’ve just tried to bully me, and I picked up, I’d got a cassette recording, a 
cassette in my briefcase, and I picked it up and I said “if it please”, I remember I felt, I felt 
like Rumpole of the Bailey, “if it pleases My Lord, I will have transcripts made of these 
telephone conversations and we’ll see who said what”. Then uh, Mr. Justice Eady said to 
Bennett, “Shall we listen to these tape recording, Mr. Bennett?” Bennett turns ‘round to his 
solicitors sat behind him and they’re like: “no no no no no! [whispered], shaking [their 
heads], “no, no, no, no!” “That won’t be necessary My Lord, we withdraw our application 
for costs”. But you know the thing is, if I’d actually put […] if I’d, if I’d actually, if we’d put 
this tape in, I’d got the right box but the wrong tape…and uh, I’d got one of me mates, I 
got the tape in, and if we’d have plugged it in and played it we would have heard a friend of 
mine called Butty, he’s a black guy, it would have, we would have heard Butty’s Special 
Reggae Dub Mix. 
Neil 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why is going to law so difficult for LiPs? In the previous chapter I argued that it was 
disproportionately more difficult for a LiP to go to law than for a legally trained professional. 
This is not a controversial conclusion to come to; many researchers in the area have argued 
this to be the case.472 But why? A number of reasons have been suggested. Some writers argue 
that it is because legal training is a necessary prerequisite for successfully participating in any 
kind of legal proceedings.473 Others claim it is because it is easier pursuing or defending claims 
when one has knowledge and experience of the context and environment in which one will be 
acting.474 Another suggestion is that the difficulty arises because LiPs are too emotionally 
attached to their ‘stories’ to be able to represent themselves coherently and successfully 
engage in proceedings.475 But which is it? All of these reasons, or some of them? Or different 
reasons altogether? In this chapter I seek to address these questions by considering where 
LiPs themselves believe the difficulties to lie, and through examining how these difficulties are 
manifested in their experiences. I do this by exploring three key areas of potential difficulty 
that emerge through this study.  
 
Firstly, I look at the gap between legally specialised knowledge and lay understandings of law. 
As I have outlined in earlier chapters, this gap has been argued by many, including scholars 
such as Pierre Bourdieu and Larson, to be a deliberate and necessary separation which 
functions at least in part to perpetuate dependence on the legal profession. The gap manifests 
in practice in the collision between two ‘world views’: what is common sense to a layperson 
and what is common sense to a professional. In legal proceedings, any knowledge outside of 
field-specific knowledge is either diminished in value or inadmissible unless it can be 
translated effectively into legal discourse.476 This means experiences such as those the LiPs 
narrated in the last chapter must be translated into specialist language to be accepted. This 
gap also means that the language used by legal professionals is often alien to an outsider and 
difficult, if not impossible, for LiPs to comprehend. As I will show, in the interviews for this 
study, LiPs were frequently unable to accomplish the effective translation of their experiences 
into appropriate discourse which resulted in them feeling unable to communicate what they 
                                                     
472 See Moorhead and Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants; Genn and Genn, Representation in Tribunals; 
McFarlane, The Self-Represented Project; Baldwin, “Experiences of Adjudication”; Trinder et al, LiPs in 
Private Family Law Cases.  
473 Lewis, “Litigants in Person”; Baldwin, Monitoring the Rise, 74-75. 
474 Nicholas Crichton, DJ, quoted in Grania Langton-Down, “Litigants in Person Could Struggle.”  
475 Sourdin and Wallace, “The Dark Side.” 
476 The role of expert witness is a moderate exception to this, where there is a degree of recognition of 
expertise, but this is still controlled by rules of evidence and they can be questioned and have their 
explanations accepted, or not, by a judge.   
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believed to be important, leading to frustration that they were not being listened to.477 In 
addition, LiPs routinely found themselves unable to understand the language deployed by 
legal professionals both inside and outside of the courtroom. This was to the extent that LiPs 
were unable to understand the proceedings of which they themselves were at the centre. In a 
number of cases, LiPs felt that this lack of understanding had an active impact on the 
outcome.478 The collision between two ways of seeing, then, poses considerable barriers of 
access for LiPs. 
 
Secondly, there is the equally large difficulty concerning role play. I have earlier in this thesis 
argued that inconsistencies exist when it comes to articulating exactly what it is that a LiP is 
meant to do. In this chapter I will return to this in more detail. What behavioural expectations 
are there for LiPs? How can a LiP perform well, or perform badly? As I will show, LiPs are 
frequently given contradictory information. They are told, for example, to tell their stories 
“simply”. Yet they are also expected to be able to conduct closed questioning, or be able to, on 
the spot, explain what area of law their proceedings deals with.479 These inconsistencies of 
performative demands lead to the majority of LiPs in this study feeling that they do not have a 
coherent script to which they can adhere. Should they act naturally? Should they mimic the 
behaviour and language of lawyers? What would a good LiP look like? Many interviewees 
were told at different stages of proceedings to do both of these things, sometimes at the same 
time, leading to LiPs feeling they are being punished for failing to adequately perform in 
impossible circumstances. The significant, and unclear, performative demands placed on LiPs 
are therefore also a clear source of disadvantage. 
 
The first two difficulties identified so far, that of an unclearly conceptualised role for LiPs, as 
well as the difficulties LiPs have translating experiences and understanding legal discourse, 
can both be seen as manifestations of the gap between “lay” and “law” described above; ways in 
which the law as a specialised profession functions through reification and exclusion, and 
reinforces its own autonomy. But the final section of this chapter considers a third and 
different potential source of difficulty for LiPs, one which cannot be explained through this 
kind of sociological analysis: the impact of the “gatekeeper”. By the term gatekeeper I refer to 
individuals who are not legal professionals, but who are individuals who are key intermediaries 
between LiPs and legal professionals. These include court staff within HMCTs, and others in 
related administrative and managerial roles. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to these 
people when considering the experiences of LiPs. And yet it is overwhelmingly these 
                                                     
477 As I have already argued, of course, LiPs’ inability to translate is of course a deliberate mechanism to 
enforce the specialism of the legal profession.  
478 The two most obvious examples of this are Trevor and Marie.  
479 This is precisely what happened to Tim, as I will explore later in the chapter.  
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individuals who are the first to have contact with LiPs and on whom LiPs are reliant 
throughout.  
 
The LiPs in this study frequently cite problems of access relating to such gatekeepers. 
Interviewees feel that these individuals pose a considerable barrier to them when pursuing or 
defending their claim. The difficulties that inhere in these kinds of encounters cannot be 
explained away by arguments relating to the gap between lay and law. It is important to be 
clear that this thesis does not attempt to critique the behaviour of individuals not involved in 
this study. In addition, many of the difficulties in these encounters may be, at the very least, 
partially attributable to the behaviour of the LiPs themselves. However, these gatekeeper 
difficulties are also, arguably, indicators of a wider contemporary strategy imposed by policy 
makers on the courts, and beyond, of deflecting individuals from being able to pursue or 
defend complaints through limiting accountability and access. The decrease in face-to-face 
contact, the increased centralisation of procedures and use of privatised, outsourced or legally 
untrained intermediaries is a significant development that once again, as I will demonstrate, 
disproportionately impacts LiPs compared with legal professionals.480  This chapter therefore 
concludes by considering what implications these kinds of previously unexamined difficulties 
have for the experiences of LiPs into the future.  
 
RED HERRINGS  
 
No disrespect to your colleagues or solicitor friends and stuff [laughing]…All college, no 
knowledge? Where’s the common sense element? I mean, there’s no, there’s very little 
common sense in law. You know it doesn’t, it just doesn’t make sense, does it? A lot of law.  
           Neil 
 
In 2012, when Marie still had a solicitor representing her, she attended the final hearing 
regarding the custody of her daughter. Ultimately, this hearing resulted in Marie’s child being 
permanently adopted.  From Marie’s perspective, the issue of relevance for this hearing was 
ensuring that the presiding judge in the case understood that she was in the process of getting 
an Independent Social Worker (ISW) assessment. Potentially, if the ISW was positive, Marie 
believed it could have changed the custody outcome. An ISW assessment date had been agreed 
but the date was after this final hearing and Marie could not get it moved sooner. 
Consequently, she wanted her solicitor to explain this to the judge so that they could delay the 
                                                     
480 There is of course an impact on the legal profession too; increased outsourcing and changes in the 
Legal Services Act 2007 point to a potential for ‘de-skilling’ in the provision of some legal services, 
which have now been opened up to non-legal competition. 
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final hearing until the ISW had been done. Instead, this is how Marie recalls what happened 
when the judge asked her solicitor about the ISW.  
 
Marie: My solicitor said it was a red herring.  Now, at that point in time I had no idea 
what that meant, but when I found out what it meant I was absolutely livid 
because basically that comment had allowed the final hearing to carry on.  
 
Kate: So you were present during this final hearing? 
 
Marie: Yeah but like I said I didn’t know nothing, uh, I didn’t even understand the 
terminology of red herring.  
 
Kate: And so you didn’t have anyone else with you? They weren’t allowed to… 
 
Marie: No.  
 
Kate: So did your solicitor raise the ISW? 
 
Marie: No as I, he turned around and said it was a red herring, like the appeal and 
everything about it was a red herring and I was, when I found out what it 
actually meant I was absolutely livid. 
 
Kate: And when did you find that out? 
 
Marie: Um, yeah, when the appeal happened, ‘cause we actually got our transcripts. 
 
For Marie the language used by her own solicitor was incomprehensible. As she herself says, it 
was only much later, during the appeal (by which time she was a LiP), that she obtained a 
transcript and, in consultation with her McKenzie friend, finally understood what the 
expression ‘‘red herring’’ meant, and what the consequences of her solicitor’s statement had 
been.481  
 
                                                     
481 I want to emphasise here that the impact of this happening is of course still based on Marie’s 
perceptions and we cannot be certain what effect the ISW may have had if it had been explicitly 
discussed in court on that day. We can be certain, however, that it had a material effect on Marie’s 
perceptions of fairness in the justice system and was a major factor in her becoming a LiP. This latter 
outcome—how loss of trust in legal professionals can lead to becoming LiPs—is explored in detail in 
the following, final chapter drawing in particular on the work of Professor Tom Tyler’s work, Why 
People Obey the Law , on trust and legitimacy as well as the role of procedural justice, as outlined by 
Tyler and Zimmerman, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice”.  
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 I begin this chapter with Marie’s experience because what happened to her is not unusual in 
the context of this study, or in the context of other research into the challenges posed to 
laypersons by certain kinds of language, but it is difficult to capture if we assume ‘legal 
language’ refers only to legal vocabulary.482 As stated in the introduction, it is a generally 
accepted fact that legal terminology is inaccessible to an outsider and needs to be explained.483 
There is no doubt that a certain amount of progress has been made in this direction. Plain 
language is advocated by researchers, and guides for LiPs explaining key terms, can now be 
accessed online and sometimes at courthouses themselves.484 But in this study, the language 
that functioned to exclude or confuse LiPs was not limited to specialist legal terms, or Latin or 
anything else that we might expect to constitute ‘legalese’. Instead, the kind of expressions 
and constructions that confused LiPs frequently encompassed language that was unusual or 
deceptive.485 The degree to which such language may be a product of the legal world, even 
though it is not specifically ‘legal language’ is something that clearly needs to be considered.  
 
To approach how we might do this, it is helpful to draw on the work of Pierre Bourdieu. As 
outlined earlier, the smallness of the interviewee sample means that I cannot claim that my 
interviewees are representative of all LiPs, and I hesitate to make any assumptions about 
demographics on the basis of this sample. But it does seem quite likely that many LiPs, 
including those in this study, are formally educated to a lesser degree than the legal 
professionals they encounter in a courtroom.486 Pierre Bourdieu recognises the importance of 
this when he argues in his sociological theory that all semi-autonomous fields, such as the field 
of law, operate within and are relatively closer or further away from, the field of power. 
Individuals who work within a field are therefore also part of a broader operation of social 
power. Those who work in positions of authority or influence within a field are likely to 
exhibit traits that reinforce their social status and class in all of their encounters, and this will 
be most obviously manifested in encounters with those of lesser authority. This idea is 
emphasised in Bourdieu’s Distinction, where he argues that aesthetic choices are determined 
early on by one’s habitus and the earliest social influences individuals have through their 
parents, the kind of people they go to school with and their education.487 It is clearly also 
                                                     
482 Criminal Justice Alliance in Structured Mayhem, 23. Similarly see The Law Society, Litigants in Person: 
Guidelines for Lawyers (The Law Society: London, 2015), 6. 
483 Christopher Williams argues that the key features of ‘legal vocabulary’ are a usage of archaic or 
rarely used term, a preponderance of foreign vocabulary, particularly French or Latin, and ‘obsessive 
repetition’ of terms to avoid obscurity. In addition, this is complemented by long, ‘convoluted’ sentences 
and impersonal language. See “Legal English and Plain Language: An Introduction,” in ESP Across 
Cultures (Global Print: Italy, 2004): 113-117. 
484 For example, the Bar Council’s Guide to Representing Yourself in Court (April 2013).  
485 By deceptive, I mean language that has a double meaning: one within the legal field and one without 
it. I will return to this idea later in the chapter.  
486 This was the conclusion reached by the Williams, LiPs: A Literature Review. See also Charlie Ball, 
“Most People in the UK Do Not Go to University – and Maybe Never will,” The Guardian, 4 June 2013.   
487 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Routledge: London, 1979).   
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evident in language. As Bourdieu emphasise, language is a function of social power. As he 
expresses it, when critiquing the neutral or scientific study of linguistics: 
 
one must not forget that the relations of communication par excellence – linguistic 
exchanges - are also relations of symbolic power in which the power relations between 
speakers or their respective groups are actualised.488  
 
The idea I want to take from this is that when talking about ‘legal language’, we need to go 
beyond narrow definitions that only encompass technical language. LiPs are not only confused 
by this kind of language, instead they are also potentially excluded from fully comprehending 
proceedings by the use of unusual, formal or complex language that goes unexplained to them 
because it is not recognised to be legal language.   By failing to see such linguistic 
constructions, like Marie’s red herrings, as part of a broader pattern of social power, we limit 
the significance of legal language difficulties by saying they only evidence difficulties with a 
particular kind of transaction in a specific time and place. Laypersons don’t understand because 
they don’t have law degrees.489 But instead, by encompassing a broader understanding of legal 
language we can see these transactions more broadly as an unequal relationship of power that 
denotes social class and educational differences, and is common to many such encounters.  
 
The importance of considering the unequal distribution of power in the relationships between 
LiPs and legal professionals is supported by the work of Larson. The ‘professional project’ is 
about the collective pursuit of social mobility for professions that will result in ‘the desired 
social position to their occupants’.490 Specialisms, such as lawyering, are predicated on the 
development of increasing autonomy based on markers of distinction, and through this 
distinction enjoying the exercise of financial and social power. As she notes: ‘The upgrading of 
an occupation into a profession, or the upgrading of a profession in terms of respectability and 
social credit, implies the articulation of principles of inclusion and exclusion’.491 This pursuit of 
such a ‘project’ is one where acquiring specialist skills is only one small piece of a much more 
complex process that is rooted in processes of exclusion: class and educational differences.  As 
Larson points out: ‘professions are not exclusively occupational categories: whatever else they 
are, professions are situated in the middle and upper middle levels of the stratification system. 
Both objectively and subjectively, professions are outside and above the working class, as 
occupations and as social strata’.492  
 
                                                     
488 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, (Polity Press: London, 1991), 37. 
489 Although, of course, some of them do, including Tim in this study as well as Oliver.  
490 Larson, Professionalism, 67. 
491 Ibid, 74. 
492 Ibid, xvi. 
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A number of interviewees in this study were clear, for example, when asked whether they had 
considered the law as a profession, that it was out of reach as it was too expensive and/or not 
for people like them. Charles expresses it thus: ‘no, I mean law was for rich people [laughter]. 
We don’t…contemplated that. You had to have the right accent, and um, lots of money’. Peter 
echoes this, stating: ‘from my own personal point of view um, I would, if I had the money and 
it is all about money because if I had the money I, I would study law’. Neil similarly notes that 
given his time again, he would study law although he had no interest in law at school at the 
time. However, even if he had, as he outlines, it wasn’t an option for him as he needed to earn 
money immediately to support himself. As he says:  
 
All the lads, all the girls and the fellas that went to university, it took them another five or 
six years before they were earning the same amount of money as I was earning, you know, 
and they were off at university somewhere and their family were having to pay for them 
and we didn’t have that sort of money either. 
 
Marie was caught by this difficulty because of the language her solicitor used. While ‘red 
herring’ may be a common enough expression that other LiPs are not caught by it, we should 
not underestimate the degree to which these kinds of language usages may trip up many more 
LiPs, because legal professionals may be more likely tha LiPs to use this kind of language in the 
first place, whether formal or idiomatic, or with references to aesthetic traditions that are tied 
to specific social origins and contexts. 493  For us it means that we cannot ignore the 
disadvantage that Marie, and other LiPs, may experience, by not sharing the same social or 
educational background as other individuals in the courtroom.494  
 
Part of the difficulty with this kind of language of exclusion is that it tends to go unnoticed 
both by those deploying it as well as by those encountering it, which is why habitus as a 
concept is so useful. Individuals in this study talked of a general lack of comprehension, and 
many commented on the accent and tone in which legal professionals spoke, denoting a kind of 
educational privilege or representing class, but could not give linguistic specifics, arguably 
because all of these factors worked together to generate an impenetrable complexity.495 This 
means while one can only speculate on the impact complex or formal language constructions 
                                                     
493 For one interviewee it was also a gendered experience. Talia, who comes from a comparatively 
privileged background, attending a public boarding school in the UK, made clear that her parents only 
expected her brother to pursue a career (he became a lawyer). She was expected to marry and 
consequently her education was of secondary importance. This has become a source of regret and anger 
for her and is explored in the next chapter. 
494 This was not the case for all the interviewees however, with some coming from a relatively 
privileged background, such as Oliver and Talia.  
495 This includes Neil, and Eleanor who complains in her interview of her barrister’s misogyny and 
pomposity, emphasizing that ‘I kept being referred to by the barrister as a “silly little woman”. 
[laughter]’.    
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can have, in this case we at least know it meant that Marie was unable to understand how the 
decision was reached in the most important hearing she ever attended.496  It also seems likely 
that this is not an unusual experience for a LiP. Clearly facilitating access for LiPs also 
requires addressing ourselves to language differences as expressions of power, not just as 
evidence that laypersons lack a narrow, specialised knowledge.   
 
However, what Marie’s experience also draws attention to is what appears to be troubling 
behaviour on the part of her legal representative. Clark D. Cunningham, in his 1992 article on 
lawyers as translators, notes that he uses the metaphor of translation because:  
 
 [t]he metaphor suggests that the meaning of the client's story will ‘inevitably’ be 
transformed through the lawyer's representation; no sentence can be perfectly translated 
from one language to another.  Yet if one feels a sense of loss in speaking through a 
translator, there can also be something gained. By speaking through a translator, one can 
be heard and understood in places where otherwise one is mute. The translator does not 
silence the speaker but rather seeks to enhance the speaker's voice by adding her own. The 
good translator does not alter the speaker's meaning without the speaker's consent, and 
may even collaborate with the speaker to produce a statement in the foreign language that 
is more meaningful than the speaker's original utterance. Thus, translation offers both an 
image of the constraints upon a lawyer's ability to represent fully his client's story and a 
model for recognizing and managing the inevitable changes in meaning in a way that may 
empower rather than subjugate the client.497 
 
But, as Cunningham points out: ‘lawyers routinely silence and subordinate their clients while 
purporting to tell “their” stories’.498 Clearly, while the solicitor may not have deliberately or 
consciously employed the term “red herring” to evade Marie’s understanding, this solicitor, by 
Marie’s account of this event, is not attempting to translate Marie’s needs, or to communicate 
for or with her. At the very least, the relationship between Marie and her representative 
suggests a lack of ‘translation’.499 Indeed, he seems to be doing the opposite by cutting her out 
of the communication taking place in court.500  
 
                                                     
496 This hearing, and the behaviour of her solicitor, had clear consequences when it came to Marie’s 
trust in the legal profession. The impact of solicitor behaviour on shaping litigants in persons’ decisions 
to forego representation will be explored in the next chapter drawing in particular on the work of Tyler 
and Zimmerman, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice.”  
497 Clark D. Cunningham, “The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an 
Ethnography of Legal Discourse,” Cornell Law Review 77, no. 6(1992): 1299. 
498 Ibid, 1300.  
499 Another way of thinking about this failure of translation is to consider that lawyers, as Sarat, Abel 
and Felstiner argue, see each case as a unit of analysis; Marie’s separate application done without this 
representative is arguably something that falls outside the boundaries of this case.    
500 See Genn and Genn, Representation at Tribunals, 237. 
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It is of course important to stress here that the concept of ‘lawyering’ is a complex one, and 
how people ‘do’ lawyering is matter of historical and contextual specificity, so overly 
generalised claims should be avoided. Sarat and Felstiner draw attention to the complicated 
power dynamics existing between lawyer and client. Their 1995 work emphasises the 
‘dynamic’ nature of the power relationship whereby, at different points in time, both lawyer 
and client feel a relative ‘powerlessness’, and that the relationship between lawyer and client is 
much more tightly negotiated than had been previously suggested.501 In addition, more recent 
scholarship has consistently advocated for a more client-driven focus, with a greater sense of 
equality in the relationship between the two.502 As well, there has been an emphasis in some 
critical scholarship of the ethical imperatives of communicating a client’s story.503 This vision 
of lawyering is, however, usually limited to the extent that there remains an expectation that 
lawyers are meant to perform some kind of translation and to be relatively autonomous in 
taking steps that are in the best interest of their client.504  
 
In the context of this study, therefore, it is important to be cautious about any claims made as 
to how lawyers behave generally. All we can know from Marie’s tale is Marie’s perspective on 
one incident. But the story remains troubling, at the very least because it indicates a rather 
paternalistic narrative of lawyer behaviour.505 A more critical reading suggests that, while 
exclusion on the basis of language and behaviour largely takes place on a preconscious level, 
there may well be individuals within the legal profession who might deliberately and 
consciously exploit this exclusion; in this scenario, by ignoring what his client was saying and 
failing to translate this to the judge.506 Larson points out, ‘although the project and its means 
are collective: it is through the upgrading of an occupation—with the attempts to control the 
individual members which this involves—that prestige is to be attached to the profession 
roles, and by extension, to their occupants, making the project ‘ultimately individualistic’.507 
While conscious exclusion may not be applicable to the majority of legal practitioners, Marie’s 
experience suggests that Larson’s ‘professional project’ is an important way to consider the 
minority of lawyers who may well deliberately emphasise and perpetuate distinction through 
exclusion.  As Larson observes: 
 
                                                     
501 Austin Sarat and William L.F. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients: Power and Meaning in the 
Legal Process (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995).  
502 See, for example, Julie McFarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of 
Law (UBC Press: Vancouver and Toronto, 2008), xiii.  
503 Anthony V. Alfieri, “Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative,” 
Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 2107-2147. 
504 Richard Moorhead et al., “What Clients Know: Client Perspectives and Legal Competence,” 
International Journal of the Legal Profession 5 (2003): 5-35. 
505 R. Wasserstrom, “Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues,” Human Rights 5(1975): 1-24. 
506 This is of significance to LiPs not only when they are periodically represented, but when they, as 
LiPs, face represented opposition.   
507 Larson, Professionalism, 67. 
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[t]he service orientation is…undoubtedly, part of the ideology and one of the prescriptive 
norms which organised professions explicitly avow. Yet the implicit assumption that the 
behaviour of individual professionals is more ethical, as a norm, than that of individuals in 
lesser occupations has seldom, if ever, been tested by empirical evidence.508 
 
 
Another problem with language and communication that emerged from this study was about 
what might best be termed “deceptive” language. This can be seen in the case of Trevor. While 
awaiting the outcome of the small claim he was defending against the contractor who had 
initiated proceedings in the County Court against him, Trevor received a letter in the post 
from the court. As he explains it: ‘what it said was, um, Judgment, blah blah blah, Action: 
None, so I thought, with the first one, I thought well okay so there’s, he’s found a judgment 
but he’s, I don’t have to do anything because it says none.[…]’ His sister, a qualified solicitor, 
and a friend of hers, also legally trained, then explained the meaning of the letter to Trevor. 
As he goes on: 
 
Once they [his sister and friend] read it they understood what it meant, but I as a layman 
don’t understand legal terminology, I don’t, but they write it all legalese so you’re there 
reading it, trying to interpret something that you haven’t got a clue what it actually means. 
When it says action: none, you think that means no action to be taken…that’s what you 
would ex-…so I don’t have to do anything, but no, that wasn’t what it meant, I can’t 
remember what it meant actually, but it meant something else, something to do with the 
judgment it meant that that was no-…um, so and those, and they use all that, you know, 
like, and they use legal terminology but yet it’s supposed to be litigant in person. How are 
you supposed to know legal technol-, terminology if you’re just a normal person who 
doesn’t operate within the law, operate in the law world if you know what I mean? You 
don’t, you won’t know what those things mean so you won’t understand what they’re 
trying to tell you or get you to do.509 
 
Trevor’s experience is a commonplace one for LiPs, where the language employed by legal 
professionals is difficult to understand. However, as Trevor himself suggests in the above 
extract, the problem here is not the use of long, or complicated terms that would be easily 
recognisable as a form of such jargon, it is instead words that are misleading because they 
have both a legal and non-legal meaning, such as ‘action’, ‘judgment’ and ‘none’. Richard 
                                                     
508 Ibid, ix.  
509 Trevor Extract, 14.01.16, 02:07:59 – 02:09:06. 
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Moorhead and Sefton draw attention to this issue in their 2005 study were they note the ‘risk’ 
of LiPs expressing themselves ‘solely in social, non-legal terms’.510    
 
The collision between what Moorhead and Sefton termed the ‘social’ and the legal can be seen 
even more clearly in the experiences of both Charles and Paul who both took their solicitor to 
court for negligence. This is how Charles recalls what happened during the hearing: 
 
Well, the verdict didn’t take long at all, it was like just about half an hour, he, he,  [the 
judge], like, he prepares a document and he reads through it and then says, um, you know, 
Mr C, basically judgment goes to Mr C but, um, then he goes, he tells you, he goes and to 
tell you, what um, what the, what you’ve actually achieved in terms of the, the, the the 
judgement what judgment would actually be, um, the, the money that you would gain, I 
don’t even know what the right expression is, what  the compensation would be for your 
losses. But then he says, like £5, and I actually sued them for another case as well and it 
was £5 for each case, I won on both counts, but um, and then he basically said because I 
didn’t, um, I couldn’t prove my, my losses, which was nonsense. Because I’d showed him, 
demonstrated with documents what my losses were because that got, it was in my 
statement of claim.  
 
As can be seen above, in Charles’s mind, he won this case (‘judgement goes to Mr C’). As he 
says, ‘like I said, I did very well because I won the case’. Consequently, the tiny amount of 
damages awarded to him was a source of significant confusion. This confusion was 
compounded when the judge went on to order him to pay the other side’s costs. As he 
remembers:  
 
I did actually win the case, but when you win a case on negligence the judge, what he did 
was, um, he just gave me, I can’t remember the exact word they call it, um, punitive 
damages and just gave me £5 as compensation, knowing that the, the solicitors would have 
made an offer and because they had offered me £15,000 which I couldn’t take because I’d 
already lost over £100,000 because of all the, all, the, in terms of cost and the time, I 
couldn’t take £15,000 so, and so because he, my, my judgment was less than what was 
actually offered to me it means automatically I have to pay the solicitors’ costs which was 
£90,000. 
 
Clearly, in the passage above Charles has confused ‘punitive’ and ‘nominal’ damages. However, 
the major source of confusion is what “winning” means. From Charles’s account of what 
happened, it seems clear that the judge accepted his argument on at least one of his points, 
                                                     
510 Moorhead & Sefton, Unrepresented Litigants, 154. 
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resulting in the awarding of nominal damages. However, from the judge’s perspective, this was 
not a victory, but rather a failure to prove the rest of his case, hence being awarded only 
nominal damages. In addition, Charles clearly fell afoul of the Civil Procedure Rules pertaining 
to Part 36 on offers to settle. Essentially, because the solicitors offered Charles a substantial 
settlement, £15,000, and because Charles failed to obtain a judgment ‘more advantageous 
than a defendant’s part 36 offer’, he was ordered to pay the other side’s costs.511  
 
The collision, then, between ‘social’ and ‘legal’ meanings here means that a LiP can’t even be 
sure if he or she is successful or not.  Charles clearly believes he has succeeded because the 
judge has told him he was succeeded, or ‘won’ on at least one or more grounds. However, the 
fact that the other side was awarded costs tells us he has not. For Charles to know that, 
though, he would need to understand Blackstone’s Civil Practice 66.10, which states that:  
 
A claimant who has claimed substantial damages, but has only recovered nominal damages, 
will normally be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs (Texaco Ltd v Arco Technology Inc 
(1989) The Times 13 October 1989; Mappouras v Waldrons Solicitors [2002] EWCA Civ 842, 
LTL 30/4/2002 [….]Where a claimant recovers more than nominal damages but only a 
small proportion of the amount claimed, costs should follow the event unless this conflicts 
with some other established principle […].512 
 
As above, generally speaking, costs orders to a defendant where only nominal damages are 
awarded to the claimant, are commonplace, although not automatic. As a 2013 case, Clack v 
Wrigley’s Solicitors LLP, establishes, the judge has a ‘wide discretion’ to decide the issue of 
costs. In determining costs, though, it is about who is the successful party:  
 
There is no doubt that the starting point in all cases is that the party who, looked at 
practically and realistically, is the successful party [my italics] will be awarded the costs of 
the action, but equally it is clear that there is a wide discretion to depart from this in 
appropriate circumstances. The authorities, both pre-and post-CPR, establish that a 
defendant who is held liable only for nominal damages will ordinarily be regarded as the 
successful party (unless the claimant had a legitimate reason for seeking to establish 
liability only), and that in such a case (a) the claimant will not ordinarily be awarded any 
costs but (b) the defendant will not necessarily recover all his costs, especially if and to the 
extent that (i) they have not been incurred in relation to an issue which should have been 
                                                     
511 Civil Procedure Rules 36.11 – 36.21.  
512 See Blackstones Civil Proceedings 66.10. 
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conceded and (ii) they would not have been incurred anyhow in resolving issues on which 
the defendant has succeeded.513 
 
In the eyes of the judge, then, Charles is not the successful party. However, the circumstances 
surrounding how this process takes place do not seem to have been clearly explained to him. 
Charles is aware that his decision not to settle was what caused this costs decision, but for him, 
this is still baffling because he ‘won’.514 The fact that one can ‘win’ but still lose, by virtue of 
only succeeding in being awarded nominal damages, is clearly, and unsurprisingly, a site of 
confusion for LiPs.  
 
Paul narrates a similar story, also a case where he took his solicitors to court for negligence:  
 
I had to present the case and he [the judge] later complimented me saying I had presented 
the case very, very effectively, uh very politely and uh, you know, I, uh, handled it really 
well. So he ruled in my favour, he said that the solicitors had been negligent. So I won at 
that stage and he awarded me costs, and a very tiny amount…they award certain people 
huge damages and they, wrong-, seemingly, wrongly, they, they award other people tiny 
amounts! [laughter]. They’re almost insignificant! Pennies! In relation to them. So, um, I 
was then needing to get these solicitors to comply with the court order and they were not. 
And I was having to do my, uh, costing to show what I’d, you know, my genuine costs, and 
they were difficult. So I then went back to court saying look, they’re not complying with 
the court order. And the district judge awarded them costs for attending that hearing. And 
their costs were more than my costs and damages. 
 
Here we see an account closely paralleling Charles where Paul succeeds only to the extent of 
nominal damages, although in his account, it seems that he was awarded costs, or was at least 
certainly not ordered to pay the other side’s costs. While there are no particulars of the case to 
refer to in order to be certain as to what exactly happened at the second hearing, it seems 
likely that at this point the judge intervened, presumably because in the eyes of the courts Paul 
was not the ‘successful party’ in this situation and therefore his taking the solicitors back to 
court may have been perceived as a vexatious action. As Paul summarises it, however: ‘I won, 
but then I lost because the district judge, the subsequent district judge awarded costs against 
me’.  
                                                     
513 Clack v Wrigleys Solicitors LLP 2013 All ER (D) 83 (Apr), Strauss N, QC sitting as Deputy Judge, at 
18.  
514 Charles is also baffled because the offer made by the other side was, in his mind, not reasonable 
(Charles was asking for more than £100k in damages). The question of settlement, and litigants in 
person being punished for failing to settle, is explored in the subsequent chapter. For the purposes of 
this chapter, though, ‘reasonable’ can certainly be seen as an example of the same word having both a 
social and a legal meaning. 
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Common to both individuals in these accounts is a bewilderment as to what has taken place in 
the courtroom. For them, the judge has said they were right, and awarded them compensation 
(albeit a small amount), and then they have been, as they see it, punished despite succeeding. 
This is clearly because the concept of ‘winning’ inside and outside a legal context differs.   
 
However, in Moorhead and Sefton’s account, although they concede the situation is 
‘understandable’, LiPs are held somewhat responsible for their own confusion; because they do 
not know how to distinguish between what is socially just and what is ‘legally’ just.515 But of 
course, why should they? To fully comprehend the situation described above seems to require 
either an intimate knowledge of the Civil Procedure Rules or, at the very least, a judge able to 
explain what has occurred in a way that each LiP can understand. We cannot, of course, be 
sure of what was explained to either or both LiPs. It is perfectly possible the situation was 
explained by the judge and that Charles and Paul stated that they understood, even though 
they did not. It is also possible the judge did not fully explain the reason for his or her actions. 
What we can be fairly certain about, however, is that there was a fundamental 
miscommunication arising from what is a clear example of legal language and procedure being 
at loggerheads with a ‘common sense’ understanding of the matter to a layperson.516 It is also 
unsurprising that LiPs may experience these kinds of decisions as unjust (in the ‘social’ 
meaning of the word). If a LiP pursues a case to court, despite all the difficulties detailed in the 
last chapter, so that a judge can adjudicate on the matter, only to be told that even though 
they’ve won, they are somehow at fault, we cannot be surprised that LiPs may be angered or 
upset by the experience. As suggested in the previous chapter, what happens here is that LiPs 
may be financially punished for pursuing a claim of importance to them.517  
 
Moving beyond what happened in these two cases and returning to the broader argument, 
then, how can we make sense of these kinds of confusions and their impact on LiPs? As I 
                                                     
515 This question of course touches on a complex and much discussed issue in legal philosophy: to what 
degree should what is legal be also ‘just’? There are two paths to think about this question that are 
relevant here: firstly, there is the fact that the civil justice system has transformed from a court based 
system where what is just is what judges pronounce to be just, to one of ‘structured negotiation’ where 
settlement is the overriding objective. This transformation impacts on LiPs who, as I will show in this 
chapter, do not understand these changes and expect to be heard by a judge. For more on this, see 
Simon Roberts, “’Listing Concentrates the Mind’: the English Civil Court as an Arena for Structured 
Negotiation,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29, no. 3(2009): 457-479. The second path is the gap 
between popular justice and ‘legal justice’; the work of Nobles and Schiff in Miscarriages of Justice, is 
again relevant here, pointing to the wide gap between the two conceptions.  
516 We can also be certain that there was another serious outcome: the result of these transactions for 
both Charles and Paul was to substantially erode trust in the judges presiding over their cases. The way 
in which LiPs choose to make sense of encounters with law that are not effectively explained to them, 
and how some may resort to conspiracy, is the subject of the next chapter.  
517 This policy is also in keeping with the courts increasingly being used to punish those who do not 
settle, regardless of the relative merit of their case. See Roberts, “’Listing Concentrates the Mind,” 457.  
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argued above, Moorhead’s account ultimately seems to imply that this collision is natural and 
unfortunate. However, this kind of argument fails to take into account the disparity of power 
levels between parties that serves to reinforce and perpetuate a LiP’s relatively lowly status. It 
also doesn’t fully engage with how confusing and unfair the situation is for the layperson. It is 
therefore instead, perhaps, more useful to think in terms of sociological theory when 
pondering LiP disadvantages regarding language and procedure, particularly Bourdieu’s 
theory of habitus. Following Bourdieu’s argument, then, in these situations it is not the case 
that the judges or solicitors are deliberately trying to exclude or confuse Charles, Trevor, Paul 
or Marie. Instead, because of both the specialised knowledge legal agents have acquired and 
naturalised, as well as their broader pattern of class, education and social values, what seems 
obvious to these individuals is not what is obvious to a LiP. Instead these two forms of 
common sense will be fundamentally different and inevitably come into conflict.  
 
So far, I have spent some time in this chapter talking about language. However, the conceptual 
gap between lay and law can be seen in other areas besides legal language. Bourdieu argues  
 
The institution of a “judicial space” implies the establishment of a borderline between 
actors. It divides those qualified to participate in the game and those who, though they may 
find themselves in the middle of it, are in fact excluded by their inability to accomplish the 
conversion of mental space—and particularly of linguistic stance—which is presumed by 
entry into this social space.518 
 
The language Bourdieu employs in this extract is highly suggestive, drawing attention as he 
does to a ‘borderline between actors’. Often accounts of the gap between the lay and the law 
tend to focus exclusively on language. Clearly, as above, the role language plays is very 
important, however it is easy to overlook the equally important role of embodied behaviour. 
How does performance affect LiPs? This is what I explore in the next section of the chapter.  
 
ACTING UP  
 
Kate:  Did you do research [on how to behave in court]? 
 
Neil:  No, what I, what I did, I don’t know whether it’s on there, it’s probably 
upstairs, I, I’d got a book, I’d got a book out of the library, I bought a book 
from Waterstones or something, advo-, yeah, called advocacy at the Bar. 
                                                     
518 Bourdieu, “The Force of Law,” 828.  
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Advocacy at the Bar and I read a bit of that. I went down to court and quite, 
quite funny I just, I wanted to see how the barristers, where they sat in court, 
and how they addressed the court, and what they did. So I remember, a 
particularly funny case, there were about six defendants in this one case and 
each one had got their own barrister and they were all bobbing up and down, 
they were all sat on the same row all with the wigs and the black thing on, 
they looked like pistons in a car, bobbing up, bobbing, when one sat down, the 
other one…in no particular order, it was sort of random bobbing up and 
down. I found it quite, quite funny. I don’t think I learned a lot apart from 
you’ve got to call a judge in the High Court My Lord. …yeah I just blagged it, 
blagged it all the way through. 
  
How should LiPs behave in court? Since the passage of LASPO in April 2013 and the 
concomitant rise of unpresented litigants ending up in courtrooms, there has been 
considerable effort by legal practitioners and other legal service providers to provide guidance 
and advice on this score. The Bar Council released a document for litigants in person in April 
2013, a Guide to Representing Yourself in Court, and there are other similar documents and 
sources, such as AdviceNow’s website which has a page called ‘Going to court or tribunal 
without the help of a lawyer’ and which links to the Royal Courts of Justice Advice Bureau 
guides.519 These guides, produced by the Citizens Advice Bureau, similar to the document 
produced by the Bar Council, envisage specific scenes and times where a litigant in person 
might find themselves in court and attempt to explain what they should do and how they 
should behave. One of the first things both of these guides emphasise is that a LiP needs to 
disregard anything he or she may have seen on television. As the RCJ CAB guide puts it:  
 
Forget everything you see on the telly. Most court hearings in TV programmes are about 
crime – and that is not what we are talking about here and anyway they focus on the drama 
of the story rather than reality!520 
 
This is echoed by the Bar Council, whose guide states:  
 
Keep it simple Throughout the Hearing, use simple, non-legal language as much as you 
can. Speak in short sentences. You might be tempted to speak like lawyers speak on 
television. Resist this temptation. Lawyers do not really speak like that. Some bad lawyers 
do, but judges hate it. Judges just want you to say what you mean in plain English.521  
                                                     
519 CAB, Going to Court, 1.  
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521 Bar Council, Guide for LiPs, 23.  
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Clearly, the emphasis here is to persuade LiPs that they should not behave as they have seen 
on television programmes, because these shows tend to be from the US and depict criminal 
proceedings, and will lead LiPs astray. The repetition of this advice in both guides suggests 
that this is a genuine problem and this is arguably supported by the fact that many of the 
interviewees in this study had a far more intimate knowledge of the law from television than 
they did from reality.522 But what this also indicates is that many of these LiPs will not have 
attended a courtroom before and will have no prior knowledge of what it will be like. So they 
will be quite likely to have only ever seen courtrooms on television. This means that, when 
considering how they should behave, not only do LiPs lack any experience of the proceedings 
in which they will be acting, but they are also entering unfamiliar, and frequently intimidating 
environments. As Marie describes, attending a local magistrate’s court for a civil hearing:  
 
The courtroom? It felt like I’d committed a crime. It really really did, walking in, never 
been in front of the judge, never been in a courtroom or anything. It was horrendous. It 
was so, the courtroom themself looked like, well look like they do on TV and that and, and 
its just like, you know when you see them on TV and you think oh right, whatever, but 
when you’re actually in there it’s so intimidating. And like I say, you feel like you 
committed a crime or something.  
 
Marie’s extract suggests that the very fact that a LiP might base his or her knowledge of 
courtrooms on television may make them more intimidating, as they are more likely to 
associate courts with criminality, punishment or imprisonment. In this respect, many LiPs 
may already face a behavioural ‘handicap’: intimidation and fear.523  
 
Putting aside the question of intimidation for now, we might begin this section by asking 
generally, how can one behave well in a courtroom? For a LiP, an obvious place to start might 
be to watch and imitate the behaviour of legal professionals. This approach is implied in the 
above guides, when LiPs are told that when they speak plainly, they are following the strategy 
of how lawyers ‘really’ speak, and that this is a desirable phenomenon. This is also what Neil 
does in the above extract; he attends a courtroom and observes the behaviour of legal 
                                                     
522 Trevor, and Charles, acknowledge this openly.   
523 The experience of intimidation is of course one that is well-recognised and discussed in criminal 
proceedings. Many scholars argue that architecture, procedure, placement of the defendant and other 
forms of ‘segregation’ are deliberately employed to intimidate defendants and witnesses before the 
overwhelming authority of the ‘law’. See A.E. Bottoms and D. McClean (1976) Defendants in the Criminal 
Process (London: Routledge and K Paul, 1976); Paul Rock, “Witnesses and Spaces in a Crown Court”; 
Linda Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of Law (Routledge: London and New 
York, 2011). However, less material has been written on the experiences of civil claimants and 
defendants in this regard. See “The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant as 
Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, Stanford Law Review 21(1969).  
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professionals. But Neil clearly finds the experience largely comic. In this respect, this does not 
seem to be a helpful technique for him. More than this, though, Neil’s reception to the 
behaviour and dress of barristers serves to remind us that there is a significant gap between 
what he, and other laypersons would consider ‘normal’ behaviour in a courtroom and what 
legal professionals themselves might consider ‘normal behaviour.’ Neil clearly finds the 
behaviour of the barristers bizarre, rather than instructive; referring to the ‘random bobbing 
up and down’ of barristers, he cannot make any sense of it and cannot use it as a basis for his 
own behaviour.524  
 
So how does this gap between two different normalities of behaviour, between that of the LiP 
and the legal professional, come about? This is arguably because the performance of lega is 
another example of field specific knowledge which they learn through repeated experience. No 
junior barrister or trainee solicitor enters the courtroom fully embodying the expected 
behaviour and traits of their role; it is something they learn through rehearsal and repetition. 
This practice enables these individuals to habituate and naturalise their experiences, including 
overcoming their initial intimidation, and establishing familiarity with other participants they 
may share a courtroom with on more than one occasion. Through example of their senior 
colleagues, or mistakes, or failures on their part, these individuals will learn how to behave 
appropriately. But the boundaries of what is ‘appropriate’ or inappropriate behaviour in a 
courtroom is not a matter of “common sense” (or rather it is a matter of “common sense” in the 
sense that “common sense” itself is a field specific construct), which is why it is very different 
from what Neil would recognise as normal.   
 
A legal professional who performs well in a courtroom, then, is an individual who gives the 
appearance of acting in a way that seems professional, skilful, or persuasive to his or her fellow 
legal practitioners. But this kind of assessment of skill—what is good--can only exist in 
comparison to its opposite: what is bad.  Poor performance in the case of legal professionals 
might therefore be any behaviour that seemed histrionic, clumsy or overtly theatrical. But 
while the latter is sometimes characterised as ‘acting up’ or performing, whereas the former is 
considered to be behaving ‘normally’, a better way of interpreting this behaviour would be to 
understand it as the juncture, for legal professionals, between ‘good acting’ and ‘bad acting’. 
Bad acting, on the part of a legal professional, is any overtly ‘theatrical’ behaviour that 
deviates from what is appropriate. Good acting, on the other hand, is misrecognised as 
‘natural’, but is what I call legal naturalism: a style of performance habituated by legal 
                                                     
524 For an overview of the role of dress in legal process see A Hunt, “Governance of the Consuming 
Passions” (MacMillan Press Limited: Hampshire, 1996); Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, 
History, Law (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1995); Rob McQueen, “Of Wigs and Gowns: A 
Short History of Legal and Judicial Dress in Australia”, in Rob McQueen and W. Pue, eds., Misplaced 
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professionals that mobilises years of learning how to behave, move or speak, in a way where it 
seems to be relatively effortless. Key to the concept of legal naturalism is the role of the 
habituated and the preconscious. As Bourdieu would argue, this acquisition and refinement of 
habitus is not explicitly recognised, and consequently legal professionals will see their own 
competency as ‘natural’.525  
 
However, when a professional attains such skill, this is only possible through a forgetting of 
how this transformation took place:   
 
[i]gnoring the social and cultural conditions underlying such an experience, and at the 
same time treating as a birthright the virtuosity acquired through long familiarization or 
through the exercises of a methodical training […] for the acquisition of art competence in 
the sense of mastery of all the means for the specific appropriation of works of art is a self-
seeking silence because it is what makes it possible to legitimatise a social privilege by 
pretending that it is a gift of nature.526 
 
Performative competence in a court of law, then, could be argued to be a ‘social privilege’ 
masquerading as a ‘gift of nature’. The point to take from this analysis is that legal naturalism 
is of course therefore not obvious to a LiP; it isn’t even obvious to legal professionals 
themselves. Because lawyers and judges have habituated these courtroom performance skills 
themselves, they are likely to underestimate how difficult—or impossible—it is for an outsider 
to master.527 In this respect, purporting that performative skills can be ‘put on’ by LiPs by 
following a guidebook conceals the inequality that divides the world of legal professionals 
from that of laypersons. The reality is that LiPs are clearly not going to be able to learn how 
to behave like legal professionals without the concomitant experience. 
 
This is of course recognised to a degree by those who work in the legal world: indeed, guides 
are quite clear that LiPs are not expected to be lawyers. For example, consider the following 
extract from the Bar Council guide.  
 
Sometimes, the other side will make arguments about what the law is. Before the Hearing, 
you might have tried to understand the law as well as you can. If you feel that you 
understand it and have a point to make, make it clearly and simply. However, you are not 
                                                     
525 For example, Geoffrey Robertson argues in The Justice Game that advocacy skills are ‘instinctive’. See 
also Justice Edward Parry, Seven Lamps of Advocacy, 72. 
526 Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production, 234. 
527 This is to varying degrees; there will always be more nervous, or less able, individuals and I don’t 
mean to imply that there is a blanket competency that descends on all practitioners through rehearsal. 
See Paul Moore, “Longing to Belong: Trained Actors’ Attempts to Enter the Profession,” PhD Diss., 
University of Sydney, 2006, 43.  
 163 
expected to be a lawyer. The judge will try hard to think about the arguments that you 
would be making if you were a lawyer. The lawyers for the other side should talk to the 
judge about any law that is damaging to their case (and supports your arguments). In that 
way, the judge and the other lawyers will be aware that you are not a qualified lawyer and 
will make allowances for that. 528 
 
The above extract clearly sets out to emphasise that LiPs are not expected to behave exactly 
like lawyers and that allowances will be made for them by other court users. This is echoed in 
the CAB guide which states: ‘You don’t have to speak in legal language or long words– use 
plain English’.529 But the problem here is that what is ‘simple’ or ‘clear’ in a courtroom is 
simply not the same as what is simple and clear outside of a courtroom so while LiPs are being 
asked to behave normally, this normality is based on field specific logics that will disadvantage 
them. LiPs cannot speak simply and clearly without having to translate their experiences into 
legally accepted ones: this may not be a case of using legal words, but it is a case of being 
expected to be coherent in specifically legal way.530 So actually LiPs are being implicitly 
expected to behave like skilled professionals because legal professionals don’t realise this is what 
they are asking of them. Speaking ‘simply’ masks considerable translation and effort that is 
disproportionately far more difficult for a LiP.  
 
Beyond the problems with LiPs being told to act ‘naturally’, there is also more explicit 
inconsistency in what they are expected to do. Both the Citizens Advice Bureau guide and the 
Bar Council guide on going to court provide advice on how to conduct closed questioning and 
cross examination, indicating that these skillsets are expected of LiPs as well. So here we reach 
a significant difficulty: firstly, that LiPs are told to speak plainly and naturally, as good 
advocates do, without recognising that this behaviour is not actually natural. Secondly, that 
they are simultaneously expected to be able to master, or at least effectively imitate, technical 
questioning skills. As Marie describes it: 
 
but the thing is, you’ve got to learn about, it’s not just about learning what’s in the 
courtroom, it’s about learning how to deal with court staff because sometimes you can face 
nightmares filing applications, it’s about learning how to put applications together, how to 
file it, um, how to do fee remission forms and what evidence you need, uh, putting together 
bundles, putting together um, arguments, uh, putting together questions, if you, even for a 
final hearing you got questions to do, it’s about linking the evidence to the questions, being 
able to point out certain areas where you, within the evidence where you can pull them up 
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and say what’s this about? What- Yeah, but you said this and then you’ve said this, which 
contradicts, you know what I mean? It’s not, it’s not just as straightforward as walking into 
court and saying ‘hiya judge’. There’s so much more to it and it’s a very, very hard thing to 
actually achieve. 
 
There is clearly a kind of confusion of role occurring. LiPs are meant to speak plainly and 
clearly, to not be lawyers or pretend to be lawyers, but are still expected to master lawyerly 
skills: as Marie puts it, you can’t just walk into a courtroom and say ‘hiya judge’.  
 
Compounding this role confusion is the inconsistency of how this role may be being applied for 
each LiP at any time. The Bar Council says that while one might have tried as a LiP to 
familiarise oneself with the law, it doesn’t matter if a LiP does not, because the judge will 
assist or explain the law to them.531 But this does not seem to be what happened when Tim 
first came to court. As Tim describes it, when filling in his County Court claim form, there was 
no point in this form, or in the limited guidance relating to it, that asked him to frame the 
claim in explicitly legal terms; indeed, following the logic above, there is no reason why there 
would be, as the courts say they do not expect LiPs to be legal experts. Tim therefore filled in 
the facts as best as possible. He describes what happens when he attended the first hearing:   
 
And it’s the first, the first question we got asked when we were in there, which I’m 
surprised hadn’t been asked before, was on what grounds of law we were actually bringing 
the claim in the first place. Now I’d never been asked the question previously….Uh, um, 
and you know we were fairly unprepared in that respect. Um, thankfully thinking relatively 
quickly on our feet, um, it was, it was breach of verbal contract really. 
 
Tim emphasises that he was only able to answer this question successfully because he just 
happened to have a law degree and had had previous experience going to court as a trainee on 
behalf of his employees. This previous training and education clearly materially assisted him. 
As he says: ‘I was able to go back to my old law school folder, pick it up and work out exactly 
what made a good witness statement and we’d also looked at, um, counties, magistrates, 
criminal and the larger civil courts and the different statements that were expected for each’. 
He emphasises that he was lucky, but that this was clearly a serious problem for a LiP, 
particularly in a County Court, where he or she may not be expecting it:  
 
Certainly, for the County Courts, or certainly for the small claims, it sells itself on being for 
the layperson. I guarantee a person walking into that room and gets asked the question we 
were asked with regards to what area of law we were bringing this on, at no point was 
                                                     
531 See: The Law Society, Litigants in Person: Guidelines for Lawyers, 5.    
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there ever any question over we bring this as an area of law. Um. You know, there was no, 
not even a hint in any of the paperwork, or any of the discussion or anything else that we 
would have to prepare a legal case for this kind of claim. Um, which I think would be very 
difficult for a layperson in that respect. To, to, you know what area of law are you doing it 
on? I dunno. It’s kind of why I’m here, I was hoping, you know, hoping someone could tell 
me. You know, that would be my perceived response. 
 
While we cannot be sure how the judge would have responded if Tim could not answer the 
question (perhaps the judge may have supplied the answer for him), Tim’s experience clearly 
suggests not having sufficient knowledge of legal grounds can be a point of issue, even in a 
context where LiPs are told they do not need to have a legal education.  
 
So, if LiPs are expected to acquire some legal expertise (and this does seem to be the case, 
either relating to technical skills such as questioning, or knowledge of the subject matter) then 
how do they go about it? Something that emerged very strongly from these interviewees is 
how disproportionately more difficult it was to obtain information for a LiP because legal 
knowledge is largely inaccessible to laypersons. As Eleanor puts it: 
 
The average Joe in the street, even if they want to educate themselves and to find out more 
and to…you know, be the best litigant in person they can, it’s stacked against them, 
because you simply do not have, you’re not allowed access to the information because it’s 
jealously guarded by the law firms and everybody else so you, you can’t get access to it. 
Possibly the only way to do it would be to find a tame law student, and realistically, kind of 
hanging around on street corners asking everybody if they’re a law student is not really my 
idea of a good way to spend my, you know, my free time. 
 
As many interviewees described it, simply getting the basic legal information required was 
often difficult and required sympathetic assistance, or slightly devious methods. Neil resorted 
to sneaking into a law library:  
 
Uh, the law library up at uh S---- university. […] I don’t know how I found it….to...to be 
honest I didn’t ask because I really shouldn’t have been in the law library, I sort of blagged 
my way in. Sort of waited while somebody swiped their card and then nipped in with them. 
 
Other interviewees noted that accessing legal knowledge was becoming increasingly more 
difficult in the wake of digitalisation and austerity measures. Paul for example, used to access 
the All England Law Reports in his local library. However, more recently the library has been 
shut. As he says:  
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Um, no, well you see if you do on-, if you try and do online research, very often there’s a, 
you have to pay a fee to, to access them. It may be online, but it’s not accessible. It’s not 
free, it’s not like in the library you could go to the AELR, look at the index and find it you 
know, and pay for copies. 
 
One of the more successful interviewees in accessing legal knowledge was Neil, and this was 
through relying on fairly unorthodox methods. As he says: ‘In 1996, I was spending a lot of 
time in the pub, but that’s where you could catch a barrister’. He explains:  
 
I used to go in a pub in S---- in the town centre where barristers, it was just, just uh, a place 
called Paradise Square in S-----, and there’s all barristers chambers around there, down 
near the courts, so I made a point of going into a pub that I knew all these barristers, well a 
lot of barristers used to go in and I used to get, a bit of, you know, legal information off 
them, ‘glass of red wine, Mr Barber?’ ‘Ah thank you Neil’  [Neil imitates a comically posh 
accent]; What do you think of this then?532 
 
Clearly then, LiPs are in a bit of a bind. They are meant to behave naturally, like legal 
professionals, but legal professionals do not behave naturally. LiPs should also not actually 
mimic legal professionals. However, LiPs are meant to be able to conduct questioning like 
lawyers do. They are also expected to have some legal knowledge even though this is far less 
accessible to them than it is to legal professionals. From the LiP perspective, then, it is very 
difficult to see how they should confidently prepare for their role and easy to see how they 
might get it wrong. This is, of course, what frequently happens. As Charles describes: 
 
What I did was I, I did a lot of research at the library, at the law library actually at the 
Royal Courts of Justice, used all their books apart from I’d bought a lot of books of my own 
about representing yourself in court and that sort of stuff […]  
 
He goes on to note:  
 
Um, that [questioning] was quite daunting, and I think the judge had to kind of assist me 
with that because, um, I, I, what I did was, because I had read all the books I was trying to 
[laughter] do it the way it said in the book, you know, um, use certain terms that they 
                                                     
532 This was clearly quite a useful strategy. As he says later in the same train of thought, ‘I became 
aware, after talking to the barristers in the pub, of the limitation act, the 1980 limitation act that says 
you’ve got, uh, three years to bring a, to issue a writ with regard to personal injury cases’.   
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would use in the books or, or what, or what you see on TV where in fact it doesn’t actually 
happen that way [laughter]. 
 
By following the advice Charles found in legal texts, he found himself at times behaving 
inappropriately, or resorting to what he had seen on TV, and was again reliant on a judge to 
assist him.533 Charles’s experience is not unique. Many interviewees similarly attempted to 
acquire legal expertise, only to find themselves being told they had misunderstood, were using 
the information incorrectly, and that they should not be attempting to navigate this kind of 
information. The result of this is, as above, that a number of LiPs feel that they are actively 
prevented from acquiring legal expertise. There are also a number of LiPs who feel that when 
they attempted to present their hard-won legal expertise, their information was not accepted 
through processes of conscious or unconscious discrimination. This, too, was a significant 
factor in undermining trust, and led a small proportion of LiPs to attribute conspiracist 
explanations to their different treatment.534  
 
What is more likely to be the reason for LiP failures, however, is not a conspiracist judge so 
much as that their performance was deemed to be a kind of ‘bad acting’; that LiPs had 
mistaken what legal expertise or behaviour was and that this is what was held against them. 
But what is important to note here, in the light of these findings, is that we cannot be 
surprised that LiPs make mistakes because their role is so inadequately defined. This poor 
conception of role means that even repeated practice will not assist LiPs. This is at odds with 
Marc Galanter’s influential article, “Why the Haves Come Out Ahead” where he argues that 
laypersons in court proceedings are disadvantaged compared with legal professionals unless 
they are what he calls ‘repeat players’ or RPs.535 In Galanter’s thesis, individuals who are 
repeat players (such as defendants who have been on trial on multiple  occasions will be able to 
acquire certain skills and knowledge that will assist him or her that is not available to ‘one-
shotters’ (OS). However, what emerged from this study is that while it is certainly the case 
that some LiPs report feeling more confident in attending court through repeated practice, and 
there is a degree to which some may get better at conducting questioning, or knowing where 
to stand, for example, many instead seem to end up repeating what might best be understood 
as bad acting.   
 
                                                     
533 Charles is not alone in having had difficulties applying something he had read in practice. This 
problematic acquisition of legal expertise—where LiPs read up on a matter, or a point of law, or a 
technique, and then find difficulties in deploying it successfully, is of key importance when exploring 
issues of trust between LiPs and the legal profession. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
534 These conspiracist ideas and the circumstances under which they come about will be explored in the 
following chapter.  
535 Galanter, “Why the Haves Come Out Ahead.”  
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Essentially, a LiP cannot really know what to do when they attend courtroom because a series 
of inconsistent expectations are placed upon them, failure at any of which can result in their 
being penalised, and because these performative accomplishments are misrecognised as easily 
acquired when they are not. Repeat player LiPs, then, often do badly with greater experience. 
This is because in their pursuit of attempting to acquire legal skills, which is not available to 
them, they instead rely on a form of mimicry. This takes the form of attempting to memorise 
and cite legal rules, particularly the CPR, or to adopt “formal” modes of address that may be 
incorrect. Most tellingly, such mimicry leads to a lot of paperwork. Watching the reliance of 
legal professionals on bundles leads LiPs to develop their own extensive bundles of paper, but 
this is mistaking what the file is and does. Thomas Scheffer argues that the case file brings 
together the ‘organised memory’ of the case. As he puts it: ‘The circulation of case-information 
relies on the file’s completeness. Everything that enters the file is supposed to remain in it. As 
a result, it swells with each file-work session. The file as archive does not forget’.536 As 
Scheffer argues, however, the file constitutes a locus of specialised knowledge and activity: 
knowing how to use the file, access the file, and so on, relies on a specific legal skill set. LiPs, 
who do not understand how a bundle is used, only see the materiality of the file: an ever-
growing bundle of paper and they therefore accumulate this, mistaking the ‘materiality’ of the 
paper for the ‘materiality’ of what it is to be a legal professional.537 
 
This means that each repeat LiP will develop a peculiar ‘LiP’ skillset which appears on the 
surface to have traces of legal professional, but is in fact a product of inaccessibility of 
knowledge, inconsistency of performative demands and lack of understanding of the embodied 
skills of legal professionals. While all LiPs will not behave alike, it is likely such individuals 
will generate a lot of paperwork, cite legal rules extensively and struggle to understand why 
this way of behaving is ineffective. It is therefore a role of failure. However, I would argue that 
this is simply because there is arguably no clearly defined way to be a good LiP. Indeed, this 
study seems to suggest that for LiPs, what is appropriate or inappropriate for a LiP is instead 
largely a discretionary matter for the judge. Take Neil’s epigraph at the opening of this 
chapter. Neil describes positive experiences because he and the judge clearly got along rather 
well. He is clearly not behaving “normally” in the sense that, as he himself puts it, he is acting 
like Rumpole of the Bailey. But the judge is willing to listen to him and indulge him, and finds 
him sufficiently personable or interesting.538 This seems, in fact, to be Neil’s technique 
                                                     
536 Thomas Scheffer, “Materialities of Legal Proceedings,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 
17(2004): 32-33. 
537 And this leads to the ‘plastic-bag wielding’ image of LiPs. Neil himself relates carrying his large 
bundle of papers in a hessian bag marked “Fit as a Butcher’s Dog” on the side.  
538 As Neil tells it, after these proceedings where he threatens to put on the reggae, Justice Eady’s clerk 
approached him after court to tell him that this was one of the most entertaining days at work Justice 
Eady had ever had and the clerk gave him the courtroom notice as a memento.   
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throughout his court proceedings; to deliberately distinguish himself from legal practitioners 
to signify his difference and his (social meaning of the word) normality: 
 
He [the opposing solicitor] got up and did his little bow, and it was in the district registry. 
It was in, just like an office really, with a great big desk and we were sat on these little 
desks up here, and uh, district, oh, mister, Judge H---, he said ‘very nice meeting you Mr -’. 
And I walked around the table and I said ‘very nice meeting you as well sir, thank you very 
much’, I reached over to shake his hand and as he is shaking my hand, he says to me, I 
would be very interested to see how this progresses’ so I said oh, well, do you want me to 
keep you informed? He said ‘I’d appreciate that yes. Thank you Mr Heathcote’. And this uh 
solicitor for the hospital or whatever he was […] he’s saying ‘You can’t do that! I said 
‘What?”. He said ‘Shake the judge’s hand’. I said ‘I just have done’. But yes, but ‘You can’t 
do that’. It’s like, ‘I’ve done it, you know, you were there, you saw me’. ‘Yes, but you can’t 
do it’. Maybe you can’t do it, but I’m doing it out of respect. You can’t do it because you’re 
scared of him.  
 
But the success of this strategy is dependent on a judge deciding that this form of behaviour is 
charming rather than offensive, or inappropriate. And different judges will behave in different 
ways. Take this piece of advice from the RCJ Advice Guide again: 
 
 People often think that the Judge will run the hearing; that the Judge will ask the other 
party questions, give them a hard time or unpick the evidence to get at the truth. This is 
not what happens. If it is your claim, you have to take the lead. Judges vary in how they 
start a trial. The Judge may invite you to speak, or not. They may just expect you to stand 
up and start. If you are not sure what to do, just stand up and say something like, ‘Would 
you like me to start now?’539 
 
So where does this leave LiPs? While it is a positive indicator that judges are encouraged to 
intervene and assist LiPs, it is troubling that LiPs are so dependent upon them for a positive 
reception.540 Finally, to return to where we started, this very short analysis of the 
disadvantages for LiPs in role play doesn’t even consider the question of intimidation, or high 
stakes, and how they may impact on a LiPs ability to perform. As Talia puts it: ‘I’m one of 
those people who is much better on paper than on my two feet, especially when I’m petrified 
and someone is trying to take away my home’. There is no doubt, then, that the inadequately 
conceptualised role of the LiP is a significant source of disadvantage for LiPs and that it is 
                                                     
539 CAB, Going to Court, 6.   
540 It is also burdensome for the judge, as Genn and Genn point out, noting that in tribunals, lack of 
legal representation means the judge’s task is significantly more difficult. See Representation at Tribunals. 
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currently insufficiently addressed by those involved in legal proceedings and those attempting 
to assist LiPs. 
 
THE GATEKEEPERS 
 
Throughout its history many defendants, if not most, never actually attended the court, or 
at least got no further than the court office, but their perceptions of the legal system in its 
civil garb will certainly have been influenced, and perhaps shaped or reshaped, by that 
experience541 
 
In the above two sections of the chapter, I have spent some time elaborating on the significant 
disadvantages for LiPs that arise from the conceptual gap between lay and law and how it is 
played out in the skills gaps between layperson LiPs and legal professionals. However, in the 
final section of the chapter, I want to briefly consider something quite different: the 
disadvantage that can result for LiPs from individuals or processes that mediate between them 
and the courts. As I outlined in the introduction, these “gatekeepers” involve individuals who 
work at the courts, or at central processing organisations, and other various individuals 
involved in administrative or managerial roles. The key distinguisher for these ‘gatekeepers’ is 
that they are not legal professionals, however they can have a significant impact on LiPs 
because LiPs are frequently dependent on their goodwill or assistance to progress their claim 
or defence.542  
 
To begin with, it has long been recognised that the systems of communications in courts are 
generally poor. In the Lord Chief Justice’s Report of 2015, Lord Thomas noted that:   
 
Although in common with many other European states the number of court buildings has 
been reduced through closure, the failure to invest has meant that many of the courtrooms 
have not been modernised and lack modern means of communication to provide for better 
access to justice.  
 
He went on to point out that:  
 
                                                     
541 Patrick Polden, History of the County Court, 1.  
542 Before going any further, I want to emphasise again that this argument is not about questioning 
gatekeeper behaviour, but rather an analysis of the current gatekeeper role as representative of shifts in 
policies due to austerity measures imposed on the courts.   
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Outdated IT systems severely impede the delivery of justice. For example, the reforms to 
civil justice which were intended to implement the report of Lord Woolf were introduced in 
April 1999 only on the promise of modern IT; none was ever provided.543  
 
Many of the proposed changes that Lord Woolf outlined on streamlining access to justice 
were dependent on the development and adoption of more sophisticated IT systems to support 
individuals navigating legal proceedings.544 This was particularly directed at assisting LiPs. 
As Applebey points out, the idea was that ‘Litigants in person would be assisted by access to 
video instruction films, computer access points and information kiosks, as envisaged by Lord 
Woolf in his report’.545 But this was never achieved and the courts remain woefully behind 
over twenty years after Lord Woolf’s recommendations.  
 
The point I want to make here is that poor IT and communication issues disproportionately 
affect LiPs. We saw in the previous chapter the experience of Trevor in having his claim lost 
twice by the Northampton Central Claims Processing Centre. Such an event is far from 
surprising in a context where a single, outsourced service is meant to process all claims. But 
the point is that the effect it had was considerably more severe for Trevor because he is a LiP. 
Because Trevor is not a lawyer, he did not recognise the potential consequences nor was he 
able to intervene until after harm had been done and the bailiffs had been to his door. This is in 
tandem with Marie’s point outlined in the last chapter; that problems and errors can be dealt 
with more directly by legal professionals because they can bypass the administrative processes 
and go directly to their colleagues, through personal contacts or emails, whereas LiPs must go 
‘round the houses’.  
 
The second crucial issue to consider is what is currently happening in HMCTS. Simply going 
‘round the houses’ for LiPs involves attempting to access what is an enormously 
oversubscribed service. The courts post-LASPO are facing considerable challenges. The MOJ 
has cut £157m from its budget over the period of 2010/11 to 2015/6. Achieving these savings 
has involved cutting 22% of staff overall. In addition, there are targets of an additional 15% 
                                                     
543 Judiciary of England and Wales, The Lord Chief Justice’s Report (Judicial Office: London, 2015). 
Available online at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/lcj_report_2015-
final.pdf (accessed 3 November 2016).   
544 For an interesting overview of the developments of technology in criminal proceedings, the work of 
Emma Rowden explores how inconsistent availability of technology, variation in quality and lack of 
sufficient thought into consequences can lead to unfair outcomes for defendants. See Emma Rowden, 
“Virtual Courts and Putting ‘Summary’ back into ‘Summary Justice’: Merely Brief, or Unjust?” in 
Architecture and Justice: Judicial Meanings in the Public Realm (Ashgate: London, 2013).  
545 George Applebey, “Justice without lawyers? Litigants in person in the English civil courts,” 
Holdsworth Law Review 109 (1997): 123. 
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saving and a projected halving of the administrative budget by 2020.546 This is coupled with 
the closure of 142 courts so far, with another 86 scheduled to shut.547 These austerity 
measures have led to a dramatic decline in service quality. This is something explicitly drawn 
attention to by court staff themselves in the Trade Union Congress’s latest publication, Justice 
Denied: Impacts of the Government’s Reform of Legal Aid and Courts on Access to Justice published in 
October 2016, which drew on interviews with 141 staff members from HMCTS.548 The report 
found that: ‘the majority of respondents (90 per cent) viewed budget cuts to court services and 
the Crown Prosecution Service as being detrimental to the effective delivery of justice and this 
in turn was seen as diminishing access to justice’.549 In addition the report noted that:  
 
More than half of those surveyed (57 per cent) feel that their workloads have increased 
since 2010, and in many cases this was attributed to cuts to staffing combined with an 
increase in the volume in their work areas[...]Changes to staffing and workloads over the 
last two to three years have resulted in, for example: the loss of experienced and permanent 
staff and an increase in the use of agency and temporary workers or staff on fixed-term 
contracts; an increase in stress, pressure and unpaid work; and an increase in errors, with 
quality of work affected.550 
 
A single email address serves as a communication point for all matters relating to each County 
Court; the LiPs are therefore reliant on someone responding to them in good time, which 
frequently doesn’t happen, due to a combination of poor IT systems and understaffing.551 In 
addition, staffing cuts have had an impact on how able LiPs are to get any assistance. Trevor 
commented, when in the midst of attempting to get the court decision stayed:  
 
I, I felt sorry for the lady in um, B----- because, you know, it’s literally just one lady behind 
a window. There’s, there was obviously more people at one stage, because there was lots of 
windows but there was only this one person and it is, it was all a bit, she can’t give you any 
information or doesn’t know anything […]. 
 
Trevor is sympathetic towards this individual but his extract also notes that this is a new 
development; there used to be more windows, and more people to help you and budget cuts 
have led to fewer staff. In addition, the woman who is at the window is not equipped to 
                                                     
546 M Fouzder, “There was no money: MOJ called in consultants to help control spending,” Law Society 
Gazette, 19 October 2016. 
547 This figure includes all HMCTS, and is not restricted to only civil courtsSee Ministry of Justice, 
Proposal on the Provision of Court and Tribunal Estate in England and Wales, July 2015. The consultation 
ran from July to October 2015, 5.  
548 Trade Union Congress [TUC], Justice Denied (London: TUC, 2016).   
549 TUC, Justice Denied, 5.  
550 Ibid, 5.  
551 Ibid, 6.  
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respond to the questions. For Trevor, obtaining help or assistance to clarify what to do next is 
the prime requirement of being a LiP: 
 
Who can you speak to? Is there someone? Do they provide some sort of back up, even if it’s 
just a, even if it’s just a website, you know, is there a website you can go to that you can, 
you know, ask a question and get some sort of answer…..you know, I mean I know you can 
be, the problem with that could be is that it gets completely jammed and everyone is asking 
legal questions to a, you know, a young eighteen year old who is just there for his Saturday 
job[ laughs]. 
 
What is interesting here is that Trevor clearly assumes that the individuals who are assisting 
LiPs are not people who will have the requisite experience or expertise, instead they are 
increasingly likely to be ’eighteen year olds’ on a ‘Saturday job’.552 The implication is that 
increasing responsibility in the context of rising numbers of LiPs is being put on the shoulders 
of those who are not insufficiently trained and inadequately compensated. Many individuals 
who work at the court therefore cannot help a LiP, either because they don’t know how, or 
because it is beyond their job description.553  
 
While many of the measures imposed on the courts have an austerity rationale, that of saving 
money in the face of enormous budget cuts, the results are an increasing inaccessibility of 
services and assistance for LiPs. It is hard to reconcile this with the concept of ‘access to 
justice’, something Lord Thomas himself draws attention to when criticizing the rise in court 
fees and LiPs.554 The point I want to make here is that while these measures might be posited 
as unfair or unfortunate, there is arguably an ideological shift being undertaken through such 
policy initiatives. The reduction of face-to-face assistance, the move to central processing of 
claims and the closure of windows, the rise in court fees and many other related measures also 
all serve to minimise or deflect any accountability government policy may have towards 
impeding access to justice for LiPs. If a LiP does not receive an answer to an email, there is no 
one to whom he or she can appeal or complain. If the single staff member at the window has 
too long a queue, then a LiP may not be able to get an answer in time to respond to a claim. If 
the court fees rise substantially in tandem with a cutting of legal aid, many LiPs will not make 
it to court at all. But all of these patterns of experience and decision making cannot be directly 
attributed to any individual or institution’s specific failing; instead they will be attributed, if at 
all, to the failure of the LiP to sufficiently ‘work’ with the system. The systems being put in 
place that cause difficulties for LiPs aren’t perhaps simply unfortunate; they are an indirect but 
                                                     
552 This is supported by staffing changes at HMCTS. Ibid, 16.  
553 Ibid, 19, 27.  
554 Judicial Office, Lord Chief Justice’s Report.  
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arguably useful means of reducing certain kinds of court users while also reducing any 
accountability for lack of access to justice.555  
 
Trevor outlines the collision between austerity and fairness explicitly reflecting on his own 
experience:  
 
Because what I mean is, if a thing is, by its nature going to be inefficient, if you, if what the 
law is about is getting to the truth, if that’s what it’s about, it’s about giving people the 
hon-, the honest, as close to the truth as you can get about stuff, um, then it’s gonna take, 
you’ve got to give that thing time, it can’t be done quickly. If you’re trying to make it 
quickly at some, somewhere down the line someone’s going to lose out, something’s gonna 
get missed because you’re doing it quickly and if it can’t be done quickly, then it can’t be 
done quickly. There’s no point in trying to make something into something that it’s not, 
that’s my point. Is that, if that’s the case, that there is efficiency is going to have to be, you 
can either be efficient or you can be correct, then which, it depends which way you’re going 
to go, whether you want to be correct or you want to be efficient, and then if you want to 
be correct then obviously you’re going to have to put the money in to make sure that you 
can be correct, you can’t, you can’t have both, I don’t think, I’m not an expert. It seems to 
me you’re trying to save money in something that, where actually, you can’t really save a 
lot of money. All you can do is make things less fair, less right, and then you save money 
but then you don’t get the right result. So, that’s what I think about the court system from 
my experience. 
 
To follow Trevor’s line of thinking then, cost cutting measures clearly result in 
disproportionately unfair experiences and encounters for LiPs. But beyond this, we can argue 
what is increasingly being put into place through government policy initiatives is a court 
system where saving money is the key motivator; and, most importantly, that the 
implementation of this savings policy is done through decreasing human contact, or recourse 
to assistance, even if this was not the primary or conscious aim. By achieving savings through 
outsourcing, or decreasing of workplace skills, one can also neuter the possibility of any 
complaints that may arise: the courts remain theoretically open, but are increasingly 
impenetrable, expensive and inconsistent. It is no wonder, then, that LiPs find navigating legal 
proceedings so challenging. Firstly, LiPs are excluded from procedures through a lack of 
understanding of legal language and behaviour, secondly, their own role is not conceptualised 
clearly and finally, crucially, LiPs are operating in a system that was never designed for them 
and that, increasingly, favours privatisation and outsourcing that serves to disadvantage them 
further but for which there is very limited accountability when things go wrong.  
                                                     
555 Fouzder, “There was no money.”  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, then, the question I asked at the beginning of the chapter perhaps needs to be 
changed. Instead of asking why is it harder for LiPs to go to law, perhaps we should be asking, 
how is it even possible for LiPs to go to law successfully? And if it isn’t possible, is it their 
fault? To begin with, as this chapter has illustrated, LiPs face significant difficulties in 
communication and comprehension. They frequently feel not listened to. But such gaps in 
communication and comprehension speak to the preservation of the necessary gap between the 
law as a professional field and the layperson. Such a gap is not accidental. In addition, no 
matter how hard they try, LiPs are unable to improve, with success being an exception, not 
the rule. But as I have argued here, this is because there is no such thing as a good LiP: to be a 
LiP is, by its very definition, to fail. There is simply no way for LiPs to do well. In addition, 
the current policies in place, such as a lack of legal aid, rising court fees, and minimal 
assistance, clearly serve to discourage LiPs presence as much as possible through indirect 
means, if not actively direct ones.  
 
It seems, perhaps, that LiPs are simply not wanted. Or, to rephrase this in a more nuanced 
way, LiPs are not significant enough players to warrant further assistance or attention in a 
belt-tightening environment. However, it should come as no surprise that LiPs themselves feel 
unwanted. And it is this idea that leads to the concerns of the final chapter: that of conspiracy. 
In this chapter I will examine how the cumulative, largely negative experiences LiPs have can 
come to affect their beliefs about lawyers, about the legal system, and about justice. As I will 
show, this erosion of trust in the legal system leads some LiPs to entertain conspiracist 
theories. But while the conspiracist conclusions LiPs may reach may be ill-conceived or 
disproportionate (and, at times, offensive), I argue that to dismiss these individuals as simple 
cranks overlooks two essential tenets of conspiracy theories that pertain to LiP experiences in 
the civil justice system: firstly, Bad Things certainly happen to good LiPs and secondly, ‘even 
paranoids have real enemies’.556  
 
  
                                                     
556 Of course by ‘enemy’ I am not setting up a simplistic analysis of the courts actively persecuting LiPs, 
however, as I hope to show in the following chapter, the combined lack of assistance for LiPs and the 
generally hostile attitude of legal practitioners to LiPs amounts to what can be considered at the very 
least a limited tolerance towards LiPs moving towards active animosity. Ronald Inglehart, “Extremist 
Political Positions and Perceptions of Conspiracy: Even Paranoids have Real Enemies” in Changing 
Conceptions of Conspiracy, Graumann, C.F. and Moscovici, S, eds. (London: Springer-Verlag, 1987), 231.  
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7 
CONSPIRACY!:  
OR, WHEN BAD THINGS HAPPEN TO GOOD LIPS. 
 
 
It was very, very, very distressing because, um, they had, um, they had a barrister supplied 
by, um, the Solicitor’s Indemnity Fund and, um, even though I think I held my own very 
well, well obviously I did because I won the case, so I-I did very, very well considering that 
I was, I was a complete amateur but um, I think because of, um, the masons and all that 
sort of stuff, masonic lodges and all these people knowing each other, it would be very 
embarrassing for a solicitor to um, the thing is if I had won, it would have been in the 
press, and it would have been very embarrassing for them and they didn’t want that so 
that’s how they cover up to keep litigants in person down to make sure that, um, you don’t 
rock the boat. 
                     Charles 
 
Yeah there’s the odd case where, um, suddenly somebody is selected, probably a freemason, 
to win a landmark case, yeah? Erm, like that actress who got um, similar to an MRSA 
claim, um, can’t remember what her name was but she got huge compensation for 
something very similar to me, um, uh what was it she had, what was her name, uh, quite a 
famous actress but anyway she had something similar to me, but oh! It’s all over the 
newspapers. Is it Leslie Ash? Leslie Ash, I think so. All over the papers. I thought oh yeah, 
she’s probably a freemason. They’ve selected her to give her some compensation. Uh, lots 
of publicity to try and persuade the general public that the courts are giving people 
compensation whereas in reality the only people that get compensation is a very small, 
selected few. 
                 Anna 
 
I know it sounds like I’m a conspiracy theorist but I can assure you I am not.  
           Georgina 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
How do some LiPs come to be conspiracists? The majority of LiPs, of course, probably don’t 
become conspiracy minded.557 There is also no evidence that LiPs are any more likely than 
anyone else in legal proceedings to be conspiracists, only, perhaps, that it tends to be more 
obvious when they are.558 But there is no doubt that in this study, as has been identified before, 
there continue to be individuals who have conspiracist explanations for difficulties or failures 
they experience throughout their legal proceedings (and, sometimes, elsewhere).559 But while 
it is known that some LiPs hold eccentric beliefs, there has been little attempt to understand 
how and why LiPs may come to acquire, or articulate these beliefs.560 This is presumably at 
least partly because it is easier to dismiss such individuals as “cranks” or “nutters”. 
Alternatively, because such individuals form so small a percentage of LiPs, too much attention 
placed on them risks misrepresenting other LiPs.561 Regardless of which objection one 
subscribes to, though, both tend to share the presumption that such cases involve pathological 
individuals who happen to be involved in legal proceedings; in other words, the fact that they 
are LiPs is less, or not at all, relevant. In this chapter, I take a different approach by seeking to 
understand how conspiracist beliefs may be connected to experiences of becoming, and acting, 
as LiPs. In other words, I argue that  conspiracist behaviours and beliefs are affected, 
reproduced and even created by contact with legal proceedings.  
 
Up until this point, this thesis has argued that legal proceedings can have a significant and 
negative impact on LiPs. What this chapter seeks to trace is the degree to which these kinds of 
negative encounters with legal proceedings affect LiP beliefs about the law, lawyers and the 
courts. I argue here that LiPs uniformly feel unwanted by the courts. But this is not because 
they are fundamentally needy or pathological individuals. It is because they experience 
differential treatment. While this treatment is symptomatic of structural inequality, and not 
                                                     
557 It is important to note that in this chapter I am making a distinction between conspiracist minded 
LiPs and vexatious litigants. At the moment, the only attention paid to more obsessive LiPs in research 
tends to absorb them all into the ‘vexatious’ category. This may be because other studies have not been 
able to identify conspiracist individuals prior to, or separately from, their declaration as vexatious 
litigants.  
558 As I will demonstrate, LiPs in this study who did entertain conspiracist ideas often freely expressed 
them in the courtroom itself. The possibility remains that represented individuals who may hold similar 
beliefs were prevented from doing the same by their legal representative.  
559 Fewer still will become declared vexatious litigants or have civil restraint orders taken out against 
them, and people who are declared vexatious litigants may not themselves be conspiracists.  
560 The important exception to this is the work of Didi Herman whose article on “Hopeless Cases” 
considers how and why declared vexatious litigants keep obsessively pursuing ideas of justice. Similar 
research has been undertaken by Monica Taylor in Australia as well. However, both pieces of work 
focus on vexatious litigants only, whereas this research looks at a broader group of LiPs.  
561 This is an argument I myself have already advanced in the beginning of this thesis. 
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necessarily of overt or conscious discrimination, what LiPs themselves perceive is that they 
are deliberately and systematically excluded from access to justice by the actions of the legal 
profession. Negative encounters with the law lead many LiPs to become critics of a legal system 
they feel fails to adequately perform and leads beyond this, for some, to the development or 
elaboration of conspiracist ideas to explain the failures they experience. 
 
I begin this chapter by introducing the conspiracy theories that were brought up by 
interviewees in this study. I then draw on conspiracy theory literature to understand these 
ideas, arguing that conspiracies are better understood not as the product of individual 
pathology, but are rather rooted in social and collective experience. Applying these ideas to 
the situation of the LiP, I then look at how and why conspiracist beliefs arise and the context 
in which this takes place for these individuals. I go on to argue that while the malign authority 
conspiracists may invoke to explain their experiences is fictive, what leads to these beliefs—a 
perception of deliberately unfair treatment—is rooted in genuine and systematic experiences 
of exclusion, and these exclusions happen to all LiPs to differing extents in the civil justice 
system. Legal professionals have colonised the legal system, and thus LiPs are always treated 
as exceptions to the norm. There is no specific role for LiPs and so LiPs lack guidance as to 
how to do well. Legal information is largely inaccessible to laypersons. LiPs aren’t recognised, 
or treated, as equal participants in legal proceedings. Most importantly, what LiPs may want 
or value is rendered almost impossible to translate into the policy and practice of the civil 
justice system in which they seek to pursue or defend their claim. So, then, is it any wonder 
that LiPs feel paranoid? As I conclude, if some LiPs are “crazy”, we ought to consider the 
possibility that going to law has made them this way.  
 
CONSPIRACY! 
 
Talia, fighting a possession claim on her property, has long suspected that in order to win 
their case against her, her freeholder and the bank who hold her mortgage are in league 
together, and have resorted to ‘faking’ court documentation. As she expresses it: 
 
 
The claims production centre, they have to ensure that you cannot substitute, um, a 
genuine template with a fake template. Because I work in IT I know how easy that 
is…most people wouldn’t occur to them that that’s what they’d done. And when I, when I 
looked at this order I’d been served I didn’t notice straightaway that it was fake and then I 
had a closer look and then I realised that the note to defence to the defendant was the 
wrong one and was of a different form and then I started looking harder and noticed there 
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was no copyright notice and then I knew I was on to something and I went on the web and 
tried to find a genuine N31 and I could only find one. One, on the web. It’s not on the um, 
it’s not one of the forms that you can download on the …court service website. I just found 
one that had been produced by Sweet & Maxwell some years ago and left on the web….if I 
hadn’t found that, I couldn’t have done what I’ve done so far which is prove to the, um, 
chief executive’s office of the Court Service what had happened and…when the police get 
back to me I’ll be able to prove to them that this is what has happened.  
 
For Talia, her belief that court documents are being “faked” is attributable to the lengths her 
opposition will go to to try and win. As she notes:   
 
All I could do was defend my interests and my, really vigorously, defend my position and 
let the cards fall as they would after that but I could never have foresawn, foreseen the fake 
court forms, I mean there just seems to be no e-….there seems to be no limit to what this 
claimant can do to subvert all stages of the, um, legal process.  
 
Talia’s belief that the court documents are fake has led her to refuse to accept the legitimacy of 
other documents she received in the belief that they are also fake. Talia’s belief that there are 
counterfeited court documents in circulation, deliberately employed to trick LiPs, is shared by 
other interviewees, some of whom believe something even more elaborate and sinister. For 
example, Georgina not only believes documents issued by the courts are fake, she believes the 
courts themselves are ‘fake’. As she expresses it: 
 
I believe we’ve got a situation where we’ve got shadow banks contracting with shadow 
courts who are contracting, you know, with privately hired judges. Shadow means 
privately hired, paid for, commercial courts, administrative courts, they’re not using due 
process, they’re ignoring the law, they’re even ignoring their own CPR rules and it’s a dire 
state of affairs. They’re not fit for purpose, it’s a rigged game, there’s no level playing field 
and, and woe betide anybody who goes in there. 
 
For Georgina, there is a parallel system of ‘shadow courts’ in operation that is entirely self-
serving; ignoring the rules and exploiting the less powerful.  
 
For Russell, the picture is slightly different. Russell also believes that courts produce fake 
documents. Unlike Georgina, though, he does not refer to fake courts.562 Instead, for Russell, 
the courts are real enough, but the decisions in these courts are made on the basis of 
                                                     
562 Which does not necessarily mean that Russell isn’t a believer in a ‘shadow conspiracy’, however he 
was not explicit in saying so.  
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influential, shadowy figures having their objectives rubberstamped by those they are in league 
with; namely, it’s a masonic conspiracy. For Russell the courts are riddled with Freemason 
influence. Russell describes how this influence might manifest in court:  
 
[a] freemason, if he is in difficulties, say in a court, and you see it in a court, they go up like 
that, I just don’t know what to do your Honour, so he’s saying (finger signals) I’m a 
widow’s son, see that’s a fraud, you see, passing themselves off as something they’re not. 
Yeah, they do all sorts of other tricks like you know, turn their head away and that means 
it stinks, this case stinks. Um, various things they can do. 
 
Russell believes that fundamental to this masonic conspiracy is the idea that masons help one 
another, over the interests of anyone else. This belief means that there does not need to be a 
prior plot to undermine a specific LiP; a mason need only ‘signal’ to communicate his desired 
outcome and other masons will accommodate him, thus disadvantaging others in the 
courtroom.  This suggests a very wide-reaching, and elaborate, conspiracy of all masons 
against other non-masons, in keeping with general conspiracist beliefs about Freemasons.563 
Georgina also believes in this wide ranging masonic conspiracy, noting it is one of the ‘cults’ 
infiltrating the justice system: 
 
there’s a lot of Machivalean [sic] cults like Freemasonry for example, I know that a lot of 
the things they do, they swear allegiance to each other, um, uh, even above their own 
families and to me that’s highly dangerous, I know an awful lot of the bad things that are 
happening are in, through, you know they’re in the same lodge, for example members of the 
police force, members of the legal profession, even judges. I’ve seen judges shaking like a 
leaf in terror, probably because they’ve been threatened if they go against the agenda. 
 
For Georgina the conspiracy of masons is so strong that even individual judges are unable to 
act freely.564 Charles and Anna, too, cite the perceived influence of the masons on the courts in 
                                                     
563 I will go into more detail about masonic conspiracy theories later in the chapter, however it is worth 
mentioning here that Freemason conspiracy theories were prominent enough in the UK in the 1980s to 
lead to a parliamentary enquiry. See: Home Affairs Select Committee, Freemasonry in the Police and 
Judiciary, Third Report from the Home Affairs Committee (House of Commons: London,1996-97), 192. 
They’re not exactly extinct now either, with Lord Berekeley submitting the following question in 
March 2016: ‘To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of reports of collusion within the police 
forces and other agencies after the Hillsborough disaster, whether they will introduce legislation to 
prevent serving members of the police force and the judiciary from belonging to the freemasons.’ 
HL1687, 9 May 2016, available at:  http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/2016-05-03/HL8167/  
564 When asked to provide a percentage of judges they believed to be masons, neither Paul nor Georgina 
was able to put a figure on it, however, Russell estimated that it affected almost all judges: basing his 
estimate on a percentage of masons in a small area, he suggested: ‘Take that number and extrapolate 
over all the judges in the UK. And you find out that virtually 100% of judges are freemasons’.  
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the epigraphs that open this chapter.565 While Charles’s claim is quite vague, citing a general 
masonic ‘influence’, Anna is quite explicit about the control masons have over the courts, 
illustrated by their ability to ‘choose’ to ‘reward’ a fellow mason to illustrate [falsely] that 
sometimes ordinary litigants can succeed.   
 
The masonic conspiracy mentioned by interviewees is also coupled with a strong anti-Semitic 
element, where alongside the masonic influence, there is alleged to be a “Jewish” influence on 
the courts. Anna says, for example:  
 
What I did, uh, I know that in these scandals in M----, I mean, a lot of the scandals in the 
country, the, the, um, I mean, like Shipman’s obviously a Jewish freemason scandal, but 
certainly there are, a number of Jewish people involved in my scand-, both my scandals. 
Um the medical one in particular, um, so I thought, um because, because of the Jewish 
influence that um I needed a decent Jewish judge to stand up for what is right because you 
know, because I’m aware there’s, that there is some thoroughly decent Jewish people who 
have got great family values but I’m also aware from personal experience and what my 
mother has told me that there are others who will do anything for money, um, and so I 
thought, this is an opportunity for him to stand up for the decent ones, yeah? 
 
Georgina, too, makes claims about ‘money Jews’, and Russell also makes multiple anti-Semitic 
references to Zionism, and the ‘world citizenry’ of the Jews.566 However, as Bernard Levin 
points out:  
 
Freemasonry hysteria [. . .] is paralleled to the same principles as those of anti-Semitism, 
and indeed it has often been to a very considerable extent a stalking-horse for the more 
ancient vileness. It could hardly be otherwise; attacks on suspect Jewry have almost always 
been inextricably entwined with anti-freemasonry. Hitler lumped them together without 
distinction of any kind. 567 
 
It is certainly the case in this study that claims about Freemasons heavily overlap with anti-
Semitic traditions, including assertions about control over the judiciary, banking and other 
areas.568 For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, I am largely combining Freemason and 
                                                     
565 In addition, Paul also mentions the masons, albeit only once, when referring to the earliest dispute he 
remembers his family being involved in:   
566 Russell says: ‘And of course the Jews believe in the bible that, that they are citizens of the world, the 
world is theirs, that is what they’re striving for’.  
567 Bernard Levin, The Times, 30 November 1976.  
568 For an overview of some of the clichéd orthodoxies of anti-Semitism, a good starting point is Frank 
Felsenstein, Anti-Semitic Stereotypes: A Paradigm of Otherness in English Popular Culture, 1660-1830 (Johns 
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1995).   
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anti-Semitic conspiracy since it is arguable the language and attitudes of masonic conspiracy 
draws heavily on older anti-Semitic conspiracies if not always explicitly anti-Semitic in 
itself.569 Finally, a common theme emerging across all of these conspiracies is the accusation of 
‘corruption’ in the courts. As Georgina puts it: ‘I’m actually pretty angry with the whole, uh, 
justice system in Britain I think it stinks, um, you know, I, I, I, I can’t bear the corruption’. 
Charles says: ‘I just feel that, I’ve got no confidence in the system, I think they’re totally 
corrupt’. 
 
So, what are we to make of these conspiracy theories? Offensive, yes. Anti-Semitic, very. 
Crazy: well, yes. It is hardly difficult to argue that LiPs who come to court and express these 
kinds of beliefs should be considered difficult, or vexatious or, frankly, “nuts”. 570 It is also hard 
to imagine how any engagement with these ideas doesn’t risk suggesting a sympathy that is 
unpalatable in the face of the hateful nature of some of these beliefs. But in this thesis I set out 
to engage with LiP perspectives; to understand how they understood their own experiences. 
And this is the challenge of this chapter: to find a way of approaching these accounts that 
might be useful, and able to tell us something about LiPs and their experiences.  What can we 
do with these stories? 
 
CONSPIRACY THEORY: A SHORT HISTORY  
 
Conspiracy theory has been an object of academic attention for a relatively short period of 
time; with the earliest research being in the discipline of psychology in the 1960s571, and the 
vast majority not emerging until the last twenty years, symptomatic of what political theorists 
Michael Butter and Peter Knight argue is evidence that conspiracy theory was considered (no 
irony intended) as a ‘fringe’ concern.572 Today, however, conspiracy theory has gone 
mainstream, and research in the area is flourishing, prompted by an unprecedented context in 
which ‘fringe’ conspiracy theories are routinely deployed by world leaders and where the 
                                                     
569 It is important to note here that while Charles mentions the ‘masons’ in a quite off-hand way, he at 
no times says anything anti-Semitic at all, nor is there any indication he holds any such prejudices. As I 
will consider in more detail later, his conspiracist beliefs are much less developed than the other four 
interviewees routinely drawn on in this chapter who do routinely express anti-Semitic beliefs both 
connected to, and separate from, masonic conspiracy theories.   
570 I have argued earlier that ‘vexatious’ theoretically pertains to the proceedings, not necessarily the 
conduct of an individual, but it is easy to see how a LiP making claims in court about masonic 
conspiracies undermines or obscures any validity there might be to the proceedings they have brought 
or are defending.  
571 R Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style In American Politics,” The Paranoid Style in American Politics and 
Other Essays (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1964). 
572 Michael Butter and Peter Knight, “Bridging the Great Divide: Conspiracy Theory Research for the 
21st Century,” Diogenes 2016.   
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internet has enabled the dissemination and repetition of conspiracies in public discourse.573 
Butter and Knight, in an article considering the history of research into conspiracy theories, 
argue that two clear approaches to understanding conspiracy have emerged in academia. The 
first, most dominant, and the oldest, is rooted in the discipline of psychology. This approach 
thinks about conspiracism as a form of pathology. In this way of thinking, conspiracist theories 
are signs of conspiracist ideation and, concomitantly, a conspiracist mentality. As they explain 
it: 
 
 Early researchers in the field tended to take for granted that conspiracy theories are held 
by distinctive kinds of people with identifiable and flawed psychological characteristics: 
conspiracy theorists. Instead of investigating the structural, historical and cultural features 
of conspiracy theories, much work in psychology has sought to profile believers, and 
enumerate the personality and cognitive factors involved in what is usually termed – in a 
phrase that evokes an unwarranted level of diagnostic precision – ‘conspiracy ideation’.574 
 
The focus in psychology studies of conspiracy is firmly trained on the individual and seeks to 
explain that individual’s maladjustment; why such a person might be prone to fringe beliefs or 
delusional ideas. While there is no literature specifically on conspiracy theory and LiPs 
(indeed, there is no literature directly focused on conspiracy theories and the law at all), there 
is a body of law-and-psychology, and law-and-psychiatry, literature that attempts to explain 
‘obsessive’ LiPs.575 Such literature supports Butter and Knight’s claim that identifying 
pathology is the most common approach to understanding unusual behaviours or beliefs.576 
These kinds of analyses of LiPs focus on obsessive litigation as an identifying pathological 
behaviour, often termed “querulousness” or “querulous behaviour”. Mullen and Lester, for 
example, in their study of ‘unusually persistent complainants’ argue querulousness can best be 
understood as:  
 
a constellation of behaviours and attitudes, which may, or may not, arise secondary to a 
major mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, and may, or may not, be characterised by 
delusional phenomena. What primarily defines the concept, we believe, is a disorder of 
                                                     
573 Kurt Anderson, “How America Lost its Mind”, Atlantic Monthly¸ September 2017; Paul Rosenberg, 
“Conspiracy Theory’s Big Comeback: Deep Paranoia Runs Free in the Age of Donald Trump,” Salon, 1 
January 2017.  
574 Butter and Knight, “Bridging the Great Divide,”4.  
575 The slippage in terminology that I have earlier argued causes confusion arises again here, with work 
in this area shifting between ‘obsessive’, ‘vexatious’, ‘difficult’, and ‘querulent’ litigants, who are usually 
self-represented but not always explicitly defined as such. See Ian Freckelton, Vexatious Litigants: A 
Report on Consultation with Court and VCAT Staff (Victorian Parliament: Melbourne, 2015), 22. 
576 See, for example, Paul Mullen and Grant Lester, “Vexatious Litigants and Unusually Persistent 
Complainants and Petitioners: From Querulous Paranoia to Querulous Behaviour,” Behavioural Science 
and the Law 24 (2006); Ian Freckleton, “Querulent Paranoia and the Vexatious Complainant,” 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 11 (1988).  
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behaviour, and, like any pattern of behaviour, the routes to its emergence and the factors 
that enable and sustain it can be many and varied. Pathology in this conceptualisation does 
not lie exclusively in the subjects’ mental state but in their behaviour and its impact on 
themselves and others.577 
 
This focus on the pathology of individuals pursuing multiple complaints is also evidenced in 
the work of Sourdin and Wallace in Australia who note that: 
 
It seems likely, and some court decisions report this, that there is a small number of SRLs 
who require more court time and are difficult to deal with and that this population may be 
greater in higher courts. These SRLs may be difficult to deal with because of personality 
disorders and behavioural factors, which may mean that a particular SRL is more likely to 
be in dispute and less likely to act in a rational, logical or helpful manner.578  
 
For Sourdin and Wallace, mental health and behavioural issues will prevent some LiPs from 
being ‘rational, logical or helpful.’ This is in keeping with the association Mullen and Lester 
make above between querulousness and an underlying psychopathology.579 While this thesis 
does not dispute the possibility of individuals acting as LiPs who may suffer from mental 
health problems, the critical issue here is the association made between the ‘difficult’ and the 
pathological. Sourdin and Wallace, for example, are suggesting that longer court time equates 
to behavioural issues. In Mullen and Lester’s conception, too, those who are persistent 
complainants without success are automatically displayers of pathological behaviour.580   
 
This association between pathology and difficulty suggests, then, that any disruption or 
difficulty, or extension of the legal proceedings is primarily attributable to that difficult 
individual. These individuals therefore pose a problem, and need to be separated from those 
litigants who are ‘legitimate’ complainers.581 In addition, such individuals potentially pose a 
threat: 
 
Attacks by the querulous on court officials, claims officials and politicians are by no means 
uncommon. In such cases there has often been a course of conduct characterized by 
                                                     
577 Mullen and Lester, “Vexatious Litigants,” 334. 
578 Sourdin and Wallace, “The Dark Side,” 8.  
579 Other similar pieces of work include RL Goldstein, “Paranoids in the legal system: The Litigious 
Paranoid and the Paranoid Criminal,” The Psychiatric Clinics of North America 18 (1995): Grant Lester 
et.al, “Unusually persistent complainants,” British Journal of Psychiatry 184 (2004). 
580 Hazel Genn, for example, argues that there are two ‘types’ of LiPs: those who are ‘one-shotters’, and 
those who are serial, querulous or vexatious litigants. See Genn, “Do It Yourself Law,” 9. This division 
into two groups is echoed by Sourdin and Wallace in “The Dark Side” and Moorhead and Sefton in 
Unrepresented Litigants. 
581 Mullen and Lester, “Vexatious Litigants,” 334. 
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increasingly threatening and intrusive activities, usually over many months, which, with 
the benefit of hindsight, takes on a sinister import. In a number of cases of serious or fatal 
violence, of which we have knowledge, clear and specific threats had been issued.582 
 
Here we see again the shadow of the LiPs who might ‘spill blood’ in the courtroom.583  
 
Another, related, trend in psychological and psychiatric literature on conspiracy theory 
identified by Butter and Knight tends to explain conspiracism in terms of cognitive error: 
 
Instead of focusing on conspiracist personality as such, some psychologists have 
investigated the heuristics, cognitive biases and other forms of supposedly faulty reasoning 
involved in ‘conspiracy ideation’, such as mistaken causal attribution and an overreliance on 
intentionality (‘fundamental attribution error’), a faulty estimation of probability 
(‘conjunction error’), and a ‘stickiness’ to beliefs in the face of contrary evidence 
(‘confirmation bias’).584 
 
These kinds of explanations are also evidenced in ‘difficult litigant’ literature. Mullen and 
Lester note that:  
 
The cognitive style of the querulous is that of seeking confirmation of their viewpoint, 
seizing on supposed support, and rejecting or minimizing all counterexamples. This 
unfortunately is a common enough approach to the world, but in the querulous it is 
combined with a pedantic attention to selected details, which ignores broader patterns of 
meaning, and with a suspiciousness of the motives of any who question their 
interpretations.585  
 
Such an approach, while less inclined to necessarily ascribe cognitive error to delusion or 
paranoia, focuses its attention on how and why LiPs are mistaken in their beliefs and the kinds 
of cognitive ‘errors’ they make.586 There is no doubt that LiPs misunderstand, and LiPs make 
errors. But what these kinds of approaches also do is again locate the source of the difficulty 
within the individual. If the case takes too long, it is because the LiP is ‘difficult’. If the LiP 
persists in complaining, it is because they are querulous. If the LiP misunderstands, it is 
                                                     
582 Ibid, 345. 
583 District Judge Nick Crichton quoted in Langton-Down, “Litigants in Person Could Struggle.” 
584 Butter and Knight, “The Great Divide,” 5.  
585 Mullen and Lester, “Vexatious Litigants,” 342. 
586 Ian Freckelton "Querulent Paranoia and the Vexatious Complainant"; Ian Freckelton “Editorial: 
Vexatious Litigant Law Reform,” Journal of Law and Medicine 16 (2009): 721. 
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because of their cognitive difficulties. If the LiP displays fractious behaviour, this may be 
because of an underlying pathological condition.587  
 
We are, as ever, too quick to pathologise LiPs, perhaps especially those who express ‘fringe’ 
beliefs.  But we do damage to our own understanding of LiPs by making these kinds of 
assumptions, for three key reasons. Firstly, by assuming conspiracy theorists are pathological, 
we assume that what these individuals are saying is untrue. As Michael J. Wood points out: ‘it 
assumes that they are deluded and what they believe in cannot be so’.588  While in this study, 
we can be confident that there is no masonic plot, there is a danger in dismissing all 
conspiracist claims. As Butter and Knight point out:  
 
If believers in a Watergate conspiracy or an official cover-up in the Hillsborough football 
stadium disaster had been included in some of the psychological studies of conspiracy 
ideation before those stories were confirmed as proven conspiracies, would they have 
manifested the same traits as those who believe in stories that have not been proven?589 
 
Take, for example, Mullen and Lester’s comments, with the above warning in mind. They 
argue that querulousness is found in  
 
three broad types, unusually persistent complainants, vexatious litigants, and those who in 
pursuit of idiosyncratic quests harass the powerful and prominent with petitions and pleas. 
Excluded from this category are social reformers and campaigners who use litigation and 
complaint to advance agendas of potential public interest, even if they are pursuing 
unpopular causes in a disruptive manner.590  
 
Fundamental to Mullen and Lester’s theory is a distinction that can be made between ‘worthy’ 
and ‘unworthy’ litigants predicated on whether their obsessive litigation has ‘potential public 
interest’. But, as Butler and Knight point out, how are we to know this if this kind of ‘social 
reform’ is often only vindicated or validated in hindsight?  
 
Secondly, as Wood points out: ‘the conspiracy-theory label exerts its influence by shifting 
attention away from the validity of the claims and toward the competence and credibility of 
the person making them’.591 Labelling someone a conspiracy theorist turns the entire question 
                                                     
587 See Ian Freckelton, Vexatious Litigants: A Report on Consultation with Court and VCAT Staff (Victorian 
Parliament: Melbourne, 2015) 7.   
588 Michael J. Wood, “Some Dare Call It Conspiracy: Labelling Something a Conspiracy Theory Does 
Not Reduce Belief in It,” Political Psychology 37, no. 5 (2016): 695. 
589 Butter and Knight, “Bridging the Great Divide,” 9.  
590 Mullen and Lester, “Vexatious Litigants,” 334. 
591 Wood, “Some Dare Call It Conspiracy,” 695. 
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into one of credibility. By displacing attention from what someone is saying to the competence 
of the individual, we undermine the potential seriousness of the claims. Harriet Washington’s 
book on medical experimentation on African-Americans in the 20th century points out that 
those who suggested such experiments were taking place were considered ‘paranoid,’ which 
successfully shifted attention from the institution to the individual making the assertion. Of 
course, such ‘paranoia’ was later revealed to be all too true.592 Again, while I am not 
suggesting that the conspiracies stated above are in any way a parallel, particularly to such a 
dark history of racial discrimination and violence, the structural issue at stake is the same. As 
Wood goes on to note: ‘Calling something a conspiracy theory (or someone a conspiracy 
theorist) is seen as an act of rhetorical violence, a way of dismissing reasonable suspicion as 
irrational paranoia’.593 Concentration on individual competence—or, more accurately when it 
comes to LiPs, incompetence—is very much in keeping with LiPs in the literature. LiPs are 
often poor performers, and poor communicators, and this is focused on at the expense of the 
substance of what they might be trying to communicate. But someone could be a difficult, or 
confused, or ‘querulent’ individual and still have a valid complaint.  
 
Finally, the third issue with considering conspiracy theory the product of individual pathology 
is one where the ‘rhetorical violence’ of the claim prevents any investigation into the 
complaint. As Lance deHaven-Smith argues: ‘the conspiracy-theory label comes with such 
negative baggage that applying it has “the effect of dismissing conspiratorial suspicions out of 
hand with no discussion whatsoever’’’.594 In short, to call someone’s beliefs “nuts” forestalls a 
conversation about what might provoke these conspiracist ideas in the first place. By 
concentrating on the individual, psychiatric and psychological explanations of conspiracy 
theories and of difficult LiPs tend to ignore the contribution that legal processes themselves 
may make in shaping a LiP’s beliefs or behaviours.595 
 
CONSPIRACY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
There is another way of approaching understanding conspiracy theories, however, which 
involves moving away from the psychological and psychiatric literature and moving towards 
the social sciences. The second, parallel research in conspiracy theory identified by Butter and 
Knight is located in the political sciences. Political science literature about conspiracy theories 
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posits them in a fundamentally different way to that of psychology and psychiatry. For many 
political scientists, the key to understanding conspiracy theories is to recognise that they are 
collective and social processes. As Butter and Knight express it: ‘The starting point would need to 
be the recognition that no matter what psychological traits are involved, conspiracy theories 
are essentially social constructs’.596  They go on to argue that:  
 
What makes conspiracy theories a distinctive way of explaining the world is not to be 
found solely in the psychology of individual believers, but in the shared structural elements 
of the conspiracy theories themselves. Researchers therefore need to investigate the 
cultural work conspiracy theories perform in different places and times, and the social 
relations that conspiracism both enables and curtails.597 
 
In other words, concentrating on individual pathology fails to capture the structural 
conditions that might give rise to conspiracist beliefs. So, excavation of these structural 
conditions may offer a way in to understanding how these beliefs are produced and 
reproduced. This does not exclude the possibility of pathology, but it also doesn’t reduce a 
holder of conspiracy theories to a mere pathology. And this approach presents a unique 
opportunity to do something different with LiP conspiracist stories. Instead of assuming that 
these individuals are pathological and that this therefore invalidates anything they say, what 
might we find out by looking at the conditions under which such ideas emerge? What work are 
these conspiracy theories doing?  
 
In the broadest sense, the work conspiracy theory does is provide an explanation of a negative 
experience or a failure. Conspiracists simply use a different explanation for why failure takes 
place; or rather, because they have a desire for a unified explanation of why this takes place.598 
As David Aaronovich suggests, this belief is sometimes about ‘the unnecessary assumption of 
conspiracy when other explanations are more probable’.599 But conspiracy theories also 
provide unified or simple explanations for experiences and phenomena that do not have such 
obvious explanations. Conspiracy theories therefore allow individuals who believe in them to 
identify a clear ‘enemy’ or have a clear explanation for ‘why’ something happened that may 
provide reassurance.600 These aspects of conspiracy are underlined in this study, with the 
conspiracists in this study using their theories to provide an explanation for why they are 
having such bad experiences in the courts. However, in addition, as I will demonstrate, the 
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conspiracies that such interviewees select correspond to these experiences of LiP exclusion and 
as such are indelibly linked to those experiences.  
 
In the next section of the chapter, I turn to consider how the conspiracies evidenced by 
interviewees in this study are connected to their experience as LiPs.  It is important to note, of 
course, that there is no doubt that conspiracist ideas are a convenient way for LiPs to interpret 
why the court has gone against them when they are convinced that they are right.601  But all 
conspiracies are particular and they can tell us something about the social context in which 
they occur. I argue in the following section that the impetus for conspiracist explanation in 
this study is linked to LiP experiences of exclusion: the kind of exclusion that is experienced 
by all LiPs. This is not to say, of course, that what the interviewees assert are true. It is, 
however, to take seriously the idea that LiPs themselves consider it to be true, and to consider 
the consequences of these beliefs.  
 
 
WHY FREEMASONS? 
By far the most common conspiracy expressed by interviewees in this study relates to 
Freemasonry. But why the Freemasons? What work does this conspiracy do and under what 
conditions does it arise? Masonic conspiracy theories date back hundreds of years and evolve 
out of a broader fear of secret societies that arise in Europe in the late 17th and 18th century. 
The founding precept of such secret societies is that they are societies that are secretly 
working against the interests of the population to further their own agenda.  Historically, the 
emergence and entertainment of such fears seems to be connected to periods of revolution or 
political unrest.602 Daniel Pipes notes the link between Freemasons and conspiracy that arises 
in the 1790s, first in 1791 when a French priest attributes the moves against the Church to 
secret freemasonry. This is followed by two influential authors both claiming that freemasonry 
and/or the Illuminati are behind the French Revolution.603 The work of John Robison, who 
published his book: Proofs of a Conspiracy against all the Religions and Governments of Europe, in 
1797, and Augustin Barruel, whose book: Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism, was 
published in 1798 and translated into English in 1799 are ‘responsible for the birth of modern 
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conspiracy theories’ according to Alex Kurtagic, who edited their republication in 2014.604  
Kurtagic notes that:   
 
Robison and Barruel’s respective texts bear all of the elements that characterise modern 
conspiracy theory on both sides of the Atlantic, including the idea of a sinister cabal 
orchestrating world events behind the scenes and the construction of a narrative directly 
linking the past to the present. Their application of conspiracy theory was thorough and 
influenced subsequent generations.605  
 
For Kurtagic, and other scholars, masonic conspiracy has changed very little since its 
emergence in the 18th century, continuing to revolve around the idea of an influential secret 
society working in their own interests and against a (variously described) greater good. In this 
respect it is in some ways, alongside anti-semitism, the Ur-conspiracy. Fundamentally linked 
to anti-Semitic ideas, the conspiracy has been historically deployed by the Church, 
governments such as the Nazi regime, in the middle East, and beyond to attribute 
responsibility for political failures, political unrest and others to a masonic or Jewish influence, 
and to target or persecute minorities.  In this study, interviewees clearly shared ‘classic’ 
conspiracist ideas about the masons: including the belief that masons were controlling things 
behind the scenes in the courtroom, that they had infiltrated the legal profession, and that such 
a ‘secret society’ had the power to decide which litigant would be successful. They would also 
help one another at the expense of non-masons.  LiPs identify the legal profession in general, 
or many people within the legal profession as being part of a secret society. But why?  
 
An obvious place to begin is with the difference in educational and socio-economic background 
between many LiPs and members of the legal profession. I have earlier argued that the legal 
profession is far from diverse, and parts of it, like the senior Bar, and the judges, tend to be 
dominated by those from a relatively small pool of privately educated individuals.606 In 
addition, as Michael Blackwell has noted, family ‘connections’ seem to also play a role in 
supporting an ability to succeed in the profession.607 The higher echelons of the legal 
profession tend to be dominated by those from a privileged education and economic 
background. These factors can certainly facilitate a perceived gap between legal professionals 
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and ‘ordinary’ individuals that can potentially stoke resentment, and lead to individuals being 
perceived as elite.608  
 
This perceived ‘elitism’ is coupled with, and aggravated by, conceptions around the relative 
wealth and earnings of legal professionals.  Within the legal profession, of course, income, and 
job stability vary radically, from those who earn precariously little, to those who are very well 
remunerated.609 However, public perception has historically tended to view legal professionals 
as generally wealthy.610 In addition, in this study, there was a perception that legal 
professionals were more interested in financial gain than in the wellbeing or justice for their 
client. As Paul expresses it:  
 
Their [solicitors] job is to have money, they want income, their job is not to do your legal 
work. It’s not to solve problems, so, why give somebody a load of money? And then of 
course they sued me because I, um, I wouldn’t pay them, the, the, some of the money, I said 
well you haven’t done what I asked you to do. 
  
Charles similarly argues: ‘solicitors get paid for their time, so the longer they, they, they take 
to do a case, the more money they get and that is basically what they do, they just took me for 
a ride for sort of five or six years, got thirty grand out of it’. Georgina says: 
 
solicitors seem to me to be working to a hidden agenda, they get bought off. There’s a 
whole hiearcheal [sic] pecking order with solicitors and, um, you know they they, they are 
literally ending up, um, what’s the word I’m looking for, taking advantage of what they 
perceived to be vulnerable people so that they can make a lot of money. And it’s as if they’re 
all driven by money and very little else. And I just think that’s very tragic.  
 
These factors open up a significant chasm between the perceived wealth and status of legal 
professionals versus the ‘ordinary’ layperson.611 As Charles expresses it: 
 
Well I actually think the, the legal system in this country, um, because all of these blokes 
go to Oxford and Cambridge and those sort of big colleges and they probably, unis, they 
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probably go, they, well they, sort of the way they live and that sort of thing, I think they all 
kind of know each other and, uh, the actual legal institution is designed to just, generate 
money and rip off the general public because they don’t do anything. You pay them 
thousands of pounds to do something for you, what they do is just generate tonnes and 
tonnes of paperwork but don’t actually deal with anything you ask them to do.  
 
There is a legitimate grievance here, when it comes to equality and class, gender and race-
based representation in the courts. While this does not justify a masonic conspiracy, it does 
demonstrate how the specific nature of a conspiracy can illustrate a genuine systemic issue.  
 
But in addition to issues with elitism and class-based exclusion in parts of the legal profession, 
there is also clearly, a significant issue with trust when it comes to members of the legal 
profession. While assumptions about solicitors’ self-interest can be dismissed as based on 
traditional, popular stereotypes of lawyers, it is worth noting that in this study the LiPs had a 
good deal of contact with legal professionals, particularly solicitors, both from previously had 
legal representatives and from facing them in court. And this suggests there is an experiential 
dimension to their conspiracies: certain things that happen to LiPs that fuel their belief in a 
‘cabal’.  
 
TRUST AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION  
It is clear from these interviewees’ belief that, as above, trust, or lack of trust, plays a 
significant role in shaping litigant attitudes and behaviours and this can result in the 
development of conspiracist beliefs. But how can we understand what the significance of trust 
is, and what it means, for litigants? It is here that the work of Tom Tyler becomes particularly 
useful. Tyler’s work, rooted in psychology, concentrates on trying to understand how lay 
perceptions about justice and legitimacy are shaped or understood for laypersons in both civil 
and criminal processes. Tyler’s 1990 book, Why People Obey the Law, seeks to explore the 
conditions under which individuals accept or perceive laws to be legitimate, as well as the 
conditions under which this acceptance might break down.612 As such, this book, and his 
subsequent research, is particularly valuable to this study in helping to flesh out how the 
experiences of LiPs in this study may alter their beliefs and attitudes to civil justice, and ‘the 
law’ as they perceive it, more generally and how this might ultimately lead to 
conspiracising.613 Tyler argues in Why People Obey The Law, that the dominant paradigm for 
how authorities generally understand obedience to the law is based on an instrumental 
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perspective; that is, that people obey the law because they fear the consequences if they do not. 
However Tyler argues that this overlooks the importance of the normative arguments as to 
why people might obey the law. As Tyler expresses it:  
 
Normative commitment through personal morality means obeying a law because one feels 
the law is just; normative commitment through legitimacy means obeying a law because 
one feels that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behaviour.614 
 
This concentration on the normative perspective is useful for this study as it is notable that 
interviewees in this study expressed strong beliefs or perceptions about justice that, after 
negative encounters and experiences, began to erode their faith in ‘justice’ more generally and 
this affected their behaviour and led to conspiracist beliefs.  
 
Of course, the term ‘normative’ perception of justice is very broad, and such a category covers 
up a great many differences in perspectives. However, as Tyler points out, whilst there are a 
number of ways in which we can understand this, ‘distributive justice’ (caring about the 
fairness of the outcome)  and ‘procedural justice’ (caring about the fairness of the process) are 
particularly useful approaches to understanding alternate approaches to the instrumentalist 
view on what constitutes legitimacy for laypersons. In particular, ‘procedural justice’, a term 
originated by Thibaut and Walker in their 1975 study of the same name, Procedural Justice: A 
Psychological Analysis,  arguably plays an important role in understanding how litigants 
perceive fairness in their contact with the courts.615 Procedural justice, with its emphasis on 
the fairness of processes, no less than the fairness of outcomes, and with its attention on what 
happens during proceedings, is a key lens through which to evaluate LiP experiences, and is 
one that rings true in this particular study.616 As I set out to explore, getting LiP perspectives 
means understanding what they perceive to be important. Tyler and Zimmerman note, 
following Thibaut and Walker’s research:  
 
What law has summarized under the “due process” rubric, social scientists capture as a 
bundle of interests, needs, or wants described in a variety of ways—vindication, attention, 
accountability, information, accuracy, comfort, respect, recognition, dignity, efficacy, 
empowerment, [and] justice. . . . Research on litigants . . . reveals a group of individuals 
who seek something in addition to money.617  
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Indeed this study, as outlined in particular in the previous chapter, underlines that litigants 
are not only interested in ‘winning’, but instead have a complex range of desires when it comes 
to litigation. Whilst such complexity makes it potentially very difficult to talk about what 
litigants want, and why and how this affects legitimacy, the work of Zimmerman and Tyler is 
a particularly helpful way to try and think through this in this chapter. In their 2009 study, 
Zimmerman and Tyler set out to consider the experiences of pro se litigants in the U.S. and in 
particular to think about how not having representation may or may not affect ‘access to 
justice’.   In going about this, Zimmerman and Tyler conclude that there are four key aspects 
of ‘procedural justice’ that play a strong role in shaping perceptions of legitimacy for litigants: 
‘voice’ – where a litigant is able to tell their story, ‘neutrality’ – a belief that those arbitrating 
litigation are fair and treat people equally, ‘respect’- where litigants are taken seriously by 
professionals, and finally ‘trust’ – whether litigants perceive that authorities are listening to 
them, and trying to do what is just.618  In the next section of the chapter, I will draw on these 
categories to consider how LiP negative experiences can lead to conspiracising and evaluate to 
what degree lack of ‘procedural justice’ underlies mistrust felt by LiPs in this study.619 I will do 
this by focusing on the kinds of negative experiences reported in this study by LiPs. As I will 
argue, two clear areas of perceived unfairness from their perspective emerges: firstly, through 
LiPs’ belief that a represented opposition is treating them unfairly, and secondly, through 
perceiving themselves as being excluded from conversations that take place between legal 
professionals. As such the conspiracist ideas that emerge are, I will argue, less a product of 
pathology and more a poor choice of explanation for what contains the bones of a legitimate 
grievance. 
 
INEQUALITY OF ARMS 
 
Firstly, it was common for LiPs in this study to complain of unfair treatment by a represented 
opposition.  Many interviewees believed that a represented opposition took advantage of them 
as a litigant in person, commenting on what they perceived to be the violation of equality of 
arms. For example, interviewees claimed solicitors would fail to disclose information they 
were required to provide before a hearing, only to hand the LiP a large folder full of 
documents outside the courtroom just as they were about to enter, or to provide them only on 
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the day of the hearing.620 Other situations LiPs related were ones where the judge would 
instruct the opposition to undertake certain tasks, such as the writing up of his instructions, or 
ask the opposition to disclose certain documents, and the solicitors would fail to provide any 
written information confirming these arrangements as requested.621  
 
Eleanor tells the story, for example of something like this happening to her, but she makes a 
complaint and the judge listens to her: 
 
Um they were basically sort of housekeeping type stuff. Have you served this, have you 
done that and why, why have you failed to, because I mean there was one case, one of the 
very first hearings, I’d served everything of mine on time and the barrister tried to serve 
something on me literally the moment that the hearing took place which I, as I pointed out 
to the judge and he agreed with me, I’d not had, I was not a qualified solicitor or barrister 
and I had not had time to read it therefore he was postponing the hearing to give me time 
to read it, digest it and respond to it and the barrister needed to not do this again because 
he would not take very kindly to you know, because it’s like, you know, you’ve known 
where she is for months, you’ve not sent, you’ve had this, you know, you’ve had weeks to 
give it to her why have you, why are you just serving it on her at the beginning of the 
hearing knowing that she was a litigant in person.  
 
We cannot, of course, know to what extent any of these claims are true or accurate. It is 
important to note, for example, that almost all the LiPs in this study only became LiPs after 
negative experiences with their own representation. In this respect, LiPs in this study already 
lacked trust in solicitors, which will probably make them more likely to find fault with legal 
professional behaviour, a form of ‘confirmation bias’.622 There is also a significant difference 
between a busy represented opposition being late in providing some information, and the 
deliberate withholding of information in an act of ‘gamesmanship’. What we can know, 
however, is that if there are instances where LiPs do not receive information they are meant to 
receive, or if they are provided with materials late, regardless of why, they are much less able 
to deal successfully or effectively with such a scenario.  
 
As outlined in Chapter Four, LiPs have disproportionately greater difficulties in redressing 
errors, or obtaining assistance. So should a LiP receive case materials late, he or she would not 
necessarily find sympathy from the judge in delaying a hearing. The LiP also may not be 
believed. Recent case decisions also suggest that LiPs will not be given any ‘excessive 
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indulgence’ when it comes to timelines; that is, they are expected to conform to the same 
timelines afforded to legal representatives.623 But perhaps a LiP may not realise they can raise 
an issue, or only learn this at a later date. In Tinkler v Elliott, for example, where Elliott’s 
request to have a judgment set aside was deemed out of date at appeal court level, while the 
lodgement was technically 18 months late, Mr Elliott only received transcripts of the hearing 
(that he had not attended, being unwell with a medical certificate being provided) well over a 
year after it took place, thus most likely only learning of the possibility of having the judgment 
set aside at that point.624 Similarly, in a situation where a LiP does not receive a copy of 
judicial instructions, LiPs will have a much harder time attempting to gain this information.  
They will also not necessarily have individuals who can assist them. They may not have the 
schedule that allows them to effectively follow these problems up. In summary, life is made 
much harder for LiPs in these situations.  
 
While the likelihood is these narratives reflect administrative error, or workload related delay, 
we still cannot exclude the possibility—at least in some instances—that there is a degree of 
unregulated gamesmanship on the part of legal representatives. This may be because such 
gamesmanship is a regular part of tactics routinely adopted by some legal professionals.625 
Perhaps a more likely explanation is that a legal representative is simply capable of 
assimilating information far faster than a LiP and therefore is giving the LiP the same amount 
of time they would give another legal representative, and this is simply insufficient for a LiP. 
Neither exclude the possibility that a legal representative may be less inclined to rush to fulfil 
an obligation towards a LiP since they may speculate that a LiP will be less likely to be 
believed should they make a complaint. While the majority of the legal profession act ethically, 
this doesn’t mean that there aren’t those within the profession who are above such behaviour; 
the fact that the legal profession already has such a negative perception of LiPs only fuels this 
fear on the part of LiPs. 
 
Much of this is of course, pure speculation, and based on unilateral accounts. But something 
we can consider is the ambiguous guidance given to legal representatives when it comes to 
LiPs. The 2015 guidelines issued by the Solicitors Regulatory Authority notes that, as ever, a 
lawyer’s overriding duty is to the court, and then to their client.626 In addition, any lawyer is 
                                                     
623 See Tinkler & Another v Elliott [2012] EWCA Civ 1289; Bendore Bankas Snoras (in bankruptcy) v 
Yampolskaya [2015] EWHC 2136 (QB) 
624 To be fair, the court did consider this issue, but decided that a strict timeline applied to LiPs anyway. 
So in this case the claimant’s knowledge from reading the transcripts (presuming he did so on the day 
he received them) started in September 2011 but request to set aside judgment wasn’t made until 
December 2011. The courts relied on their previous harshness on timelines.  
625 See Paolo Moro, “Rhetoric and Fair Play: The Cultural Background of Legal Ethics,” US-China Law 
Review 14, no.2(2017): 72-83; Beth Henschen, “Judging in a Mismatch: The Ethical Challenges of Pro Se 
Litigation,” Public Integrity (2017): 1-13. 
626 Law Society, Litigants in Person: Guidelines for Lawyers (Law Society: London, June 2015), 3. 
 197 
forbidden from engaging in any behaviour that unnecessarily delays or misleads the court, or 
brings the profession into disrepute.627 But when it comes to LiPs it is a bit more confusing. 
Under Chapter 11 dealing with ‘third parties’, the guidelines state that legal representatives 
must not take ‘unfair advantage’ of LiPs: 
 
Taking ‘unfair advantage’ refers to behaviour that any reasonable lawyer would regard as 
wrong and improper. That might include: bullying and unjustifiable threats; misleading or 
deceitful behaviour; claiming what cannot be properly be claimed; or demanding what 
cannot properly be demanded. Such conduct is likely to be penalised if identified by a judge 
or upon complaint. 628  
 
 
But the guidelines then go on to say that: 
 
Knowing and using law and procedure effectively against your opponent because you have 
the skills to do so, whether that be against a qualified representative or a LiP, is not taking 
'unfair advantage' or a breach of any regulatory code [….] you are under no obligation to 
help a LiP to run their case or to take any action on a LiP’s behalf. Moreover, you should be 
aware that by doing so you might, depending on the circumstances, be failing in your 
duties to your own client.629  
 
  
 
So while legal representatives are forbidden from ‘taking advantage’ of LiPs (which in itself 
suggests that such a possibility must exist if the guidelines need to make this explicit), they are 
also not expected to change their behaviour in terms of deploying their skills.  The problem 
here is that LiP difficulties rarely arise from out-and-out bullying or abuse; it is far more likely 
to be a subtler form of disadvantage that will come from their lack of skills – and this 
disadvantage is one where the courts have suggested that they are not particularly 
sympathetic.630  
 
In addition, while legal representatives are not expected to assist LiPs, the guidelines do note 
that the court can ask legal representatives to fulfil certain tasks they wouldn’t normally have 
to do when they weren’t dealing with a LiP: such as preparing and copying bundles to provide 
to a LiP and to the court.631 But this is something that seems to be a source of confusion to the 
legal profession since it seems in contradiction to the idea that they have no duty to assist a 
                                                     
627 Ibid, 3. 
628 Ibid, 5.  
629 Ibid, 5-6. 
630 Tinkler v Elliott;  
631 Law Society, LiPs: Guidelines for Lawyers, 8. 
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LiP.632 In addition, it can cause conflicts with their own clients who may struggle to 
understand why their representative is ‘assisting’ the other side. It seems from the above, then, 
that it may be these kinds of requirements some LiPs argue aren’t being fulfilled. Arguably, 
such requirements put a burden on the legal representative, and it may be one which they 
struggle to fulfil within a given time frame, given their own workloads. Also, it seems legal 
representatives themselves may not be sure where their responsibilities, and duties, lie.  
 
In summary, what is happening here is something of which we cannot be sure. But there are 
two issues that arise from these perceived experiences that matter: firstly, because there is an 
imbalance in skills and ability, any of these kinds of misunderstandings or behaviours 
substantially impacts upon a LiP. LiPs are much less able to work with such difficulties than 
legal representatives are. Secondly, such scenarios undermine LiP trust in the profession. Such 
a situation exposes the comparative powerlessness of LiPs compared with the legal profession 
and may stoke the perception that legal representatives are acting against them deliberately, 
in a situation where they hold far more cards.  
 
In this respect, this kind of scenario  - where an imbalance of knowledge or power is perceived 
to be being used against a LiP – could be perceived as indicative of a lack of respect. As 
Zimmerman and Tyler note, respect covers a broad area, but one aspect of significance in 
ensuring that individuals’ rights are protected and needs are considered: ‘Providing people 
with information about what to do, where to go, and when to appear, all demonstrate respect 
both for those people and for their right to have their problems handled fairly by the 
courts’.633The belief that LiPs are being excluded from access, and having unequal experiences, 
arguably indicates a lack of this aspect of ‘procedural justice’. Here then, whilst such inequality 
may not be deliberate, a hallmark of conspiracy theories in general, of course, is the converting 
of all error into design; so, no matter whether issues arise from accident, or error, they will be 
interpreted as significant or malignant by those who hold conspiracist ideas.  
 
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS 
 
The second experience of exclusion that provides fertile ground for masonic conspiracy is the 
perceived exclusion of LiPs from conversations. Interviewees commented on multiple 
experiences of conversations taking place without them between other actors in the case, 
                                                     
632 Ibid, 4; Thomas Crockett, “Do it Yourself: Any Further Guidance Since Tinkler v Elliott?,” The 
Commercial Litigation Journal (2013): 17.  
633 Zimmerman and Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice,” 488. 
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including, at times, the judge and the opposition. Peter described the feeling as that of a 
‘mixing club’: 
 
Peter:  In a criminal court you have the defence and the prosecution and they don’t 
mix. These were like, it was like a club. And that, that sort of struck me as like 
‘hang on a minute’. I’m not even having a say here, and I came out and this is 
what’s happening…you’re totally in turmoil and that’s something that’s 
ignored. The impact of what happens on the, on the people involved.  
 
Kate:  Mixing club? 
 
Peter: Well they seemed to be, I said club, you know, they’re all in there, sort of like 
pals around the table and um, you don’t know what‘s being said, so they’re 
talking about you and you don’t even know what, what they’re saying and 
outside of the court in like what happens with social services specially…people 
meet and they’ve never met you before and they’re judging you.  
 
Talia describes a similar experience: 
 
The hearing was on 22 June and they didn’t respond to either my defence and counterclaim 
or my payment proposals. On 22 June the hearing was at two o clock and I turned up at 
about twenty past one and found the Deputy District Judge talking to the advocate for the 
other side in the entrance hall and I’m going to complain to the MOJ [Ministry of Justice] 
about this. So the hearing lasted about three minutes and it was clear that the DDJ already 
knew what the other side wanted, they wanted an adjournment so that they could prepare 
an application to strike, strike down my defence and counterclaim…and this is…they 
hadn’t done anything to that point, and so they got permission for an adjournment and that 
was until the eighth of September. 
 
Similar experiences are narrated by Martin, Marie and others.634 This perception seems to be 
key to the allegations of corruption for some. Charles, for example, says, when describing his 
distrust of the outcome of his case against his solicitors: ‘they, um, maybe give each other a 
telephone call, obviously I don’t know but there was definitely a lot of corruption involved’. 
Peter, too, notes:  
 
                                                     
634 Martin notes, when describing the behaviour of two solicitors involved in his case: ‘they got very 
friendly with each other, obviously, things were happening’. 
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You hear people talk about corruption and it is, it’s not just about money, it’s about like the 
corrupt behaviour of like almost, well don’t mention that… we’ll just say this. Things have 
been decided and agreed without you even being there. You don’t even know.  
 
All the interviewees narrating these experiences mentioned that they felt disadvantaged by 
lack of access, excluded from crucial discussions concerning the case and many shared fears 
that key decisions were taking place in their absence, with some using this as the basis for 
allegations of ‘corruption’. Of course, these ‘meetings’ may well be because these individuals 
work together, know each other socially, are being polite, or are attempting to facilitate the 
progress of the case without any malignant intentions. But it is not difficult to see why LiPs 
would interpret this behaviour distrustfully. Once again, such an exclusion emphasises LiP 
powerlessness. An obvious linkage between this experience and Zimmerman and Tyler’s 
categories is that of ‘neutrality’: the idea that legal professionals are excluding LiPs from 
access to important discussions, or the belief that authorities are colluding with the other side 
are consistent with factors undermining trust in this neutrality. Zimmerman and Tyler note 
that neutrality is about decisions being open and transparently made; discussions behind 
closed doors clearly undermine this.635 
 
In addition, while the meetings may indeed be entirely banal, or well-intentioned, there is a 
slippery slope here to genuine unfairness. Such familiarity and ease between legal professional 
and judge facilitate and reflect an environment where a legal professional is more likely to be 
believed than a LiP. Indeed, because of the deep-rooted pejorative attitudes towards LiPs, and 
the linking between repeated litigation and ‘querulous’ behaviour, it is perfectly likely that a 
LiP is less likely to be believed, or that their word will not be believed over a represented 
opponent. In this respect, it is arguable that such a scenario is also one that undermines the 
‘voice’ category of procedural justice, as Zimmerman and Tyler outline. ‘Voice’ – the ability to 
tell one’s story and be listened to – is one this study has repeatedly brought up. But as 
Zimmerman and Tyler note, voice is not simply about being able to speak; it is about being 
listened to. So conversations excluding LiPs clearly undermine this, even if LiPs are 
theoretically given other opportunities to speak.636 The worrying implication here is that if 
LiPs are worried that they are treated differently, and more distrustfully, than legal 
representatives, than perhaps they should be, because they probably are. As George Bernard 
Shaw observed: ‘All professions are conspiracies against the laity’.637 
 
                                                     
635 Zimmerman and Tyler, “Between Access to Justice and Access to Counsel,” 487. 
636 Ibid, 487, 
637 George Bernard Shaw, The Doctor’s Dilemma (Auckland: The Floating Press, 2011), 39. 
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Summarising, then, the masonic conspiracy theory is predicated on a powerful secret society 
that acts in its own interest over the interests of others. In this context, it is easy to see that a 
number of factors LiPs experience can contribute to the fuelling of such ideas, such as the 
‘elite’ background of many players in the legal profession, LiP exclusion from the social world 
of the legal profession, and the distrust in which LiPs may be held compared with legal 
professionals. These experiences of powerlessness are endemic to being a LiP. Such 
experiences are also illustrative of a lack of ‘procedural justice’; in particular, voice, trust and 
neutrality. And it is a short step from perceiving these kinds of exclusions as inevitable 
consequences of the status of LiPs, to seeing masonic conspiracy as an explanation for LiP 
experiences.  
 
CORRUPTION! 
 
The second dominant conspiracy in this study is about a generalised ‘corruption’ in the courts, 
manifesting in ‘‘fake’ documentation’, and, at an extreme, ‘fake courts’. This kind of 
conspiracist thinking seems to be linked to believing legal representatives to be ‘breaking the 
rules’ through, for example, trying to pass off forged documents as real, or through ‘cheating’ 
the system. This conception of conspiracy is interesting because the emphasis here is on how 
the legal profession brings the courts into disrepute. Those who hold such conspiratorial 
attitudes frequently hold quite high expectations about the courts, only to have them 
disappointed. As Eleanor expresses it: 
 
Basically, you are sold a myth that the British judicial system is the finest in the world, that 
it is fair, just, reasonable and concerned with finding out the truth. That is a load of fucking 
bollocks, pardon the French. 
 
Georgina, for example observes that she believed very strongly prior to embarking upon legal 
proceedings, that every individual was ‘equal before the law, uh, blah blah blah’ before going 
on to note that:  
 
as far as I am concerned it is all just words because they know very well there’s no way in 
the rea-, reality of the set up that you can get a, a fair hearing in British courts across the 
board unless your, you get lucky. I think the courts in Britain are run like a lottery. 
 
These beliefs are echoed by Martin, who says: ‘Well I knew I had a case, and I knew I was 
right. And I knew I’d been turned over and maybe naïve, I actually believe in British justice 
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[laugh] so I thought if only I can get it together correctly and right, with the ability to show 
it, I will win’.  
 
The idealistic expectations held by the interviewees in this study are in keeping with many 
laypersons understanding or beliefs about legality as understood in a ‘remote sense’, as noted 
by Ewick and Silbey in The Common Place of Law. As they observe, ‘one story’ told about law 
by their interviewees is where law is: 
 
removed and distant from the personal lives of ordinary people. In this story, law is 
majestic, operating by known and fixed rules in carefully delimited spheres. The law exists 
in time and places that put it outside of, rather than in, the midst of everyday life.638  
 
This description emphasises that those who have minimal or no experience of legal 
proceedings are far more likely to entertain idealistic notions of courts and legal proceedings. 
Such individuals also formulate ideas of justice that were arguably not related to the kinds of 
justice that may or may not be possible as an outcome of legal proceedings. 639  Indeed, the 
interviewees in this study are arguably more positive towards the legal system prior to 
commencing their claim than members of the public identified in Genn’s Paths to Justice.640  
 
But the difficulty arises when these interviewees experience the courts, and realise that the law 
does not merely operate ‘by know and fixed rules’ or, indeed, in carefully delimited spheres’. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, many LiPs sought to attempt to obtain legal information and 
acquire it themselves, whether through university libraries, online or elsewhere. A source of 
distrust and anger for interviewees was when this hard-won knowledge was overlooked or 
disregarded by the judge. For example, Talia spent many months learning the Civil Procedure 
Rules, only to find that the judges did not necessarily stick to those rules during the 
proceedings:  
 
Um, I didn’t, there are other things I didn’t expect. I didn’t expect some judges not to, uh, 
implement the Civil Procedure Rules which are rules, I mean they’re, they’re laid down in 
law, um, I really didn’t expect them, um, not to implement at all or only to implement the 
ones that favoured the over-mighty claimant. If, if a litigant in person as I’m finding just 
makes, you know, fails to comply with something or other, the other side will exploit it to 
the nth degree but the, certainly in my case, the other side has completely ignored 
timescales in a way that prejudices my uh rights in law, and no one has pulled them up at 
                                                     
638 Ewick and Silbey, The Common Place of Law, 28. 
639 See Bourdieu, “Force of Law,” 830.  
640 See Genn, Paths to Justice, 249.  
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all! And in two cases, they’ve submitted their, um, their claim, um, at less than 28 days, I 
should have 28 days to respond provided I put in the acknowledgement of service, and they 
cut a week off that by being late and nobody pulls them up on it.  
 
As she goes on to say: 
 
I have, I have really scrupulously told the truth all the way through and I’ve been 
completely fair to them to the extent of my ability, to the other side. And they’ve lied and 
lied and lied and it’s broken the rules and taken advantage of their, um, greater bargaining 
power and resources and when it comes to decide whether to blem-, believe them or me, 
people like the FOS and judges believe them. 
 
When Talia felt the judges themselves didn’t follow the rules, this became a significant source 
of anger. This experience of Talia’s was shared by other interviewees including Peter and 
Georgina. 
 
This feeling that judges were ‘breaking the rules’ returns us to the gap between what legal 
skills are and how they are perceived by LiPs. LiPs attempt to acquire legal skills, and through 
repeated practice, to improve. However, they are not able to understand what legal skills are, 
instead tending towards an empty mimicry. Repeat experience does not improve performance 
because of the inconsistency in the way in which LiPs are treated. LiPs acquire more and more 
information but this does not improve their outcomes. As such, alternate explanations seem to 
be necessary to explain this failure, either through ‘corruption’ or ‘fakery’.  
 
Paul, for example, says:  
 
So you had to, you know, set things up correctly and then you have to present the case in 
such a way the best you can so that there is no loophole for the judge to, to find against you 
unless there’s cheating. So of course what I have observed as a litigant in person is 
dishonest lawyers, dishonest barristers, dishonest judges, dishonest senior judges, 
corruption at, even at a very high level. 
 
In addition to corruption being the product of being excluded from conversations, corruption 
was also used quite widely by interviewees to signify their disbelief that a case they so 
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strongly believed in was unsuccessful.641 But it isn’t always clear what interviewees mean by 
the term corruption. I asked Martin to be more specific: 
 
Kate:  So what does corrupt mean?  
 
Martin:  It means that because it's a bank you are fighting or because it's a huge 
organisation you are fighting, the law goes with it.  
 
Kate:  Is that because of the bank’s official clout or are you thinking more of 
the money?  
 
Martin:  All of it, um, I mean, you know I don’t say it. What I’m trying to do is 
speaking abstract at the moment. Um, I am lucky because I’ve got [an 
organisation Martin is involved with] as an outlet, and I can actually 
see, um, that uh, the courts try very hard to be transparently straight, 
But you can see it from a litigants in person point of view right now, I 
mean this is almost the perfect example for you…no matter how hard 
you try, to say that the courts are trying very hard, you get a decision 
like this which goes against you and you think, oh that’s corrupt. 
 
 
As Martin makes clear, the ‘corruption’ allegations seem to spring from a combination of 
factors: the fear that they are being excluded from conversations, the relative powerlessness of 
the LiP, their failure despite considerable effort at a disproportionate cost to them, and the lack 
of an explanation that they understand as to why this is happening.  
 
Similarly, the allure of the ‘fake’ documentation and courts claim seems to be that firstly, like 
all conspiracy theories, it explains why LiPs fail, despite considerable investment and energy 
directed into learning the law, often in situations where this is made extremely difficult. But 
secondly, interestingly, this conspiracy allows LiPs to preserve intact the belief that they know 
the law better than those who would abuse it. Take Talia’s explanation of false templates: to 
conspiracise about an unstamped letter from the court suggests a strong belief in the 
‘perfection’ of the courts, rather than an acceptance that individuals can make errors. 
Interviewees holding these beliefs do not seem to accept that courts may make mistakes, or 
that courts can mislabel documents or simply not always issue identical documents; that 
                                                     
641 Charles: ‘You’ve won the case but you’ve basically lost because £90,000 was what I was supposed to 
pay the solicitors and I get £10 compensation for all that I’ve been through. So he was corrupt, I could 
see he was corrupt’.  
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someone might forget to sign something, or date something or anything else similar. This is 
perhaps attributable partially to having had idealised visions of justice as well as being rooted 
also in the need of LiPs to uncover something ‘wrong’ that can allow them to succeed in their 
claim.642 Talia says: 
 
It’s going to make me really unpopular but I believe as I’ve said to them, the rule of law it’s 
the most precious asset any civilised society can have and as a statutory authority they 
should be upholding the law, not breaking it for commercial gain. 
 
 It is also, of course, indicative of a conspiracist approach that tends to allocate meaning to 
what might be accidental or random incidents. 
 
But the other feature to note is the degree to which such a conspiracy allows LiPs to retain a 
belief in their own hard-won ‘expertise’. That after significant efforts, they know the law, and 
how the law is supposed to be. This manifests not only in these kinds of conspiracist ideas 
about ‘faking’, but also in the ways in which repeat LiPs ‘counterchallenge’ legal authority. 
These LiPs attempt to assert their legal knowledge, or authority, arguing that it is the courts 
that are not observing the law, and that their knowledge, or their moral claim, is superior. This 
can be seen, for example, in the case of Paul who entered a courtroom and asked the judge 
‘under what system of law’ the court proceedings would be held. As he explains, he was trying 
to ascertain that the burden of proof would be on the claimant, but he expressed it in the way 
he did to signal to the judge the knowledge he possessed about the ways in which he believed 
the courts did not always uphold decisions according to law. Talia, too, repeatedly tried to 
hold the court to ‘order’ by pointing out what she perceived to be the ignoring of basic 
procedure: 
 
The, the, the judge on the 26th October not reading my bundle and then making a 
judgement against me, I mean that, that is wrong at every level. That is wrong in law, it’s 
wrong in, you know, European law, to pass a judgment against me without having heard 
my case, I mean she’ll say that she heard me because it says in the transcript you know, 
Talia X was there in person, but she hadn’t read the bundle and so, um, she didn’t, when I 
complained that the other side’s witness statements were all defective, which is a polite way 
of saying they told lies, all three of them, and for instance I think I mentioned to you, 
they’d um, in the third witness statement they’d [laughter] cited the mortgage loan 
conditions for properties secured, for loans secured on properties in Scotland which is 
completely and utterly irrelevant and they put this in the witness statement and then 
                                                     
642 Remember, for example, in Chapter Five Peter’s attempt to use the missing two weeks of temporary 
care orders to rescind the final Care Order where he had permanently lost custody of his son.  
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signed it as, you know, a statement of truth, um, but I got no opportunity to talk about any 
of that, um, the judge was doing what she’d been told to do, um, and I escaped by the skin 
of my teeth.  
 
Georgina took her counterchallenge even further in our interview, rejecting law and 
parliament’s role, saying instead that ‘divine’ justice outweighed them:  
 
I realise now of course that I’ve got a very very strong sense of divine justice, you know, 
that essentially we’re under no laws except God’s law. Um, I go to the absolute because I 
think what people are calling law, which is statutes which are not law, they are statutes, 
they require consent, most of them have been passed with a show of hands, they have never 
been ratified through parliament, never can be ratified through parliament. 
 
The conspiracising around corruption, ‘fake’ courts and legal professionals ‘breaking the law’ 
seem to reflect most strongly the issue of LiPs being unable to obtain quality information, and 
not having clear guidance as to what their role is. Legal information is largely kept out of their 
reach, and LiPs do not fully understand the complex nature of legal skills. This means that 
acquiring any information takes a significant amount of effort. But without the understanding 
of legal skills, this information does not necessarily assist them. As this thesis argues, repeated 
behaviour does not improve LiP performance. But for LiPs, they have acquired expertise. This 
expertise is being denied or disavowed (in their eyes) by the courts. They are routinely failing 
and they don’t know why. They know the law (they believe). So the courts, and people within 
those courts, must be letting them down. It is not difficult to see here how this experience may 
lead to conspiracising.  
 
In this respect, the conspiracy of ‘corruption’ carries strong echoes of an undermining of ‘trust’ 
as a subset of procedural justice according to Zimmerman and Tyler. They note that ‘trust’ is 
predicated on a litigant’s perception on whether the authorities are honest or seeking to do 
what is right.643The cumulative effect of the kinds of exclusions above are those that militate 
against the development of trust for litigants: as such this can undermine perceptions of 
legitimacy. Zimmerman and Tyler note that: ‘The experience that litigants have when they 
deal with the legal system is important because it shapes their willingness to accept decisions 
and their evaluations of the legal system’.644 In this respect, exploring normative perceptions 
of justice and procedural justice can be illuminating in determining not just what enhances 
legitimacy, but what may undermine it. Tyler noted in Why People Obey the Law, that  
 
                                                     
643 Zimmerman and Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice,” 488. 
644 Ibid, 503. 
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Legitimacy can reside either in a person who occupies a position of authority or in an 
institution. Political and legal theories of legitimacy have emphasized that using legitimate 
institutions and rules when making decisions enhances the likelihood that members of the 
public will comply, even if they do not agree with the decisions or support those who have 
made them.645 
 
So whilst legitimate institutions and rules enhance compliance, institutions and rules perceived 
to be illegitimate, as a consequence of exclusions, such as those procedural justice categories 
examined above, are likely to breed a lack of compliance, and a lack of trust. And this is 
precisely what this study shows: the more LiPs are excluded, the less likely they are to trust 
the legal proceedings. But this isn’t a consequence of not ‘winning’, it is about the process, 
rather than the outcome: not being listened to, not being respected, not being valued. And this 
study supports the idea that litigants may enter into litigation with a high respect for legal 
proceedings only to have their negative experiences lead to a breakdown in trust that fosters 
conspiracising.  
 
CONSEQUENCES  
 
On reflecting on the above, then, many of the “hotspots” that LiPs experience that lead to 
conspiracising are from the processes of exclusion described throughout this thesis.646 
Ultimately, these processes of exclusion, which are commonplace, are emblematic of LiPs’ lack 
of established place, or understood role in legal proceedings, beyond as exceptions who are 
treated with significant variation. They are also symptomatic, as above, of a lack of perceived 
procedural justice. These are significant factors in undermining LiP faith in the fairness of 
judicial proceedings. Believing firmly in the rightness of their case, any decisions that go 
against LiPs, or negative encounters with legal professionals, are perceived as undermining 
their faith in justice. While this may be due to overblown expectations and, at times, delusion 
as to the merits of their case, it is also due to the many and often processes of exclusion and 
lack of fairness many LiPs experience. In this study this caused all LiPs, not just the obvious 
conspiracists, to become more negative about the possibility of accessing justice. And for some 
individuals in this study, their failure could only be explained in terms of conspiracy. 
 
                                                     
645 Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, 29. 
646 This is of course not a uniform position. Many LiPs in this study would talk about varying 
experiences in different courtrooms or with different professionals that were more or less fair. However, 
the sources of unhappiness and unfairness were largely shared and attributable to this not 
understanding ‘the rules of the game’.  
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So why does it matter if some LiPs are conspiracists? Firstly, of course, as this thesis has tried 
to argue, it matters because it matters to them. LiP experiences of the courts are negative and 
damaging. It is also of concern that there is such significant distrust of the legal profession. It 
also matters because LiPs who espouse conspiracist ideas cause difficulties for others. In 
addition, it is important because, as this study has tried to suggest, we also need to listen more 
to LiPs, rather than pathologizing them which does not really serve any other purpose than to 
reinforce LiPs as a monolithic ‘problem’ or burden to be dealt with. If we pathologise LiPs, we 
also dismiss their complaints, and these complaints, however offensive, are at least partially 
rooted in genuine experiences of exclusion. But there is a final, important factor to consider: 
how conspiracy spreads.  
 
In this study, I have largely been talking about five or six individuals in this study who are 
clearly conspiracist, with the others not. But why do some LiPs come to be conspiracists then, 
and others not, if they share these similar experiences of exclusion? Perhaps it is because 
conspiracists are more willing to entertain certain kinds of explanations that others reject. For 
example, Eleanor clearly identifies her solicitors withholding information from her but is 
explicit that this is a product of ‘gamesmanship, echoing Ewick and Silbey’s summary of seeing 
the law as ‘tactical’:   
 
Um, if the other party’s a litigant in person, go for it. If they’re not, think long and hard. 
Purely and simply, because you will not get a fair shake in the courts if you are a litigant in 
person and your opposing side is not, they’ve got representation, you will get screwed 
because it’s, as I say, unfortunately, not about the law in those circumstances, its’ about 
who’s got the most toys and who can do the best performance and who’s got the best ga-, 
who’s better at winning the game. Because that’s one thing I’ve learned through all of this, 
2002 onwards, is the law is a game. 
 
This willingness to conspiracise may well be rooted in personality, education, pathology, past 
experience or a host of other explanations beyond the scope of this project.647  
 
However, it really isn’t as straightforward as that. While for convenience I have highlighted 
‘obvious’ conspirators, the distinction is much blurrier. Some interviewees were clearly 
conspiracists, such as Georgina, Anna and Russell, and others were clearly not, such as Eleanor 
and Trevor. But many trod a much less clear line somewhere in between.648 This manifested in 
                                                     
647 Some of these are outlined in the law and psychology, psychiatry literature detailed earlier in the 
chapter. 
648 However, Eleanor argues that she is certain her solicitor agreed a plea deal behind her back with the 
prosecution. This illustrates the very blurry line between conspiracy, exclusion and unfair treatment. 
Did this happen behind her back? Perhaps. If so, Eleanor is not conspiracist to think so, but one might 
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interviewees generally avoiding any recourse to conspiracist explanations, except at certain 
moments. Charles, for example, began to see conspiracy in the way he felt the legal profession 
was treating him, alluding periodically to the masons, but he was by no means as developed in 
his conspiracist outlook as Georgina or Anna. Marie, too, occasionally made statements 
connected to a belief that the Local Authority and solicitors conspired together, but otherwise 
made no claims to any kind of influence, whether Masonic or otherwise. 649  Martin is perhaps 
the most instructive example of this continuum, whereby he would at times talk of feeling that 
certain judges were ‘corrupt’ before catching himself and commenting on how easy it was to 
start to become a conspiracist. In this respect, conspiracist thinking might best be understood 
as existing along a spectrum, instead of being reserved for only the most ‘extreme’ LiPs. And 
if conspiracising is connected to repeated negative experiences, this suggests that all LiPs run 
the risk of becoming more conspiracy minded because of their experiences; so, any division 
between the “nutters” and the ‘normal’ is a false one.650  
 
In addition, all of those who entertained the more extremist conspiracy ideas are individuals 
who, in the absence of formal legal advice, are part of informal networks of advice. In these 
advice exchanges, which take place via email, through Facebook groups, and other forms of 
online correspondence, group members email one another with suggestions, arguments and 
claims ranging across a whole series of issues and at an array of targets. The arguments are 
not based on any kind of proof or evidence, only on opinion and experience, and yet they are 
frequently taken up as fact by participating members.651 These advice networks, which operate 
privately, are clearly of critical importance in shaping some of these more extreme beliefs. 
Research consistently shows that a believer in one conspiracy theory is more likely to believe 
in another.652 However, while such private exchanges may be argued to be beyond the reach of 
legal influence, it is important to note that these networks of informal advice flourish at least 
partially because quality advice is so difficult to access for LiPs. In other words, in the absence of 
formal and accessible legal advice, many LiPs turn to the internet. Most interviewees in this 
                                                                                                                                                           
equally argue that this did not happen and therefore she is attributing malign (if not conspiracist) 
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649. Groh, “The Temptation of Conspiracy Theory,” 11.  
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651 One such exchange involved the identifying of a ‘sympathetic’ judge to take up their cause of 
‘exposing’ the influence of freemasons. Anna suggested Lord Neuberger, only to receive a flurry of 
emails accusing Lord Neuberger of being part of the ‘cover up’ and a mason himself.  While these 
documents do not form part of the data specifically collected for this PhD, throughout this study I have 
been copied into correspondence from several LiPs in this study, enabling me access to these networks 
of information.  
652 See Ted Goertzel, “Belief in Conspiracy Theories,” Political Psychology 15.4(1994). Viren Swami et al, 
“Conspiracist Ideation in Britain and Austria,” British Journal of Psychology 102, no. 3(2011); Ken 
Drinkwater et al, “Reality Testing, Conspiracy Theory and Paranormal Beliefs,” The Journal of 
Parapsychology 76, no.1(2012).  
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study did and while some were able to see the poor or questionable quality of the information 
provided and steer clear, others embraced it and were clearly influenced by it.653  
 
So if a LiP is unable to access reliable formal advice, they will turn to these networks.654 And 
such exchanges can frequently share ‘bad’ information back and forth which can encourage and 
perpetuate conspiracy theories.655 It is notable that when LiPs in this study talk about 
developing conspiracist ideas, they often speak in the language of revelation where something 
now obvious was ‘revealed’ to them, and more often than not, this has come from someone 
explaining ‘what really happened’ to them.656 The role of informal advice networks is also 
important to explore because the other commonality amongst conspiracy theorists in this 
study is the desire to ‘help’ others see what they have seen.657 All the interviewees in this study 
who explicitly entertained conspiracist ideas have subsequently sought to help other LiPs with 
their experiences, thus potentially perpetuating this kind of misinformation for future LiPs. It 
was notable that the most conspiracist LiPs in this study were the most active in attempting to 
assist other LiPs, through setting up websites, helping other LiPs with their casefiles, and 
through working as McKenzie Friends. Anna says: 
 
Basically um we are people who are victims of corrupt courts and corrupt solicitors and we 
are educating people what to avoid. We’re, we’re sharing our experiences so that others 
don’t suffer like we do so no, we’re not very popular bur there’s currently a consultation 
going on about what to do about McKenzie friends and I think as part of that, somebody I 
know has been set up to help bring it under tighter control so if you like I’m counteracting 
it by showing that McKenzie friends can, you know, are a very well worthwhile cause.  
 
Georgina, Charles, Paul, Peter and Anna have all, in different ways, assisted LiPs as a response 
to their own experiences. This desire to help people, as well as the existence of these kinds of 
networks, also suggests a picture where repeated experiences of exclusion risk tipping those 
who hold borderline conspiracist views into full-blown conspiracy in the absence of better-
                                                     
653 Charles and Talia for example thought that many of the groups they encountered on the internet 
were unreliable, or ‘crazy’.  
654 This is therefore another possibility to be added to that Hazel Genn outlined in 2013. Reflecting on 
changes to legal aid she notes that some individuals may not come to law at all, while others may come 
without the benefit of advice. This study suggests the need to add a third category; that many will start 
to come to courts armed with ‘bad’ advice from informal networks. Genn, “Do It Yourself Law,” 5-6. 
655 Groh, “The Temptation of Conspiracy,” 3. 
656 For example, Georgina talks about wishing she had been ‘more awake’ eight years before when the 
alleged fraud was first taking place. Martin similarly ‘discovers’ what has happened to him through 
meeting someone who experienced something similar. Marie learns, through her contact with 
McKenzie Friends, that lawyers within the local authority cannot be trusted.  
657 One of the most common methods for doing so was to become a McKenzie Friend and use this as a 
platform for helping others.  
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quality information and advice, because they will turn to these networks for support and 
assistance.658 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In concluding, I want to make clear that I am not arguing that all LiPs are conspiracists. Most 
are not and may never become so. I am, though, arguing that there are important findings to 
draw from this study; firstly, there is a connection between the real experiences of exclusion 
LiPs face and entertaining conspiracist ideas. The experiences individuals have as a LiP can 
help to create, reproduce and aggravate conspiracist ideas. Secondly, conspiracist thinking 
isn’t undifferentiated, but may better be understood in this study as a spectrum, with some 
LiPs completely embracing conspiracies explanations, others using them at times to explain 
certain points in their experiences, and others rejecting these ideas altogether.659 This means 
that there is a real possibility that some LiPs may slip from disappointed expectations into 
these subtler forms of conspiracy.  This study suggests the more LiPs lack access to good 
quality information, advice or even just basic assistance and sympathy, the more likely they are 
to find alternative explanations through informal advice networks, and the greater the risk 
that LiPs may interpret their negative experiences as being symptomatic of something more 
malevolent. This means a future of more conspiracist LiPs acting in a ‘difficult’ way for the 
courts. In this respect, such a finding suggests a clear impact on the courts. However, more 
importantly for this study, it evidences a real problem for LiPs. 
 
This chapter, then, and this thesis, ends up where it started: with the idea of LiPs as ‘pests’, 
‘nuts’ and ‘loonies in person’. As I argued at the beginning of this thesis, since LASPO, and 
arguably earlier, the legal profession has feared the effect of more LiPs, focusing on their 
perceived pathology and the impact this ‘querulous behaviour’ will have on the courts. Perhaps 
ironically, or perhaps inevitably, the research of this chapter suggests that the legal profession 
is somewhat responsible for creating them in the first place. Going to law is disproportionately 
more difficult for LiPs and at its worst, put simply, it can make LiPs “crazy”.  In addition, 
recent policy shifts and austerity measures that have resulted in a decline of access to legal 
advice, basic assistance or even simple face-to-face contact are aggravating this situation 
considerably, creating a perfect storm of advice deserts, lack of human contact, and a 
proliferation of online networking between LiPs.   
                                                     
658 See Neil Dagnall et al, “Conspiracy Theory and Cognitive Style: a Worldview,” Frontiers in 
Psychology 6(2015): 206. 
659 Both Martin and Charles are quite clear about their desire to avoid entertaining conspiracist ideas, 
but are also both at times clearly tempted by conspiracist explanations to explain their failures.  
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However, I want to end on a slightly more optimistic note. While nothing systematic can be 
done about individuals with pre-existing pathology, something can be done about redressing 
LiP experiences of systematic exclusion, at least partly.  In this respect, forestalling the 
assumption that serial litigants are inevitably suffering from ‘querulous behaviour’ syndrome 
not only stops internalising responsibility in the LiP, but can also offer a better way forward 
for everyone. This involves confronting the idea that LiP difficulties are systemic, and are 
embedded in the civil justice system itself. In addition, we need to address the role and purpose 
of LiPs in a more coherent and systematic way. Perhaps then, there is a possibility that some 
of the more negative experiences told in these pages might be avoided. And that is what I will 
explore in the conclusion to this thesis: what can we do?   
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CONCLUSION  
 
 
This thesis has tried to understand more about what it is like to be a LiP. In the first two 
chapters I explored how LiPs are viewed by the legal profession and scholarship, considering 
why LiPs often have a negative reputation, and how they came to acquire this pejorative 
baggage. I then turned, through my empirical research, to flip perspectives and consider how 
LiPs themselves describe their experiences of litigation, and their attitudes towards legal 
professionals and process. As I conjectured at the outset of this research, a vast divide 
separates these two different perspectives; misunderstanding upon misunderstanding, 
deliberate, accidental, useful, detrimental, and all of these issues continue to throw hazards in 
the path of clear communication, eroding trust and accumulating like mounting debris on a 
highway. It is therefore quite difficult to see beyond the rubble or, to borrow a metaphor from 
writing about LiPs, to think about after the ‘flood’.  
 
As I set out in the first and second chapters of this thesis, distrust and dislike of LiPs is deep-
rooted and longstanding. And what LiP perspectives tell us is that this distrust cuts both 
ways; LiPs in this study have deeply negative experiences that lead them to dislike and 
distrust legal professionals in turn. So much of this distrust and dislike is grounded in gaps 
between ways of seeing. It is also rooted, as I have sought to argue, in the lack of place for 
LiPs. They don’t belong. They are made to feel that they don’t belong. This perpetuates not 
only their own negative experiences, but also the very likelihood of their being received in a 
hostile environment. And so a distrustful cycle carries on. In this conclusion then, we find 
ourselves at somewhat of an impasse. LiPs are badly and inadequately accommodated in the 
civil justice system. And more LiPs are coming into this system that has no clear place for 
them; in terms of resources, attitudes, and the workings of civil justice itself, which seems to 
preclude, or at least limit, recognition of LiP needs or desires. The dimension of the problem is 
vast, and seemingly intractable.  
 
However, while the future for LiPs looks bleak, what I hope to have achieved in this thesis is 
not simply laying out the scale of the problem, but to also provide at least a partial corrective; 
some small steps or adjustments that may indeed be possible and which may, in a small way, 
make a difference. It is the delusion of every PhD student to have inflated ideas about what her 
thesis can ‘do’, so I want to be quite frank here. I am clearly not going to solve anything; not 
through a small study, not through a single thesis; of course not. Nor can I come up with a 
holistic, or developed proposal, which is again sadly beyond my reach and ability. But to 
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return to Clifford Geertz: ‘it is not necessary to know everything in order to understand 
something’.660 I might paraphrase this to say that it is not necessary for me to solve anything, 
but that doesn’t mean that I can’t make some contribution towards that end. And so that is 
what this conclusion seeks to do: to not just summarise the problems, but to also start to think 
about what we might do. 
 
What are the problems? As the first chapter of this thesis sought to demonstrate, there is a 
widely disseminated negative perception of LiPs. At different times, and in different 
jurisdictions, people representing themselves have been described as time wasters, difficult, 
“crazy”, obsessive and so on. The emphasis in such writing is on the difficulty LiPs cause 
others; through taking too long, through lacking legal skills, as well as through what is often 
conjectured to be fundamentally down to their psychological makeup or troublesome 
personality. As I have argued, inherent in these kinds of descriptions is an instinctive 
association between LiPs and vexatious litigants, and between LiPs and compulsive litigants. 
There is an implicit assumption in much of this writing that assumes LiPs are there out of 
choice, much in the same way that criminal retributivists perceive crime. Criminals choose to 
commit crimes, and LiPs choose to “commit law”. Ultimately, this paints a picture of LiPs as 
an overriding problem whose impact needs to be managed, or controlled.  
 
Compounding this unflattering portrait of LiPs is the current context we find ourselves in: five 
years after the cuts to legal aid, which left those pursuing or defending civil claims almost 
completely without access to free advice or representation. As I have laid out in the first 
chapter, this has engendered something of a crisis when it comes to LiPs. Attention focused on 
LiPs has expanded exponentially because the expected rapid increase in numbers has raised 
considerable concern: how the courts will deal with the influx of LiPs, what legal professionals 
can do and whether their roles will be expected to change, and a host of other unanswerable 
questions. At times, this concern is elevated to the status of an explicit threat: evident in 
claims about potential LiP violence and abuse of others, including court users, court staff and 
legal professionals. This threat seems to be rooted in the concern that in the wake of LASPO 
there may be too many LiPs to be adequately controlled, or safely dealt with in the context of 
limited resources and funding cuts to court services. This concern is explicitly made, too, in 
the literature that draws diluvian analogies talking of flooding, tsunamis and waves; 
apocalyptic and catastrophic imagery to symbolise just how problematic LiPs are perceived to 
be by some practitioners and scholars in civil justice. But as the first chapter set out, and this 
thesis has maintained throughout, this conceptualisation of LiPs as threat can only be created 
and maintained through positioning LiPs as outsiders. Fundamental to the negative 
                                                     
660 Geertz, “The Interpretation of Cultures,” 20.  
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conception of LiPs, therefore, is that they are conceived of as “outside” of normal legal practice: 
LiPs are fundamentally aberrant.  
 
Of course, this is not uniformly the case. As I laid out in my second chapter, there have always 
been sympathetic scholars and practitioners who have tried to assist LiPs, notably the 
influential and important work of Hazel Genn, as well as Rosemary Hunter, Mark Sefton and 
Richard Moorhead, John Baldwin, Elizabeth Trinder, Didi Herman and others. This thesis 
would not be possible without the illuminating work of these scholars, including the difficult 
groundwork of finding and interviewing LiPs, testing presuppositions and tracking policy 
developments and their effects at a time when LiPs were being largely ignored in research.  It 
is important to emphasise, too, that there is a growing body of scholarship that seeks to 
understand the litigant in person. This includes the work of the Civil Justice Council, and their 
Litigants in Person Working Group, the work of Bob Lee and Tatiana Tkacukova at the 
University of Birmingham, the work of Julie McFarlane in Canada, and the recent project 
currently underway under Professor Grainne McKeever at Ulster University. Such literature 
has attempted to better understand LiP experiences and to offer suggestions for how to 
improve their experiences as well as how to minimise the impact on the courts.  
 
There has also been a wave of guidance, research and policy about the LiP since LASPO.  Such 
materials have been produced by the High Court, the Supreme Court, the Bar Pro Bono unit, 
the Law Society and numerous others. Networks of research and collaboration have also 
formed, including the LiP Network, doing important work in finding ways to better assist 
LiPs.  I would therefore not wish to minimise the important work that has recently been done, 
and is continuing to be done in the area. However, this more recent work, while useful and 
illuminating in some ways, still arguably has certain limitations when it comes to 
understanding LiPs.  Firstly, whilst such work is very important and is slowly growing, it 
remains constituted by a relatively small group of researchers, although it is growing. 
Secondly, such scholarship is made challenging by the almost total absence of data about LiPs; 
as I mentioned earlier in this thesis, figures for LiPs have only been published since 2014, and 
these are far from robust. This means that much of this research, including my own project, 
remains preliminary in the absence of better data. 
 
Lastly, though, this thesis also sets out to argue that a limitation of at least some of this 
guidance and assistance for LiPs is that it can be, at least at times, primarily concerned with 
the future and status of the legal profession: the effect the cuts will have on the future of legal 
representation. Such motives of course do not preclude a meaningful effort at assistance, but 
they do reflect the primacy of legal representation as the ultimate objective. Essentially, such 
scholarship largely seeks to find ways of expanding or obtaining advice for LiPs. This is of 
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course invaluable and important, but the solution here is always: get a lawyer. And this poses a 
problem. Firstly, this is because the clock is not being turned back post LASPO. While over 
the course of this PhD there have been certain about-turns in conditions for lay litigants – 
such as the Supreme Court defeat of the raising of Employment Tribunal Fees661 (and in the 
criminal sphere, the defeat of the Criminal Courts Charge), and while there are continuing 
discussions and proposed green papers about Family Court fees and access to legal aid, this 
simply isn’t the case for civil justice more widely.662 As the Bach Commission report, published 
in late September 2017, outlines, Labour’s vision for legal aid advocates restoration of such aid 
to certain spheres, but does not propose reinstating it for non-family civil matters.663 So this 
government, and the opposition, are certainly not proposing restoring legal aid for anyone 
within these pages. This means that ‘get a lawyer’ isn’t a good enough answer.  
 
In addition to this issue, however, this thesis has tried to hint at a deeper one; a fundamental 
contradiction that exists between the theoretical ‘right’ to self-represent and a civil justice 
system that makes this extremely difficult in practice, and where LiPs remain outsiders. So 
how did we get here? Why are LiPs outsiders? As I outlined in Chapter Three, this history is 
quite a specific one. The idea that people who represented themselves were always seen as 
aberrant simply isn’t the case. It was common for individuals to act without legal 
representation for hundreds of years, in multiple different kinds of proceedings, such as 
manorial courts, Eyres, other forms of itinerant court proceedings and in the Courts of 
Request. But such a landscape was one where there were forums not dominated by the legal 
profession. The coming of the professional, and the professionalisation of the new County 
Courts, is a story of attorneys fighting for recognition and distinction in these new courts. But 
these developments limit self-represented litigants from being able to pursue or defend claims 
without legal expertise. By the end of this process, legal expertise and formal procedure has 
become the norm in civil proceedings.  Being a ‘LiP’ therefore means something different to 
self-representation; it signifies the moment where self-representation becomes aberrant. To be 
a LiP is to occupy a role arguably defined by lack of judgment and lack of skill: the obverse of 
the legal professional. This means that LiPs exist in conceptual opposition to the mastery, 
colonisation and normality of the legal profession for resolving disputes. From this moment, 
self-represented parties are outsiders, and there is no place for them in this new, post 
Judicature Act world.  
                                                     
661 See R (on the Application of UNISON) (Appellant) v. Lord Chancellor (Respondent) 2017 UKSC 51. 
662 The Criminal Courts Charge was a system of fixed fees of up to £1200 that essentially penalise 
criminal defendants should they be found guilty of a criminal offence. It was introduced in April 2015 
under Secretary of State for Justice Chris Grayling. The next justice secretary, Michael Gove, scrapped 
the charges after a select committee report highlighted the widescale problems and protests with such a 
charge. See House of Commons Justice Committee, Criminal Courts Charge: Second Report of Session 2015-
16 HC586 (The Stationery Office: London, 2015).  
663 The Bach Commission on Access to Justice, The Crisis in the Justice System in England and Wales 
Interim Report (Fabian Society: London, 2016).  
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It is important not to overstate the point: as mentioned above, LiPs are increasingly becoming 
a fact of life in multiple courts, and there are many people within the profession who actively 
seek to assist them. But they remain, conceptually at least, outsiders. And this ‘outsider’ status 
does something useful and productive; it emphasises the competency of the profession. One 
troubling question that arises from this study, then, is how can LiPs succeed? How can we 
ameliorate or improve LiP experiences in a legal world that, unconsciously or not, relies to 
some degree on their shortcomings? This odd positioning is ultimately echoed in some of the 
literature that demonstrates fear of the LiP: a situation where LiPs are ‘normal’ is a situation 
where legal professionals are giving way to another group in an area that they dominate. This 
issue surely provides some illumination as to why research on LiPs can be limited in what it 
can do: because it tends to reproduce the scenario that retains the LiP as outsider. It also 
explains the most significant research gap that this thesis identifies, and which was identified 
by John Baldwin twenty years ago: much of the research into LiPs, including more recent and 
sympathetic scholarship, focuses on the impact LiPs have on the courts. What about the 
impact of the courts on the LiP?   
 
This is what this thesis set out to consider through my empirical research. What can we find 
out by talking to LiPs? Not in concert with legal professionals, nor with the aim of 
reconfiguring LiP comments into previous frameworks; but unilaterally, in their own words? To 
do this, of course, I argued we need to go ‘without the law’: find other ways of reaching LiPs 
that could, if not completely escape, at least partially avoid falling into the potential trap of 
seeing LiPs as a problem or of assuming the solution ought to be legal representation. Most 
importantly, I argued that we needed to find out more about the impact going to law has on 
the LiP: what is it like to pursue or defend a claim? As I contended throughout the second half 
of this thesis, the answer is, for these fifteen interviewees at least, is: it’s terrible. Interviewee 
after interviewee expressed the deep and negative impact these experiences had had on them, 
including loss of family, loss of jobs, loss of homes, loss of social lives and loss of identity. For 
some interviewees, their claims became all they had.   
 
It is important to emphasise that this study is of a very small sample and as such, I do not 
want to overclaim based on these findings. However, at the very least, I argue the findings of 
this study potentially rebuts the idea that LiPs are choosing to “commit law”: no interviewee 
acted out of ‘choice’ as they understood it: rather they felt compelled or obliged to fight for 
something they perceived to be important in circumstances that were extremely difficult. In 
addition, whilst the significant and negative impact going to law can have for LiPs is perhaps 
to some degree recognised in family proceedings, this study has suggested it is not necessarily 
only those involved in the more obvious “worthy” claims who have difficult or challenging 
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experiences. No LiP in this study went to law for fun, and the negative impact experienced by 
interviewees was considerable. This finding suggests, I would argue, that we need to 
concentrate more on understanding this negative impact when researching LiPs in civil 
justice. Finally, I argue this study problematizes the distinction between ‘worthy’ and 
‘unworthy’ litigants: this study has suggested that the complex individual histories of litigants 
often involve a development of litigious behaviour, or development of distrust: the long-term 
narrative challenges this distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ litigants and this thesis 
contends overall it is arguably a false one; certainly it is unhelpful. 
 
But what this study also found, beyond the depth of difficulties experienced by these LiPs, is 
that so many of these difficulties aren’t because of them, it is arguably embedded within the 
practice of civil justice itself. Interviewee after interviewee narrates scenarios where access to 
justice is made disproportionately more difficult, whether because of access to material, 
inaccessibility of language, incomplete understanding of required behaviour, restrictive 
opening times, limited access to advice, and more. This all points to a scenario of differential 
treatment. This study suggests therefore, that LiPs are being held to many of the same 
standards as legal professionals without the skills, privileges and networks that the latter 
possess. And they are perhaps at times blamed for these failures. Again, I want to emphasise 
that this was a very small study. But as I have contended throughout this thesis: this begs the 
question: how can a LiP be good? We are very familiar with the bad LiP in the literature: it is 
clear what it means to not succeed. But what does a good LiP look like?  The lack of consistent 
guidance or clearly conceptualised role for LiPs results, in this study at least, in the experience 
of individuals being told that they have a right to self-represent, only to find the odds stacked 
against them when they set out to do so. In this respect, at least, it is arguably far more likely 
that they will fail than succeed. 
 
And fail many do. With some exceptions, this study largely records and discusses experiences 
of failures. LiPs in this study fail to communicate what they wanted, LiPs fail to provide the 
right documentation, LiPs fail to succeed in their claims, LiPs fail to get the right information 
to the right person at the right time. There is no doubt that amongst these failures, there are 
overblown expectations, perhaps some poor preparation, and other difficulties that are due to 
the LiP themselves. In addition, of course, all this study has is stories; we don’t know “what 
happened”. But the stories that emerge are deeply troubling. Because this failure seems to be 
often attributable to things that the LiP simply doesn’t understand or will struggle to do 
anything about. Worryingly, an important finding from this study is that one of the worse, 
and least recognised, aspects of being a LiP is that they are at such a disadvantage when 
things go wrong: how will a LiP know how to deal with this?  In the end, then, this study 
suggests not only that LiPs often fail (which we already knew), but that they often fail and they 
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don’t know why. This is troubling on a basic level, suggesting we need to do a great deal more 
to understand what is happening here. But there are also significant consequences to these 
experiences of failures. 
 
As the final chapter of this thesis set out, LiPs in this study understand failures in particular 
ways, and for some LiPs, the only way to understand why they repeatedly fail, despite the 
effort and work they put in, is conspiracy. But while such claims tend to reinforce negative 
attitudes some have towards LiPs (“loonies in person” and “nutters”), what this study suggests 
is that this conspiracising may be a response to the scenario that LiPs find themselves in: 
where they are given theoretical access to the courts, but where they cannot easily succeed, 
and where it is extremely difficult—if not impossible—to learn how to improve. The 
differential treatment LiPs in this study experience, the systemic exclusions they face, are 
symptomatic, I argue, of their fundamental lack of place in the legal system. It is this 
collective, systemic experience that gives rise to conspiracy; not aberrant psychopathology. 
But when such individuals come to court and express these ideas, this arguably serves to 
reinforce negative impressions of them and undermine their claims. And so we arrive at the 
challenging cycle: this study argues that negative experiences of justice exacerbates or perhaps 
even creates conspiracists in the first place. And so LiPs conspiracise, and so they fail again. 
And so on. And as this study also points to, the more LiPs fail, the more likely they may be to 
conspiracise, and so repeated failure can potentially lead to greater conspiracising. Most 
troubling of all, this study suggests that it is those who are the most conspiracy minded who 
are also the most likely to share information, often bad information, through advice networks, 
and through acting as advisers to LiPs. This means that this study suggests that in the 
absence of good advice, bad advice is more likely to flourish.   
 
Clearly, we have multiple problems of significant scale. But as I set out to do in this chapter, I 
don’t just want to lay out the scale of the problem. What can we do? As I have argued above, 
the findings in this study suggest some deep-rooted systemic problems that need addressing: 
firstly, this involves recognising the implication of the courts and legal professionals 
themselves in LiP experiences: how their practises and assumptions serve to reinforce and 
perpetuate the certain issues with LiPs. This involves considering how the failure of the LiP is 
linked to the success of the legal professional. How this is done is something for future study 
and research, but at the very least this study has demonstrated how much more we can 
understand about LiPs if we speak to them outside of the assumptions we place on them. If we 
don’t do this, we will always fail to understand.  
 
But I want to end on a more positive note. While the issues that this study points to are deep-
rooted, there are surely ways to do small things to assist. Firstly, providing clearer guidance 
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for legal professionals would surely help. This might involve things like explaining to them 
the distrust LiPs feel when they see lawyers and judges gathering and conversing together 
without them. If legal professionals were more explicit about how and why this took place, or 
if they refrained from doing it, this could improve LiP experiences. Better explanations also 
seem called for here. While of course many judges try extremely hard to explain situations to 
LiPs, these explanations would work better earlier on in the process. Some of the worst 
experiences in this study came from LiPs failure to understand the financial consequences of 
not settling. This is surely something that can be built on in the mediation process so that the 
consequences are made more explicit than they currently are. I obviously cannot outline every 
possible proposed solution for LiPs. But I do believe that there are probably many relatively 
simple, inexpensive steps that could be done, and that I hope can be developed (and which I 
hope to continue developing after this thesis). 
 
One mooted next step to assist LiPs is the coming online court. Lord Justice Briggs’ report in 
July 2016 proposed that small claims be moved online.664 The model suggested would follow 
the example set by British Colombia in Canada where they have already introduced such an 
online court.665 In this proposed process, litigants would go through three stages; early ‘triage’ 
to identify problems through an automated system; arbitration with an appointed mediator, 
which would also take place online and finally, only if necessary, a judicial decision if litigants 
couldn’t agree. Arguments in favour of an online court cite its greater accessibility for 
litigants, being online and circumventing the need to attend court.666 In addition, this would 
also mean litigants could upload documents rather than sending them to a claims processing 
centre. While details have not been finalised, simplified proceedings are intended including the 
online court not being subject to the Civil Procedure Rules.667 Such developments may indeed 
greatly assist in bypassing ‘gatekeeper’ issues referred to repeatedly in this thesis: the paper-
bound nature of civil justice currently undoubtedly causes difficulties for LiPs. 
 
However, there are areas of concern we need to consider before embracing such a court. The 
automated triage system means that litigants will not have any human contact until the 
arbitration process. The ‘triaging’ relies on a system that can categorise disputes. But this 
thesis has already raised the problem with these kinds of categorisation. LiPs rarely only have 
one problem, and struggle to separate out such issues. It is hard to see how an automated 
system will optimise this process, and the risk is that it may simply once again fail to be able to 
                                                     
664 Briggs, Civil Courts. 
665 The Civil Resolution Tribunal is available at:  https://civilresolutionbc.ca  
666 Briggs, Civil Courts, 36-52. 
667 Ibid, 52.  
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comprehend the complexity of litigants’ cases.668 The presumption built in here is that 
individuals have discrete problems, and this research contradicts this, as other research has 
done before.669  It is also hard not to see this drive towards online courts as another means of 
pushing litigants out of the courts into alternative proceedings, creating a ‘second-tier’ system, 
where litigants would no longer have the ‘right’ to access the courts. I have argued that this 
right, in practice, is largely a rhetorical one, but this court potentially takes this further by 
removing it altogether.  
 
Beyond the online court, this thesis has also argued that we need to think about what a good 
LiP might be. The lack of clear role as it currently stands leads to considerable inconsistency, 
leaving LiPs unable to know how to behave, and unable to improve. This is a significant 
source of resentment for them. Is there a way of providing useful guidance that might better 
lay out the role? Can we make the role a positive one, one that contained within it the 
possibility of competency, rather than signifying its lack? The difficulty we face here, of 
course, is that to be a LiP is to not be a legal professional: and it is therefore hard to imagine 
how they can ever be ‘good’. At the very least, though, admitting such inconsistencies that 
exist now would be a positive step. 
 
Finally, this thesis has argued throughout that, whilst there has been a significant 
improvement in research and attention paid to LiPs, we are still at the very beginning of the 
process: we still have trouble understanding LiPs and their experiences. This difficulty 
forestalls any long-term improvements in LiP experiences. The most important development 
in this area must therefore be through better education: not just for the LiP, but for the 
profession as well. While some of this is beginning with the work the Personal Support Unit 
do with barrister training, much more could be done. We also need to stop talking of 
‘managing’ LiPs and talk more seriously about accommodating them. We need to understand 
why LiPs come to law, and the challenges they pose, instead of seeing them as problems. To 
make any long-term difference, such education needs to move us beyond any lazy, pejorative 
assumptions we still at times make about LiPs: it needs to be predicated on a greater 
understanding of LiP experiences. We need to hear more of the kinds of stories told in this 
thesis.670 And this means we must keep listening.  
                                                     
668 Most of the suggestions Lord Woolf himself made about necessary IT developments never took 
place with the system still entirely paper-dependent. This leads to other concerns about the poor history 
of IT development in the courts. 
669 Pleasence, Causes of Action; Balmer et al., “Worried Sick.” 
670 The PSU provide a workshop as part of the Bar Professional Training Course (BPTC). Lizzie Iron, 
head of service at the PSU, invited me along to attend the workshop in 2016.  
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POSTSCRIPT 
 
Hi Kate, 
 
Ever since 4 April 2017, I have been either staying [with] friends/relatives (4-25 April) or 
AirBnB-ing in S---- (25 April-15 August) but I couldn't afford to continue AirBnB-ing, 
without getting into more debt (bank overdraft).  Last week, the local council finally agreed 
to provide temporary accommodation for me, from today, to enable me to save enough of 
my pensions to use as a deposit on renting a room instead of having to keep spending it on 
AirBnBs (or perhaps justice and law and order and sanity might start to prevail, re my flat).  
(I had to explain why, even though my family are the very people to whom I have a right to 
turn for help, my brother cannot have me to stay, because his wife won't allow it and is 
behaving like a total monster.) 
 
Arrived at this guest house in I----, about an hour ago.  As the booking was made by [the 
council] (who are paying), it signifies that I am now officially homeless.  I may be here 
some weeks while I make other arrangements - I'd like to live in H-----, for everything you 
need is in walking distance (public library, health centre, cycle shop, pubs, small 
supermarket), 90% of the mile-long High Street is Listed (300-400 year old buildings), and 
every vista lifts up the spirit.  (I have been trying to rent a room and almost succeeded 
several times: it isn't easy because I don't drive - some rooms advertised are located in 
villages with no bus service - and because of my age - most people advertising rooms to 
rent stipulate an upper age limit for the new house-sharer, eg 40 or 35.)   It is such a relief 
not to have to spend money I don't have on more AirBnB accommodation. 
 
The room here is fine: larger than the bedroom at the (tenth!) AirBnB I left this morning, 
light, with "ensuite" loo and shower, tv, fridge. Door can be locked, and I have been given 
the key.   I have opted not to have the breakfast provided (as I prefer to go on as at the 
AirBnBs for the past four months, making real coffee in the morning in the little cafetiere I 
have brought with me and having that with a bun or a few squares of a chocolate bar).  So I 
won't need to have much contact with the other residents who, I guess (having seen two of 
them so far), are much "rougher" and more "shouty" than I am.  Full meals can be cooked 
in the communal kitchen.  But I do feel lucky: this is so much nicer than an emergency 
night shelter.  And there is free wi-fi. 
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It is a short walk from here into the centre of I--------.  I'll have to go out and buy a bowl, 
plate and cutlery this afternoon, as these are not provided (apparently they get broken or 
stolen too often). I'll also go to the little shop I found that sells Appleton crewel tapestry 
wool skeins and buy what I need to complete the second doll's house rug I am working on 
(to sell on eBay) and perhaps start a third one: finding that shop is a compensation for 
having to be in I------. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Talia.671 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
671 Email from Talia, 15.08.17, cited with permission. 
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APPENDIX A: 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
       Oral History of Litigants in Person  
     Interviewing Question outline 
 
 
INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS/BACKGROUND 
 
Opening Question     Secondary Question[s] Literature connection 
1. What is your full name?   
2. When were you born?   
3. Where were you born? If not in the UK: 
3A) When did you first arrive in the UK?  
 
3B) What was it like coming here? 
 
3C) What do you remember from before you 
came here? 
Beyond providing basic 
demographic information, these 
questions are designed to establish 
an individual’s self-defined 
ethnicity & how they might define 
their national identity. This is in 
response to Hermann (2012) 
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 where Herman raises question of 
overrepresentation of BME 
individuals in vexatious litigant 
categorisation.   
4. What is your earliest memory?  The reasoning behind this question 
is to begin to pose open-ended 
relatively creative questions to 
allow the interviewee to pursue an 
individual line of response – this 
links to Luisa Passerini (1979) 
research on oral history and 
sensibility, Michael Frisch (1979) 
on oral history, Alessandro Portelli 
(1998).  
5. What language(s) did you speak at home? 5A) Did you learn English as a second 
language? 
 
5B) Where did you learn English?  
This follows from the above to try 
and consider to what degree 
language may play a role in 
facilitating/hindering 
participation. Are any of these 
individuals non-native English 
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speakers? Do they perceive this to 
have had an effect? This links to 
questions raised about ESL by 
Moorhead (2003), Moorhead & 
Sefton (2005), as well as Hermann 
(2012).  
6. Can you tell me about the first place you 
remember living? 
 Following Passerini (1979); 
Darnton (1985); Geertz (2006) 
another open-ended question to 
get the interviewee to practice 
describing a particular location; 
part of developing individual detail 
that will hopefully enable them to 
be more evocative and descriptive 
when later discussing places they 
have been to in the course of their 
dispute.  
7. Can you walk me through the flat/house 
where you lived? 
 This question is designed to get 
the interviewee to think in terms of 
place and layout, and to 
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encourage them to not simply 
focus on people or speech; instead 
it allows them to re-imagine 
themselves in a particular place; 
this evocation of place can lead to 
stronger memories, from Hastrup 
(1990, 1994), Geertz (2006).  
8. Did you stay there [in this first place] long? If NO: 
7A) Where did you go? 
 
7B) What do you remember about the move? 
 
 
9. Who did you live with there? 
 
9A) Tell me about your  
[Mother /father/sibling/extended family  
member] 
 
9B) Did your […] go to college? University? 
 
9C) Did your [… ] do paid work? 
 
9D) Who did you see most in your family 
This is an open-ended question 
designed to elicit information 
about family/home life without 
trying to pre-empt assumptions 
about who they might live with 
(e.g. not simply an assumption 
they live with a nuclear family). 
The purpose behind this is firstly to 
understand better the family and 
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growing up? 
 
9E) What was your relationship with [this 
person/these people] like? 
home life of individuals who act as 
LiPs , following Williams (2011), 
Moorhead & Sefton (2005), that 
attempted to gather some of this 
information) but secondly to also 
consider the family network these 
individuals existed/exist in: this 
may become pertinent when 
considering what steps individuals 
take in seeking advice – where do 
they go first?  This connects to 
questions about advice seeking 
that Hazel Genn (1998) explored in 
Path to Justice and which this 
study seeks to broaden.  
 
The questions are also designed to 
establish the degree to which the 
individual was happy in their home 
life – once again, without pre-
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empting a negative response, but 
enabling the individual to be as 
explicit as they want to be. This 
links to literature on supposed 
‘pathology’ of LiP that presumes 
psychological trauma or difficulty 
can drive their motivation to seek 
‘justice’, e.g. Taggart (2004).   
10. Were there rituals in your family? 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Were there activities your family did 
regularly? 
 
If YES 
10A: Can you tell me about these rituals? 
 
 
 
 
11A) Can you tell me about these activities? 
 
The thinking behind this line of 
questioning is to get them to 
articulate examples of practices 
that would be normal in their 
family, but may not be something 
others have experienced – re-
questioning or accounting for the 
familiar. This links to Darnton’s 
(1985) work on sensibility where 
he argues that an individual’s way 
of seeing is best evoked at the 
moments of greatest differences. 
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This also links to Bourdieu’s 
research on naturalisation – whilst 
this is a fairly simple question, it is 
intended to get the interviewee to 
recognise and account for the 
familiar, rather than taking it for 
granted.  
12. Is your family religious? If YES: 
12A) did you go to services? 
 
12B) What do you remember about these 
services? 
 
12C) Did your family observe religious 
festivals?  
 
12D) What do you remember of the festivals?  
 
12E)Can you talk me through what you 
remember about a religious event? 
This questioning partially links 
back to Hermann’s (2012) 
research on BME backgrounds & 
vexatious litigants, and partially is 
accounted for by supplying more 
demographic information about 
LiPs. However, another impetus is 
the degree to which religious 
education or socialisation may or 
may not link to particular ideas of 
justice or their accessibility in 
particular communities. For 
example, those raised in a Jewish 
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 or Muslim household may be 
aware of the particular practices 
of dispute resolution that those 
from other households may not. 
This goes to the question of 
Bourdieu’s (1987; 2000) habitus 
formation and tries to elicit any 
early ideas about law and justice.   
 If NO: 
12A) was religion talked about in your house? 
This questioning partially links 
back to Hermann’s (2012) 
research on BME backgrounds & 
vexatious litigants, and partially is 
accounted for by supplying more 
demographic information about 
LiPs. However, another impetus is 
the degree to which religious 
education or socialisation may or 
may not link to particular ideas of 
justice or their accessibility in 
particular communities. For 
If YES 
12A) do you share the beliefs of your family or 
have your beliefs changed?  
 
12B) If so, how have they changed and why 
do you think that might be? 
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example, those raised in a Jewish 
or Muslim household may be 
aware of the particular practices 
of dispute resolution that those 
from other households may not. 
This goes to the question of 
Bourdieu’s (1987; 2000) habitus 
formation and tries to elicit any 
early ideas about law and justice.   
This questioning is designed to 
lead on from the above and 
potentially move from the specifics 
of religion to the question of ethics 
or morality that the individual may 
attribute to a religion or not; once  
again, the link is to habitus around 
beliefs about law and justice.  
13. Do you remember any advice or  
guidance your parents/caregiver gave you 
when you were a child? 
13A) What kind of morals did your parents 
pass on?  
As above, this line of questioning is 
hopefully encouraging the 
interviewee to explicitly account 
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for ‘codes’ that their parents gave 
them; all of this links back to 
identifying early beliefs about law 
and justice in habitus formation, 
as well as Passerini’s (1979)  
argument as to evoking sensibility.  
14. Did your family discuss politics? If YES 
14A) What kind of politics?  
 
14B) What do you remember about these 
discussions? 
 
This question is an early one 
designed to consider whether or 
not certain assumptions made by 
literature (e.g. that on LiPs as 
pathological or vexatious, i.e. 
McKenzie (2009) are sustained; 
e.g. are LiPs more likely to be 
motivated by a perceived sense of 
injustice – and is this because of a 
general link to being openly 
‘political’? 
15. What were some rules in your house?  This is a question designed to get 
the interviewees to consider codes 
and rules that influence behaviour 
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and thought although they are not 
formal ‘laws’; this is to encourage 
them to think about the ways their 
own behaviour was influenced/the 
degree to which they internalised 
certain norms of behaviour – again 
this links to Bourdieu (1987; 2000).  
16. What happened if you broke the rules?  This question follows from the 
above to consider punishment and 
accountability; again considering 
how disputes were dealt with in 
their particular house, what 
consequences there were for ‘bad’ 
behaviour, and so on.  
17. What did your parents want for your 
future, do you think? 
17A) How did you know they wanted this? 
 
17B) Did you want this too? 
This question aims to move 
towards questions of the gap 
between legal professionals and 
laypersons. Literature: Moorhead 
& Sefton (2005); Williams (2011); 
Baldwin 1998, 1999) suggests LiPs 
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are more likely to come from a 
poorer background – this is 
considering the degree to which 
opportunity was perceived in their 
particular household. What were 
their expectations about what 
their future would hold?  
18. Who were your earliest friends?  This is again establishing the 
individual’s ability to make friends 
and how easy they found it; the 
literature link is back again to the 
question of pathology – do people 
who act as LiPs lack regular social 
skills?  
19. Where did you meet these friends?  This questioning, besides following 
the above, is also fleshing out the 
‘network of connections’ of this 
individual as per the family 
questions: this is laying the 
groundwork for questions of 
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advice (following Genn 1999).  
20. Did you go to their houses?  20A) What was their home like? 
 
20B) What was their family like? 
 
20C) Was it [their house/family] like yours? 
 
IF DIFFERENT 
20D) how did you feel about this [difference]? 
This line of questioning is designed 
to consider difference, if the 
interviewee perceives there to be 
any, between him/her and his/her 
peers. This difference could be 
attributed to socioeconomic 
circumstances, language, 
ethnicity, identity and so on and is 
deliberately broadly framed to 
allow the interviewee to pursue 
the difference they identify. This 
links back to demographic 
information about the 
socioeconomic or ethnic 
background of those who act as 
LiPs. This also asks them to 
consider from their perspective 
how aware they were, rather than 
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assuming this awareness was 
present.  
21. Did anyone in your family work in law? If YES  
21A) Who? And what do you remember 
about what they did? 
 
This line of questioning is designed 
to see how early an exposure 
individuals had to legal 
professionals; were they from a 
family with legal professionals in 
it; if so, would that influence what 
kind of career they would have 
and their later decisions? Would it 
affect how they sought advice? 
Contrarily, are these individuals 
less likely to be connected to legal 
professionals and therefore have 
less of an idea of what legal 
professionals might do? This links 
partly to Michael Blackwell’s 
(2012) research on the degree to 
which family connections influence 
career choice; whilst Blackwell is 
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talking about legal professionals, 
to what extent is this reflected in 
the inverse position; are those who 
act as LiPs from backgrounds 
where access to a legal career was 
not a perceived possibility?  
 If NO 
 21A) did you know anyone who worked in 
law when you were a child? 
This line of questioning is designed 
to see how early an exposure 
individuals had to legal 
professionals; were they from a 
family with legal professionals in 
it; if so, would that influence what 
kind of career they would have 
and their later decisions? Would it 
affect how they sought advice? 
Contrarily, are these individuals 
less likely to be connected to legal 
professionals and therefore have 
less of an idea of what legal 
professionals might do? This links 
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partly to Michael Blackwell’s 
(2012) research on the degree to 
which family connections influence 
career choice; whilst Blackwell is 
talking about legal professionals, 
to what extent is this reflected in 
the inverse position; are those who 
act as LiPs from backgrounds 
where access to a legal career was 
not a perceived possibility?  
 
 
 
 
SCHOOLING/EDUCATION: 
 
 
22. What was the first school you went 
to? 
 This opens up a line of questioning 
about education, again trying to 
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ascertain what kinds of behaviour 
was normalised, what their earliest 
predispositions were in terms of 
what they enjoyed and thought they 
might do in their future, and how 
they formed social networks, again 
all linking back to Bourdieu (1987; 
2000) and habitus formation.  
23. What is your earliest memory at 
school? 
 Another question designed to 
enable the interviewee to again 
answer creatively about something 
particular and depart from a 
dispassionate or perceived ‘factual’ 
account of school, back to Passerini 
(1979), Frisch (1979) and Hastrup 
(2000). 
24. How did you find going to school?  Rather than asking if the 
interviewee ‘liked’ school, the 
question is designed to ask them 
more broadly about how they felt 
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about schooling in general, giving 
them the opportunity to answer in a 
way they think is appropriate to 
their experience.  
25. Can you describe a particular subject 
that you studied and what the classes 
were like? 
 Another question to elicit a richer 
memory than a ‘list’ of a favourite 
subject. Asking the individual to 
describe a particular class and what 
they did may hopefully assist in 
making connected memories more 
complex.  
26. Did you remember any particular 
teachers? Why?  
 This question is to trigger specific 
memories, rather than a more by 
rote account of schooling; this can 
potentially ideally evoke a positive 
or negative memory that the 
interviewee can describe in detail 
27. Were you good at school?  Whilst this is a slightly leading 
question, it is here deliberately to 
get the interviewee to consider the 
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degree to which they ‘fit in’ with the 
expectations of what was ‘good’ 
where they were; e.g. does the 
interviewee interpret this purely in 
terms of academic achievement? If 
so, what can this tell us about their 
particular experience? Or do they 
interpret this as behavioural? And 
so on. Once again, these questions 
link to habitus formation (Bourdieu 
1987; 2000)  more specifically to 
questions of social and education 
conformity. How well did they 
function within an institutional 
setting like a school? (Contra 
vexatious litigant literature, e.g. 
Taggart (2004); McKenzie ( 2009) 
28. Did you have many friends?  This question is again considering 
the degree to which they felt 
comfortable establishing a social 
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network, in an institutional setting, 
were able to make connections with 
other individuals; this goes to 
individual psychology (contra the 
pathology literature) as well as to 
building up their social world.  
29. What is your happiest memory of 
school? 
 This question is deliberately 
designed, at this point in the 
proceedings, to potentially bring out 
a positive experience that the 
interviewee can enjoy relating – 
whilst the substance can also be 
useful in learning what was of value 
to that individual as a child, it is also 
technical to ensure interviewee is 
not only being asked dry or 
distressing questions.  
30. And your unhappiest memory of 
school? 
 This question will be asked 
depending on the above; is this 
individual already recounting 
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unhappy memories? If so, it may not 
be useful in terms of making the 
interviewee uncomfortable; 
alternately, if the individual is 
presenting a uniformly rosy picture, 
this question can be used to get 
them to think about another way of 
seeing things (e.g. the questioning is 
designed as a form of ‘interruption’ 
to how the individual may have 
repackaged the narrative of their 
childhood, following Frisch (1979), 
Darnton (1985).  
31. What was your personality like as a 
child? 
 A very broad question designed to 
evoke the individuals’ self defined 
subjectivity; it comes at this point in 
the proceedings because it will 
hopefully be influenced by the 
previous discussion and therefore 
won’t simply be a two word 
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response.  
32. Did you ever come across bullying? If YES  
32A) What is the bullying incident you remember? 
 
32B) Was this at school or outside school? 
 
32C) Was anything done about this bullying?  
This line of questioning is designed 
to move again towards law and 
disputes in an informal setting, but 
in a way that does not come across 
as accusatory. This structuring of 
the question enables the 
interviewee to account for bullying 
whether they simply viewed it, were 
a victim of it, or were responsible for 
it. The secondary questions are very 
rough outlines; the aim of the 
questions will be to get at the 
individual’s sense of right and 
wrong in this situation, what 
informed that sense, and how well 
they felt the situation was dealt 
with. This will later link to questions 
about what a just outcome looks 
like.  
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33. How many schools did you go to? If MORE than 2-3 
33A) Why did you change schools? 
 
33B) What was starting somewhere new like? 
This question goes to considering 
whether they had a more disrupted 
schooling than we might perceive to 
be the usual and what effect they 
perceived this to have on their 
ability to form social networks and 
their access to opportunities. Did 
they find this process destabilising, 
or conversely, exciting? 
34. Were you interested in politics or law 
at school? 
If YES  
34A) Do you remember studying anything along 
those lines? 
 
34B) What do you remember about what you 
learnt? 
 
34C) Were any subjects to do with law available to 
you at school? 
 
This line of questioning moves 
specifically towards early 
experiences or perceptions of law 
and justice in a more explicit 
capacity. What did these individuals 
know about what politics or law 
was? What was their opinion of it at 
the time? What was this informed 
from? Did they see themselves as 
potentially heading in that 
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If NO 
34A)What subjects interested you more? 
 
34B) Did you ever think about politics or law as a 
job choice? 
 
34C)Were any subjects to do with law available to 
you at school? 
direction? (the literature connection 
here is partially to those who 
attribute LiP behaviour to those who 
wanted and failed to become legal 
professionals – see Williams 2011; 
MOJ 2013). All of these questions 
are again trying to get at 
predispositions towards the legal 
world and notions of justice, from 
Bourdieu (1987; 2000).   
35. Were you interested in performing 
arts or artistic subjects at school 
If YES 
 
35A) Did you study any of these kinds of courses?  
 
35B) Which courses did you study? 
 
This line of questioning is 
considering the potential ‘theatrical’ 
connection for individuals who act 
as LiPs. Some literature has 
suggested LiPs are motivated by self 
aggrandising desires to be ‘centre 
stage’ or to be able to ‘perform’ , 
e.g. Taggart (2004); McKenzie 
(2009). I am interested to see 
whether these individuals do enjoy 
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public speaking and performance, 
and whether they identify as being 
particularly drawn to this or 
capable.  
36. Did you enjoy public speaking or 
debating at school?  
 
 As above 
37. Did you socialise much outside of 
school? 
If YES 
 
37A) What kind of things did you do when 
socialising? 
 
37B) Whom did you socialise with? 
 
More questions on socialisation; to 
what degree did they have an 
independent social life with friends, 
or were they particularly 
studious/antisocial/had difficulties 
fitting in? 
If NO 
37A) Were you allowed to socialise? 
 
37B) What did you spend your time doing outside 
of school hours? 
38. What do you first remember wanting  This questioning links up with 
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to do as a job?  earlier questions about 
predisposition and opportunity; 
were there specific things the 
individual could imagine doing and 
others that weren’t a possibility? 
Where does law fit on that 
spectrum? Linking back to 
Blackwell’s (2012) research here as 
well as trying to establish if there is 
systemic disadvantage here.  
 
 
TELEVISION/BOOKS/INTERNET: 
 
 
39. Did you have a television when you 
were growing up? 
If YES  
39A) What did you watch in your house? 
This line of questioning is to identify 
information about law and justice 
and where it came from; i.e. does 
it connect with literature 
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suggestion that most people’s 
expectations are formed by 
television/internet? Also 
questioning designed to consider 
whether these expectations of law 
are formed based on criminal 
procedure as opposed to civil 
procedure.  
40. Did you have access to a computer 
when you were growing up? 
If YES 
 
40A) Did you have an internet connection? 
 
If YES 
40B) What kind of sites did you visit? 
 
40C) Did you use social media? 
 
40D) What kinds of social media did you use? 
 
40E) Do you still use these social media today? 
These questions are designed to a) as 
above, identify sources of 
information about law, but also to 
b) identify the degree of digital 
literacy individuals have and what 
later knock-on effect this might 
have in terms of i) seeking advice 
(Genn, 1999), ii) being able to 
complete forms/access information, 
e.g. Woolf (1995) and so on.  
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41. Were you interested in reading as a 
child? 
If YES  
 
41A)What kind of things did you read in your house? 
 
 
These questions are linked to the 
above, but also go to questions of 
literacy, language and class.  
42. Did you follow the news when you 
were growing up? 
If YES 
 
42A) where did you get most of your information 
about the news from?  
Also a means of finding out sources 
of information about law.  
 
 
CLASS/MONEY: 
 
43. Were you aware of your social class 
growing up? 
If YES  
 
43A) How were you aware of this class ? 
A series of more explicit questions 
to ask interviewees directly about 
self-perceived issues of class and 
socioeconomic status. This links to 
self-perceived or subjective ideas 
of lack of equality and whether 
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this may play out in their acting as 
LiPs (as suggested by literature on 
vexatious litigants, e.g. Taggart 
(2004), McKenzie (2009), Hermann 
(2012).  
44. Did you feel your family were 
economically comfortable 
compared with your peers? 
  
45. Were there things you wanted that 
you couldn’t have? 
  
 
 
 
 
EARLY ENCOUNTERS WITH LAW/BELIEFS ABOUT LAW: 
 
46. Was anyone in your family involved 
in a dispute when you were growing 
up? 
If YES 
 46A) What was the nature of the dispute? 
 
These questions are designed to 
identify how disputes were dealt 
with in their experience prior to 
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 46B) What was done about the dispute? 
 
46C) What was the outcome of the dispute?  
the dispute they have made a 
claim about. The purpose of this 
is to go deeper into why these 
individuals went down a legal 
path eventually, what 
alternatives they saw, and how 
this informed that decision 
(literature connection: Genn 
(1999), as well as Felstiner, Abel 
and Sarat (1980).  
47. Did you ever go to court or know 
anyone who did? 
47A) Why? 
 
47B) What do you remember about this?  
Whilst this is explicitly about 
court, whereas they may not 
attend court at all in their 
experiences as LiPs, I want to see 
if they have an embodied 
experience of being in a 
courtroom and what their 
impressions of the space was 
48. Did anyone in your family work as an 
advice giver or for a trade union?  
 This is a broader question to get 
at those who might have worked 
284 
 
in campaigning, advice giving, 
public speaking or any other 
forward facing situation that 
may be involved in disputes in 
some way, without the 
presumption it would  be legal; 
this goes to how the individual 
formulates approaches to 
dispute resolution and how/why 
they later pursue a legal claim. It 
also goes to later questions 
about advice and where these 
individuals might seek it.  
49. Did anyone in your family or whom 
you knew work in the law in any 
way? 
If YES 
49A)What did they do? 
 
49B) Did you ever want to do that job? 
These questions go to any direct 
and explicitly legal connection 
and what knock on effect this 
might have in understanding of 
law – goes to the question of gap 
of experience and knowledge – 
does having family connections 
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make the law less intimidating or 
confusing?  
50. Did anyone in your family or whom 
you knew work as a social worker? Or 
a police officer? Or a probation 
officer? 
If YES  
50A) What did they do? 
50B) Did you ever want to work in [this] area? 
These questions are about 
whether there is a perceived link 
to a figure that works in a 
‘justice’ capacity in some way.  
51. Do you remember any incidents 
where you felt something unjust had 
happened to someone you knew? 
If YES 
51A)What was the incident of injustice? 
 
51B) What did you feel was unfair? 
 
51C) What did you think should have happened? 
 
51D) Did you discuss this with anyone at the time?  
Again, a question designed to get 
at a specific experience of 
injustice to see what this was 
based on and why. This is a 
broad question to leave it up to 
interviewee, but also to consider 
what they might now say about 
resolving this dispute. This goes 
to Cowan and Hitchins (2007) 
and Ekelaar (2011). The question 
of what is perceived to be 
important or not important being 
a subjective one, and the degree 
to which these individuals 
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perceive these events as 
important.  
52. Did you ever get into trouble growing 
up with your family or with anyone 
else? 
If YES  
52A) What kinds of things did you get into trouble for? 
 
52B) Were you a risk taker? 
Another question to elicit 
whether the individual has any 
specific experiences of arrest, or 
punishment in a formal sense, 
or in a less formal sense. Did 
they perceive this to be just? 
What were the circumstances – 
it is another opportunity for the 
interviewee to narrate the 
circumstances of a dispute or 
wrongdoing in detail.   
 
 
 
 
WORK/FURTHER STUDY: 
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53. After school, did you go on to 
college/university? 
If YES 
53A)What did you study? 
More demographic questions 
about the educational 
backgrounds of LiP: link to 
MOJ research, Williams 
(2011);MOJ 2013, as well as 
Moorhead & Sefton (2005)– 
questions emerging are: does 
educational background 
influence ability to participate 
effectively? If so, how?  
54. Did you have a clear sense at that 
time of what you wanted to do with 
your life? 
  
55. What do you think influenced your 
choice in wanting to do that 
particular job? 
 Asking interviewee to consider 
what led them to form their 
particular vocational desire. 
Was this limited by 
circumstances? Practical? 
Idealistic? 
56. What was your first job?  What kind of skill s 
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backgrounds to LiPs have? 
What effect does this have on 
their ability to act as LiPs? 
This links to questions to do 
with digital literacy, 
administrative ability and so 
on; is it really a gap of legal 
knowledge that is of issue, or 
is it disadvantage based on 
lack of technical or 
administrative knowledge (if 
there is a perceived gap on 
the individual’s part).  
57. Can you describe the place you first 
worked? 
 Another locale question to get 
the individual reimagining 
themselves in the past in an 
embodied way. Links to 
Kirsten Hastrup (2002) and 
evoking place in 
ethnography/anthropology 
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(see also Geertz, 2006).  
58. What were your co-workers like? Did 
you get along with them? 
 Yet another question about 
ability to form social networks 
and get on with others – 
linking to Hermann (2012) 
and other ‘pathology’ 
literature about the 
psychology of the Lip.  
 
 
 
 
TODAY: 
 
 
59. Where do you live now?   
60. Do you live with anyone?  Open question about current 
family or cohabitation 
61. Who do you consider your family In your family Again, a question not pre-
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today? 61A) what are some household rules? 
 
If CHILDREN 
61B) what kind of beliefs do you try and instil in them? 
empting what a family is or is 
not: but what is their current 
household like and how might 
this differ or not from 
childhood experience? How 
do these individuals regulate 
or discipline any children they 
might have? 
62. Can you describe the neighbourhood 
where you now live? 
 These lines of questioning are 
to evoke similarities and 
differences to childhood 
growing up; evocation of 
current neighbourhood is 
another means to get an 
embodied perspective of their 
life today.  
63. Do you live near to where you grew 
up?  
  
64. Is the neighbourhood like where you 
grew up or different? 
If DIFFERENT 
64A) How is the neighbourhood different? 
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FINANCES: 
 
 
 
65. Do you own a house or rent? 
 
 More explicit financial questions 
going to stability and security. 
These indirectly link to later 
questions about why the 
individual doesn’t have a lawyer 
– is this, as literature suggests, 
overwhelmingly because they 
lack the financial resources? 
(Baldwin 1998; MOJ 2013; Genn 
1999; and so on).  
66. Would you like to own a house/move 
to a bigger property? 
 
 All of these questions 67- 72 go 
to self-perceived economic 
stability or comfort; literature 
link is to a) perceived injustices 
292 
 
(Hermann 2012,  pathological 
LiPs), b) socioeconomic 
backgrounds of LiP and ability to 
access legal services.  
67. Where would you ideally like to live? 
 
  
68. Are you satisfied with your current 
income?  
  
69. Can you do all the things you want to 
on your income?  
  
70. Tell me about your healthcare. Do 
you have a regular doctor?  
 What about access to services? 
This question is designed to get 
at whether individuals may or 
may not have private healthcare; 
also goes to state of health of 
individual or individual’s family 
 
POLITICS: 
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71. Do you vote? If YES 
71A) Have you always voted?  
 
71B) When did you start voting?  
 
71C) Why do you vote? 
 
This question is designed to 
consider whether there is a link 
between political activity and 
being an LiP. Research suggests 
those who act on juries may be 
more likely to be politically 
involved; is there a 
predisposition/link between 
involvement in legal processes 
and being politically active?  
If NO 
 
71A) Have you ever voted? 
 
71B)When did you stop voting?  
 
71C) Why did you stop voting? 
72. Do you belong to any organisations 
like a trade union, or an NGO? 
 
 
72A) Which organisations do you belong to?  
 
72B) When did you join this organisation? 
 
72C) Why did you join this 
This line of questioning is about 
experience in things like 
campaigning, public speaking, 
political organising and so on. 
Does the interviewee have skills 
in this area and will this a) 
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    particular organisation ? 
72D) Have you ever been part of a campaign? 
 
72E) If so, which campaign were you part of and what did 
you do? 
facilitate potentially their ability 
to pursue a claim, or b) affect 
where they will later seek 
advice?  
73. Have you ever protested? If YES 
 
73A)  Where did you   protest? 
 
73B) What was the   protest for? 
 
73C) What do you remember about that/those 
experience [s]? 
 
74. What do you think of politicians? 74A) Have you ever considered becoming a politician?  A further question to evoke the 
degree to which the interviewee 
sees him/herself as a 
spokesperson for a 
cause/fighter for justice and so 
on (link to vexatious litigant 
material/Hermann (2012).  
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COMPLAINT AND DISPUTE EXPERIENCE:  
 
75. How do you feel about speaking in 
public? 
 
 This line of questioning links 
to previous skills but also goes 
to the behavioural aspect of 
participating in legal process; 
this links to my previous 
performance/law research, 
also Bourdieu on gaps that 
are not purely language 
(1987).  
76. Have you ever made a complaint 
about something before? 
If YES 
76A) Can you tell me about the complaint? 
This line of questioning is to 
tease out the spectrum of 
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76B) How did you go about complaining? 
 
76C) Were you satisfied with the outcome?  Why/why not?  
complaints as perceived by 
the interviewee from more 
formal to less formal, e.g. 
have they written or posted a 
complaint online about an 
internet service provider, or a 
faulty product? Have they 
made a complaint at work? 
How seriously did they take 
this issue and did they 
perceive it was dealt with 
fairly; this again goes to 
questions of when and 
whether the interviewee 
chooses to ‘formalise’ 
disputes as opposed to trying 
to informally resolve them or 
‘lump’ them. Again, there are 
links here to Felstiner, Abel 
and Sarat (1980) & Genn 
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(1999), but this is not about 
explicit legal processes and 
other – but about evoking a 
broader spectrum of 
responses.  
77. Have you ever been involved in a 
dispute before? 
If YES 
77A) Can you tell me about the dispute and what 
happened? 
An open question to get a 
sense of whether this 
individual has been involved in 
any/multiple disputes. Link: 
vexatious litigant literature – 
are they involved in multiple 
disputes; is this therefore 
potentially about their 
psychology?  
 
Also a means of evoking a first 
person narrative – telling their 
story – something that will be 
repeated when interviewee is 
later asked about the claim 
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they are pursuing and the 
nature of that dispute.  
78. How much did you know about 
making a legal complaint before this 
particular dispute you are involved 
in? 
 
78A) Where did you get your information from?  
 
This is about self-perceived 
knowledge – having discussed 
implicit knowledge formation 
on education, skills, 
background, this is more 
about whether they felt 
prepared in anyway – if so, 
how and why?  
79. Had you heard about people without 
lawyers making complaints before? 
 
79A) What had you heard about these individuals? Did they have contacts with 
other LiPs? This is going to the 
question of advice networks; 
do LiPs communicate with one 
another; is it more likely that 
you will act as an LiP if you 
know someone else who did? 
Does it matter if that person 
was successful? This 
addresses literature on why 
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BECOMING A LITIGANT IN PERSON: THE ISSUE AND MAKING IT A LEGAL CLAIM 
 
 
80. Before the dispute you are currently 
dealing with, had you ever 
encountered a legal process before? 
If YES 
80A) Can you tell me about that encounter with legal 
process? 
This line of questioning goes to 
explicit contact with legal 
processes if the interviewee has 
had any. As an adult, what impact 
has this experience had on their 
perception of the accessibility of 
legal process? Did they 
understand what was happening? 
Why / why not?  
81. Tell me about this current dispute: 
what happened, in your own words? 
 This question is central; what is 
the dispute to them? What is the 
people act as LiPs: financial 
necessity, desire to not have a 
lawyer, both. 
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purpose of it? What is the full 
story? The idea behind this is to 
consider later whether they have 
ever been able to give a full 
account of it to someone in the 
proceedings themselves, and 
what value or importance they 
attach to it. This goes to 
literature on self-perceived 
importance (e.g. Ekelaar (2011), 
Cowan & Hitchins (2013), gaps 
between legal importance and 
‘non-legal’ importance (e.g. 
Bourdieu theory (1987) and 
Moorhead & Sefton (2005)  
82. What did you first try to do to resolve 
the dispute? 
 This line of questioning is to flesh 
out the before part of the legal 
claim; what are the other 
methods – do they link to their 
past experiences of disputes? 
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Why make it legal? This links to 
Felstiner, Abel and Sarat (1980) 
& Genn (1999) but tries to not 
assume that legal was the only 
way of resolving dispute or 
becoming more ‘formal’.  
83. Did you talk to anyone about this 
dispute? 
83A) Who did you talk to about this dispute? 
 
83B) What suggestions were made by these people? 
 
83C) Did you agree with their advice? 
Going towards questions of 
advice, but starting at an 
informal setting: are these 
individuals reaching out to family 
and friends? What kind of 
information are they getting 
form these individuals? What are 
the very first steps taken when 
approaching resolving a dispute?  
84. Why did you decide to go to law with 
this dispute? 
84A) How did you feel about going towards a legal 
claim? 
This question I am only asking 
after a lengthy account of steps 
before/separate/different from a 
legal path. Why and when did 
they make the decision to pursue 
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the claim legally? Because they 
felt this would be the ‘formal’ 
way to do it? Did someone else 
suggest it?  
85. Are there circumstances where you 
might not have taken this dispute to 
law if something different had 
happened?   
 This question is designed to dig 
out alternatives; when did they 
take the legal path and what 
were the other options 
considered? Were they tried and 
failed? What might have 
happened that could have 
changed the course of events? 
This line of questioning is not just 
about the paths to law for LiPs 
but also a link to whether or not 
the individual was willing to 
compromise/settle, or whether 
they were intent on getting a 
specific validation of their claim; 
this goes to the vexatious litigant 
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literature again.  
86. What does this dispute mean to you? 
How important is it? 
 Direct link here to Cowan & 
Hitchins (2012) again, as well as 
broader literature on 
ethnography and sensibility: 
what is the perceived value to 
them (as opposed to legal 
understandings of how 
important it is/isn’t). 
 
 
ADVICE: 
 
 
87. Did you go to anyone for advice? If a family member or friend: 
 
87A) Why did you approach this person for advice? 
 
87B) What advice did they offer? 
Explicit advice questioning here 
to flesh out what the sources of 
information there are about 
acting as an LiP and going to 
law; how aware they are of it; 
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87C) Did you follow their advice? 
how useful they find it; whether 
informal networks are more 
heavily used than governmental 
resources and so on. Goes to 
policy literature; what is 
currently in place and are LiPs 
accessing it (e.g. work of 
outreach groups, PSUs, CABs, 
Woolf reform suggestions, civil 
procedure reforms).  
 
If a professional see following box Q 88 
88. Did you ask any professionals for 
advice? 
If YES 
88A) Whom did you ask for advice  
 
88B) Why did you contact that person? 
 
88C) Did you find this person helpful? How? 
This question is designed to 
come after questions about 
advice without the presumption 
it would be a professional. 
Again the term professional is 
used here to not only designate 
a legal professional. Are these 
LiPs aware of CABs, PSUs, and 
university department LiP 
assistance projects? 
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89. Did you research disputes on the 
internet? 
If YES 
89A) Which sites did you visit? 
 
89B) Which sites were most useful? 
Similarly, are LiPs accessing the 
online resources for them? If so, 
which ones? Are there informal 
networks of LiPs?  
 
 
 
 
GOING IT ALONE:  
 
90. Would you have preferred to have a 
lawyer? Why? 
 These questions are broad 
outlines but the idea behind this 
questioning is to tease out a 
more complex picture of why 
these people lack 
representation; e.g. did they 
intermittently receive legal 
advice? Did they not qualify for 
assistance? Did they decide not 
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to have a lawyer? If so, why? Is 
it a mix of these reasons? The 
secondary questioning is 
designed to test for multiple 
motives rather than assuming 
the reasoning is purely financial 
or purely out of desire.  
91. Was it your choice not to have a 
lawyer? 
If YES 
91) Why did you not want a lawyer? 
 
92. Why did you not have a lawyer? If COST 
92A) Did you try and get financial support for a lawyer? 
 
92B) Did anyone help you with trying to obtain funding for 
a lawyer? Who was that? 
 
92C) How easy was it to fill out the application form?  
 
92D) Were you unsuccessful in your application? Why? 
 
If OTHER/BOTH 
These questions go explicitly to 
questions about changing of 
legal aid; has this made people 
less able to access legal support 
and choose to go on anyway; 
linking to recent literature on 
effect of legal aid changes; 
perceived ‘surge’ in LIP 
numbers.  (See Bevan 2013; 
Ekelaar 2011, Lord Neuberger 
speech 2013). 
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92E/92A) Were there any other reasons you didn’t have a 
lawyer? 
 
This line of questioning is also 
designed to consider how 
effective or helpful the 
assistance is when completing a 
form or lodging a claim.  
93. Do you think a lawyer might have 
helped you? Why/why not? 
 These questions are designed to 
elicit attitudes to lawyers; 
literature link is to vexatious 
litigants and perceived dislike of 
or rejection of lawyers; 
generalised questions of 
distrust of lawyers; whether 
lawyers are perceived to be 
primarily financially motivated 
and so on. All links to filling in 
literature on why LiPs act as 
LiPs.  
94. What do you think of lawyers?   
95. How did you feel about not having a   
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lawyer?  
 
 
HOPES FOR OUTCOME:  
 
96. What outcome are/were you ideally 
hoping for in pursuing this dispute? 
 
 The idea behind this line of 
questioning is to consider 
from their perspective what a 
just outcome would be; not 
what the law might perceive 
to be a fair settlement. What 
are the expectations LiPs bring 
to the dispute? Are they 
looking for validation of their 
claim? Financial reward? 
Compromise?  (Literature 
links: Adler 2008; Galanter 
(1974) Roberts (2000).  
97. What would be a just outcome for  As above 
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you in this dispute?  
98. Would you be willing to compromise 
in reaching a settlement in this 
dispute? 
 As above: link again to 
vexatious litigant literature 
(e.g. McKenzie (2009), 
Taggart, (2004); is rejection of 
settlement attributable to 
personality issue or is it 
also/instead linked to a 
perceived difference of the 
importance/purpose of claim 
and perceived expectations of 
what the law can do?  
99. Going into this dispute, did you 
believe you would get a fair result? 
 What degree of confidence 
did these individuals have in a 
‘just’ outcome (whatever that 
perspective of just is)? This 
question is designed to set up 
the later questions about how 
these expectations were 
met/not met and how.  
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THE EXPERIENCE OF ACTING AS AN LIP: 
 
 
100. Can you take me very carefully 
through the process of pursuing this 
claim? What was the first step you 
took in pursing this complaint legally? 
Then what did you do?  
 Similar to the above 
question that asks them to 
describe the dispute freely, 
this question asks them to 
give a narrative as they 
remember of what 
happened when they 
decided to pursue the 
claim. The open-ended 
nature of the question is 
designed to not presuppose 
that certain things 
happened (e.g. meeting 
judges, attending court) 
and will allow for what 
most impressed itself on 
311 
 
the interviewee to emerge. 
The literature link is that of 
providing a potentially 
disruptive counter 
narrative (Fish and 
Feldman on 
interdisciplinarity) to 
previous interviews with 
LiPs that ask prestructured 
questionnaires that 
presume a particular 
pathway (e.g. Moorhead 
and Sefton (2005), Baldwin 
(1999).  
101. Did you fill out a form? 101A) Where did you find this form? 
 
101B) Did someone help you fill it out? Who? 
These questions are 
supplementary to help fill 
out the blanks if the 
interviewee is not as 
explicit or clear.  
102. Did you go somewhere in person to 102A) Where did you go? These questions are 
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lodge a complaint?  
102B) What happened when you lodged your complaint? 
designed to elicit place and 
embodied memory, as per 
Hastrup (2000). 
103. Did you meet any judges? If YES 
 
103A) Can you tell me about them? 
Literature link) are LiP and 
judge relationships still 
pivotal? (E.g. 19th century 
literature, Woolf report 
(1995) on judges, 
contemporary reports on 
degree to which judges 
must ‘accommodate’ LiPs. 
What is the special 
relationship between them 
if there is one? Do LiPs 
perceive judges to be on 
their side?  (See also Engler 
1987) 
104. Did the person(s) you were disputing 
with have a lawyer? 
 Literature link: Increasingly 
common for one side to be 
represented and one side 
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not to be, is this inequality 
of arms? Did the LIP 
perceive this?  
105. Did you meet with the other people 
in the dispute? 
105A) Where did you meet with them? 
 
105B) Can you tell me about the meeting? 
 
106. What was the place like where you 
met the other party you are in 
dispute with? Can you describe it to 
me? 
 What places did they meet 
in? Chambers? Side rooms? 
Courts? What effect did the 
location have on their 
experience of how capable 
they were of acting? Link to 
Bourdieu (2000) and 
embodied behaviour.  
107. When you met with the other party, 
did you know what you were 
supposed to do? 
If YES 
107A) How did you know what you were supposed to do 
 
107B) Did you understand the language used?  
Again, questions about 
the degree to which 
naturalised behaviour 
that is not articulated 
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If NO 
 
107A) Did anyone help you by telling you what you were 
supposed to do? 
 
107B) Did you understand the instructions they gave? 
 
107C) Did you understand the language used?  
may disadvantage non-
legal professionals. Did 
the LiP feel awkward, 
unsure? Also, language: 
could they speak 
normally?   
108. How did your experience of this 
dispute compare with how you 
imagined it? 
108A) How did you feel about this? Was this what you had 
expected?  
What was the LiPs 
perception of justice/legal 
proceedings and how did 
it compare? This is a 
broad question that 
hopefully opens up the 
question of settlement; 
did they expect to have to 
settle or reach a 
compromise? Was this 
suggested and when? 
How did they feel about 
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this?  (Genn 2013; 
Mulcahy 2013) 
109. What is your strongest memory of 
the proceedings? 
 Another embodied 
memory question to elicit 
what the interviewee 
perceives as especially 
significant. Link to 
subjectivity – via Darnton 
(1985),  Passerini (1979) 
110. Did you feel able to explain yourself?  A further link here to 
language: were they able 
to narrate freely, or were 
they being asked to 
reconceptualise their 
dispute in legal 
language/terms? Link to 
Moorhead (2003) – legal 
versus social 
understandings of terms, 
Bourdieu  (1987)– gap 
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and symbolic violence  
111. Did you feel you were listened to?  E.g. was there a gap 
between what LiP 
perceived as mattering 
and what legal 
professionals did? Cowan 
& Hitchins (2012) link 
112. Who did you spend most of your time 
talking to during the proceedings? 
 Was it another lawyer or 
a judge? Again, question 
is open ended to go to 
broad experience.  
113. What was it like not having a lawyer 
during the proceedings? 
 During the proceedings, 
what was not having a 
lawyer like? Did they 
change their minds about 
wanting one?  
114. Did you feel sufficiently prepared to 
bring your dispute? 
 How ready were you 
based on any advice they 
had had? 
115. Did you meet many legal 115A) Whom did you meet? Again getting at 
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professionals? 
 
 
115B) How did they treat you? 
 
115C) Did you feel they took your dispute seriously? 
relationship between law 
and lay here in literature: 
are LiPs taken seriously or 
perceived to be?  
 
 
AFTER ACTING AS AN LIP 
 
 
116. What was the outcome? Did you feel 
the outcome was fair? 
 
 This question goes to 
any gap between legal 
perceptions of fair and 
equitable outcome, and 
the LiPs perception of a 
just outcome – is there a 
gap in expectations? 
This goes to literature 
on outcome that tends 
to presuppose that 
legally fair is the same 
as subjectively fair (e.g. 
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Moorhead (2003)& 
Genn (1999).  
117. What effect has taking this dispute to 
law had on what you think about law 
and justice? 
 What impact does 
acting as an LiP have on 
confidence in justice and 
access to it? This is a key 
question about 
experiences of law and 
the impact they have on 
public confidence.  
118. If you had to go through a similar 
experience again, what might you do 
differently? 
 This question is key for 
considering what the LiP 
perceives themselves to 
have learnt from the 
experience – goes to 
questions of policy and 
what could be made 
clearer. Literature link: 
the guides provided to 
Queen’s Bench, 2012, 
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High Court 2013).   
119. Was not having a lawyer harder or 
easier than you thought? Why? 
 What did LiPs perceive 
as the major challenge 
of not being 
represented? Or 
advantage? 
120. Did you find the other people 
involved in the case helpful? 
 An overall question 
towards end of 
interview to see how the 
LiP feels about legal 
professionals more 
generally.  
121. What would you tell other people 
coming to law without a lawyer that 
they should know? 
 An important question: 
what advice would they 
have for others? Would 
they actively share 
it/support other LiPs? 
122. What is the one thing about going 
through this process you wish you 
had known in advance? 
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123. Would you assist other people to act 
as LiPs/give them advice if they 
asked?  
 Would they encourage 
others? What do they 
perceive to be key? 
What can this tell us 
about what might be 
useful for them to know 
earlier?  
 
 
WIDER EFFECTS OF ACTING AS LIP 
 
124. Were your family supportive of you? 
 
If YES 
124A) How were they supportive? 
 
These questions go to the 
wider effect of pursuing 
claims in terms of stress, 
family disruption that 
may be more aggravated 
for non-legal 
professionals than for 
those who customarily 
work in dispute 
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resolution.  
125. Was the process of taking your 
dispute to law expensive? 
 The idea of this line of 
questioning is to 
determine financial or 
other costs of process 
126. Did going through this process have 
any effect on your life outside of it? 
If YES 
126A) Can you tell me about these effects? 
What are the long lasting 
effects if there are any of 
going to law? Beyond 
purely financial that legal 
studies may not identify?  
127. Did you keep a record of what 
happened throughout your dispute? 
  
128. Did you keep a diary or a blog or use 
social media? 
If YES 
128A) Did you find this helpful? How? 
Did they keep a record of 
what happened? Has this 
affected how they may 
remember it – goes to 
questions about the 
subjectivity of 
interviewee and the 
degree to which 
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information must be 
interpreted in accordance 
with this subjectivity (e.g. 
Hastrup (2002), Passerini 
(1979), Darnton (1985).  
129. Did you talk to other people also 
acting without lawyers? 
If YES 
129A) How did you make contact with them? 
These questions again go 
to whether there are LiP 
networks operating and 
whether they have stayed 
in touch with them. Are 
these advice sources 
perceived to be useful?  
130. What do you think might have been 
helpful? 
  
 
 
AFTERMATH AND EFFECTS ON BELIEFS ABOUT LAW: 
 
131. Have you changed your beliefs about 
how fair law is? 
If YES 
130A) How have your beliefs changed? 
The last two are explicit 
but broad questions for 
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130B) Why have your beliefs changed? 
interviewee to wind 
down by evaluating the 
overall impact of taking 
a claim on their beliefs. 
The aim is to get overall 
view but also to function 
as ‘downer’ questions, 
to conclude the 
interview on a 
thoughtful but not 
distressed note 
132. Do you have different expectations 
about justice and law now? 
If YES 
131A) How are these expectations different? 
131B) Why are they different? 
 
133. Status of LiPs? What needs to 
change? Research resources?  
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134. Is there anything else you would like 
to talk about that we have not 
discussed? 
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APPENDIX B: 
PROJECT MATERIALS 
                                                                                
 
 
Litigants in Person Oral History Interviews: Project Information Sheet 
 
I am a researcher who is interested in hearing the stories of people who have had little or no 
help from a lawyer in preparing their case.  I believe that it is really important for the views of 
these people about the legal system are heard. The project is concerned with civil cases not 
criminal cases. If you would then like to participate, please contact me (k.l.leader@lse.ac.uk).  
 
What is this study for? 
 
We know far too little about what it is like taking a case to court for ordinary people who 
don’t have lawyers. I am interested in asking these people what their experience of the legal 
system without the help of a lawyer was like. I want to find out what could help make the 
experience better. 
 
Who is conducting this study? 
 
This study is being carried out by Kate Leader, a postgraduate student in the Law Department 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science. It is being supervised by Professor 
Linda Mulcahy and Professor Nicola Lacey.  The completed interviews will form part of the 
Sound Archive at the British Library (http://sounds.bl.uk/). 
 
What will I have to do?  
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The study involves up to three interviews with you that will be recorded.  The interview will 
take place at a time and place most convenient for you, such as your home. We can discuss 
where and when would be best for you once you have contacted me. 
 
What kind of things will I be asked?  
 
As it is a life stories project, I am interested in asking you not just about your experiences of 
the legal system, but also about your background, childhood, education and work. It is possible 
some questions might be of a personal nature, but you do not need to answer anything you do 
not feel comfortable with. 
 
Why should I participate? 
 
Too often, the only views of the legal system heard are those of lawyers and judges, and this 
project seeks to change that with your help. By talking to me, you have the chance to tell your 
story. You will also have the chance to be part of a permanent at the British Library where 
your interview can be listened to, and will form part of valuable research and education, for 
years to come. 
 
What happens to the interviews afterwards? 
 
The interview recordings will be lodged permanently in the British Library Sound 
Archive.  The British Library will keep a copy of this permanently for future researchers and 
other members of the public. You will also be given a copy of the full sound recording of the 
interview to keep once the project is completed.  Your interview will form a valuable part of 
my research project and will be used in publications such as articles and books. 
 
Is my privacy protected? 
 
We understand the importance of protecting your privacy. Although the recordings will make 
clear who you are, if you would like to close your recording for a period of time so it is not 
publicly available this can be organized and made into a Recording Agreement. 
 
What is a Recording Agreement?  
A Recording Agreement confirms in writing that you are willing for your interview to be kept 
in the British Library archive. You can also decide how researchers can use it: for example, you 
can close parts of the recording for a period of time.  
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What if I want to change my mind? 
You can withdraw from the project at any time.  
 
Where can I get further information?  
If you have any questions about this project, you can contact me at k.l.leader@lse.c.uk and I 
would be happy to discuss this further with you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
Litigants in Person Oral History Interviews: Further Details for Participants 
 
What happens to my interview once it’s done? 
 
The interview recordings will be lodged permanently in the British Library Sound Archive.  The 
British Library will keep a copy of this permanently for future researchers and other members of 
the public. You will also be given a copy of the full sound recording of the interview to keep 
once the project is completed.  Your interview will form a valuable part of my research project 
and will be used in publications such as articles and books. 
 
Is my privacy protected? 
 
We understand the importance of protecting your privacy. Although the recordings will make 
clear who you are, if you would like to close your recording for a period of time so it is not 
publicly available this can be organized and made into a Recording Agreement. 
 
Your Recording Agreement: 
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At the end of the interview, I will go through an Oral History Recording Agreement form with 
you, to make sure your interview is added to the British Library collection exactly as you want. 
The Agreement confirms you are willing for the recording to be archived and also lays out the 
terms under which your recording will be archived and made open to the public at the British 
Library.  
 
The Recording Agreement lets you decide how researchers can use your recording both now 
and in the future. If you want to stop people accessing all or part of your recording there is 
space on the Agreement form to include this. If you do not wish to impose any access 
restrictions, then that section of the Agreement can be left blank.  
 
If you do wish to restrict access to the recording [called an “embargo”] please tell us which parts 
and we can specify this on the form. You are required to give an end date to each restriction 
you specify, up to a maximum closure period of 30 years.  
 
If you have requested an embargo for all or part of your recording, please note this means it is 
not possible for anyone to request access to it under the Freedom of Information [FOI] or Data 
Protection Acts, due to the confidential nature of the material. Once you are happy with all the 
details, I will ask you to sign this form. 
 
If at a later date you want to change any of these details, you can contact the Oral 
History Curators at the British Library oralhistory@bl.uk or telephone 020 7412 7404.  
 
Please note: once an interview is catalogued and archived at the British Library, the British 
Library does not destroy or delete interviews. 
 
What if I change my mind? 
 
You can withdraw from the project at any time.   
 
Where can I get further information?  
 
If you have any questions about this project, please get in touch with me at k.l.leader@lse.c.uk 
and I would be happy to discuss this further with you.  
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Would you like to be interviewed for a research project at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science? 
The project is intended to collect your story about not having a lawyer. 
What was it like for you? What would you do differently? What do you 
think could be done to make the experience better for others? 
By getting involved, your experiences can form part of a growing body of 
knowledge that can be used to help improve the experiences of others 
coming after you. 
If you would like to participate, or to find out more, email Kate at 
contact@litigantstories.com or visit the website at 
www.litigantstories.com 
         
ARE YOU  
REPRESENTING 
YOURSELF  
IN COURT? 
                  @litigantstories  
                 https://www.facebook.com/litigantstories/ 
     Tel:     07506997002  
